Candace Hildreth v. John Hildreth - Child Custody Modification Appeal

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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Candace Hildreth (Now Mendez) v. John Hildreth

Court of Appeals of Arkansas

• Citations: 2026 Ark. App. 193

• Docket Number: Unknown

• Opinion

• Authorities (20)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 193
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-25-191

CANDACE HILDRETH (NOW Opinion Delivered March 18, 2026

MENDEZ)
APPEAL FROM THE SALINE
APPELLANT
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 63DR-17-795]
V.
HONORABLE BRENT DILLON
JOHN HILDRETH HOUSTON, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED

CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge

Candace Hildreth (now Mendez) appeals a Saline County Circuit Court order that

granted appellee John Hildreth’s motion to modify the couple’s child-custody arrangement.

On appeal, Candace argues that the circuit court erred in modifying the joint-custody

arrangement because there was no material change in circumstances and because

modification was not in the best interest of the couple’s minor child (MC). We find no error

and affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Candace and John were married in 2010 and have one child, MC, who was born in

1. The couple was divorced by a Garland County Circuit Court decree entered on March

18, 2016; at that time, the circuit court awarded Candace and John joint legal custody with

a “week-on/week-off” schedule.
Candace moved to modify the custody arrangement in March 2017. She noted that

she resided in Bryant and John resided in Arkadelphia; therefore, because MC would be

starting kindergarten in August, their living arrangements would make joint physical custody

impossible. John responded and moved to dismiss, noting that at that point, no

determination had been made as to where the child would enroll in school and that there

had therefore not been a material change in circumstances.

The case was transferred from Garland County to Saline County in July 2017, and in

December 2017, the circuit court entered an agreed temporary order that was intended to

establish custody of MC until the end of the school year. The order continued joint physical

custody on the week-to-week schedule and directed that the party having physical custody

was responsible for taking MC to and from school in Bryant. MC was also allowed to

participate in extracurricular activities in Saline County.

Candace and John both moved to modify custody in the spring and summer of 2019,

trading accusations of hostilities. The court ordered Candace and John into mediation in

August 2019. Thereafter, on December 30, 2020, the circuit court entered an agreed order.

In this order, the court maintained joint legal and physical custody of MC, with the parties

to continue to exercise week-to-week custody of the child, exchanging her on Mondays after

school. Candace and John were directed to make joint legal decisions, with John making

final decisions on medical issues and Candace making final decisions regarding educational

issues in the event they were unable to agree on those decisions. The court also allowed the

parties to enroll MC in one extracurricular activity each year so long as the activity did not

2
have practice or meet more than once a week. Candace and John were ordered to submit to

coparenting communication classes and were directed to not speak ill of each other in MC’s

presence.

In March 2024, Candace filed a motion for contempt and for modification of the

December 2020 order. In it, she complained that she had been excluded from accessing

MC’s medical portal and that John’s current wife (who is also named Candace) had

completed MC’s HIPAA forms as parent/guardian and was listed as the main emergency

contact on MC’s medical records. Additionally, Candace asserted that the December 2020

order had given her final authority to make educational decisions if she and John were

unable to agree, but John had unilaterally decided that MC would not be attending summer

school even though her school recommended that she attend. Candace further complained

that John had fostered alienation between MC and her and refused to coparent. She

therefore asked the court to hold John in contempt and to modify certain aspects of the

decree, although she did not ask for modification of custody at that time. John responded

to Candace’s motion and counterclaimed with a request that custody of MC be placed with

him.

The circuit court held a hearing on the parties’ competing motions on December 2,

2024, and heard testimony from John, John’s current wife, MC, Candace, Candace’s

mother, and Candace’s current husband. After taking the matter under advisement at the

end of the hearing, the court entered an order on December 4 in which it ultimately

determined that a material change in circumstances had occurred. On this point, the circuit

3
court specifically cited John’s relocation to Garland County and the difficulty this placed on

MC’s ability to fully engage in extracurricular activities; the deterioration of the relationship

between Candace and John’s current wife; the additional deterioration of the relationship

between Candace and MC; and MC’s expressed preference to live with John. The court

further found that it would be in MC’s best interest to maintain joint legal custody but for

physical custody to be placed with John, subject to Candace’s every-other-weekend visitation.

The court also modified Candace and John’s parental responsibilities, making John the

primary decision maker for educational and medical decisions in the event they could not

reach an agreement on those issues.

Candace filed a timely notice of appeal and now argues that the circuit court erred in

modifying the child-custody arrangement because there was no evidence of a material change

in circumstances, the unequal division of custodial time is inconsistent with the retention of

“joint custody,” and the modification was not in MC’s best interest.

II. Standard of Review

Child-custody cases are reviewed de novo on appeal, but we will not reverse a circuit

court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Carrillo v. Morales Ibarra, 2019 Ark.

App. 189, 575 S.W.3d 151. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing all the

evidence, the appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been made. Id. Whether a circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous turns largely on the

credibility of the witnesses; therefore, we give special deference to the circuit court’s superior

position to evaluate the witnesses, their testimony, and the child’s best interest. Redman v.

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Redman, 2024 Ark. App. 562, 701 S.W.3d 40. There are no cases in which the circuit court’s

superior position, ability, and opportunity to observe the parties carry as great a weight as

those involving minor children. Id. The primary consideration in child-custody cases is the

welfare and best interest of the child; all other considerations are secondary. Id.

III. Discussion

Modification of custody is a two-step process: first, the circuit court must determine

whether a material change in circumstances has occurred since the last custody order; and

second, if the court finds that there has been a material change in circumstances, the court

must determine whether a change of custody is in the child’s best interest. Wallis v. Holsing,

2023 Ark. App. 137, 661 S.W.3d 284. A child-custody determination is fact specific, and

each case ultimately must rest on its own facts. Graf v. Graf, 2024 Ark. App. 212, 686 S.W.3d

1. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court, which observed the

witnesses firsthand. Id.

A judicial award of custody should not be modified unless it is shown that there are

changed conditions that demonstrate that a modification of the decree is in the best interest

of the child or when there is a showing of facts affecting the best interest of the child that

were either not presented to the circuit court or were not known by the circuit court when

the original custody order was entered. Dorrell v. Dorrell, 2014 Ark. App. 496, 441 S.W.3d

925. In making a decision whether a modification of custody is in a child’s best interest, the

circuit court should consider factors such as the psychological relationship between the

parents and children, the need for stability and continuity in the relationship between

5
parents and children, the past conduct of the parents toward the children, and the

reasonable preference of the children. Bamburg v. Bamburg, 2014 Ark. App. 269, 435 S.W.3d

6; Rector v. Rector, 58 Ark. App. 132, 947 S.W.2d 389 (1997). In addition, failure of

communication, increasing parental alienation by a custodial parent, and inability to

cooperate can all constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant

modification of custody. Montez v. Montez, 2017 Ark. App. 220, 518 S.W.3d 751. Further,

we have held that the combined, cumulative effect of particular facts may together constitute

a material change. Graf, supra; Shannon v. McJunkins, 2010 Ark. App. 440, 376 S.W.3d 489.

A. Material Change in Circumstances

In her first point on appeal, Candace argues that the evidence failed to demonstrate

that a material change in circumstances had occurred. Of the multiple factual findings

supporting the court’s determination that a material change in circumstances occurred, she

challenges only three. She asserts that the court erred in finding a material change in

circumstances based on her relationship with MC, John’s relocation to Garland County, and

MC’s involvement in athletics. We therefore examine the relevant testimony on each of these

subjects, as well as the circuit court’s reasoning.

1. Relationship between Candace and MC

John was the first witness to testify at the hearing. He said that he and Candace do

not get along and cannot talk about anything without it turning into a fight, so they just try

not to talk as much as possible. The situation between them was beginning to affect MC,

who was “pretty stressed out over it.” He said that she would sometimes come home from

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visitation with her mother and break down and cry. He felt that Candace was discussing too

much of the custody situation with MC, adding that Candace did not deny doing so.

MC testified at the hearing as well. She said she was living half the time with her mom

and half the time with her dad, but it was not going too well and was “difficult to live like

that.” She said that with her mom, “it’s a little crazy. With my dad, it’s kind of normal.” MC

did not feel comfortable talking to her mother about things that bothered her because her

mom would not accept it or would just make another excuse.

On cross-examination, MC said that her mother had taken her to counseling, but she

(MC) had made it clear that she did not want to go because it didn’t help. Her mother also

encouraged her to keep a journal, but she was not comfortable doing so “[b]ecause either

way she’s still going to be like, [MC]! And there’s no point.” She said that if her mother was

mad on any given day, she could “get in possibly trouble for anything.” She denied that her

relationship with her mother had improved since she had started counseling, adding that

her mother stayed in the room when she was speaking to the counselor, which made it hard

to say what she felt. When she was asked if she thought the counseling was intended to

improve her relationship with her mother, she said, “Honestly, I thought it might be the

other way around because I thought she might be getting a counselor to see what I said and

then report back to her.”

For her part, Candace testified that she loves her daughter: “We have a great time.

We play a lot of cards together. We go shopping. We do plan trips together. We like to travel

when we can. We do work on our relationship. We do attend family counseling. And we

7
work on our relationship too, so that we can communicate better with each other and for

me to understand where she’s coming from because she does live in two households.”

Candace explained that she put MC in counseling because she had said some things that

Candace found disturbing, like “that [she] was the fault for [the] divorce, that [she] was

cheating on [John] with [her] current husband.” She also accused MC of having a habit of

lying, describing a few incidents that had occurred around 2021. She added that there had

been times when MC had told her one thing and told John something different, which

caused a strain in their relationship.

On cross-examination, Candace acknowledged that the incidents in which MC had

lied had happened over three years previously, and she has grown up a little bit since then.

She also agreed that she had put MC in counseling without telling John, saying that she did

so because “it was family counseling, it was something for a relationship for me and my

daughter.”

In its order, the circuit court made lengthy and detailed findings regarding the

deterioration of the relationship between Candace and MC:

1. [T]he relationship between [MC] and [Candace] has become very strained, to the point [Candace] sought joint counseling with [MC] with a counselor. The Court does not believe that counseling has changed the direction of their relationship at the present time. What is troubling about the counseling decision, in addition to the fact that it has become necessary, is that [Candace] did not notify [John], who has joint legal custody and who has final medical decision-making authority, of the counseling decision. When [John] asked [Candace] about the counseling when he later learned about it, she refused to give him any information and basically told him it was none of his business. This is not how individuals communicate and co-parent in these situations.

8
14. When [MC] testified, she stated that the joint custody relationship was not
going well. When asked why, she indicated that her mom’s house was “crazy” and her
dad’s house was “normal.” She stated at her dad’s house she has comfort, support,
and there are no favorites. She does not feel the same way about her mother’s home.

1. [MC] also testified that counseling was not improving their relationship.
   She felt inhibited in counseling because much of the time her mother was in the
   room when she was talking to the counselor and she could not open up to better
   discuss issues with the counselor for that reason. She also testified that she has
   difficulty talking to her mom about issues.

2. While [Candace], after [MC] testified, attempted to portray her as a liar,
   the evidence presented to substantiate this claim was roughly three years ago when
   [MC] was younger and less mature. Prior to her testimony the Court questioned her
   about her understanding of the difference between the truth and a lie and the
   consequences for telling a lie. After this discussion she was administered the oath.
   She acknowledged having problems telling the truth in the past but testified she had
   matured since then and understood there are consequences for telling a lie. In the
   Court’s observations, while some of [MC]’s testimony may have been exaggerated,
   mainly concerning the amount of work she has to do to clean [Candace’s] home by
   herself, her testimony appeared genuine and truthful. She cried and was visibly
   distraught during some of her testimony, in particular when she testified about her
   mother and their relationship. Those tears did not appear to be tears from anything
   other than being distraught over the subject matter of her testimony. While [MC] is
   12, she appeared to by older and more mature than a 12-year-old. She appeared to be
   at least 14 to 15 in how she spoke, how she articulated her answers, and how she
   conducted herself in the courtroom.

3. The Court is of the firm opinion that one of the most “material” of the
   material changes which has occurred in this case is the strained relationship between
   [MC] and [Candace]. Those issues are real and do not appear to be fabricated by [MC]
   even though it appeared [Candace] wanted to downplay them.

On appeal, Candace argues that the circuit court misinterpreted the evidence,

asserting that the strain between her and MC is “situational and nothing new” and

complaining that the court focused on “isolated and occasional incidents.” She contends

that the circuit court erred in accepting MC’s testimony that counseling was not helping

9
because “the patient is not the judge of what is helping her; rather, the medical professional

is, yet [John] called none, and the court cited no evidence.” She further argues that it is no

surprise that MC wants to live with her father who “let[s] her do anything” rather than her

mother who makes her do chores.

We find that Candace’s arguments amount to little more than a request for this court

to weigh the evidence differently than the circuit court did. It is, of course, well settled that

we do not do this. Bay v. Fajriati, 2025 Ark. App. 226, 712 S.W.3d 388; Cline v. Simpson,

2024 Ark. App. 611, 703 S.W.3d 497. We find no error in the circuit court’s analysis of the

deteriorating relationship between Candace and MC as a factor in concluding that there had

been a material change in circumstances.

1. John’s relocation to Garland County and MC’s involvement in athletics1

This case was initially filed in Garland County; at that time, John lived in Hot Springs,

and Candace lived in Malvern. At some point during the proceedings (the exact date is not

clear in the record), John moved to Clark County, and Candace moved to Saline County.

The case was transferred to Saline County in July 2017. By the time of the final hearing,

John had moved back to Hot Springs, and Candace lived in Benton.

At the hearing, John testified that MC was currently enrolled in the Benton School

District; when he and his wife had MC, they drove her back and forth to Benton for school.

1
Although Candace presents these issues as two separate subpoints on appeal, the
circuit court’s findings regarding John’s relocation and MC’s activities were addressed
together in the order modifying custody. We therefore treat them together as well.

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If custody were changed, she would be enrolled in the Mountain Pine School District. He

explained that it is hard for MC to “join sports and stuff” with the current custodial

arrangement. He said that MC wants to play volleyball and basketball, which she could do

at Mountain Pine, but Candace told her she could not play those sports. He added that it is

“extremely difficult” for MC to engage in extracurricular activities because of the distance

between Saline and Garland Counties.

MC also described the difficulty in engaging in extracurricular activities caused by

splitting her time between Garland and Saline Counties. She said she could only play sports

in Saline County. She wants to play basketball, but practices take place more than once a

week: “It’s like you got to go there every day to play it, and I can’t do that with my dad. And

then my mom said no, so I can’t do that.”

The circuit court made the following findings regarding John’s relocation and MC’s

activities:

[W]hile both parties have relocated to different counties since this case was initially
filed, [John] has relocated back to Garland County. While that in and of itself is not
necessarily a material change since 2020, other facts and circumstances contribute to
[MC]’s father’s residing in Garland County as being a factor in the material change
of circumstances equation. After the passage of time from 2020 to the current time
period, [MC] is several years older, further along in school, and desires to be more
involved in educational, church, and extracurricular activities than she was when she
was younger. The distance between where [John] lives in Garland County, where
[Candace] lives in Saline County, and where [MC] attends school in Saline County
has hampered [MC]’s ability to fully enjoy her childhood and participate fully in these
activities. Certainly, having to travel to and from Hot Springs to Benton on a daily
basis to attend school and other activities, every other week, has to be a difficult
proposition for any family and a soon-to-be teenager. The Court is of the opinion that
the passage of time coupled with the distance each of the parties live from each other

11
in relation to [MC]’s school, in particular, has created a material change in
circumstances.

Citing cases such as Jowers v. Jowers, 92 Ark. App. 374, 214 S.W.3d 294 (2005), and

Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 353 Ark. 470, 109 S.W.3d 653 (2003),2 Candace argues that

relocation alone is not in and of itself a material change in circumstances, especially for the

relocating party. She argues that John’s “move and attempted justification for relocation are

not sufficient in this case to constitute a material change to [modify] custody.” The circuit

court, however, did not consider John’s move to Garland County in isolation. John’s

relocation was simply a factor in the court’s overall consideration of whether there had been

a material change in circumstances, which is entirely appropriate. See McCoy, supra (noting

that one parent’s relocation is an appropriate factor to consider when determining if there

has been a material change in circumstances).

Candace also asserts that the circuit court erred in concluding that the limitations on

MC’s ability to participate in sports was a factor warranting a modification of custody. She

asserts that MC’s testimony on this subject was, “if anything[,] misguided or pretextual. Yet

the trial court accepted this argument as a material change of [circumstances].” To the extent

that this is an argument that the court erred in crediting MC’s testimony, it is axiomatic that

we defer to the circuit court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses, especially in cases

2
In Singletary v. Singletary, 2013 Ark. 506, 431 S.W.3d 234, the supreme court clarified
that Hollandsworth’s presumption in favor of relocation on the part of the custodial parent
does not apply when the parents share joint custody of the children.

12
involving the custody of children. See, e.g., Coleman v. Coleman, 2025 Ark. App. 550; Burns v.

Dillinger, 2025 Ark. App. 543, 726 S.W.3d 596.

B. Division of Custodial Time

In its order modifying custody, the circuit court stated that it was “maintaining the

joint legal custody relationship; however, physical custody shall be with [John]” subject to

Candace’s “custodial times” every other weekend.3 The court also modified Candace’s and

John’s parental responsibilities, establishing John as the primary decision maker for both

medical and educational decisions in the event the parties could not reach an agreement on

major life decisions.

In her second argument on appeal, Candace argues that “the trial court erred in

modifying ‘joint custody’ since giving primary residence to [John], with unequal time to

[Candace] and principal decision-making authority to [John], failed to satisfy joint custody.”

Here, she argues that there is a presumption favoring joint custody, and John failed to rebut

it. In addition, she asserts that the circuit court “continued what it termed ‘joint custody,’

but in fact, it was not.” Noting that the court awarded physical custody to John and visitation

to Candace every other weekend, she maintains that this was “far from nearly equal time to

the extent possible in a case of joint custody.”

3
We note that in his counterclaim in response to Candace’s motion for modification
of custody, John specifically asked the court to place custody with him “with visitation to
[Candace]” and did not seek the retention of the “joint custody” label. He does not, however,
cross-appeal from the court’s decision to “maintain[ ] the joint legal custody relationship,”
and we therefore do not address it.

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We first note that the presumption in favor of joint custody applies only to the initial

custody determination. See Ark. Code Ann.§ 9-13-101(1)(1)(A)(iv)(a) (Supp. 2025) (“In an

action concerning an original child custody determination in a divorce or paternity action, there

is a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child.”) (emphasis

added); Saunders v. Saunders, 2022 Ark. App. 428, at 12 n.4, 653 S.W.3d 830, 838 n.4 (noting

that the presumption in favor of joint custody did not apply in an appeal from a custody-

modification order because it was “not an original child-custody determination”).

Moreover, to the extent Candace argues that the court erred in entering a “lopsided”

award of physical custody, she cites no authority supporting the notion that it is

impermissible for a court to award joint legal custody while giving one parent primary

physical custody.4 Indeed, this court has affirmed a circuit court’s decision in a divorce case

to award the parents joint legal custody of both children while granting primary physical

custody of one child to the mother and primary physical custody of the other child to the

father. Jackson v. Littleton, 2018 Ark. App. 511, 561 S.WS.3d 352; see also Hortelano v.

Hortelano, 2017 Ark. App. 98, 513 S.W.3d 890 (affirming an award of joint custody to both

parents with mother being the primary custodial parent). Accordingly, we find no error in

4
Candace cites Nalley v. Adams for the proposition that “[j]oint custody means the
approximate and reasonable equal division of time with the child by both parents
individually as agreed to by the parents or as ordered by the court.” 2021 Ark. 191, at 6 n.1,
632 S.W.3d 297, 301 n.1. As the supreme court recognized in Cooper v. Kalkwarf, however,
“joint custody arrangements cannot be defined with mathematical precision.” 2017 Ark.
331, at 15, 532 S.W.3d 58, 67 (emphasizing the phrase “approximate and reasonable equal
division of time” in Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-13-101(a)(5)).

14
the circuit court’s decision to maintain joint legal custody between Candace and John while

giving primary physical custody to John.5

C. Best Interest

In her final point on appeal, Candace argues that the circuit court erred in finding

that modification of the parties’ custody arrangement was in MC’s best interest. The circuit

court found that the modification was in MC’s best interest “based on the same analysis the

Court utilized in finding a material change [of circumstances] to exist in this case, including

specifically the comfort and support MC finds in [John’s] home, as well as her stated

preference to live with [her father].”

On appeal, Candace asserts that she “is an example of an exemplary parent who has

done all possible and should be allowed to continue in joint custody as it is understood in

Arkansas law. . . . To conclude otherwise is based on speculation or conjecture that MC will

be better served by living essentially in one household but for every other week of visitation.”

Again, however, Candace’s argument is little more than a request for this court to reweigh

the evidence in her favor, which we cannot do. Wadley v. Wadley, 2019 Ark. App. 549, 590

5
We acknowledge that decisions such as the circuit court’s findings here––retaining
the title of “joint custody” while markedly altering custodial time––can create the appearance
of a contradiction. We therefore repeat our supreme court’s caution in Heileman v. Cahoon
that “[w]hen circuit courts are adjusting parenting time, they should be cognizant of the
terminology they use and pay attention to whether an adjustment in schedule might turn
into a de facto change in custody.” 2024 Ark. 164, at 9, 699 S.W.3d 85, 90; see also Stewart
v. Stewart, 2025 Ark. App. 97, at 12 (recognizing potential conflict between an arrangement
labeled “joint custody” that also provided that one parent should have primary physical
custody).

15
S.W.3d 754. The circuit court specifically found Candace’s testimony less than credible and

noted that she “wanted to downplay” MC’s concerns. The circuit court was in a much better

position than this court to observe the parties and assess their credibility. See, e.g., McNutt v.

Yates, 2013 Ark. 427, 430 S.W.3d 91. Giving great weight to the court’s observations as we

must, we cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that it was in MC’s best

interest to modify the parties’ custody arrangement. We therefore affirm.

Affirmed.

ABRAMSON and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Robert S. Tschiemer, for appellant.

Baxter Law Firm, PLLC, by: Bobby McCallister, for appellee.

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