Jump To

Top Caption Disposition Lead Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Harold R White v. Ottawa Shores Homeowners Association

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 373712
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.6K)

• PDF

Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

HAROLD R WHITE and MARY PAT ABAIR UNPUBLISHED
WHITE, March 13, 2026
10:41 AM
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v No. 373712
Monroe Circuit Court
OTTAWA SHORES HOMEOWNERS LC No. 2024-147731-CH
ASSOCIATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and O’BRIEN and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs, Harold R. White and Mary Pat Abair White, appeal as of right the order granting
defendant, the Ottawa Shores Homeowners Association (“OSHA”), summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) (legal sufficiency). On appeal, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in dismissing
all of their claims against OSHA because plaintiffs possess a riparian easement within the Ottawa
Shores Subdivision and own a dock for mooring boats accessible by that easement. For the reasons
set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because this appeal comes to us after dismissal under MCR 2.116(C)(8), our review of the
record is limited to the pleadings alone, the factual allegations of which we must accept as true.
El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019).

The subject of this appeal is a dock for mooring boats located in the waterbed adjacent to
“Outlot D,” a riparian lot located in the Ottawa Shores Subdivision, a lakeshore community on the
Ottawa River in Erie Township, Monroe County. Plaintiffs are the owners of Lots 124 and 125 in
the Ottawa Shores Subdivision and use Outlot D.

-1-
OSHA’s rules and regulations for use and development of the Outlots are contained in a
Resolution.1 The Resolution created Outlot D for recreational use by the property owners of
Ottawa Shores Subdivision lots 101 to 130, and lots 157 to 162. This recreational use is “subject
to such rules and regulations as may be adopted” by OSHA. Article II of the Resolution also
defines “recreational use” of the Outlots:

Sec. 1 The recreational use to which each Outlot and the riparian waters thereof
are especially adaptable is declared to be the mooring of boats in the riparian waters
thereof, and all other recreational purposes and uses thereof shall be subordinate
thereto.

Article II, Section 2 states that storing boats or equipment, or parking cars on the upland of an
Outlot, are not recreational uses and are prohibited. Article II, Section 5 states: “The assignment
of mooring space at an Outlot shall at all times be subject to reassignment by [OSHA] according
to the needs of each craft thereat.”

Regarding development on and improvement of the Outlots, Article III Section 1 of the
Resolution states: “No structure shall be permitted on Outlots B, C or D excepting retaining walls,
docks and mooring posts.” Article III Section 5 states: “The improvement of the Outlot shall be
either for the common benefit or for a class benefit. . . . Docks and dock facilities shall be deemed
to be for a class benefit.” The Resolution contains provisions in Article IV that state the cost of
an improvement, where the improvement is for the benefit of a class, shall be borne by the
members of the class:

Sec. 1 The cost of improvements made or to be made for the common benefit in
each district and for the maintenance thereof shall be assessed against the “owner”
of each lot benefitted thereby and such assessment shall be a lien upon such lot.

Sec. 2 Where the improvement is for the benefit of a class the cost thereof and for
the maintenance thereof shall be assessed against the members of such class, as
from time to time constituted, and in addition thereto each member thereof
undertakes to pay and perform his share of the class project necessary at all times
to provide like benefits for incoming members of such class. Such share shall be
determined by the Association having due regard for adjustment made thereto. Said
cost and undertaking shall be a lien upon said share and upon the lot of such
shareholder.

Regarding possession of Outlots, Article V, Section 1 of the Resolution states: “The
‘owners’ of the lots which do not have water frontage are entitled as a group to possession of the
Outlot for recreational purposes and all are equal in right and no member of the group has a right

1
On appeal, plaintiffs note that the Resolution is unsigned and undated. It appears from the record,
and from plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, that the Resolution was drafted by the plattors of
Ottawa Shores during the replat and extension in 1956. It is unclear whether the Resolution was
ever recorded, which plaintiffs raise for the first time on appeal. Because both parties rely on the
Resolution as the written source of their arguments, we do not question its validity.

-2-
superior to any other member of the group or to any part of the Outlot.” Regarding transferability
of the right to use the Outlots, Article V also states:

Sec. 5 No guest of any owner shall be upon the Outlot or any class project unless
in company with such owner. Otherwise such person shall be deemed a trespasser.

Sec. 6 No Outlot benefits shall extend to a tenant of an “owner” except by
substitution and except on the condition that such benefits may be terminated at any
time by the Association for cause and further that such “owner” shall remain
responsible for the acts and omissions of such tenant.

Finally, Article VII of the Resolution states: “These Rules and Regulations shall, to the extent
therein provided, be a limitation upon the authority of the Board of Trustees to contract for and
supervise the upkeep, improvement, repair, and maintenance of Outlots and to defray the cost
thereof by special assessment upon the lots which do not have water frontage.”

Before plaintiffs acquired title to Lots 124 and 125, those lots were owned by Fred Abair,
Mary Pat’s father, and Harold’s father-in-law. Abair owned a seaplane that needed to be moored
during the summer season, so in 1976, he filed a request for a permit with the United States Army
Core of Engineers (USACE)2 to construct a dock on the shore of Outlot D and attach a mooring
buoy for the seaplane. The request was approved in 1976; Abair was authorized to “construct a
‘T’ shaped wood and steel pier extending 180 feet riverward from the existing shoreline in the
Ottawa River.” Abair individually funded the construction of the dock on Outlot D, which he used
for many years. The dock extended only approximately 65-75 feet from the shore of Outlot D.

According to plaintiffs, three more docks were installed on Outlot D and paid for by Ottawa
Shores Subdivison lot owners, and like Abair’s permit, these permits were not applied for in the
name of OSHA. One of them was applied for and paid for by Harold F. Mensing, Abair’s neighbor.
When Mensing applied to the USACE to add a floating extension to the dock he paid for, the
USACE approved the extension on the condition that Abair would not extend the dock he paid for
any further than the approximately 65-75 foot structure that existed at the time of Mensing’s
application. Mensing’s property is now owned by OSHA’s President Gregory Bixler, who has a
mooring space on the dock Mensing paid for and extended.

In February 2019, plaintiffs sought to repair the dock Abair paid for and “restore” it “to its
originally-permitted” 180 foot length. While removing sections of decking for replacement,
plaintiffs were approached by Bixler, who indicated that the repairs would require a permit from
the USACE, and that “it was a requirement that [OSHA] apply for permits on the Outlots . . . .”

2
The parties do not dispute that the waterbed below the Ottawa River falls under the jurisdiction
of USACE, which has the authority to approve permits regarding “construction of any structure in
or over any navigable water of the United States . . . .” Army Corps of Engineers, Department of
Defense, Authority to Issue Permits, 33 CFR 320.2(b) (2024). Such construction is “unlawful
unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary
of the Army.” Id.

-3-
A few years later, in February 2022, Bixler filed a permit application on OSHA’s behalf
with the USACE that sought to extend the dock to 100 feet in length. The permit application for
the 100-foot dock was approved by USACE and the Michigan Department of Environment, Great
Lakes, and Energy (EGLE) Water Resources Division in May 2022. One year later, in May 2023,
plaintiffs applied for their own permit from the USACE to rebuild the dock to measure 180 feet.
The permit application is not provided in the lower court file. According to plaintiffs, the permit
could not be approved because of Bixler’s earlier filed and approved application.

Plaintiffs, having made “substantial expenditures” in trying to rebuild the dock to 180 feet
in length, filed a complaint and first amended complaint against OSHA in May 2024 and August
2024, respectively. Plaintiffs alleged that certain provisions contained in the Resolution “create a
clear, objective, perpetual, irrevocable riparian easement for the benefit of the Subdivision lot
owners who do not own waterfront property,” and that “[t]his easement exists regardless of
whether ‘fee’ for the land underlying the Outlots resides in the collective subdivision owners, or
in [OSHA].” Plaintiffs alleged the dock was their personal property because it was paid for by
Abair. Plaintiffs also alleged “[t]he documented history of Outlot D development is conclusively
that, with [OSHA] oversight, lot owners apply for and fund the installation of docks and piers,
which are per se the personal property items of the Ottawa Shores Landowner and easement
beneficiary.” Further, plaintiffs alleged “Bixler, as the owner and user of a dock immediately
adjacent to the Abair Dock, sought to add sections to and expand the capacity of his dock, which
would be easier if the Abair Dock was shortened, or nonexistent.”

Plaintiff’s complaint sought equitable relief (Count I), for the trial court to declare: (1)
plaintiffs possessed an irrevocable riparian easement to use Outlot D; (2) OSHA is not the fee
owner of Outlot D or the bottomlands of the Ottawa River adjacent to Outlot D and only has an
easement interest in managing Outlot D; (3) plaintiffs are entitled to restore the dock Abair paid
for; (4) OSHA cannot restrict plaintiffs from building a dock that is 180 feet in length; and (5) any
of OSHA’s alleged amendments to the Resolution were ineffective. Plaintiffs sought damages for
the expenses incurred “in regards to driving of pilings necessary for the Abair dock” and sought
attorney fees. Plaintiffs also alleged OSHA breached its bylaws (Count II) and called the election
of its board members into question, accusing OSHA of operating as a “fiefdom.” Plaintiffs asked
for a court-supervised election of OSHA board members.

OSHA answered the complaint and first amended complaint in July 2024 and August 2024,
respectively. OSHA’s answer did not attach any exhibits but in paragraph 3 of its answer, OSHA
denied plaintiffs had an easement interest in Outlot D and went on to state OSHA obtained a quit
claim deed to Outlot D from the previous owners in 1970. OSHA also asserted that the docks were
a class benefit, not an easement. OSHA clarified that members of the Ottawa Shores Subdivision
may not seek permits for their own docks because they do not own Outlot D or the bottomlands
under the Ottawa River. Finally, OSHA asserted that by extending the dock Abair paid for to 100
feet, the dock was sufficient for plaintiffs to reach “boatable water,” the standard set in the
Resolution.

On September 30, 2024, OSHA filed a motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). OSHA argued that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted because they do not own Outlot D, have no authority to apply for a permit
for a dock with USACE, and there is no written instrument that conveys a riparian easement to

-4-
Outlot D. OSHA also argued that there is no genuine issue of material fact that it owns Outlot D
and the bottomlands of the Ottawa River adjacent to Outlot D, and thus, OSHA has sole authority
to apply for a dock permit with USACE. OSHA argued it was upholding the rules set out in the
Resolution to ensure lot owners in the Ottawa Shores Subdivision had equal rights to use mooring
spaces on Outlot D, and plaintiffs’ request for equitable relief violated the Resolution by affording
plaintiffs a superior right over other lot owners. OSHA’s motion asserted plaintiffs wished to have
legal ownership so they could rent mooring spaces out to third parties, but the motion did not
substantiate that allegation with any specific facts. Finally, OSHA argued plaintiff’s claims were
frivolous and OSHA was entitled to attorney fees and costs in defending the action under MCR
2.625(A)(2) and MCL 600.2591.

Plaintiffs replied to OSHA’s motion, maintaining the dock Abair funded was plaintiffs’
personal property because Abair obtained the permit to construct the dock, and paid for all costs
to construct and maintain the dock. Plaintiffs argued that USACE Chief Engineer Donald Rinke
approved plaintiffs’ subsequent application for a 180 foot dock, recognizing it did not impact
navigation of the waterway by the public or by other Outlot D users, and that a 180 foot dock was
necessary for plaintiffs to have adequate access to boatable water. However, the application was
rejected by EGLE, because EGLE and USACE already issued a permit for the same location to
Bixler, not because a 180 foot dock could not be built. Plaintiffs maintained they had a riparian
easement over Outlot D, and that “[t]he only reason that OSHA holds fee title to Outlot D is to
ensure the perpetual and [unfettered] riparian access that [p]laintiffs are entitled to.” Plaintiffs
reiterated that OSHA never paid for the construction of the docks on its Outlots, so the section of
the Resolution discussing defraying the costs of building docks to Ottawa Shores property owners
was unenforceable. With their reply, plaintiffs submitted the sworn affidavit of Harold White,
wherein he averred that if discovery were allowed to continue, plaintiffs could prove they owned
the dock Abair funded.

OSHA replied to plaintiffs’ response, arguing the Resolution does not expressly create a
riparian easement, and plaintiffs’ ability to moor boats on Outlot D docks is a privilege of
membership conferred upon a class of certain members subject to the conditions set out by OSHA
in the Resolution. OSHA also argued plaintiffs failed to rebut that OSHA owns the bottomlands
of the Ottawa River where the dock is built. Finally, OSHA separately filed the sworn affidavit of
Bixler, wherein he averred that he applied for a new dock permit because the dock Abair funded
was in disrepair and OSHA had sole authority as the owner of Outlot D to apply for such a permit.
Bixler also averred that the 180-foot dock plaintiffs desired to build would have impeded other lot
owners’ access to adjacent docks and would have put plaintiffs on unequal footing with other lot
owners and dock users, which would violate the Resolution.

The trial court heard oral argument on OSHA’s motion on November 8, 2024; the parties
advanced arguments consistent with their respective briefs. After hearing the parties’ arguments,
the trial court asked: “aren’t we short 50 people? I mean do we have necessary parties that—that
should be involved in this case? Doesn’t this [a]ffect . . . [e]verybody else that who—whose
properties adjoin Outlot D?” OSHA responded that this lawsuit did affect other lot owners inside
the Ottawa Shores Subdivision that had a right to use Outlot D, but explained plaintiffs filed the
lawsuit against OSHA, which was represented by a board of directors that included other Ottawa
Shores property owners. The trial court responded: “All right. Well that—that makes sense to

-5-
me.” Plaintiffs stated they would have no problem adding other affected residents as parties to the
lawsuit.

The trial court did not opine further on this particular issue, and went on to hold that
plaintiffs possessed no property interest in Outlot D, and only benefitted from a class privilege to
use Outlot D:

It’s clear to me that OSHA owns the outlot, there’s no question about that. That’s
proved by [the resolution] and it [is] also proved by the title commitment.

---

There’s nothing in there that says that specifically creates a riparian easement.
There’s nothing that says that. Those words are not used.

---

The—the resolution then goes on to be fairly clear: that the mooring of boats will
be within the discretion of [OSHA], that they maintain the ability to regulate and
change the assignment of the mooring of spaces, that the conditions of the use of
the mooring spaces, and—and it’s—it’s clear to me it also, the—the resolution
restricts the transfer of class benefit to any tenants and owner contradicting the
notion that an easement exists. . . . I cannot find as a matter of law that an easement
is created here.

Accordingly [the] motion for Summary Disposition is granted in favor of the
Defendant against the Plaintiff[s] pursuant to the (C)(8) motion.

The trial court entered an order granting OSHA’s motion for summary disposition “for all of the
reasons stated by the [c]ourt on the record . . . .” OSHA was not awarded attorney fees. This final
order closed the case. Plaintiffs now appeal as of right.

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY DISPOSITION
UNDER MCR 2.116(C)(8)

On appeal, plaintiffs argue they have a riparian easement over Outlot D to access the dock
Abair built, which plaintiffs allege they privately own. We disagree.

We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary disposition. Varela
v Spanski, 329 Mich App 58, 68; 941 NW2d 60 (2019). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests
the legal sufficiency of a claim based on the factual allegations in the complaint,” and may be
granted when “a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly
justify recovery.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. “When considering such a motion, a trial court
must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone.” Id. at 160.
The well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are “construed in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). “[O]nly factual
allegations, not legal conclusions, are to be taken as true” for purposes of MCR 2.116(C)(8). Davis
v Detroit, 269 Mich App 376, 379 n 1; 711 NW2d 462 (2005). “However, the mere statement of

-6-
a pleader’s conclusions, unsupported by allegations of fact, will not suffice to state a cause of
action.” ETT Ambulance Serv Corp v Rockford Ambulance, Inc, 204 Mich App 392, 395; 516
NW2d 498 (1994). If a case involves an entity’s bylaws, those governing bylaws are the law that
the trial court must interpret and apply. Pago v Karamo, ___ Mich App __, __ n 7; ___ NW3d
___ (2024) (Docket No. 371299); slip op at 18 n 7.

A. OSHA IS THE RECORD TITLE HOLDER OF OUTLOT D AND THE ADJACENT
WATERBED

“Land which includes or is bounded by a natural watercourse is defined as riparian.” Theis
v Howland, 424 Mich 282, 287-288; 380 NW2d 463 (1985). Although plaintiffs argue on appeal
that a question of fact remains regarding who owns riparian Outlot D, plaintiffs conceded below 3
that OSHA owns Outlot D. The quit claim deed from the previous owners conveying Outlot D to
OSHA is incontrovertible: it states: “Richard C. Pheatt and Harriet F. Pheatt, his wife, . . . QUIT
CLAIM To [OSHA], a Michigan Corporation, . . . a parcel known as Outlot D . . . .”

Because OSHA owns Outlot D, it also owns the waterbed adjacent to Outlot D. Under
Michigan law, an owner of riparian land bordering one of the Great Lakes owns title only to the
waterline of the lake. Hilt v Weber, 252 Mich 198, 213; 233 NW 159 (1930). But the owner of
riparian land bounded by a natural inland watercourse also owns the bed of the lake or stream to
the middle of the lake. Theis 424 Mich at 288 n 2. The parties do not dispute that the Ottawa
River is an inland watercourse subject to the jurisdiction of USACE. Army Corps of Engineers,
Department of Defense, Authority to Issue Permits, 33 CFR 320.2(b) (2024). Thus, under Theis,
424 Mich at 288 n 2, and by virtue of its ownership of Outlot D, OSHA owns the waterbed adjacent
to Outlot D on which the dock was built to the middle of the Ottawa River.

B. PLAINTIFFS DO NOT HAVE A RIPARIAN EASEMENT OVER OUTLOT D

Having established that OSHA owns Outlot D and the waterbed adjacent to it, we must
next determine whether Ottawa Shores Subdivision lot owners have a riparian easement over
Outlot D or whether they possess a revocable class privilege to use the docks on Outlot D for
recreational purposes. This can be done by determining “the intent of the plattors” in a deed, plat
dedication, or other document “from the language [the plattors] used . . . .” Theis, 424 Mich at
293. Riparian landowners enjoy certain exclusive rights, including the right to erect and maintain
docks along the owner’s shore. Theis, 424 Mich at 288. “[W]hile full riparian rights and
ownership may not be severed from riparian land and transferred to nonriparian backlot owners,
Michigan law clearly allows the original owner of riparian property to grant an easement to backlot
owners to enjoy certain rights that are traditionally regarded as exclusively riparian.” Little v Kin
(Little I), 249 Mich App 502, 504-505; 644 NW2d 375 (2002). “An easement is, by nature, a
limited property interest. It is a right to use the land burdened by the easement rather than a right
to occupy and possess [the land] as does an estate owner.” Mich Dept of Natural Resources v
Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc, 472 Mich 359, 378; 699 NW2d 272 (2005) (cleaned up). An

3
Plaintiffs stated in their response to OSHA’s motion that: “[t]he only reason that OSHA holds
fee title to Outlot D is to ensure the perpetual and [unfettered] riparian access that [p]laintiffs are
entitled to.” (Plaintiffs’ Response to OSHA’s MSD, 4, LCF 1 page 5.)

-7-
easement is generally confined to a specific purpose. Id. at 379. Easements are subject to the
statute of frauds. Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198, 205; 580 NW2d 876 (1998). “In order to create
an express easement, there must be language in the writing manifesting a clear intent to create a
servitude. Any ambiguities are resolved in favor of the use of the land free of easements.” Id.

Certain rights that are traditionally exclusively riparian may also be afforded to non-
riparian property owners by way of a license. “A license is merely authority or permission to do
some act or series of acts upon the licensor’s land without having any permanent interest therein.”
Mumaugh v Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co, 183 Mich App 597, 606; 456 NW2d 425 (1990).
A license, unlike an easement, does not constitute an interest in real estate and does not have to
comply with the requirements of the statute of frauds. Kitchen v Kitchen, 465 Mich 654, 659; 641
NW2d 245 (2002). But the key difference between easements and licenses concerns revocability.
A license is revocable at the will of the licensor, id. at 661, whereas “once granted, an easement
cannot be modified by either party unilaterally.” Schadewald v Brule, 225 Mich App 26, 36; 570
NW2d 788 (1997).

In dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against OSHA, the trial court considered the language of
the quitclaim deed from the Pheatts and OSHA’s Resolution, holding “[t]here’s nothing in there
that [] specifically creates a riparian easement. There’s nothing that says that. Those words are
not used.” We agree with the trial court’s conclusion. The quitclaim deed from the Pheatts
conveying Outlot D to OSHA provided the legal description of Outlot D, and there remained a
blank white space underneath sufficient to fit the language of an easement if the Pheatts so chose.
Below that blank white space, the form stated in parentheses: “If more space is needed for
description, restrictions, or other provisions, use reverse side.” No other restrictions or provisions
were provided but for the legal description of Outlot D. Thus, the deed does not contain express
language creating an easement.

We next consider the language of the Resolution. The Resolution does not create an
easement, but rather, a license to use Outlot D for recreational purposes. Article II, Section 1 of
the Resolution defined “recreational use” of the Outlots and “the riparian waters thereof” as “the
mooring of boats in the riparian waters thereof, and all other recreational purposes and uses thereof
shall be subordinate thereto.” The Resolution went on to restrict storing boats or equipment, or
parking cars on the Outlots. In isolation, these sections of the Resolution might read like an
easement because they allow backlot owners in the Ottawa Shores Subdivision the ability to use
the Outlots for a specified purpose.

But OSHA’s brief on appeal directs us to the Restatement of Property, Servitudes § 450
(1944), p 2901, which lays out five clauses, or elements, of an easement:

(a) entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or enjoyment of the land in
which the interest exists;
(b) entitles him to protection against third persons from interference in such use or
enjoyment;
(c) is not subject to the will of the possessor of the land;
(d) is not a normal incident of the possession of any land possessed by the owner
of the interest, and
(e) is capable of creation by conveyance.

-8-
The language of the Resolution clearly demonstrates that clauses (c) and (e) are not met.

Regarding clause (c), the Resolution states the recreational use discussed in Article II,
Section 1 is “subject to such rules and regulations as may be adopted” by OSHA, and Article II
Section 5 states: “The assignment of mooring space at an Outlot shall at all times be subject to
reassignment by [OSHA] according to the needs of each craft thereat.” Because OSHA reserves
the right to reassign mooring spaces and subjects backlot owners to “such rules and regulations
that may be adopted” by OSHA in the future, the Resolution created a revocable license or
privilege to use the docks to moor boats, Kitchen, 465 Mich at 661, not an easement. Article III
Section 5 of the Resolution states as much: “The improvement of the Outlot shall be either for the
common benefit or for a class benefit. . . . Docks and dock facilities shall be deemed to be for a
class benefit.”4

Having considered clause (c) above, we need not consider clause (e), but further
consideration of clause (e) demonstrates that the Resolution creates a license and not an easement
because the use of docks on the Outlots is not transferable. A license “is not assignable because it
is based on personal confidence,” Mumaugh, 183 Mich App at 606, and automatically terminates
upon the transfer of either the burdened or benefited property. Astemborski v Manetta, 341 Mich
App 190, 202; 988 NW2d 857 (2022). Conversely, an easement runs with the land, meaning the
right or obligation passes automatically as an incident of a conveyance or the interest in the land.
See Myers v Spencer, 318 Mich 155, 163-167; 27 NW2d 672 (1947).

The language in Article V, Section 5 of the Resolution states that no guest of any owner is
permitted on an Outlot without being accompanied by the owner, or they will otherwise be deemed
a trespasser. Article V, Section 6 states Outlot benefits would not extend to a tenant of an owner
except by substitution, and “except on the condition that such benefits may be terminated at any
time by the Association for cause and further that such ‘owner’ shall remain responsible for the
acts and omissions of such tenant.” These provisions of the Resolution make clear that the use of
the Outlots is a license, not a riparian easement right, because the privilege to use a dock could not
be transferred to guests or tenants.

Finally, plaintiffs argue they own the dock Abair paid to build and maintain, and that every
dock inside the Ottawa Shores Subdivision was paid for by an individual lot owner. According to
plaintiffs, the clause in the Resolution about defraying the costs to build docks to members of the
benefited class is unenforceable because it has never been exercised. But on this record, it appears
that OSHA’s current practice of backlot owners paying for dock construction is in keeping with
Article IV Section 1 on defraying costs of improvement to members of the Subdivision:

4
Plaintiffs relatedly argue they possess Outlot D because of Article V, Section 1 of the Resolution,
which states: “The ‘owners’ of the lots which do not have water frontage are entitled as a group to
possession of the Outlot for recreational purposes and all are equal in right and no member of the
group has a right superior to any other member of the group or to any part of the Outlot.” While
the meaning of the word “possession” here is ambiguous, it is refuted by the above clause
describing a license or privilege.

-9-
Sec. 1 The cost of improvements made or to be made for the common benefit in
each district and for the maintenance thereof shall be assessed against the “owner”
of each lot benefitted thereby and such assessment shall be a lien upon such lot.

There is no record of any other lot owner in the Ottawa Shores Subdivision with a license to use
the same dock Abair built. Thus, OSHA assessing the cost of building a new dock against plaintiffs
individually without conferring them with an ownership interest is consistent with the Resolution.
Abair was aware of this when he paid to build the original dock. In the letter forwarded the permit
application for the original dock to USACE, Abair wrote: “The strip of land” where the dock would
be built “is held in the name of [OSHA] as Outlot D for the stated purpose of mooring boats which
are owned by the holders of certain numbered lots . . . .” And the fact the Association maintains
the ability to assign mooring spaces negates any lot owner having any property right in a dock,
regardless of who paid for the dock’s construction and whether the costs were defrayed to other
members who had the privilege of using the dock.

Because the pleadings establish OSHA owned Outlot D, the adjacent waterbed, and the
dock in question, and that plaintiffs did not have a riparian easement to use Outlot D, plaintiffs
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Thus, the trial court did not
err in granting OSHA’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8).

C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PREMATURELY DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR
BREACH OF OSHA’S BYLAWS

Plaintiffs further argue the trial court prematurely granted summary disposition and failed
to consider plaintiffs’ other claims in its complaint which challenge the actions of OSHA’s board
of directors. Plaintiffs assert all of these claims are ripe for further factual development and
adjudication even if the trial court’s ruling regarding easement rights and ownership rights was
correct. As stated earlier, “the mere statement of a pleader’s conclusions, unsupported by
allegations of fact, will not suffice to state a cause of action.” ETT Ambulance Serv Corp, 204
Mich App at 395. Under MCR 2.111(B)(1), a plaintiff must plead “specific allegations necessary
reasonably to inform the adverse party of the nature of the claims the adverse party is called on to
defend.” Even if we were to view the factual allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiffs,
Maiden, 461 Mich at 119, plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action
against OSHA for breach of OSHA’s bylaws.

In order to state a claim for breach of contract, a complainant “must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) there was a contract, (2) which the other party breached (3)
thereby resulting in injury to the party claiming breach.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 164 (citation
omitted). “A breach occurs if a party does not perform a contractual duty due under the contract’s
terms.” Allen v Michigan State Univ, ___ Mich App __, _’ __ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket
No. 358135), slip op at 17.

Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint alleges “Board members of [OSHA] are breaching their
fiduciary, ethical, and agent duties to the general membership of [OSHA] by operating [OSHA] as
a fiefdom, as opposed to objective nonprofit organization.” These are legal conclusions that we
cannot accept as true for purposes of MCR 2.116(C)(8). Davis, 269 Mich App at 379 n 1. The
complaint also alleges that the election of OSHA’s most recent Board was “in question,” that

-10-
[OSHA] is “being mismanaged and improperly run,” and that “election vote results are being
obscured, improperly tallied, or otherwise modified.” But without citing to specific bylaws that
have been breached, and without alleging specific facts about how OSHA was being mismanaged
or improperly run, or any further details about its most recent Board elections, plaintiffs have not
pleaded how OSHA’s bylaws were breached with sufficient specificity to survive summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). There are no allegations about how OSHA did not perform
a duty it owed to plaintiffs under its bylaws. Allen, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 17. On this
basis, plaintiffs remaining claim for breach of bylaws failed to sufficiently plead facts that would
survive summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). These claims were properly dismissed.5

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

5
Plaintiffs lastly argue the trial court erred when it failed to order the joinder of necessary parties
under MCR 2.205 before dismissing plaintiffs’ claims because its order altered the rights of every
Outlot D user. Under MCR 2.205(B)(4), “[n]otwithstanding the failure to join a person who should
have been joined, the court may render a judgment against the plaintiff whenever it is determined
that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief as a matter of substantive law.” Given we affirm the
dismissal of this case under MCR 2.116(C)(8), this argument necessarily fails.

-11-