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Allison Martychenko Chapter 13 Venue Ruling

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Summary

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied the Trustee's Motion to Transfer Venue in the Chapter 13 case of Allison Noelle Martychenko (Case No. 25-40428), ruling that venue is proper in the Southern District of Illinois rather than the Western District of North Carolina. The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on December 17, 2025, evaluating the Debtor's testimony regarding her multiple business interests across Illinois and North Carolina, including her 50% membership in The Elite Duo LLC d/b/a RE/MAX Elite operating in Mt. Vernon, Illinois. The decision turns on the principal place of business analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1408 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014(b).

“When such circumstances are before the Court, the determination of a principal place of business for venue purposes under the United States Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure becomes a fact-intensive inquiry and correspondingly more complex.”

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The Court denied the Trustee's motion to transfer venue from the Southern District of Illinois to the Western District of North Carolina. The Trustee sought transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1408 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014(b), arguing the Debtor's residence in North Carolina made that venue more appropriate. The Debtor countered that venue was proper in SDIL because it housed her principal business operations during the 180 days prior to filing. The Court found that ED LLC, in which the Debtor holds a 50% interest, operated as a real estate sales and property management business in Mt. Vernon, Illinois, and that the two parcels of commercial real estate owned by ED LLC were listed for sale through the petition date. The Court's fact-intensive analysis of multiple LLC interests across both states resulted in a denial of the transfer motion.

For debtors and bankruptcy practitioners, this ruling illustrates that multi-state business interests create venue complexity when the principal place of business must be determined under 28 U.S.C. § 1408. Practitioners should document the location of management decisions, income derivation, and business operations during the 180-day period preceding any bankruptcy filing to establish proper venue. The decision provides guidance on how courts weigh competing state connections when a debtor holds interests in LLCs operating in multiple jurisdictions.

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Apr 24, 2026

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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Allison Noelle Martychenko

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Illinois

Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

IN RE:
Chapter 13
ALLISON NOELLE MARTYCHENKO,
Case No. 25-40428
Debtor(s).
OPINION

This matter is before the Court on the Debtor’s objection to the Trustee’s Motion to
Transfer Venue. The Debtor filed her Chapter 13 Voluntary Petition in the Southern District of
Illinois on October 21, 2025. The Trustee asserts that venue is not proper in this District and
seeks an order determining that venue is proper in the Western District of North Carolina
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1408 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014(b) and transferring the case to that
District.
Debtor objects to the Trustee’s Motion, arguing that venue is proper in the Southern
District of Illinois, because it was the Debtor’s principal place of business during the 180 days
prior to the petition date. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on December 17, 2025. The
Debtor was the sole witness and provided testimony as to her various business ventures, location
of her assets, and her former and current residence.
Although venue is typically clear for an individual debtor, the issue presented here arises
in the context of a debtor holding multiple business interests that operate in different states.
When such circumstances are before the Court, the determination of a principal place of business
for venue purposes under the United States Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
becomes a fact-intensive inquiry and correspondingly more complex. After considering the
pleadings, the Debtor’s testimony, and the arguments of the parties, the Court concludes that
venue is proper in this District, and that the interests of justice would not be served by
transferring this case to the Western District of North Carolina.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At a hearing on the matter, the Debtor testified as to the following facts:

Residence/Domicile

At the petition date, the Debtor resided at 3150 Dick Branch Rd., Robbinsville, North
Carolina. The Debtor has resided at this address since May 2024.
Non-business Assets
The Debtor holds an undivided one-half interest in her residence located at 3150 Dick
Branch Road, Robbinsville, North Carolina, which is valued at $200,000.00. In addition, the
Debtor holds an undivided one-half ownership interest in a parcel of real property located in
North Carolina valued at $27,950.00. The Debtor’s schedules also disclosed three additional
parcels of real estate as property in which the Debtor holds an equitable interest through the
Debtor’s membership interests in three limited liability companies.1 The Illinois real estate held
by one company is valued at $293,410.00, while the other company owns North Carolina real
estate valued at $99,950.00.
The Debtor further possesses tangible personal property consisting of motor vehicles,
recreational vehicles, and watercraft with an aggregate value of $26,091.50; personal and
household goods valued at $18,500.00; and financial assets totaling $28,889.15. All such
personal property is titled in, addressed to, physically located at, or otherwise associated with the

1 The Elite Duo LLC (in which the Debtor holds a 50% ownership interest) holds title to two parcels of commercial
real estate located in Mt. Vernon, Illinois valued at $173,410.00 and $120,000.00, respectively, before accounting
for encumbrances. Wrig’s Ridge LLC (in which the Debtor holds a 50% ownership interest), holds title to one
residential real estate parcel located in Robbinsville, North Carolina, which is unencumbered with a fair market
value of $99,950.
Debtor’s residence or business interests in North Carolina. The Debtor holds no tangible personal
property located in Illinois.
Business Interests

The Debtor testified that her business interests consist of rental real estate property sales
and management businesses, conducted primarily through two limited liability companies, one of
which is The Elite Duo, LLC d/b/a RE/MAX Elite (“ED LLC”) and the other is Graham
Property Management LLC (“GPM LLC”). The Debtor also holds a membership interest in
Wrig’s Ridge LLC.
Business Interests – The Elite Duo, LLC

The Debtor testified that, from May 2018 and continuing through the petition date, she
has been a member of ED LLC, operating in Mt. Vernon, Illinois. The Debtor and her co-
member, Robin Gelfius, operate ED LLC as a real estate sales and property management
business under the d/b/a RE/MAX Elite. The Debtor holds a fifty percent membership interest in
ED LLC. The Debtor testified that prior to and during the 180 days prior to the petition date
(April 24, 2025 through October 20, 2025) (“Relevant Period”), ED LLC sold and managed real
estate properties for third parties and as part of its inventory, held title to two parcels of
commercial real estate located in Southern Illinois which were listed for sale continuing through
the petition date. 2 The Debtor further testified that ED LLC intends to surrender both properties
to the secured lender. ED LLC also maintains one real estate sale listing for a third party in
addition to the two Illinois properties it owns. After surrender of the properties and termination
of the remaining listing, ED LLC intends to cease operations.

2 The two Illinois commercial real estate parcels owned by Elite Duo LLC are listed on the Debtor’s Schedule A/B
1.2 and 1.3 at a 50% beneficial ownership interest.
The Debtor further testified that most of her income during the Relevant Period was
derived from ED LLC as commissions. The Debtor testified that her work on behalf of ED LLC
was in the nature of providing assistance to Robin Gelfius, most of which was performed
remotely from the Debtor’s residence in North Carolina.
No evidence was provided regarding the Debtor’s management decisions for ED LLC.

Business Interests – North Carolina LLCs

The Debtor testified that at the petition date, she was a member of three limited liability
companies located in North Carolina: Wrig’s Ridge, LLC; Up the Creek Enterprises, LLC; and
Graham Property Management, LLC. Wrig’s Ridge, LLC is not currently engaged in active
business operations but holds title to residential real estate located in North Carolina; the Debtor
holds a 50% interest in this company. The Debtor also held a twenty-five percent membership
interest in Up the Creek Enterprises, LLC, which per the Debtor’s testimony has dissolved since
this bankruptcy case was filed and had no business activity during the Relevant Period.
Debtor and her other partner, John Allen, formed Graham Property Management, LLC
(“GPM LLC”) in 2025 to operate a vacation rental real estate management company. The Debtor
holds a 50% ownership interest in GPM LLC. During the Relevant Period, GPM LLC managed
two vacation rental properties located in Southern Illinois and eight rental properties located in
North Carolina.
The Debtor’s testimony regarding her activities for GPM LLC focused solely on the day-
to-day operations of the company. The Debtor testified that she and her co-member performed
all services provided by GPM LLC, either remotely from wherever the Debtor happened to be at
the time, or in person at each property as may be needed. In connection with these operational
activities, the Debtor and Mr. Allen traveled to Southern Illinois frequently during the Relevant
Period to prepare the Illinois listings for rental or to maintain the properties. The Debtor testified
that she spent most of July 2025 and August 2025 in Southern Illinois working on a GPM LLC
property listing and made a total of five to six trips to Southern Illinois during 2025, each trip
lasting anywhere from ten days to twenty-one days.
No testimony was provided regarding the specific location from which management

decisions for GPM LLC were made, or where the books and records of GPM LLC are kept.
Debtor’s Other Business Interests
The Debtor testified that outside of her limited liability companies, she also performed
online marketing services for an unrelated real estate broker located in Southern Illinois during
the Relevant Period.
The Debtor’s hearing testimony focused frequently on the Debtor’s post-petition business
activities, as well as the present winding-down activities of ED LLC. The Debtor testified that
she runs her businesses from her laptop, directing operations with her co-members and making
decisions from whatever location she happened to be in when a decision needed to be made,

including decisions made during the Relevant Period.
DISCUSSION

Title 28, Section 1408(1) of the United States Code provides in relevant part:

[A] case under title 11 may be commenced in the district court for the district—
(1) in which the domicile, residence, principal place of business in the United
States, or principal assets in the United States, of the person or entity that is the
subject of such case have been located for the one hundred and eighty days
immediately preceding such commencement, or for a longer portion of such one-
hundred-and-eighty-day period than the domicile, residence, or principal place of
business, in the United States, or principal assets in the United States, of such
person were located in any other district… 28 U.S.C. § 1408 Therefore, venue is determined by reviewing the facts that existed within the 180
days prior to commencement of the case to determine the district of the debtor’s
residence, domicile, principal place of business, or location of principal assets. The four
statutory bases for venue are stated in the alternative, so satisfaction of any one of them is
sufficient to establish proper venue. In re Broady, 247 B.R. 470, 472 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.

2000). This bankruptcy case was filed on October 21, 2025; therefore, the relevant time
period to determine proper venue is April 24, 2025, to October 20, 2025. A debtor’s
choice of venue is presumed to be proper, and the party challenging venue has the burden
of establishing improper venue by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Peachtree
Lane Assocs., Ltd., 150 F.3d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 1998)
Neither party has suggested that the Debtor’s domicile or residence was located
anywhere other than the Western District of North Carolina within the 180 days preceding
filing. The Debtor testified that she has resided at her current North Carolina residence
since May 2024. Thus, the Debtor’s domicile and residence are undisputed and venue does

not lay in Illinois under the domicile and residence tests of § 1408.
The evidence further establishes that, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1408, the
Debtor’s principal assets are located in North Carolina. The Debtor testified that the
aggregate value of the real property in which she holds an ownership interest (directly and
equitably) in North Carolina totals $327,900.00, compared to $290,000.00 in real property
located in Illinois. In addition, the Debtor’s personal property, including motor vehicles,
personal and household goods, and financial assets, are located exclusively in North
Carolina.
Because venue cannot be established in this District based on the Debtor’s domicile,
residence, or principal assets, the Court turns to the remaining statutory basis under 28 U.S.C. §
1408, namely, whether the Debtor maintained her principal place of business in this District
during the 180 days preceding the petition date, or for a larger portion of that period than in any
other District. The Debtor contends that her principal place of business during the Relevant

Period was Southern Illinois, based on her presence in Illinois during that period, and her
decisions for her Illinois interests during those visits. The Chapter 13 Trustee, by contrast, asserts
that venue is proper in the Western District of North Carolina, where the Debtor currently
performs her work and remotely manages the properties, and where her assets are located.
Although venue for individual debtors is ordinarily determined by domicile or residence,
the Court may consider where a debtor conducts her business activities in cases where, as here,
the Debtor is actively engaged in ongoing business operations. The determination of an
individual debtor’s principal place of business is a factual inquiry that should be resolved by
consideration of the totality of the relevant facts and circumstances.

In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010), the Supreme Court examined the meaning
of a corporation’s “principal place of business” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (c)(1), which defines a
corporation’s citizenship as the state of incorporation and “the State where it maintains its
principal place of business.” 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010). There, the Supreme Court held that a
principal place of business is the place “where the corporation's high level officers direct,
control, and coordinate the corporation's activities.” Id. It is the “nerve center” of the company,
the place from which the company's decisions are actually controlled. Id. at 93–95. This test has
been adopted by bankruptcy courts when evaluating principal place of business under § 1408.
See In re Crosby National Golf Club, LLC, 534 B.R. 888, 890, 61 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 108 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2015) (limited liability company); In re Grand Dakota Partners, LLC, 573
B.R. 197, 200
(Bankr. W.D. N.C. 2017) (limited liability company).
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of “principal place of business” under 28 U.S.C. § 1408 has developed primarily in the context of non-individual debtors, focusing on the location from
which business activities are directed and controlled. See In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., [150

F.3d 788](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/756511/in-the-matter-of-peachtree-lane-associates-limited-debtor-appellee/) (7th Cir. 1998). In Peachtree Lane, the Seventh Circuit clarified that the “principal
place of business” is not necessarily where a debtor’s assets are physically located, but where its
major business decisions are made. Id. at 795. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s use of
the “nerve center” test, which is the place from which key operational, financial, and
administrative decisions are made. Id. at 792.
The Northern District of Illinois has likewise applied the Peachtree Lane framework in In
re Magnolia Storage & Logistics, LLC, No. 21-12475, 2022 WL 42038, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Jan. 5, 2022). There, in a single-asset real estate Chapter 11 case, the court held that the debtor’s
principal place of business was in the Northern District of Illinois, notwithstanding that the

debtor’s sole asset, an apartment complex, was located in Texas. Id. at *3. The court emphasized
that the debtor’s business was managed remotely from Illinois, where the sole member and
manager directed operations, maintained books and records, and made the debtor’s significant
business decisions, including those leading to the bankruptcy filing. Id. at *1. Because the locus
of management and decision-making was Illinois, the court concluded that venue was proper in
the Northern District of Illinois rather than in the district where the property was located. Id. at
*3.
While Peachtree Lane arose in the context of a corporate debtor, its principles are
instructive for individual debtors engaged in ongoing business operations. The focus of the
inquiry is, therefore, on where the debtor actually manages and directs her business affairs, rather
than merely where property is located.
The Debtor engages in the business of real estate property management through several
limited liability companies. The Debtor testified that during the Relevant Period, she was a
member of two operating limited liability companies, one operating exclusively in Southern

Illinois, the other operating in both Southern Illinois and in North Carolina. The Debtor testified
that during the Relevant Period, she performed most of her services for ED LLC from North
Carolina, and for GPM LLC from Southern Illinois. The Debtor also testified that she had made
five to six trips to Southern Illinois during the Relevant Period for a total period of anywhere
from fifty days to one hundred twenty-five days; these trips were for the purpose of dealing with
GPM LLC’s Illinois property operations. Further, the Debtor testified that she conducts her
business affairs from her laptop, which is with her at all times, even on personal vacations. These
facts are clear and directly supported by her testimony and were not controverted by other
evidence.

Other facts brought out in testimony relate to post-petition or future events. These include
the Debtor’s intention through ED LLC to surrender the two Illinois properties and cease
operations, as well as any future business activity of Graham Property Management, LLC or
Wrig’s Ridge, LLC. While relevant to understanding the entities’ overall operations, these post-
petition facts do not establish the Debtor’s principal place of business during the 180-day period
preceding filing.
Certain details remain unclear as to the 180-day period, however, including the precise
allocation of the Debtor’s time between Illinois and North Carolina activities and the extent of the
Debtor’s managerial actions in directing the activities of each company in which she held a partial
interest. No testimony was provided as to the organizational or managerial decisions for the various
companies, such as where the Debtor keeps her books and records and whether the Debtor made
major business decisions regarding the companies from locations other than Southern Illinois.
The Debtor’s testimony clearly establishes that she was in Illinois frequently during the
Relevant Period, and no evidence controverted the Debtor’s statement that she was present in

Illinois for the greater part of the 180-day period. While the Debtor remotely performed services
for ED LLC while in North Carolina, those services were not quantified and the Debtor’s
testimony is not contradicted. The Debtor testified that she operated her business interests from
her laptop, which was with her when she was in Illinois. John Allen, her co-member in GPM
LLC, frequently traveled with her to Illinois and managed the company with her throughout the
Relevant Period. Although the Debtor was in the process of increasing her North Carolina
business holdings during the Relevant Period, such action by itself is not dispositive of whether
the Debtor made more business decisions from a location other than Southern Illinois than she
did while she was in this District. None of the evidence produced showed that the Debtor made

major business decisions from any location other than Southern Illinois during the Relevant
Period.
Venue is presumed to be proper in the district where the debtor files, and the party
challenging venue must prove that the case was incorrectly venued by a preponderance of the
evidence. Peachtree Lane, 150 F.3d at 795. The Debtor chose venue in Southern Illinois based
on the location of her principal place of business, and the Trustee has not met his burden to
challenge that choice by a preponderance of the evidence.
Having determined that venue is proper in the Southern District of Illinois, the Court
must now decide whether transfer is appropriate under Bankruptcy Rule 1014 and 28 U.S.C. §
1412. Bankruptcy Rule 1014 provides:
(a) Dismissal or Transfer.
(1) Petition Filed in the Proper District. If a petition is filed in the proper
district, the court may transfer the case to another district in the interest of justice
or for the convenience of the parties. The court may do so:
(A) on its own or on a party in interest’s timely motion; and
(B) only after a hearing on notice to the petitioner, United States
trustee, and other entities as the court orders.
(2) Petition Filed in an Improper District. If a petition is filed in an improper
district, the court may dismiss the case or may transfer it to another district on the
same grounds and under the same procedures as stated in (1).

FED. R. BANK. P. 1014.
Under Rule 1014(a)(1), the Court may transfer the case to a district where venue is
proper; however, transfer is authorized only upon a showing that it is warranted in the interest of
justice or for the convenience of the parties. In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., 188 B.R. 815,
831
(N.D. Ill. 1995)
Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1412 authorizes a court to “transfer a case or proceeding under
title 11 to a district court for another district, in the interest of justice or for the convenience of
the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 1412. Transfer under either provision is therefore discretionary and
permitted only upon a showing that the statutory criteria are satisfied.
The burden of demonstrating that transfer is appropriate rests with the party seeking
transfer. In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., 198 B.R. 272, 283 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd, 206
B.R. 913
(N.D. Ill. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Matter of Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., 150 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 1998); Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 896 F.2d 1384, 1390–91 (2d Cir. 1990).
In evaluating whether transfer is justified, courts consider factors such as the location of
creditors, the debtor, witnesses necessary to the administration of the estate, the location of
assets, and whether transfer would promote the efficient and economical administration of the
estate. In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., 188 B.R. at 831. Transfer is not automatic, nor is it
presumed, and it requires a developed factual record supporting the statutory criteria.
In considering whether transfer is warranted under Bankruptcy Rule 1014 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1412, the Court notes that neither party presented evidence addressing the factors commonly

considered in a transfer analysis. Although the testimony addressed the Debtor’s business
activities and travel between Illinois and North Carolina during the 180-day prepetition period, it
did not identify where the Debtor’s creditors are located, where key witnesses reside, or how
transfer to any particular district would affect the administration of the estate. A review of the
schedules filed in this case indicates that more of the Debtor’s creditors are located in Southern
Illinois than in North Carolina. At hearing, the Debtor’s counsel argued that retaining
administration of the Debtor’s case in this District makes for more efficient administration of
common creditor claims, as the Debtor’s co-member in ED LLC has filed bankruptcy in this
District and the duplicate payment of such claims is a consideration.

Nor did the evidence establish that transfer would enhance judicial economy, timeliness,
or fairness. Accordingly, the record is insufficient to support a finding that transfer is appropriate
under the “interest of justice” or “convenience of the parties” standards.
Accordingly, because venue is proper in this District and the record does not support
transfer to another district, the Trustee’s Motion is denied. A separate order shall enter.

ENTERED: March 2, 2026
/s/ Mary E. Lopinot


UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Named provisions

Venue Principal Place of Business

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Classification

Agency
US Bankruptcy Court S.D. Ill.
Filed
March 2nd, 2026
Instrument
Enforcement
Branch
Judicial
Legal weight
Binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Substantive
Docket
25-40428

Who this affects

Applies to
Debtors Bankruptcy trustees Bankruptcy practitioners
Industry sector
9211 Government & Public Administration
Activity scope
Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings Venue determinations Business entity interests
Geographic scope
Illinois US-IL

Taxonomy

Primary area
Bankruptcy
Operational domain
Legal
Topics
Judicial Administration Financial Services

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