In re Theodore E. Harris Jr. and Jo Carol Harris — Default Judgment Denying Discharge

Jump To

Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

Nov. 4, 2025 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re THEODORE E. HARRIS, JR., and JO CAROL HARRIS

United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Tennessee

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-00020

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (70.5K)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

LN 2
* oY i = a *
Dated: November 04, 2025 TRUS FSS
The following is ORDERED: Lor i
STRICT

Jennie D. Latta
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

In re
THEODORE E. HARRIS, JR., and Case No. 22-22360-L
JO CAROL HARRIS, Chapter 7
Debtors.

SCGV Dexter Ridge, LLC,
Plaintiff,
Adv. Proc. No. 25-00020
Theodore E. Harris, Jr., and ECF Nos. 8 and 15
Jo Carol Harris,
Defendants.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT DENYING DISCHARGE
PURSUANT TO COUNT IV OF THE COMPLAINT

THIS PROCEEDING came before the Court on October 9, 2025, upon the motion of
Plaintiff, SCGV Dexter Ridge, LLC (“SCGV”), for entry of default judgment against the
Defendants, Theodore E. Harris, Jr., and Jo Carol Harris. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants are

i neligible for discharge and the discharge of the debt owed to the Plaintiff should be denied as the
result of the Defendants’ fraud.
In support of its motion for entry of default judgment, SCGV relies upon the Declaration
of Brian Matthew Glass, trustee in bankruptcy; the Declaration of Julie C. Bartholomew, attorney
for the Plaintiffs; and the Defendants’ bankruptcy petitions, schedules, and statements in Case Nos.

19-29206, 20-23623, and 22-22360. SCGV asserts that its debt should be excepted from discharge
pursuant to section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and that the Defendants’ general
discharge should be denied pursuant to sections 727(a)(2)(A) and (B), 727(a)(3), and 727(a)(4).
Defendant Theodore Harris appeared without counsel and was permitted to give testimony
in opposition to the motion for entry of default judgment.
Having carefully reviewed the declarations, exhibits, and testimony, the Court makes the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY, AND VENUE
Jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding arising under the Bankruptcy Code lies with the

district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b). Pursuant to authority granted to the district courts at 28 U.S.C.
§ 157 (a), the district court for the Western District of Tennessee has referred to the bankruptcy
judges of this district all cases arising under title 11 and all proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title 11. In re Jurisdiction and Proceedings Under the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, Misc. No. 81-30 (W.D. Tenn. July 10, 1984).
Determinations of the dischargeability of particular debts and objections to discharge arise under
the Bankruptcy Code and thus are core proceedings. See 11 U.S.C §§ 523(a), 727(a), and 28 U.S.C.
§ 157 (b)(2)(I) and (J). Venue of this adversary proceeding is proper to the Western District of
Tennessee because this proceeding arises in a bankruptcy case pending in this district. See
2 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (a).
BACKGROUND FACTS
SCGV as landlord entered into a commercial lease with Teddy’s, Inc., as tenant on July 17,
2017 (the “Lease”). The Lease was signed by Defendant Jo Carol Harris as “President of Teddy’s,
Inc.” The first payment was due under the Lease on April 1, 2018. [Complaint, ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 6-

7].
The lease payment for June 1, 2018, was not paid and additional payments were not paid
until, in November 2019, the parties agreed that the tenant would voluntarily vacate the leased
premises. [ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 8-9].
The Defendants filed their first Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on November 19, 2019,
case number 19-29206. The Defendants did not name SCGV as a creditor or identify the lease
between SCGV and Teddy’s in their bankruptcy schedules. The Defendants did not identify
Teddy’s as a business that Jo Carol Harris owned in their Statement of Financial Affairs.
[Declaration of Julie C. Bartholomew, ECF No. 20, Ex. A].

Without notifying SCGV of their bankruptcy filing, the Defendants requested that SCGV
agree that another tenant be substituted for Teddy’s under the Lease. The proposed tenant was
Cordova Catfish Place & More, LLC (“Cordova Catfish”). SCGV agreed, and the parties executed
the First Amendment to the Lease on November 19, 2019, with Defendant Jo Carol Harris signing
as the representative of Cordova Catfish. In addition, the Defendants provided SCGV personal
guaranties of the performance of Cordova Catfish under the Lease. [ECF No. 1, ¶ 12].
On January 7, 2020, Defendant Jo Carol Harris assigned the Lease to a third party without
the permission of SCGV. The third party took possession of the premises and operated a business
there. The tenant paid rent to the Defendants, but the Defendants did not pay rent to SCGV.
S  ubletting the premises without the approval of SCGV was prohibited by the Lease. [ECF
No. 1, ¶ 15].
On January 21, 2020, the Defendants’ Chapter 13 case was dismissed for failure to provide
required documents to the Chapter 13 trustee. [Case No. 19-29206, ECF No. 26].
On March 4, 2020, SCGV obtained a judgment for possession of the leased premises and

for unpaid rent and other charges due under the Lease against Cordova Catfish in the Shelby
County General Sessions Court. The defendant appealed the judgment to Shelby County Circuit
Court. [ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 17-18].
While the appeal was pending, the Defendants filed a second Chapter 13 petition on
July 20, 2020, case number 20-23623. SCGV was not given notice of the filing of this petition nor
was it identified as a creditor or party to an unexpired lease in the Defendants’ bankruptcy
schedules. The Defendants did not identify Cordova Catfish as a business owned by them in their
Statement of Financial Affairs. [ECF No. 20, Ex. B].
On September 2, 2020, this second Chapter 13 case was also dismissed as the result of the

Defendants’ failure to provide required documents. [Case No. 20-23623, ECF No. 27].
Trial was scheduled in the Shelby County Circuit Court for June 23, 2022, but Defendants
filed a third Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on June 14, 2022, case number 22-22360. SCGV was
not given notice of the filing of this petition nor was it identified as a creditor or party to an
unexpired lease. The pending litigation was not identified in the Defendants’ Statement of
Financial Affairs even though the Defendants had filed a counter-complaint against SCGV. [ECF
No. 1, ¶¶ 26-27; Case No. 22-22360, ECF No. 1].
Without notice of the pending Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, SCGV proceeded to trial
against Cordova Catfish and the Defendants. SCGV eventually obtained a judgment against
C  ordova Catfish and the Defendants for $184,966.88 plus costs. The judgment included
$36,435.00 in attorney’s fees incurred by SCGV in pursuing the litigation. The judgment was
recorded on May 12, 2023. The defendants appealed the judgment to the Tennessee Court of
Appeals, but the appeal was dismissed on May 1, 2024. At no time during the pendency of this
appeal was the circuit court, court of appeals, or SCGV informed of the Defendants’ pending

bankruptcy case. [ECF No. 1, ¶ 32-34, 37; Proof of Claim 26-1, Ex. 2].
Finally, following the dismissal of their appeal, on May 24, 2024 Defendants filed a motion
to add SCGV as a creditor in their Chapter 13 bankruptcy case—a case that had been pending since
June 14, 2022. This was the first notice that SCGV had of the pending or prior bankruptcy cases.
[ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 38-39].
On October 30, 2024, the Defendants converted their Chapter 13 case to Chapter 7. Brian
M. Glass was appointed trustee. The Plaintiff filed the complaint commencing this adversary
proceeding on March 14, 2025. Although the Defendants are represented by Joseph D. Fox in their
bankruptcy case, Mr. Fox declined to appear on their behalf in this adversary proceeding.

Default was entered on June 30, 2025. The Defendants were given ample time to obtain
counsel but failed to do so. The hearing to consider entry of judgment by default thus proceeded
on October 9, 2025.
ANALYSIS
A discharge in bankruptcy is intended to give the “honest but unfortunate debtor” a fresh
start. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991), quoting, Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1931). It is a privilege, not a right, and requires complete financial
disclosure from the debtor. Kenney v. Smith (In re Keeney), 227 F.3d 679, 685 (6th Cir. 2000).
Having set forth the background facts that led to the filing of the Complaint, the Court will consider
i n turn each of the Counts set forth in the complaint and facts specific to those Counts.
Count I
Count I of the complaint asks that the discharge of SCGV’s claim be denied under section
523(a)(2)(A) on the basis that the Defendants obtained money, property, or services from SCGV
by actual fraud. Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge under section 727 “any debt … for

money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained
by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement concerning the
debtor’s financial condition.” 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(2)(A). The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel has adopted guidance concerning the requirement of actual fraud provided by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:
[a]ctual fraud as used in 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(2)(A) is not limited to
misrepresentations and misleading omissions. When a debtor intentionally engages
in a scheme to deprive or cheat another of property or a legal right, that debtor has
engaged in actual fraud and is not entitled to the fresh start provided by the
Bankruptcy Code.

Mellon Bank v. Vitanovich (In re Vitanovich), 259 B.R. 873, 877 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.2001) (citing
McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir.2000)). Further, the Appellate Panel has said,
Actual fraud has been defined as intentional fraud, consisting in deception
intentionally practiced to induce another to part with property or to surrender some
legal right, and which accomplishes the end designed. It requires intent to deceive
or defraud.”

In re Vitanovich, 259 B.R. at 877 (quoting Gerad v. Cole (In re Cole), 164 B.R. 951, 953 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1993)) (other quotation omitted). Further, “[a]ctual fraud has also been defined as
‘deception intentionally practiced to induce another to part with property or to surrender some
legal right, and which accomplishes the end designed.’” Helber v. Cline (In re Cline), 639 B.R.
4 52, 462 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2022), quoting Blascak v. Sprague (In re Sprague), 205 B. R. 851,
859 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997).
SCGV alleges that the Defendants induced it to enter into the original Lease “with a party
[Teddy’s, Inc.], that could not be contractually bound, was incapable of performing under the
contract, and against whose breach SCGV could not obtain compensation.” SCGV alleges, and its

statement is taken as true, that Teddy’s, Inc. never came into existence despite the false
representation of Defendant Jo Carol Harris that it was a Tennessee corporation.
SCGV cannot succeed on this theory, however, because after Teddy’s (or Mrs. Harris)
defaulted under the Lease, SCGV agreed that Cordova Catfish would be substituted as the tenant.
This worked a novation, a new contract, between SCGV and Cordova Catfish, which according to
SCGV was a member-managed limited liability company formed under Tennessee law prior to the
amendment to the Lease. See ECF No. 1, ¶ 13. A novation is “the substitution of a new obligation
for an existing debt or obligation, thereby extinguishing the latter.” 30 Williston on Contracts
§ 76:1 (4th ed.). In other words, a novation is the creation of a new contract. The parties entered

into a new contract when, with full knowledge of the failure of Teddy’s to pay, SCGV agreed to
accept Cordova Catfish as its tenant, and Cordova Catfish and the Defendants, as guarantors,
agreed to be bound by the terms of the modified Lease.
SCGV also alleges that the Defendants committed actual fraud when they had available
funds from the operation of their business for payment of rent in 2018 but intentionally withheld
payment. To support this allegation, SCGV relies upon statement made by the Defendants in their
2019 bankruptcy filing that they earned gross income in 2018 of $1,000,000. It is true that the
Defendants claim that they earned income from operation of an unspecified business in 2018 in
the amount of $1,000,000. [Case No. 19-29206, ECF No. 1, Statement of Financial Affairs,
q  uestion 4]. SCGV concludes from this that the Defendants as guarantors never intended to pay
and gave a false guaranty with the intention of deceiving SCGV.
Without more, the Court cannot conclude that the Defendants intended to deceive SCGV
when they agreed to guarantee the obligations of Cordova Catfish under the amended Lease. A
guaranty is a conditional undertaking, conditioned upon the failure of the principal obligor to

perform. The complaint contains no allegations concerning the events that led to the filing of a
Detainer Warrant by SCGV on February 6, 2020, other than facts related to the unauthorized
sublease of the premises. SCGV states that the “Debtors collected rent from the third party, without
remitting it to SCGV.” [ECF No. 1, ¶ 15]. The complaint says nothing about the failure of Cordova
Catfish to pay nor about any demand made upon the Defendants as guarantors to pay. The Court
cannot conclude from these allegations that the Defendants never intended to honor their
guaranties when they gave them.
Count I must be decided in favor of the Defendants.
Count II

In Count II the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants are not entitled to discharge pursuant
to section 727(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Bankruptcy Code as the result of their concealing property
of the debtors within one year prior to the filing of their petition and concealing property of the
estate within one year after the filing of the petition. Specifically, SCGV alleges that the
Defendants are the owners of Cordova Waste, Inc. and its assets “but have intentionally and
fraudulently concealed that ownership and the assets used or produced by that business.” [ECF
No. 1, ¶ 55].
With respect to Cordova Waste, Inc. the Complaint alleges:
On June 18, 2020, a Tennessee corporation known as Cordova Waste, Inc. was
incorporated with James King, Attorney, serving as Incorporator—the same Mr.
  King who served as Registered agent for Cordova Catfish Place & More, LLC,
Debtors’ closely-held company, which is a co-debtor of Debtors in regard to the
debt owed to SCGV. In Debtors’ Case No. 19-29206, Debtors listed James King as
attorney in two outstanding breach of contract actions filed on their or their
company’s behalf. The address of the principal office of Cordova Waste, Inc. on
East Raines Road is a residential property that is next-door to one of the principal
office addresses for J & J Waste Inc.

[ECF No. 1, ¶ 19]. Even if these facts are true, and the Court accepts that they are, they fall short
of demonstrating what SCGV would have the Court conclude—that Cordova Waste, Inc. is owned
by the Defendants. The Declaration of the Trustee is silent as to this potential asset. If there were
evidence to support the Defendants’ ownership of this corporation, the Court would expect the
Trustee to pursue mention it. SCGV has failed to show that the Defendants are the owners of
Cordova Waste, Inc., and thus has failed to show that the Defendants concealed this asset.
Count II must be decided in favor of the Defendants.
Count III
In Count III SCGV alleges that the Defendants are “the de facto and equitable owners of
Cordova Waste, Inc. and concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or preserve
recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers related to Cordova Waste,
Inc., from which Debtors’ financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained.” Thus,
they allege that the Defendants’ discharge should be denied pursuant to section 727(a)(3) of the
Bankruptcy Code. [ECF No.1, ¶ 60].
This count must fail for the same reason that Count II failed. SCGV has not established
that the Defendants are the owners of Cordova Waste, Inc. The Trustee’s declaration makes no
mention of this company or of attempts to question the Defendants about it. Without more, the
Court cannot find that the Defendants ever had records concerning Cordova Waste, Inc., much less
that they destroyed them.
  Count III must be decided in favor of the Defendants.
Count IV
Count IV of the Complaint alleges that the Debtors knowingly and fraudulently made a
false oath in connection with their bankruptcy case and thus are not entitled to discharge pursuant
to section 727(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. This is a much more serious allegation. SCGV has

demonstrated beyond any doubt that the Defendants knew about the pendency of litigation by and
against SCGV at the time they filed their pending 2022 bankruptcy petition which was not included
in Schedule A/B as a claim against a third party nor in response to question 9 of the Statement of
Financial Affairs. The Defendants knew that they were guarantors of an obligation owed to SCGV
at the time they filed their bankruptcy petition, yet they failed to disclose this obligation on
Schedule E/F. The Defendants knew at the time they filed their bankruptcy petition that they had
guaranteed the obligation of Cordova Catfish owed to SCGV, yet they failed to disclose Cordova
Catfish as a co-debtor on Schedule H. The Defendants knew that they had interests in at least two
businesses within the four years preceding the filing of their petition on June 14, 2022, Cordova

Catfish (which appears to have been operated until January 2020, when Defendant Jo Carol Harris
assigned the Lease to a third party) and J & J Waste, Inc. (disclosed in their 2020 Chapter 13 filing
as having been operated between 2003 and March 2019), but did not disclose these businesses at
question 27 of their Statement of Financial Affairs.
The Defendants had an opportunity to correct the false statements made in their original
Schedules and Statements when they converted their case to Chapter 7. After conversion, new
Schedules and Statements were filed by the Defendants on November 6, 2024. [Case No. 22-
22360, ECF No. 123]. Other than listing SCGV as an unsecured creditor in Schedule E/F, they
failed to correct any of the other omissions. They failed to include their counterclaim against
S  CGV as a claim against another in Schedule A/B (although by that time, final judgment had been
entered in the litigation with SCGV); they failed to identify Cordova Catfish as a co-debtor in
Schedule H; they failed to identify the litigation with SCGV and failed to identify Cordova Catfish
and J & J Waste, Inc. as businesses in which they held an interest in the Statement of Financial
Affairs.

To prevail on a complaint to deny a debtor a discharge based on his “false oath(s),” the
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence the following that: (1) the debtor made a
statement under oath; (2) the statement was false; (3) the debtor knew the statement was false; (4)
the debtor made the statement with fraudulent intent; and (5) the statement related materially to
the bankruptcy case. Keeney v. Smith (In re Keeney), 227 F.3d 679, 685 (6th Cir.2000); 11 U.S.C.
§ 727 (a)(4)(A).
The very purpose of ... 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(4)(A), is to make certain that those who
seek the shelter of the bankruptcy code do not play fast and loose with their assets
or with the reality of their affairs. The statutes are designed to ensure that complete,
truthful, and reliable information is put forward at the outset of the proceedings, so
that decisions can be made by the parties in interest based on fact rather than fiction
... Neither the trustee nor the creditors should be required to engage in a laborious
tug-of-war to drag the simple truth into the glare of daylight.

Hamo v. Wilson (In re Hamo), 233 B.R. 718, 725 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999).
“A debtor has a paramount duty to consider all questions posed on a statement or schedule
carefully and see that the question is answered completely in all respects.” Larocco v. Smithers,
(In re Smithers), 342 B.R. 384, *3 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2006). Representations in a debtor’s bankruptcy
statements and schedules, both of which are executed under penalty of perjury, can constitute false
oaths within the meaning of the discharge exception, as can statements and testimony given by a
debtor at the Bankruptcy Code section 341 meeting of creditors. Roberts v. Oliver (In Re Oliver), 414 B.R. 361, 374 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009).
  A debtor’s knowledge that a statement is false “can be evidenced by demonstrating that a
debtor “knew the truth but nonetheless failed to give the information or gave contradictory
information.” Keeney at 685-86, citing, In re Chavin, 150 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1998). Intent to
defraud “involves a material misrepresentation that you know to be false, or, what amounts to the
same thing, an omission that you know will create an erroneous impression.” Id. The intent

requirement may also be satisfied by a reckless disregard as to whether a representation is true.
The subject of a false oath is “material,” for purposes of § 727(a)(4)(A), if it bears a relationship
to the debtor’s business transactions or estate, or concerns discovery of assets, business dealings,
or existence and disposition of debtor’s property. Keeney at 686, quoting, Beaubouef v. Beaubouef
(In re Beaubouef), 966 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1992). It does not matter whether a significant
amount of money is involved. Neither does it mahtter that the debtor does not intend to injure his
creditors when he makes a false statement. Creditors are intended to judge for themselves what
will benefit and what will prejudice them. Hamo at 725, citing, Chalik v. Moorefield (In re Chalik), 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cit. 1984).

“The court may deduce fraudulent intent from all the facts and circumstances of a case.”
Keeney at 686. The use of circumstantial evidence is normally a must. Indeed, “in using
circumstantial evidence, there will often exist numerous evidentiary indicators, each of which
alone would not establish fraud but when viewed collectively, form a trail leading firmly in the
direction of fraudulent intent. . . . An always important consideration in any analysis under
§ 727(a)(4)(A) is whether there exist a series or patterns of errors and emissions.” U.S. Trustee v.
Halishak (In re Halishak), 337 B.R. 620, 627 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005). A continuing pattern of
omissions or false statements in a debtor’s bankruptcy schedules exhibits a reckless indifference
for the truth. Hamo at 725; Roberts v. Montgomery (In re Montgomery), 2007 WL 625196, *4
( Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2007). Moreover, “where a debtor only voluntarily discloses information after
its existence is uncovered by a third party, (e. g., a trustee or creditor), good faith is unlikely to be
found.” Halishak at 630.
The Defendants have filed three bankruptcy petitions and completed their schedules and
statements four times. The fact that they failed to notify SCGV of the filing of their bankruptcy

cases until they felt compelled to seek relief from the bankruptcy court after entry of the large
judgment against them indicates a lack of good faith in pursuing bankruptcy relief. When they
signed their schedules and statement of financial affairs, the Defendants affirmed under penalty of
perjury that they had read them, and that the information disclosed in them was true and correct.
These statements, made under oath, were false. Given the opportunity to correct their false
statements, the Defendants failed to do so. At a minimum, the Defendants have exhibited a reckless
disregard for the truth.
Thus, the Court concludes that Count IV must be decided in favor of the Plaintiff. The
Defendants are not entitled to discharge as the result of their false oaths.

CONCLUSION
Judgment by default will be entered for the Plaintiff SCGV Dexter Ridge, LLC against the
Defendants, Theodore E. Harris, Jr., and Jo Carol Harris, as to Count IV of the Complaint only.
The discharge of the debts of the Defendants is DENIED.
Judgment will be entered for the Defendants against the Plaintiff as to Counts I, II, and III
of the Complaint.
cc: Debtors/Defendants
Attorney for Debtors/Defendants (if any)
Plaintiff
Attorney for Plaintiff
Chapter 7 Trustee
United States Trustee