Auston McLain v. R. Whiteman, et al. - Fourteenth Amendment Prisoner Civil Rights

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Auston McLain v. R Whiteman, et al.

District Court, C.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 4:25-cv-04188

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

AUSTON MCLAIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 25-4188
)
R WHITEMAN, et al. )
)
Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at FCI Memphis, was granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The case is now before the Court for a merit review of
Plaintiff’s claims. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint, and through such process to
identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” Id.
The Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the
plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements
and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff alleges events that occurred while he was detained at Knox County Jail. He
alleges that Defendants Whiteman and Damewood transported him from court without securing
him in a seatbelt. Plaintiff alleges that he was in a wheelchair at the time because of a previous
stroke with a weakened right side of his body. He alleges that Defendants Whiteman and
Damewood caused a motor vehicle accident because they were both on their cell phones while
the vehicle was in motion. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Harlan and May arrived on scene,
failed to address his immediate medical needs or investigate the officers’ phone use. He alleges
that paramedics took him to the hospital. He alleges that he suffered a “neck snap,” upper back
pain, soft tissue damage, and increased anxiety.

Plaintiff alleges that he received no follow-up medical care. He alleges that Defendants
Abernacki and Jean failed to look into his complaints about medical treatment despite promising
to do so. He alleges that Defendant Johnson told him the nurse was “no longer here.”
Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants Whiteman and
Damewood for subjecting him to dangerous conditions during transport and a Fourteenth
Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate medical care against Defendants Abernacki,
Jean, and Jane Doe nurse. Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352-53 (7th Cir. 2018);
Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right for officials to investigate the vehicle

accident. Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2015). Defendant Johnson’s
alleged statement that the nurse was no longer there does not permit a plausible inference that
this defendant failed to facilitate medical care or at least requires additional context before the
Court can find that Plaintiff states a claim. Plaintiff cannot prevail against high-level
administrators just because they may have been in charge, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009), and nothing about his allegations suggests that the alleged constitutional violations
resulted from a county policy as to permit a claim against Knox County, Illinois or the Knox
County Sheriff’s Department. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Srvcs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiff’s allegations do not permit a plausible inference that the John Doe U.S.
Marshals he named as a defendant were personally involved in these events. The Court finds that
Plaintiff fails to state any additional claims.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
court finds that the plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants
Whiteman and Damewood for subjecting him to dangerous conditions during transport
and a Fourteenth Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate medical care against
Defendants Abernacki, Jean, and Jane Doe nurse. Any additional claims shall not be
included in the case, except at the court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause
shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
2. This case is now in the process of service. The plaintiff is advised to wait until
counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, in order to give notice to
the defendants and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. The
plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the court at this time, unless otherwise directed by
the court.
3. The court will attempt service on the defendants by mailing each defendant a
waiver of service. The defendants have 60 days from the date the waiver is sent to file an
answer. If the defendants have not filed answers or appeared through counsel within 90
days of the entry of this order, the plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of
service. After the defendants have been served, the court will enter an order setting
discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
4. With respect to a defendant who no longer works at the address provided by
the plaintiff, the entity for whom that defendant worked while at that address shall provide
to the clerk said defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said defendant's
forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.
Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the clerk and shall not be
maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the clerk.
5. The defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is
sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all
defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall
be to the issues and claims stated in this opinion. In general, an answer sets forth the
defendants' positions. The court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and
until a motion is filed by the defendants. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary
or will be considered.
6. This district uses electronic filing, which means that, after defense counsel
has filed an appearance, defense counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any
motion or other paper filed by the plaintiff with the clerk. The plaintiff does not need to
mail to defense counsel copies of motions and other papers that the plaintiff has filed with
the clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery
requests and responses are not filed with the clerk. The plaintiff must mail his discovery
requests and responses directly to defendants' counsel. Discovery requests or responses
sent to the clerk will be returned unfiled, unless they are attached to and the subject of a
motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until defense counsel has filed an appearance
and the court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in
more detail.
7. Counsel for the defendants is hereby granted leave to depose the plaintiff at
his place of confinement. Counsel for the defendants shall arrange the time for the
deposition.
8. The plaintiff shall immediately notify the court, in writing, of any change in
his mailing address and telephone number. The plaintiff's failure to notify the court of a
change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with
prejudice.
9. If a defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the clerk within
30 days after the waiver is sent, the court will take appropriate steps to effect formal
service through the U.S. Marshals service on that defendant and will require that
defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(2).
10. The clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order
pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
11. The clerk is directed to terminate Johnson, Harlan, May, Knox County
Sheriff’s Department, Knox County, Illinois, John/Jane Doe Knox County Officers, and
John/Jane Does U.S. Marshals as defendants.
12. The clerk is directed to attempt service on Defendants Whiteman,
Damewood, Abernacki, and Jean pursuant to the standard procedures.
Entered this 24th day of April, 2026.

s/Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE