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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People of Michigan v. Edwin Maurice Jenkins

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 368656
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
March 13, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellee, 12:13 PM

v No. 368656
Macomb Circuit Court
EDWIN MAURICE JENKINS, LC No. 2022-001071-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and MURRAY and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-I) (victim under the age of 13), MCL 750.520b. Defendant was sentenced to
concurrent terms of 25 to 40 years’ imprisonment for each of the CSC-I convictions. Defendant
appeals as of right, and we affirm.

I. FACTS

In 2020, defendant’s then 12-year-old daughter reported that defendant had frequently and
repeatedly sexually assaulted her from the time she was 3 until she was 11 years old. She could
not recall the details of all the assaults, but she described in detail four specific instances of sexual
assault. At trial, the victim testified that when she was three years old, defendant removed her
pants and underwear and rubbed her vagina with his hands and penis. When she was
approximately seven years old, defendant entered her bedroom while she pretended to be asleep,
removed her clothing, and rubbed between her butt cheeks with his penis1 and ejaculated on her
back. She testified that when she was 11 years old and at defendant’s home, defendant took her
to his bedroom and told her to her remove her clothes; she performed oral sex on defendant, and
defendant then performed oral sex on her. Again while she was 11 years old, the victim was in

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The victim testified that on other occasions, defendant penetrated her anus with his penis.

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the bathroom of defendant’s home when defendant attempted to penetrate her vagina with his penis
but was unable to do so.

In 2020, the victim’s mother died. Defendant and the victim’s mother had divorced many
years earlier. After her mother’s death, the victim moved from her mother’s home to defendant’s
home in North Carolina. At trial, the victim testified that while in North Carolina defendant told
her to perform oral sex on him, but she refused and later told a friend about the abuse. About six
months later, the victim returned to Michigan to live with her maternal grandmother. After the
victim returned to Michigan, Detective Michael Chirco of the Clinton Township Police
Department investigated the victim’s claims of sexual abuse. The victim underwent a forensic
interview and underwent a physical examination by Dr. Ryan Surujdeo at the Detroit Medical
Center. Defendant thereafter was charged with four counts of CSC-I.

At trial, Dr. Surujdeo testified as a lay witness about his findings during the victim’s
examination. Although he had not been qualified at trial as an expert witness, he also provided his
general medical opinion related to his lay witness testimony concerning certain sexual abuse
injuries. Defense counsel did not object.

During closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the victim, who was 15 years old at the
time of trial, had testified describing the texture and taste of semen, which the prosecutor argued
was knowledge that the victim would have only if she had experienced it. Defense counsel did
not object but argued that the victim could have acquired this information from the internet. The
jury found defendant guilty as charged.

Defendant moved for a new trial and requested a hearing under People v Ginther, 390 Mich
436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), arguing that (1) the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof
to defendant during closing argument, and that (2) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the prosecutor’s closing argument and to Dr. Surujdeo’s improper expert testimony. The
trial court denied defendant’s motion, determining that Dr. Surujdeo improperly provided expert
testimony but that the error was harmless. The trial court also determined that the prosecutor’s
closing argument was not improper. Defendant now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. PROSECUTORIAL ERROR

Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor made improper
comments during closing argument. We disagree that error warranting reversal occurred.

Because defendant did not object contemporaneously to the prosecutor’s statement and
request a curative instruction, we review this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights, meaning that the error affected the outcome of the lower court
proceedings. See People v Isrow, 339 Mich App 522, 529; 984 NW2d 528 (2021). Reversal is
warranted only if the plain error resulted in the conviction of an innocent person or if the error
“seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” People v
Jarrell, 344 Mich App 464, 482; 1 NW3d 359 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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During closing argument the prosecution typically is given great latitude and permitted to
argue the evidence and the reasonable inferences of the evidence as it relates to the prosecution’s
theory of the case. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 236; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). This Court
evaluates claims of prosecutorial error case by case and in the context of the record. People v
Jackson, 313 Mich App 409, 425-426; 884 NW2d 297 (2015).

In this case, during closing argument the prosecutor commented that the victim testified
regarding the texture and taste of semen. The prosecutor argued that this testimony supported the
victim’s claims because the only way she would know the taste of semen was if she experienced
it. Given the victim’s young age and the specificity of her knowledge, this was a reasonable
inference that the prosecutor was permitted to make. Because the prosecutor’s comment was
formed on the basis of the victim’s testimony and was a reasonable inference, there was no error.
See Unger, 278 Mich App at 236. In addition, the trial court in this case instructed the jury that
the lawyers’ arguments were not evidence, and jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.
Id. at 235.

Defendant argues, however, that the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof
to him when she argued in closing as follows:

Now, I had mentioned that she displayed a great amount of sexual knowledge, a
great amount of sexual relationship knowledge with another person’s sexuality.
There was no evidence again whatsoever, the only time it was brought up was here.
There’s no evidence that she [had] been exposed to that stuff online and she was
asked that question. And what she said, well, I have health class and that did help
me understand better how those private parts functioned. Could have gone into
with her what internet did you look at, do you watch porn on the internet, have you
seen anything anywhere else, that was never talked about, there is no evidence of
that whatsoever so you can’t just assume it just because she’s a teenager. You
cannot just assume it. That was not evidence so it’s not something that you can
consider.

“A prosecutor may not imply in closing argument that the defendant must prove something
or present a reasonable explanation for damaging evidence because such an argument tends to shift
the burden of proof.” People v Fyda, 288 Mich App 446, 463-464; 793 NW2d 712 (2010). “Also,
a prosecutor may not comment on the defendant’s failure to present evidence because it is an
attempt to shift the burden of proof.” Id. at 464. “However, a prosecutor’s argument that
inculpatory evidence is undisputed does not constitute improper comment.” Id. “A prosecutor
may also argue that the evidence was uncontradicted even if the defendant is the only person who
could have contradicted the evidence.” Id. In this case, the prosecutor was allowed to argue that
the victim’s uncontested statements regarding her sexual knowledge suggested that the sexual
assaults had occurred.

Defendant argues that he was precluded by Michigan’s rape shield statute from introducing
evidence to explain that the victim’s testimony of specific sexual knowledge arose from her use of
the internet. We disagree. Generally, the rape-shield statute prohibits the admission of evidence
of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim’s sexual
conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct. People v Sharpe, 502 Mich 313,

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327; 918 NW2d 504 (2018). The statute thereby “serves to limit the admissibility of evidence of
a complainant’s sexual conduct” and “protects the privacy of the alleged victim.” Sharpe, 502
Mich at 325-326.

Defendant has not demonstrated that questioning the victim about her internet usage would
have been tantamount to introducing evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct.
Moreover, defendant addressed the issue of the victim’s internet usage during cross-examination
of Detective Chirco, who explained that the victim was using a social media platform where she
represented herself as older than she was. Defendant also addressed the victim’s internet use
during closing argument arguing that one way a young person could learn about sexual
relationships was through the internet. We conclude that the trial court did not err by finding that
the prosecutor did not make improper statements during closing argument that denied defendant a
fair trial.

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for new
trial on the basis that defense counsel was ineffective. We disagree.

We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial for an abuse of
discretion, which occurs when the trial court’s decision falls outside the range of principled
outcomes. People v Johnson, 502 Mich 541, 564; 918 NW2d 676 (2018). A trial court also
necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. People v Franklin, 500 Mich 92,
100; 894 NW2d 561 (2017). We review de novo the legal question of what standard applies.
People v Walters, 266 Mich App 341, 352; 700 NW2d 424 (2005).

Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question
of fact and constitutional law; we review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, while
reviewing rulings of constitutional law de novo. People v Yeager, 511 Mich 478, 487; 999 NW2d
490 (2023). Here, defendant preserved his challenge to the effectiveness of his representation at
trial by moving for a new trial or evidentiary hearing, but because no Ginther hearing was held
this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. See People v Miller, 326 Mich
App 719, 726; 929 NW2d 821 (2019).

A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art
1, § 20, which includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel, Yeager, 511 Mich at 488.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that but for counsel’s
deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different. Id. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

In doing so, the defendant must establish the factual predicate for the claim that counsel
was ineffective. People v Douglas, 496 Mich 557, 592; 852 NW2d 587 (2014). The effective
assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel was
ineffective. People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 539; 917 NW2d 752 (2018). To demonstrate that
counsel was ineffective, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s

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performance arose from sound trial strategy. People v Cooper, 309 Mich App 74, 80; 867 NW2d
452 (2015). Counsel is not considered to be ineffective merely because a trial strategy was
unsuccessful. People v White, 331 Mich App 144, 149; 951 NW2d 106 (2020).

Before the trial court, defendant moved for a new trial arguing that defense counsel was
ineffective by failing to object to Dr. Surujdeo’s testimony. Defendant argued that the doctor
improperly gave his expert opinion despite not being qualified to testify as an expert. The trial
court determined that defendant did not preserve his challenge to Dr. Surujdeo’s testimony by
failing to timely object, and the trial court therefore analyzed defendant’s challenge under the
“plain error” standard.

However, defendant was not challenging the doctor’s testimony but rather was arguing that
his counsel had been ineffective for failing to object to the improper testimony. As stated, the
proper test of whether counsel was ineffective is whether counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and whether but for counsel’s deficient performance, there
is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. Yeager, 511 Mich at 488.
Here, the trial court analyzed whether Dr. Surujdeo’s testimony was improper as an unpreserved
evidentiary challenge but did not properly analyze whether defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the doctor’s testimony. As noted, a trial court abuses its discretion when it
makes an error of law. Franklin, 500 Mich at 100. Nonetheless, we will not reverse the trial court
when it reaches the right result but for the wrong reason. People v Hawkins, 340 Mich App 155,
195; 985 NW2d 853 (2022).

We agree that Dr. Surujdeo made certain statements of medical opinion without being
qualified as an expert under MRE 702. “The party offering the expert testimony bears the burden
of satisfying MRE 702 and establishing admissibility of the proposed evidence.” People v
Bowden, 344 Mich App 171, 188; 999 NW2d 80 (2022). However, under MRE 701 a lay witness
may give opinion testimony that helps to establish a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony
or the determination of a fact in issue, though generally, the lay opinion testimony must not derive
from scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. See People v Dobek, 274 Mich App
58, 77; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). But when a lay witness provides opinion testimony based on his
or her personal experience and knowledge and the witness could have been qualified as an expert,
error in failing to qualify that witness as an expert may be considered harmless. See id. at 76-79.

In this case, Dr. Surujdeo was not qualified by the trial court to testify as an expert; to the
extent that he offered his opinion, that lay opinion testimony is governed by MRE 701. Dr.
Surujdeo testified regarding his education and experience, and because he conducted the victim’s
physical examination, he was able to provide his opinion about his observations. MRE 701(a).
Dr. Surujdeo also testified about the regenerative rates of tissue and trauma incurred from vaginal
penetration and indicated that he did not expect to find any trauma during his examination of the
victim. He testified:

Given [the victim’s] disclosure of being assaulted over a year ago, there would’ve
been no tissue damage, no scarring, nothing that would be acute that I would have
been able to see. . . . With an internal exam, given her disclosure of having been
assaulted over a year ago, there would’ve been nothing that would have shown
during my examination. All the tissue would’ve healed.

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Dr. Surujdeo also opined that the human body heals quickly after assaults, that the hymen is
mucosal tissue and can be damaged through nonsexual or nonpenetrative trauma, and that the
tissue cannot be permanently scarred. Dr. Surujdeo also opined about the potential result of the
victim’s internal-genital examination, while admitting that he did not perform that examination on
the victim. With regard to Dr. Surujdeo’s opinions resting on his own rational perceptions and
which are helpful to explain his own testimony, such opinions were admissible under MRE 701
and we find no error. Further, because the record suggests that Dr. Surujdeo could have been
qualified as an expert in sexual assault examinations, any error in the admission of his medical
opinions in the form of lay witness testimony was harmless. See Dobek, 274 Mich App at 76-79.
We therefore cannot conclude that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness because counsel failed to object, nor that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different had an objection been made. See Yeager, 511 Mich at 488.

Defendant also argues that the trial court did not provide the jury with M Crim JI 5.10,
which instructs the jury regarding expert opinion testimony. However, the trial court instructed
the jury that “[y]ou must decide which witnesses you believe and how important you think their
testimony is. You do not have to accept or reject everything a witness says.” Moreover, the jury
was aware Dr. Surujdeo was not an expert because both he and the prosecutor stated that was not
testifying as an expert. While defendant claims Dr. Surujdeo’s testimony “overrode the jurors’
common sense,” the trial court clearly instructed the jury that it was permitted to ignore or accept
the testimony of any witness.

Defendant also contends that defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to object
to the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument that the victim’s knowledge of semen
suggested she experienced the alleged abuse, and that the implication was unrefuted, which
defendant argues was tantamount to improperly shifting the burden of proof to defendant. As
discussed, prosecutors generally are afforded great latitude regarding their arguments at trial and
are free to argue the evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from the evidence. Unger, 278
Mich App at 236. The prosecutor’s suggestion that the victim’s testimony regarding sexual details
indicated that the sexual assaults had occurred was a reasonable inference arising from the
evidence and did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to defendant. Defense counsel
therefore was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s statement. See People v
Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010) (counsel is not ineffective for failing to
advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection). The trial court did not err by denying
defendant’s motion for a new trial.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Christopher P. Yates

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