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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re S.P. CA1/5

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A173648

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/16/26 In re S.P. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re S.P., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

---

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN A173648
SERVICES AGENCY,
(City & County of San Francisco
Petitioner and Respondent,
Super. Ct. No. JD24-3004)
v.

S.P.,
Objector and Appellant.

S.P. (mother) appeals from a dependency court’s
jurisdictional ruling in a case involving her young son (the child).
Mother contends that the record contains insufficient evidence of
a substantial risk that her son would suffer serious physical
harm in her care. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

A.

The San Francisco County Human Services Agency filed
this dependency petition in January 2024, alleging that there
was a substantial risk that the then three-year-old child would
suffer serious physical harm based on mother’s failure or

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inability to adequately protect him. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §
300, subd. (b)(1)(A).)1 In support of the petition, the Agency
alleged that the child was at risk in light of his teenaged half-
sibling N.’s report that mother “has kicked, slapped, and punched
[her] on her body in the recent past.” The Agency also alleged
that “[t]he family has an extensive child welfare history with 29
prior referrals with concerns about general neglect, emotional
abuse[,] and physical abuse.” The 29 previous child welfare
referrals did not result in any cases.2 The Agency did not detain
the child, and he remained in mother’s custody during the
proceedings.

N. recounted that in June or July of 2023, mother had
slapped, punched, kicked, and degraded her during an argument
over N.’s possession of a cell phone which mother had not
authorized. Although no injuries were reported, N. called 911
and the police took her to a home called Huckleberry House with
mother’s permission. N. subsequently refused to return home,
ran away to live with relatives, and also slept out of doors for
some time.

When she was interviewed by a social worker in December
2023, N. did not have any current injuries but she stated that
mother has “has hit, kicked, slapped, and punched her on her
body in the recent past.” Mother has verbally degraded her,
called her a “Bi**h” and threatened to make her life “a living
hell.” Mother has also destroyed N.’s room by breaking and
throwing out her things, forcing N. to clean up her room within
10 minutes to avoid further punishment. Although N. and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.
2 The petition also contained two other allegations

concerning sexual abuse of N. by her maternal grandfather and
domestic violence between mother and the child’s father.
Because the dependency court struck those allegations, they are
not relevant to this appeal.
2
mother had previously participated in family therapy, mother
would “always punish her after[ward] . . . if [N.] said anything
negative about mom in the . . . sessions.” Mother’s former
therapist reported that “mom’s behavior can be controlling and
harmful to [N.]. Mom’s need for control can cause her to act in
extreme ways.” In January of 2024, the Agency removed N. from
mother’s home and initiated a separate dependency case for N.

The Agency also received reports that mother had
physically abused another half-sibling, C., who was about eight
years old at the outset of the dependency petition.3 The child’s
father, who is also C.’s father and mother’s husband, reported
that “he has witnessed [mother] being verbally and physically
aggressive to both [N.] and [C.].” He recounted that when C. was
six years old, there were “instances” in which mother had
“smack[ed] her and yell[ed] at her” for leaving fingerprints on the
car after it had just been washed. In addition, C. disclosed that
mother had slapped her across the face, threatened to make her
eat a packet of hot sauce, and denied her access to the bathroom,
which caused her to urinate on the floor. According to the child’s
paternal grandmother, N. had reported to her that mother “has
been abusive to [C.] by slapping her and making her take food
she did not eat out of the trash and . . . forc[ing] [her] to eat it.”
Mother also threw away “all of her toys.” C. was afraid of
mother.

As for the child, the Agency’s investigation did not
document signs that he was being physically abused. At a home
visit in December 2023, a social worker noted no visible marks or
bruises on the child’s body. When the social worker asked the

3According to the disposition report, C. was eight in
February of 2024. Father and C. moved out of mother’s home in
September of 2022, when C. would have been approximately six;
most likely these incidents occurred when C. was still living with
mother.
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child if he felt safe in mother’s home, he shook his head no.
However, the child started laughing immediately afterward. The
detention report observed that the child “appears well cared for,
but further assessment is needed to determine what level of
intervention, if any, is needed to ensure his safety and well-
being.”

During a home visit in February of 2024, social worker
Donita Carter had safety concerns when mother allowed the child
to walk along a bench by a window, when the bench was covered
with food, papers, and other items. The child “kept slipping,”
which made Carter “really afraid” for his safety. When Carter
flagged the safety issue, mother was not concerned and “seemed
comfortable with his behavior,” stating that there was no glass
and he knew the area well.

Subsequently, social workers had limited access to the
child. An Agency report observed that mother seemed to stop
cooperating because of a disagreement with the Agency, stating
“it is clear that once she is told NO for any reason or [is] not
being agreed with, she lashes out.” Mother did not fully comply
with father’s visitation schedule, and she failed to respond to
communications concerning the Agency’s attempts to arrange
monthly visits to check on the child, so the social worker had to
conduct a search to locate the child’s daycare.

Social workers were able to see the child briefly at daycare
on approximately five occasions in 2024 (plus one visit at a social
worker’s office). The social workers noted during such visits that
the child “looked well,” had no marks or bruises reported by the
daycare provider, and was well groomed and dressed
appropriately. The child did not speak during the visits. The
child’s daycare provider, who had cared for him five days a week
since May 2021, had no concerns about his physical well-being
and had never seen any marks or bruises on him. The child had
never reported to the daycare provider that his mother hit or

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abused him. According to the daycare provider, the child is “very
happy” and “seems happy” whenever mother came to pick him
up. The daycare provider had no concerns about mother being
violent or abusive.

Agency reports from December 2024 and May 2025 stated
that there are “no concerns regarding [the child’s] physical care.”
The Agency recommended, however, that mother engage in
individual therapy “to change her patterns and behaviors around
her need for control” and “develop strategies to manage her
mental health.”

Prior to the dependency court’s jurisdictional ruling, Carter
testified that mother’s treatment of N. raised concerns about
mother’s ability to safely parent the child, because “if Mom gets
that angry, would she be so angry [as] to use physical discipline
with” the child? Carter described mother’s actions as
“controlling,” citing her efforts to obtain restraining orders
against multiple relatives. Carter further explained: “From what
I found, . . . , if it wasn’t [mother’s] way, it was no way. She got
really, really upset if anything happened that would prevent her
from being heard [or] seen.” According to Carter, mother’s failure
to be accountable for her own actions also raised concerns.

Social worker Pernita Brown, who was qualified as an
expert in child welfare, testified that mother “wasn’t able to
control her emotions with [N.].” In her opinion mother “has a
need for control . . . that . . . is unhealthy.” Brown testified that
mother’s physical abuse of N. and her “need for control” raised
concerns about the child’s “emotional well-being.” The child’s
physical appearance during welfare checks never raised any
concerns about his safety. But the Agency’s limited access to the
child meant that the Agency did not have enough information to
adequately assess his safety in mother’s home.

In her testimony, Mother did not deny that she had
punched, kicked, or slapped N., but explained that N.’s
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possession of a cell phone concerned her because N. had had
“issues” using the cell phone inappropriately, such as by sending
nude photos or interacting with older men. Mother also testified
that before the instant dependency case, there had never been
any issues raised about her parenting of C. as a step-parent.
Mother did not deny, however, the reports about her
mistreatment of C. Mother testified that she had never punched,
kicked, or slapped the child, nor had she ever verbally degraded
him. No one had ever expressed concerns to her about the child’s
physical safety or emotional safety in her care. Mother was
engaged in therapy and had never been diagnosed with any
mental disorders.

B.

In finding jurisdiction at a June 2025 hearing, the
dependency court relied on mother’s altercation with N., noting
the Agency’s concern that “if [mother] gets that angry with [N.]
that she might also get that angry and use physical discipline
with [the child] too.”4 The court “acknowledge[d] the children are
different ages, but teenagers can be frustrating and button-
pushing in the same way toddlers can.” The court also relied on
the evidence that mother was “physically abusive” to C., “a child
of a similar age.” In addition, the court cited the evidence that
mother’s conduct posed a safety risk for the child in the incident
in which Carter had observed him walking on “a ledge by [a]
window.” Further, the court found that the evidence established
that mother had a “controlling nature” and “anger.” The court
noted that mother’s “pattern of filing restraining orders against
people that [she] disagrees with” supported a conclusion that she
may “act in a punitive and punishing nature towards [the child],

4 The court also took judicial notice of the findings in N.’s

separate dependency case against mother, in which the court
found jurisdiction based on the same allegations concerning
mother’s conduct toward N.
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and he is a young child who by all accounts is relatively shy and a
young man of few words, so the Court does have a concern that
he is not able to speak up for himself and advocate for himself.”
Taking all the evidence together, the court found that there was a
substantial risk that the child would suffer serious physical harm
or illness as a result of his mother’s conduct, including her failure
to protect him. The court sustained the allegations in the
dependency petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A),
concerning mother’s abuse of N. and the family’s extensive child
welfare history.

With respect to disposition, the court declared a
dependency, continued the child in mother’s custody, and ordered
family maintenance services for mother, including individual
therapy. The court also ordered that the results of the
psychological evaluation ordered in N.’s case be shared for
purposes of the child’s case. In addition, the court found that the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
applied to the child based on father’s membership in a tribe.

DISCUSSION
Mother contends that substantial evidence does not support
the dependency court’s jurisdictional ruling under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1)(A). We disagree.

Section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A), provides for dependency
jurisdiction when a child “has suffered, or [when] there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of” the parent’s “failure or inability . . . to
adequately supervise or protect the child.” To establish
jurisdiction, the question is whether the statutory criteria were
met, by a preponderance of the evidence, based on the facts in
existence at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. (See In re
Christopher M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1318.) In reviewing
the jurisdictional ruling for substantial evidence, we must draw
every reasonable inference and resolve all conflicts in favor of the
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dependency’s court’s ruling. (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th
159, 168.)

A parent’s physical abuse of another minor, particularly
one related to the child who is the subject of the dependency
petition, may support a conclusion that the parent has
characteristics that place the child at substantial risk of similar
abuse. (See In re Marquis H. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 718, 725-
726; In re Y.G. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 109, 115-116 (Y.G.); see
also § 355.1, subd. (b) [“Proof that either parent, the guardian, or
other person who has the care or custody of a minor who is the
subject of a petition filed under Section 300 has physically
abused, neglected, or cruelly treated another minor shall be
admissible in evidence.”].) Consideration of the parent’s past
abuse of other children reflects the principle that a parent’s prior
conduct may contribute to a current risk when there is a reason
for believing that the conduct will continue. (Y.G., at p. 116; cf. §
300, subd. (j) [providing an additional ground for dependency
jurisdiction where “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or
neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and
there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or
neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.”].) In assessing the
likelihood that the parent’s abuse of another minor is probative of
a current risk, the court might consider when the earlier abuse
occurred, whether the other minor is of similar age to the child
named in the dependency petition, and the reasons for the abuse.
(See Y.G., at p. 116.)

In In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 330 (D.B.), for
example, the court considered a case in which the parents
routinely hit their six-year-old son with a belt, injuring him, but
there was no evidence that the parents had ever physically
harmed his younger brother, a toddler. (Id. at pp. 330-331.) The
court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support
dependency jurisdiction because, in light of the sibling’s young

8
age and the parents’ physical abuse of the older son, “even a
single episode of corporal punishment could have devastating
consequences” on the toddler’s physical safety. (Id. at pp. 330-
332.)

Here, although there is no evidence that mother ever
physically abused the child, the record did contain evidence that
she assaulted and abused the child’s half-siblings. Mother
punched, kicked, and slapped N. when N. was 14. Mother also
slapped and “smack[ed]” C. on multiple occasions when she was
approximately six or younger, denied her access to the bathroom,
and forced her to eat food out of the trash. According to the
child’s paternal grandmother, mother’s “behaviors and abuse of
the children ha[ve] been ongoing for years.” As a result of
mother’s abuse, C. was afraid of her and N. refused to return
home. Mother never denied striking or kicking N. and C. in her
testimony, nor has she attempted to justify her behavior as
reasonable physical discipline.

Mother’s physical abuse of N. and C. created a substantial
risk that she would inflict similar physical abuse on the child,
who was only four at the time of the jurisdictional ruling. That
mother abused both N. and C. despite the difference in their ages
supports a conclusion that the risk of harm was not limited based
on age. And there can be no doubt that punching, kicking, or
hitting a four-year-old can result in “serious physical harm.”
(§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A); cf. D.B., supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 332.)

The record also supports the conclusion that mother’s
abusive conduct was likely to reoccur. Although the abuse of N.
and C. happened approximately two or more years before the
jurisdictional ruling, by which point neither N. nor C. were
residing with mother, there was evidence that the abuse had
been “ongoing for years.” Evidence that the abuse was caused or
exacerbated by mother’s tendency to engage in controlling
behaviors also supports a concern that the risk of abuse was

9
ongoing. Mother’s former therapist opined that mother’s desire
for control caused her to act in “extreme ways” harmful to her
children. Mother’s controlling behavior continued during the
dependency petition, including seeking restraining orders against
multiple family members, refusing to allow the agency access to
the child, and failing to make the child available for visitation
with his father in some instances. As the social workers
observed, mother had a tendency to lash out or engage in
punitive behavior when she did not get her way. In addition,
there was evidence that mother failed to accept responsibility for
her abuse of the child’s half-siblings, which increased the
likelihood that she would repeat or even escalate her abusive
behavior in the future as new parenting challenges related to the
child inevitably arise.

In sum, combined with her physical abuse of the child’s
half-siblings, mother’s controlling tendencies and inability to
control her emotions support the dependency court’s conclusion
that there is a substantial and continuing risk that she will
subject the child to serious physical harm or illness. (Cf. In re
T.R. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140, 1144, 1150-1151 [evidence that
parent had choked his 13-year-old daughter once, pulled his 10-
year-old daughter by her hair, and hit them and his seven and
five year-old daughters with a belt for punishment demonstrated
the children were in danger of suffering serious physical harm];
In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 438-439 [evidence
that a mother had hit her three-year-old son and eight-year-old
daughter with a belt on multiple occasions supported a conclusion
that “without intervention, the severity of punishment could
escalate even further” and place both children at risk of serious
physical harm, where the mother had minimized her conduct].)

DISPOSITION
The dependency court’s jurisdictional order is affirmed.

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BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.

In re S.P. / San Francisco Human Services Agency v. S.P. (A173648)

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