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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Damon Houston

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-10908
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: CON

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (19.8K)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-10902 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026 Page: 1 of 14

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 25-10902
Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

DAMON EUGENE HOUSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:15-cr-00037-RH-MAF-1

---

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No. 25-10908
Non-Argument Calendar

---

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
USCA11 Case: 25-10902 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026 Page: 2 of 14

2 Opinion of the Court 25-10902

versus

DAMON EUGENE HOUSTON,
a.k.a. Derek Mullough,
a.k.a. Derrick Mcullough,
Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00020-AW-MAF-1

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Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Damon Houston appeals the district court’s imposition of a
60-month prison sentence after it found Houston violated the
conditions of his supervised release from sentences in Houston’s
2015 and 2021 criminal cases. Houston argues that the district
court’s sentence is substantively unreasonable because it imposed
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences and did not
properly weigh the mitigating evidence he offered. We affirm
because the district court did not abuse its discretion, and the
sentence was substantively reasonable.
I. Background
Houston is no stranger to run-ins with the law. In 2015, a
grand jury indicted Houston and charged him with three counts of
knowingly and intentionally distributing a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), one count of carrying a firearm while doing
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25-10902 Opinion of the Court 3

so, and two counts of knowingly possessing a firearm and
ammunition while being a convicted felon. Houston pled guilty to
all charges.
The district court sentenced Houston to 84 months’ total
imprisonment, with three years of supervised release to follow.
The supervised release conditions included requirements that
Houston “shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime”
and “shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any
controlled substance . . . except as prescribed by a physician.”
In 2021, another grand jury indicted Houston and charged
him with knowingly escaping from custody by willfully failing to
remain within the extended limits of his confinement at a
residential reentry center. Houston again pleaded guilty. The
district court sentenced him to an additional 12 months’
imprisonment to run consecutively with his previous sentence, and
to three years of supervised release to run concurrent with the
previously imposed term of supervised release. The supervised
release conditions again included prohibitions on further crime and
unlawful controlled substance possession or use.
Houston began his supervised release term after his release
from custody in October 2022. Beginning in March 2023, Houston
violated the supervised release conditions seven times. These
violations included the following: (1) Houston unlawfully
possessed/used marijuana on March 4, 2023, and May 6, 2024
(Violation One); (2) he was arrested and charged with a state crime
for having “No Valid Driver’s License” on July 15, 2024 (Violation
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-10902

Two); (3) a state warrant was issued for his arrest on August 21,
2024, for “Sale of a Controlled Substance” (Violation Three); (4) a
state warrant was issued for his arrest on September 12, 2024, for
“Burglary of a Structure Causing Damage Over $1,000” (Violation
Four); (5) he was arrested and charged with a state “Fleeing and
Eluding” crime on October 7, 2024 (Violation Five); (6) he was
arrested and charged with a state “Driving While License
Suspended/Revoked” crime on October 7, 2024 (Violation Six);
and (7) he was arrested and charged with a state “Resisting an
Officer without Violence” crime on October 7, 2024 (Violation
Seven). Houston pleaded guilty in state court for Violations Three
through Seven after spending 82 days in jail. Houston’s probation
officer filed two petitions, each recommending the court revoke
Houston’s supervised release.
On February 28, 2025, the district court held a revocation
hearing to determine whether Houston violated the terms of his
supervised release in both his 2015 and 2021 cases. Houston
admitted to Violations One, Two, and Seven, but contested
Violations Three, Four, Five, and Six. The government admitted
into evidence copies of Houston’s guilty pleas and the state court
judgments for the challenged violations. Based on this evidence,
the district court found that the government had met its burden to
prove all seven violations of Houston’s conditions of supervised
release. The district court then found that the most serious
violation was Violation Three and, based on Houston’s criminal
history category of VI, his guidelines sentencing range in the 2015
case was 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment with a statutory
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25-10902 Opinion of the Court 5

maximum of 60 months. As for the 2021 case, the district court
found that Houston’s guidelines range was 33 to 41 months’
imprisonment with a 24-month statutory maximum, again based
on Violation Three. Both Houston and the government agreed
with the court’s calculations of Houston’s guidelines ranges.
The district court then gave Houston the opportunity to
address the court and provide explanations for the circumstances
surrounding the violations, which he did. Houston admitted
having pleaded guilty to the underlying offenses but disputed that
he was truly guilty. His counsel argued that Houston pleaded
guilty to these offenses only as a “best interest” plea because the
state prosecutor offered him probation instead of jail time.
Houston and the government disagreed as to whether the guilty
pleas were proof of the underlying offenses as relevant to his
alleged violations of supervised release. The court, despite already
finding that the government proved each violation, granted a
continuance to allow the parties to brief the issue. In the briefing,
Houston conceded that his guilty pleas proved the offenses but
asked the court to consider his explanations disputing guilt as
mitigation evidence.
The district court held another hearing on March 3, 2025.
There, the court again found that Houston’s guilty pleas were
sufficient to show that he violated the terms of supervised release
as to the challenged violations and again gave Houston an
opportunity to address the court.
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-10902

Houston stated that he did not commit the offenses that
were at issue and that he had nothing to do with the “sale charge.”
Houston also asserted he had “been working, 401 account, bank
accounts, credit cards, everything” and that he had received
custody of his children from Department of Children and Families
(“DCF”). Houston said that in negotiating his state plea
agreement, the prosecutor had looked at his background and said,
“you have been doing good” and offered him probation instead of
jail time because Houston had not committed these offenses.
Houston urged the court that he had done “[n]othing to break the
law.”
As to Violation Three, Houston’s counsel clarified that he
was requesting that the court impose a below guidelines sentence.
Houston’s conduct justified a lower sentence because although he
pleaded guilty to sale of a controlled substance, a Grade A violation
under § 7B1.1(a)(1) of the federal sentencing guidelines, he was not
the target of the investigation and only aided someone in
purchasing the drugs. Specifically, the target was Houston’s
coworker and, when the coworker did not show up to work, a
confidential informant tried to purchase drugs from Houston
instead. Houston took the informant to a house, went inside to get
drugs, sold the drugs to the informant, and then went back inside
the house to deliver the money from the sale. Houston argued that
he sold the drugs in exchange for the informant allowing Houston
to keep some of them, so the transaction was closer to him
purchasing drugs for his own use rather than selling them. Under
that argument, the purchase-instead-of-sale distinction would
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25-10902 Opinion of the Court 7

result in a Grade B violation instead of Grade A under the
guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a).
Houston also emphasized that upon release from prison he
took full custody of his children to keep his children out of foster
care. DCF assigned Houston a case plan, and he and the children’s
mother complied with the plan’s requirements, so DCF allowed
them to retain joint custody of their children. During this process,
Houston also agreed to come up with a payment plan to catch up
on his overdue child support obligations that had accrued while he
served his prison sentence. Houston worked as a welder at an
aluminum company. In connection with this job, he had
established a 401(k) retirement savings account and a bank account
to receive his paycheck deposits. Houston asserted that in 2023,
life got stressful, and he began using substances. That stressful time
was when he agreed to go with the informant to purchase drugs.
Houston also explained that his conviction for driving with
a suspended license (Violation Six) was because of past due tickets
and a controlled substance violation, and if he cleared those things
up, he could receive a valid driver’s license. Houston asserted that
the burglary (Violation Four) was more like trespass and criminal
mischief because the property he damaged was property he had
purchased for the victim and he “broke [his own] things in the
burglary.” Additionally, Houston stated that there was a previous
incident where the victim tried to shoot him, indicating the volatile
nature of their relationship. She pleaded guilty to improper
exhibition of a weapon and was sentenced to probation.
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-10902

Houston contended the violation for fleeing from police
(Violation Five) was only a half mile pursuit during a hurricane
while he was trying to “relocate to a safer area” from the storm.
But when he realized the officers were stopping him, Houston
panicked and took off running. Houston concluded that he knew
he violated the terms and conditions of his supervision, but he
requested that the court consider the circumstances of the
violations, as well as the good things that he was doing while on
supervision. Thus, Houston requested the court consider a
sentence within the guideline range as if the violation offenses were
Grade C violations. That lower range would be 8 to 14 months’
imprisonment, which he asked the court to modify to a period of
home detention to run concurrently with his 10 years’ probation in
the state sentence. Houston stressed that such an arrangement
would allow him to maintain his employment and provide for his
family.
For its part, the government acknowledged that Houston
tried to be cooperative, participated in a proffer with the U.S.
Attorney’s Office and the Drug Enforcement Administration, and
provided as much information as possible. Still, the government
argued that the cooperation did not rise to substantial assistance.
The government also argued that although Houston claimed that
he tried to do things correctly and live within the bounds of the
law, his violations proved otherwise. Thus, the government
requested “an appropriate sentence . . . that potentially still gives
him a term of supervised release afterwards,” because it thought
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25-10902 Opinion of the Court 9

“that Mr. Houston, and he even recognizes, will need that
continued supervision after.”
The district court imposed a total sentence of 60 months’
imprisonment—36 months for the 2015 case and 24 months for the
2021 case—which it noted was “a little below the guidelines as to
the 2015 case, but not to the extent requested, and it [was] a
guideline sentence as to the 2021 case.” The district court also
imposed five years of supervised release as to the 2015 case. The
district court found that there had been a “substantial violation of
trust” by Houston: he had received a below-guidelines sentence in
the 2015 case, re-offended in 2021, and “then gets out and has
committed this pretty serious violation[] of the trust that’s there.”
The court accepted that “the drug sale conviction was maybe not
the most traditional type of drug-trafficking that goes on” and
stated that peculiarity was the reason it “did vary down from the
guidelines which would have been . . . 51 to 60 months for that
offense.” The district court also noted the burglary and the fleeing
and eluding arrests and found that Houston was “someone who
just doesn’t have a whole lot of respect for the law and needs
deterrence . . . but there’s a public protection aspect of this too.
This is serious conduct, and again, it’s a significant breach of the
trust that’s placed there” when a defendant receives supervised
release. The district court acknowledged that “[t]here [wa]s some
mitigation. There was . . . some good things happening there with
the job, working. Those are good things.” It also acknowledged
that Houston accepted some limited responsibility by pleading
guilty but, overall, the plea was not significant because the court
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10 Opinion of the Court 25-10902

“kept hearing that [Houston] didn’t do anything wrong, even
though he’s pleaded guilty to multiple felonies, admitting that he
did lots of things wrong.” The district court reiterated that it
thought a “modest variance” from the guidelines was appropriate
and applied the same conditions of supervised release as the
previous 2015 sentence.
The district court concluded that Houston violated his
supervised release for all seven alleged violations, and after
considering everything said in court and at previous hearings, the
court revoked Houston’s supervised release in both the 2015 and
2021 cases. The district court explained that it considered the
sentencing guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) factors as
identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (e) and found that the sentence it
imposed was appropriate to deter future illegal conduct and protect
the public.
Houston objected to the sentence as “being greater than
necessary.” The court noted the objection but did not alter the
sentence. Houston timely appealed the revocation in both the 2015
and 2021 cases. We granted Houston’s unopposed motion to
consolidate his appeals.
II. Discussion
Houston argues that the district court imposed a
substantively unreasonable sentence when it ordered the sentences
to run consecutively instead of concurrently. He also contends that
the court improperly analyzed the § 3553(a) factors in not
attributing more weight to Houston’s efforts to hold a job and care
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25-10902 Opinion of the Court 11

for his children. Houston further believes the court should have
considered the three months he spent in prison for the state charges
in determining the appropriate sentence. The government
disagrees, arguing that the guidelines-range combined sentence
below the statutory maximum was reasonable, included a
downward variation for the violation in the 2015 case, and
considered the § 3553(a) factors. And the government contends
that Houston’s three-month incarceration on the state charges was
irrelevant because it was punishment for the state violations, not
for his supervised release violations.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a district
court’s sentence upon revocation of supervised release for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 935 (11th Cir.
2016). The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of
establishing that the sentence is unreasonable based on the facts of
the case and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d
1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). And we review the imposition of
consecutive sentences for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Covington, 565 F.3d 1336, 1346 (11th Cir. 2009).
Revoking supervised release requires the court to consider
the defendant’s history and characteristics, the crime’s nature and
circumstances, and the need for the sentence to afford adequate
deterrence and protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant, among other factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (e) (referencing
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)). While the district court must
consider the statutory factors in imposing a sentence, it need not
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12 Opinion of the Court 25-10902

discuss each factor. United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322
(11th Cir. 2008). It also need not weigh all the factors equally so
long as the court considers the necessary factors. United States v.
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015).
Along with the statutory factors, the district court should
also consider the particularized facts of the case and the sentencing
guideline range. Id. at 1259-60. A district court abuses its discretion
if, among other things, it “gives significant weight to an improper
or irrelevant factor.” Id. at 1256 (quotation omitted). We give “due
deference” to the district court’s consideration of the sentencing
factors because it has an “institutional advantage” as the factfinder.
United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018)
(quotation omitted).
District courts “have discretion to select whether the
sentences they impose will run concurrently or consecutively with
respect to other sentences that they impose, or that have been
imposed in other proceedings, including state proceedings.” Setser
v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 236 (2012). The § 3553(a) factors
guide the court’s exercise of discretion in these decisions. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3584 (b). Per the sentencing guidelines, a term of imprisonment
resulting from a supervised-release violation “shall be ordered to
be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the
defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment
being served resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the
revocation of probation or supervised release.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f)
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25-10902 Opinion of the Court 13

(2024). 1 A sentence below the statutory maximum for the crime is
an indicator of reasonableness. United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d
1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014). “Although we do not automatically
presume a sentence within the guidelines range is reasonable, we
ordinarily . . . expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be
reasonable.” See United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.
2008) (alteration adopted) (quotations omitted).
Here, the district court’s total 60-month sentence is
substantively reasonable. The district court considered and
credited the mitigating evidence Houston presented, including the
fact that he was working and that his drug sale conviction involved
atypical facts for that crime. But the record also shows that
Houston betrayed the court’s trust when he violated his supervised
release terms seven times in a variety of ways. These violations
indicated to the court that its sentence needed to deter Houston’s
illegal conduct and protect the public.
To be sure, as Houston points out, the district court did not
specifically mention Houston’s efforts to care for his children. But
the law does not require the court to specifically mention every fact
it considered. See Williams, 526 F.3d at 1322. Consistent with this
principle, it was sufficient that the district court made clear that it

1 This section of the sentencing guidelines was amended effective November

1, 2025. Compare U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) (Nov. 2024) with U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) (Nov.
2025). The November 2024 version was in effect at the time of Houston’s
sentencing for the supervised release violations on March 3, 2025. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.11(a) (“The court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date
that the defendant is sentenced.”).
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14 Opinion of the Court 25-10902

had considered everything said during the hearings, including the
“good things” that Houston had done. Nor was the district court
required to individually weigh the mitigating factors, as Houston
suggested, for Houston’s sentence to be reasonable. See Rosales-
Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. The district court expressly stated that it
had considered the § 3553(a) factors, the sentencing guidelines, and
everything said at the hearing, all together indicating a reasonable
sentence. Furthermore, the district court granted a “modest”
downward variance for the 2015 sentence violation and imposed a
within-guidelines sentence as to the 2021 sentence violation, which
together are another indication that the sentence was reasonable.
See Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1364; Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746. Thus, given
our precedent, we cannot conclude that the district court abused
its discretion in imposing Houston’s sentence. See Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d at 1259-60. And Houston has not borne his burden to
show otherwise. See Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378.
Finally, the district court did not err in not discussing
Houston’s three-month imprisonment on the state charges. That
punishment stemmed from his violations of state law, and while
those violations provided part of the basis for the court to revoke
Houston’s supervised release, the sentence the court imposed was
within its discretion. See Setser, 566 U.S. at 236.
III. Conclusion
The district court’s decision to revoke Houston’s supervised
release was substantively reasonable and not an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.