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March 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

CHINS: D S v. Indiana Department of Child Services

Indiana Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25A-JC-01881
• Panel: Paul D. Mathias, Nancy H. Vaidik
• Judges: Mathias, Vaidik, Pyle III

• Disposition: Reversed and Remanded

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.8K)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed and Remanded

Combined Opinion

                        by [Nancy H. Vaidik](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/7282/nancy-h-vaidik/)

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana
In the Matter of D.S., FILED
A Child in Need of Services, Mar 23 2026, 9:26 am

CLERK
D.S., Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Appellant-Respondent Child

v.

Indiana Department of Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner

March 23, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-JC-1881
Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court
The Honorable Travis L. Bauman-Crane, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
32D03-2501-JC-1

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 1 of 17
Opinion by Judge Vaidik
Judge Pyle concurs.
Judge Mathias dissents with separate opinion.

Vaidik, Judge.

Case Summary
[1] After adjudicating D.S. to be a child in need of services (CHINS), the juvenile

court entered a dispositional decree awarding wardship of D.S. to the

Department of Child Services (DCS). The court later modified the dispositional

decree to authorize DCS to place D.S. in a state institution for inpatient

psychiatric treatment under Indiana Code section 12-26-3-2, which allows a

child’s “parent or legal guardian” to apply to a facility for admission of the child

for voluntary treatment. D.S. appeals the modification.

[2] We hold that DCS being awarded wardship of D.S. is not the same as being

appointed her legal guardian, and therefore DCS did not have the same

authority as a parent or legal guardian under Section 12-26-3-2 to apply to a

facility for D.S. to be admitted for voluntary treatment. Since the treatment here

was not voluntary, the only avenue for having D.S. admitted to a state

institution was an involuntary civil commitment, which requires a civil-

commitment proceeding. Because the juvenile court here authorized D.S.’s

placement in a state institution without affording her a civil-commitment

proceeding, we reverse. On remand, we instruct the court to refer the matter to

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 2 of 17
the court having probate jurisdiction for a civil-commitment proceeding or to

initiate such a proceeding itself under probate law.

Facts and Procedural History
[3] D.S., born in June 2010, and her brother were adopted by W.S. and S.S.

(“Parents”) in 2016 after their biological parents’ parental rights were

terminated. D.S. has a variety of mental-health diagnoses and a history of self-

harming behaviors and suicidal ideations. From 2021 to 2024, D.S. had

multiple hospital admissions and stays at residential-treatment facilities.

Additionally, police responded to the family home six times due to D.S.

threatening to harm herself, Parents, or her brother.

[4] In December 2024, D.S. was twice admitted for acute stays at Hendricks

Behavioral Hospital due to self-harming behaviors. Parents contacted DCS to

inquire about “what other additional resources or different things could be put

into place” because they “ha[d] tried and done everything possible to help

[D.S.].” Tr. p. 14. DCS conducted a family evaluation and concluded that

“[P]arents have done what they could with the resources they have and right

now they need DCS’s help and the Court’s intervention.” Id. at 18.

Accordingly, DCS filed a petition alleging that D.S. is a CHINS. The juvenile

court appointed D.S. a court-appointed special advocate (CASA) and later

appointed her counsel through Child Advocates, Inc., a nonprofit organization.

[5] D.S. was placed at Safe Passage in January 2025 for an evaluation and

recommendations. The psychologist who performed the diagnostic evaluation

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 3 of 17
recommended that D.S. be placed in a state hospital. NeuroDiagnostic Institute

(NDI), a state hospital, had a four-to-six-month wait for a bed, so D.S. was put

on the waitlist. In April, Parents, DCS, and CASA submitted an agreed entry

on fact-finding and disposition in which Parents admitted that D.S. is a

CHINS. The agreed entry provided that D.S, who was still at Safe Passage,

“will continue to be placed in a mental health facility.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2

p. 30. The juvenile court accepted the agreed entry, adjudicated D.S. to be a

CHINS, and entered a dispositional decree awarding wardship of D.S. to DCS.

[6] In June, D.S. was moved to a therapeutically licensed foster placement on a

temporary basis while waiting for an opening at NDI. Later that month, the

parties learned that a bed at NDI would soon be available. D.S., by counsel,

moved to modify the dispositional decree to allow her to remain in her foster

placement. She argued that placement in a state hospital, which had been

recommended nearly five months prior, “is no longer the least restrictive, most

family-like, and most appropriate setting available, consistent with [her] best

interests.” Tr. p. 50. DCS filed its own motion for modification requesting

authorization to change D.S.’s placement to NDI and noting that a bed would

be available for her there on July 21. D.S.’s CASA submitted a report to the

court agreeing that D.S. should be placed at NDI.

[7] The juvenile court held a hearing on the parties’ motions on July 16. DCS

relied on Indiana Code section 12-26-3-2, which allows a child’s parent or legal

guardian to apply to a facility for the child to be admitted for voluntary

treatment. DCS explained that it had “already initiated the placement as

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 4 of 17
[D.S.’s] legal guardian,” and NDI had “accepted [D.S.].” Id. at 52. Thus, DCS

explained, it was “asking the Court to simply allow that placement to occur.”

Id. D.S.’s counsel argued that authorizing such a placement is “outside of the

dispositional authority of a juvenile court” and that DCS needed to petition for

a civil commitment to have D.S. placed in inpatient psychiatric treatment. Id. at

1. The court asked the parties to submit briefs on the issue of the court’s

authority and set another hearing in two days because the bed at NDI would

only be available until July 21.

[8] At the second hearing, the parties rested on their briefs, and the court concluded

that “voluntary commitment of the Child in NDI for in-patient psychiatric

treatment is within the authority of the Court under a combined reading of

Indiana Code 31-34-20 and Ind. Code 12-26.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 94.

The court then heard evidence as to what placement is in D.S.’s best interests.

Jackie Parrish, D.S.’s therapeutically licensed foster placement, wished to

continue as D.S.’s placement. Parrish testified that, in the six weeks D.S. had

been in her care, D.S. hadn’t engaged in any self-harm, and she hadn’t needed

additional support (such as DCS or the police) to control D.S.’s behavior. W.S.,

D.S.’s father, believed that it’s in D.S.’s best interests to be treated at NDI.

After the close of evidence, the court concluded that placement at NDI is in

D.S.’s best interests. Accordingly, the court modified the dispositional decree

“by adding the authorization of treatment services to the child through a

voluntary commitment process at NDI.” Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 5 of 17
[9] D.S. now appeals. A recent filing by DCS indicates that D.S. is being

considered for discharge, but as of the date of this opinion, she is still at NDI.

See Motion for Hearing, Cause No. 32D03-2501-JC-1 (Mar. 13, 2026). A

hearing is set for March 25.

Discussion and Decision
[10] D.S. contends that the juvenile court lacked the authority to modify the CHINS

dispositional decree to authorize DCS to place her in inpatient psychiatric

treatment at NDI without first initiating civil-commitment proceedings. The

juvenile court’s conclusion that it has such authority was based on “a combined

reading” of Indiana Code chapter 31-34-20, which governs dispositional decrees

in CHINS cases, and Indiana Code article 12-26, which governs “Voluntary

and Involuntary Treatment of Mentally Ill Individuals.” While we generally

afford deference to the trial court when reviewing a CHINS disposition, In re

A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 9-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) reh’g denied, trans. denied, because

this case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo, In

re P.F., 268 N.E.3d 777, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Our objective in interpreting

a statute is “to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent,” and “[w]e

presume that our legislature intended its language be applied in a logical

manner consistent with the underlying goals and policy of the statute.” In re

G.W., 977 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “Statutes relating

to the same general subject matter . . . should be construed together to produce

a harmonious statutory scheme.” Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 6 of 17
[11] Once a child has been adjudicated a CHINS, “the juvenile court may enter one

(1) or more of the following dispositional decrees” (among others):

(2) Order the child to receive outpatient treatment . . . .

(3) Remove the child from the child’s home and authorize the
department to place the child in another home, shelter care
facility, child caring institution, group home, or secure private
facility. . . .

(4) Award wardship of the child to the department for
supervision, care, and placement.

Ind. Code § 31-34-20-1 (a). It is undisputed that NDI is not a shelter-care

facility, child-caring institution, or secure private facility; 1 it is a “State

institution.” I.C. § 12-7-2-184(b)(6).

[12] As D.S. highlights, the court’s dispositional options do not include ordering

inpatient treatment or authorizing placement at a state institution. Nonetheless,

DCS contends that the juvenile court had the authority to authorize D.S.’s

placement at NDI as part of the CHINS disposition based on Indiana Code

1
A “shelter care facility” is “a place of residence that: (1) is licensed under the laws of any state; and (2) is
not locked to prevent a child’s departure unless the administrator determines that locking is necessary to
protect the child’s health.” I.C. § 31-9-2-117. A “child caring institution” is “(1) a residential facility that
provides child care on a twenty-four (24) hour basis for more than ten (10) children; or (2) a residential
facility with a capacity of not more than ten (10) children that does not meet the residential structure
requirements of a group home.” I.C. § 31-9-2-16.7. And a “secure private facility” is a “facility that is licensed
under IC 31-27 to operate as a secure private facility” other than a juvenile detention facility, a facility
operated by the department of correction, a county jail, or a detention center operated by a county sheriff.
I.C. § 31-9-2-115. DCS doesn’t argue that NDI meets any of these definitions.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 7 of 17
sections 12-26-3-2 and 31-34-19-5. Under Section 12-26-3-2(a), “If an individual

is less than eighteen (18) years of age, an application under this chapter may be

made” to a facility “by the individual’s parent or legal guardian” for the

individual to be admitted to the facility for voluntary treatment. DCS argues

that because the juvenile court granted it wardship of D.S., it could “act[] as

[her] legal guardian” under this statute and apply to NDI for her admission for

voluntary treatment. Appellee’s Br. p. 17. Although “voluntary treatment” in a

state institution isn’t an option under the CHINS dispositional statutes, Section

31-34-19-5 alludes to a court authorizing such treatment. That statute states:

If the court authorizes a child who is under the custody or
supervision of a local office or the department to be placed in a
state institution (as defined in IC 12-7-2-184) for voluntary
treatment in accordance with IC 12-26-3, the court may not
release the department from obligations of the local office or the
department to the child until a parent, guardian, or other
responsible person approved by the court assumes the
obligations.

[13] DCS claims that since Section 31-34-19-5 references a court authorizing the

placement of a child in a state institution for voluntary treatment, “the CHINS

court had statutory authority to authorize DCS acting as [D.S.’s] parent or

guardian, to place [D.S.] for voluntary treatment at NDI.” Appellee’s Br. p. 17.

This argument is a nonstarter because DCS is not D.S.’s legal guardian. Being

granted wardship of D.S. does not make DCS her legal guardian. As part of a

permanency plan, a CHINS court may appoint a legal guardian for the child as

provided in Indiana Code sections 31-34-21-7.5 and 31-34-21-7.7. But neither

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 8 of 17
statute contemplates DCS as a guardian, and the court didn’t appoint a

guardian here.

[14] In the context of a CHINS disposition, a guardianship and a wardship are not

the same thing. When a CHINS court appoints a legal guardian for a child, the

guardian “is a caretaker in a judicially created relationship between the child

and caretaker that is intended to be permanent and self-sustaining.” I.C. § 31-

34-21-7.5(c)(1)(D) (emphasis added). A wardship, on the other hand, “means

the responsibility for temporary care and custody of a child by transferring the

rights and obligations from the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to the

person granted wardship.” I.C. § 31-9-2-134.5(a) (emphasis added). If the

legislature intended for a person (or entity) having wardship of a child to have

the same authority as a parent or legal guardian to apply to a facility for

voluntary treatment for the child, it could have said so in Section 12-26-3-2 or in

the CHINS statutes discussed above. See In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1189

(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“[I]n interpreting a statute, we must consider not only

what the statute says but what it does not say. In other words, we are obliged to

suppose that the General Assembly chose the language it did for a reason.”

(quotations and citations omitted)), trans. denied. Because no application to NDI

was made by a parent or legal guardian, and because D.S. opposed being placed

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 9 of 17
there, this was not an admission for voluntary treatment; it was an involuntary

civil commitment. 2

[15] Because an involuntary civil commitment is a “significant deprivation of

liberty,” the formal civil-commitment procedures set forth in Indiana Code

article 12-26 must be followed to protect the respondent’s due-process rights

H.J. v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 243 N.E.3d 375, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans.

denied. In the context of a CHINS case,

If it appears to the juvenile court that a child has a mental illness,
the court may:

(1) refer the matter to the court having probate jurisdiction
for civil commitment proceedings under IC 12-26; or

(2) initiate a civil commitment proceeding under IC 12-26.

I.C. § 31-34-19-3. In other words, the juvenile court can either refer the matter

to the probate court to conduct a civil-commitment proceeding or act as a

probate court and initiate such a proceeding itself. See 15A Ind. Prac., Family

Law—Children in Need of Services § 25:10 (2025). Either way, the standard

civil-commitment procedures in Article 12-26 must be followed.

2
The dissent emphasizes that Parents consented to D.S.’s placement at NDI. But as DCS highlights, by
granting wardship of D.S. to DCS, the juvenile court transferred to DCS Parents’ rights and obligations and
the responsibility for D.S.’s care and custody. See I.C. § 31-9-2-134.5(a). By DCS’s own argument, then,
Parents’ consent is inconsequential because they no longer have the right to make decisions about D.S.’s care
or custody.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 10 of 17
[16] “To satisfy the requirements of due process, the facts justifying an involuntary

commitment must be shown by clear and convincing evidence[.]” Civ.

Commitment of T.K. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015)

(quotation omitted). Had D.S. been afforded the commitment proceeding to

which she was entitled, DCS would have had to show by clear and convincing

evidence that she is either dangerous or gravely disabled. See I.C. § 12-26-2-5(e).

But the juvenile court considered D.S.’s placement only in the context of a

motion to modify the CHINS dispositional decree. So, instead of the clear-and-

convincing evidence standard, the court’s findings needed only be supported by

a preponderance of the evidence. See I.C. §§ 31-34-19-10, 31-34-12-3. And

rather than determining whether D.S. is dangerous or gravely disabled, the

focus of the hearing was her best interests. See I.C. § 31-34-23-6(g). By

authorizing DCS to place D.S. at NDI for inpatient psychiatric treatment

without first affording her a commitment proceeding, the juvenile court

deprived D.S. of due process.

[17] Further, as D.S. points out, although she was fortunate enough to be

represented by an attorney through a nonprofit organization, children alleged to

be in need of services or who have been adjudicated CHINS aren’t entitled to

representation by counsel. See I.C. § 31-32-4-1. On the other hand, an individual

for whom involuntary commitment is sought has an absolute right to an

attorney to represent their legal interests. I.C. § 12-26-2-2(b)(4); see also Jones v.

State, 477 N.E.2d 353, 356-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that individuals

alleged to be mentally ill have a “right to effective counsel” in a commitment

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 11 of 17
proceeding and that “the commitment hearing itself is designed, in part, to be

an adversarial proceeding”), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Allowing children to be

placed in inpatient psychiatric treatment as part of a CHINS disposition rather

than a commitment proceeding means that children can be committed without

being represented by an attorney. The appointment of a CASA or guardian ad

litem (GAL) doesn’t cut it. CASAs and GALs are appointed to protect the best

interests of the child, not necessarily to provide legal representation. See I.C. §

31-32-3-6.

[18] We recognize that the juvenile court here was faced with a difficult situation

where Parents had tried everything in their power to help D.S. and a bed at

NDI would only be available for a few more days. But when the State wants to

take away the liberty of anyone, adult or juvenile, due process is required.

Reading the CHINS statutes and commitment statutes together to create a

workaround to our statutory procedures undermines the protections in place for

individuals subject to civil-commitment proceedings and leads to children being

committed without due process.

[19] Because D.S.’s placement at NDI was an involuntary civil commitment, not an

admission for voluntary treatment, the juvenile court lacked the authority to

approve such placement without affording D.S. a civil-commitment proceeding.

Accordingly, we vacate the court’s order modifying the dispositional decree and

remand with instructions for the court to refer the matter to the court having

probate jurisdiction to conduct a civil-commitment proceeding or to initiate a

commitment proceeding itself, acting under probate law.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 12 of 17
[20] Reversed and remanded.

Pyle, J., concurs.

Mathias, J., dissents with separate opinion.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Joel C. Wieneke
Wieneke Law Office, LLC
Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 13 of 17
Mathias, Judge, dissenting.

[21] I respectfully dissent.

[22] D.S. was an adopted, 15-year-old minor child with multiple, serious mental

health diagnoses and treatment needs, and Parents did all that they knew to do

for their child to the limit of their resources. Concerned for D.S. and for the

safety of her sibling at home, Parents turned to DCS and agreed that D.S. was a

CHINS. DCS, Parents, and the CASA for D.S. further agreed that she needed

the in-patient mental health treatment recommended by a psychologist.

Thereafter, the trial court authorized DCS to place D.S. in a mental health

facility for in-patient treatment. Under these extraordinary facts and

circumstances, I would affirm the trial court’s authority and placement decision

in this case, as the law should not require the doing of a useless thing. After

adjudicating D.S. a CHINS, the juvenile court granted wardship of D.S. to

DCS. The court further ordered that DCS was authorized to consent to D.S.’s

medical care. I.C. § 31-9-2-134.5 provides that:

“Wardship”, for purposes of the juvenile law, means the
responsibility for temporary care and custody of a child by
transferring the rights and obligations from the child’s parent,
guardian, or custodian to the person granted wardship. Except to
the extent a right or an obligation is specifically addressed in the
court order establishing wardship, the rights and obligations of
the person granted wardship include making decisions
concerning the:

(1) physical custody of the child;

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 14 of 17
(2) care and supervision of the child;

(3) child’s visitation with parents, relatives, or other individuals;
and

(4) medical care and treatment of the child.

I.C. § 31-9-2-134.5 (emphasis added). While I acknowledge the majority’s

distinction between a legal guardian, a more permanent relationship, versus a

wardship, which allows for temporary care and custody of a child, See Slip op.

at 9, in this case, concerning this minor child, it is a distinction without a

meaningful difference. DCS’s authority over its ward, D.S., as defined by

section 31-9-2-134.5, expressly extends to making decisions about her medical

care, which includes treatment decisions regarding her mental health.

[23] I also strongly disagree with the majority’s conclusion that D.S.’s placement at

NDI was not an admission for voluntary treatment. D.S. was at all relevant

times a minor, and as such, she had no controlling, decision-making authority

concerning the healthcare she desperately needed. In addition, this case

involves the unique circumstance in which both DCS and D.S.’s Parents agreed

that D.S. was a CHINS and that, on the recommendation of a psychologist, she

needed in-patient mental health treatment. Specifically, DCS and Parents

entered into an agreed entry on factfinding and disposition, which the trial

court accepted when it adjudicated D.S. a CHINS. And at the placement

modification hearing, Parents agreed with DCS and the CASA that it was in D.S.’s

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 15 of 17
best interests to receive in-patient treatment at the Neuro Diagnostic Institute. 3 Tr. Vol.

2, p. 90. Parents turned to DCS for assistance after they had exhausted their

own resources to obtain mental health treatment for D.S. and after they began

to fear for the safety of D.S.’s sibling in their home. Because DCS requested

modification of D.S.’s placement to NDI for in-patient mental health treatment

with the agreement and consent of Parents, I can only conclude that D.S.’s

admission to that facility was voluntary.

[24] I also disagree with D.S.’s assertion that allowing DCS to act in loco parentis

with respect to providing care for a ward’s mental health expands the scope of

DCS’s authority beyond the court’s orders. As I noted above, the General

Assembly has expressly authorized a person, or in this case an agency, granted wardship

over a child to make decisions concerning the child’s medical care and treatment. DCS is

also required to file progress reports every three months after the dispositional

decree and the juvenile court must hold periodic case reviews at least once

every six months, “or more often, if ordered by the court.” See I.C. § 31-34-21-1,

-2. Moreover, DCS’s implementation of a child’s case plan and placement are

subject to continual review by the juvenile court. These reports and safeguards

are at least equal to those provided by formal commitment proceedings.

3
Indiana Code section 12-26-8-1 requires the juvenile court to appoint a CASA or guardian ad litem for a
child committed either voluntarily or involuntarily to a mental health facility to “represent and protect the
best interests of the child”.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 16 of 17
[25] Perhaps one might argue (and the majority does) that alternative, formal,

mental health commitment proceedings might be preferable to the custom-

shaped, alternative procedure used here under extenuating circumstances.

However, under these unique facts and circumstances, and the unassailable

protections provided to D.S. prior to her commitment, I conclude that the

juvenile court was authorized to grant DCS’s requested placement

modification, and place D.S. at the Neuro Diagnostic Institute so that she could

receive the in-patient mental health treatment she needed.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 17 of 17