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Feb. 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Cordarro T. Dorsey v. The City of Chicago, Chicago Police Officers Daniel Fair, Fred B. Coffey, Kevin Taylor, and Jeffrey Morrow, and Chicago Police Department

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:23-cv-15149

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (28)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.2K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CORDARRO T. DORSEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 23 C 15149

)

THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Chicago ) Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

Police Officers DANIEL FAIR, FRED B. )

COFFEY, KEVIN TAYLOR, and JEFFREY )

MORROW, and CHICAGO )

POLICED DEPARTMENT, )

)

Defendants.

             MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                            
Plaintiff Cordarro Dorsey has had a number of run-ins with Chicago police.  In October 

2023, he filed a pro se complaint against the City and a host of police officers, alleging that CPD
violated his constitutional rights on four separate occasions over multiple years. The court
severed the claims and dismissed one of them as time barred. Dorsey seeks to revive that claim
in this lawsuit, but for the reasons explained here, the effort fails.

The episode again before the court occurred on the evening of July 3, 2021, when pro se
Plaintiff Cordarro Dorsey was stopped by officers of the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”).

After a search of his person and vehicle revealed a firearm that did not belong to him, police
officers placed Dorsey under arrest. He was placed on pretrial electronic monitoring for over a
year, but released when the charges against him were dropped. In the amended complaint now
before the court, Dorsey attempts again to assert claims against the involved officers (“Defendant
Officers”), the City of Chicago (the “City”), and CPD, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Illinois state tort law. Defendants have moved [97, 99] to dismiss, and as explained below, the
court grants both motions.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The facts laid out below are taken from Dorsey’s Fourth Amended Complaint 121, which the court accepts as true at the pleading stage.

At around 11:30 p.m. on July 3, 2021, Dorsey was “lawfully parked outside a friend’s
residence after dropping off their children.” (FAC ¶ 8.) An “unmarked CPD SUV approached,”
and CPD Officers Morrow, Taylor, and Fair exited the vehicle and approached Dorsey. (Id.)

Morrow shined his flashlight into the vehicle, and inquired about Dorsey’s activities. Dorsey
explained that he had just conducted “a lawful drop-off” and was leaving, but the officers blocked
him in and CPD Sergeant Coffey ordered him out of the vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) After he stepped
out of the vehicle, Dorsey was handcuffed. (Id. at 6.) He claims that the handcuffs were too tight,
and that he “couldn’t breathe due to the tight cuffs” and being forced “to stand prolonged.” (Id.)

He “became nauseous and vomited” as a result. (Id.) Dorsey claims that the officers then
subjected him to a public strip-search, and that he was ordered to remove his shoes, socks, and
underwear.1 (FAC ¶ 10(c).) During the search, officers seized a set of keys that unlocked a gun
safe in Dorsey’s vehicle; they opened it and found a “legally owned firearm” that was registered
to Dorsey’s romantic partner. (Id. ¶ 10(d).) Upon discovering the weapon, Dorsey alleges, the
officers “began to clap their hands as if they had won a championship ring.” (Id. at 6.)
Dorsey was then arrested—he does not say on what charge—and was held temporarily
at a police facility in Chicago. (Id. ¶ 16.) He was later released on electronic monitoring, and was
required to wear an ankle bracelet for sixteen months. (Id.) During the pendency of the charges,
Dorsey asserts, Defendant Officers “submitted false testimony, failed to appear in court, and

1    The court notes that prior iterations of Dorsey’s complaint describe the search 

somewhat differently. Compare FAC ¶ 10(c) (“Officers strip-searched Plaintiff in public, removing
shoes, socks, and underwear.”), with Am. Compl. [13] ¶ 12 (“Defendants conducted an invasive
and degrading search of the Plaintiff, including going inside the Plaintiff's underwear and removing
the Plaintiff's socks.”). The court accepts the latest version as true for the purposes of this motion.
prolonged prosecution maliciously.” (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.) The charges were later dropped via a nolle
prosequi, which Dorsey claims was due to an unspecified Fourth Amendment violation. (Opp’n
[108] at 2.)

II. Procedural Background

On October 19, 2023, Mr. Dorsey sued the City of Chicago and many individual CPD
officers, alleging that four separate encounters—including the one at issue here—with the police
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois state tort law. (See Compl. [1].) He subsequently amended
the complaint twice [10, 13]. Defendants moved to dismiss [27, 28, 31]. In its Order addressing
the motions, the court observed that each of the four encounters described in Dorsey’s
submissions was a “separate occurrence[] involving different Chicago police officers”; the court
ordered the claims severed and docketed as four separate cases. See Order on First Motion to
Dismiss [86], 2025 WL 327425, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2025). As part of that ruling, the court
addressed the incident at issue here and concluded that any claim arising out of that incident is
time-barred or does not state a claim for relief. The court again granted him leave to amend his
complaint.

Dorsey did so, filing his Third Amended Complaint [94] on May 21, 2025. Defendant
Officers again moved to dismiss on timeliness grounds and for failure to state a claim [97], and
the City of Chicago moved separately for dismissal, arguing it could not be held liable under
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and that Dorsey lacked standing
to pursue injunctive relief. In response to these motions, Dorsey filed a brief in opposition [108],
and Defendants replied [109, 110]. But on November 12, 2025, with the motions to dismiss fully
briefed and pending, Dorsey requested leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint [121], which
the court granted with some reluctance. Defendants filed supplemental briefs [135, 136]
incorporating their prior briefing, which Dorsey opposed [138], and the motions are once again
fully briefed.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the court's
subject matter jurisdiction. "[S]ubject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental limitation on the power
of a federal court to act." Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 230 F.3d 974, 980 (7th Cir. 2000). If a
federal court "determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must
dismiss the action." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, Dorsey
bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Bazile v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 983 F.3d 274,
278 (7th Cir. 2020).

Likewise, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint, not its merits. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police of Chi.
Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). To survive, a complaint “must allege ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Fosnight v. Jones, 41 F.4th 916, 921–
22 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 922 (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). At this stage in the litigation, the court accepts as
true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 2014).
Pro se complaints like Dorsey’s are construed liberally. Johnson v. Prentice, 29 F.4th 895,
903 (7th Cir. 2022). Nonetheless, even pro se pleadings must go beyond mere labels and
conclusions and “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” to survive a motion to dismiss.

Brockett v. Effingham Cnty., 116 F.4th 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). The court need not “imagine every possible argument” in Dorsey’s favor simply because
he is pro se. Harris v. United States, 13 F.4th 623, 629 (7th Cir. 2021).
DISCUSSION

Dorsey’s sprawling Fourth Amended Complaint raises fourteen claims in total, but they
can be separated into five buckets: (1) claims arising out of the officers’ conduct during the July
3–4, 2021, traffic stop; (2) a malicious prosecution claim; (3) Monell claims against the City of
Chicago; (4) claims for injunctive relief; and (5) claims brought under Illinois state law. The court
examines each in turn.

I. Traffic Stop

Defendants first argue that Dorsey’s § 1983 claims relating to the officers’ conduct during
the traffic stop—unlawful seizure, excessive force, false arrest, unlawful search, and failure to
intervene—are time-barred. (Officers’ Supp. Br. [135] at 3.) The court agrees.
“Claims under § 1983 borrow the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the
state in which the cause of action arose,” Cielak v. Nicolet Union High Sch. Dist., 112 F.4th 472,
477 (7th Cir. 2024)—in Illinois, two years. 735 ILCS 5/13-202. While timeliness is an affirmative
defense, it is well-established that a complaint may be dismissed at the pleading stage when the
facts, as pleaded, “plainly reveal[] that an action is untimely under the governing statute of
limitations.” United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 582–83 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint at the pleading
stage because it was obvious that the plaintiff’s claims are time barred).
Here, Dorsey’s dispute with Defendant Officers occurred on the night of July 3–4, 2021,
more than two years before this case was filed on October 19, 2023, so those claims cannot
proceed. As noted, this court already dismissed those claims on timeliness grounds in its First
Motion to Dismiss Order. 2025 WL 327425, at *9–12. Dorsey’s Fourth Amended Complaint
raises these claims again in a materially identical way, and they are again dismissed, this time
with prejudice.

Dorsey has not effectively responded to the conclusion the court reached months ago
(and reiterates now). He observes, first, that “This Court has twice granted Plaintiff leave to
amend in light of these issues. Defendants’ renewed limitations argument does not present
intervening law, or new facts sufficient to justify reconsideration.” (Supp. Opp’n [138] at 2–3.) But
this is an obvious misconstruction of the case status. The court’s earlier order dismissed these
claims on statute of limitations grounds. Defendants do not request reconsideration of that order,
they request that the court stand by it. Second, Dorsey has requested, via a separately filed
motion [107], that the court relate back under FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) the claims in his amended
complaint to the original filing date, which he asserts was November 3, 2023 (an odd request, as
the case was in fact filed two weeks earlier).2 (See Mot. to Relate Back [107] at 1.) But both the
correct filing date, and certainly the date Dorsey invokes now, post-date the events of July 3–4,
2021, by more than two years. They do not alter the court’s conclusion.

Dorsey’s final response is a request that the court defer ruling on the statute of limitations
because he “realized his claims only after his initial case was dismissed,” and that his purported
late realization requires that the statute of limitations issue be determined by a jury. (Mot. to
Relate Back [107] at 2.) The court is not persuaded. His “initial case” (presumably the earlier
iterations of his complaint) included claims that are essentially identical to those he now raises in
the Fourth Amended Complaint; it makes no sense for Dorsey to argue that he only became
aware of claims he in fact attempts to assert again after the court previously dismissed them.

It appears that Dorsey intends to invoke the “discovery rule,” which holds that an injury
does not accrue until the plaintiff realizes that he has been injured. See, e.g., Cada v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The rule that postpones the beginning of
the limitations period from the date when the plaintiff is wronged to the date when he discovers
he has been injured is the ‘discovery rule’ of federal common law, which is read into statutes of
limitations in federal-question cases (even when those statutes of limitations are borrowed from

2    Because it does not ultimately make a difference in this case, this motion is stricken 

as moot. The court suspects that Dorsey mistakenly filed this motion on the docket in this case
instead of one of his other cases before this court.

state law).”). But Dorsey was certainly aware that he was injured at the time of the stop. He was
physically present, experienced the events firsthand, and necessarily would have perceived any
pain, force, embarrassment, or any resulting injury at the time it occurred. His reported belief that
he did not realize he had been injured for several months is simply implausible in this context.3

See Towne v. Donnelly, 44 F.4th 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2022) (stating that “a claim under § 1983
accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff
can file suit and obtain relief” (citation and quotations omitted)).

Moreover, as the court explained in its prior opinion, the discovery rule applies whenever
a plaintiff is unaware of the facts of his injury, not that the law entitles him to relief. Even if Dorsey
was truly unaware at the time that his injuries could be remedied via a federal lawsuit, his claim
remains untimely. See First Mot. to Dismiss Order, 2025 WL 327425, at *10.
II. Malicious Prosecution

A claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 is, essentially, a Fourth Amendment claim
for “unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42 (2022).

To state such a claim, Dorsey must plausibly allege “(1) the judicial proceeding was instituted
without probable cause; (2) the motive for the proceeding was malicious; and (3) the prosecution
ended in the plaintiff's favor.” Lee v. Harris, 127 F.4th 666 (7th Cir. 2025); see also Thompson,
596 U.S. at 45–48 (clarifying that a prosecutor’s dismissal of a case qualifies as a favorable
termination for purposes of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim).

This claim, too, must be dismissed. While he makes the perfunctory assertion that he was
arrested without “reasonable suspicion or probable cause” (e.g., FAC ¶ 14), Dorsey’s operative

3    In Devbrow v. Kalu, [705 F.3d 765](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/818007/eugene-devbrow-v-eke-kalu/) (7th Cir. 2013), the case Dorsey cites in support 

of his theory, the Seventh Circuit held that the “statute of limitations for a § 1983 deliberate-
indifference claim brought to redress a medical injury does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows
of his injury and its cause.” Id. at 766. In that case, the injury was prostate cancer, and the court
found that the statutory clock did not begin to run until the prisoner was informed that he had been
diagnosed with prostate cancer. Dorsey’s case is clearly different. Unlike prostate cancer,
Dorsey’s injuries were such that he would immediately become aware of them when they
occurred.

complaint does not state what crime he was charged with or under what pretenses the officers
detained him. The court is unable to assess whether he plausibly alleged the lack of probable
cause without knowing precisely what crime he was accused of committing. Abbott v. Sangamon
Cnty., 705 F.3d 706, 715 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that the “existence of probable cause” depends
on the “elements of the predicate criminal offense(s) as defined by state law”). Absent this
information, Dorsey does not state a plausible claim.

And, while the complaint itself does not describe his charges, an exhibit filed by Dorsey
entitled “Criminal Disposition Sheet” provides some answers. (FAC, Ex. Q [121] at 30.) This
document, if accurate, states that Dorsey was charged with aggravated use of a weapon in
violation of 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), and with possession of a weapon despite having a previous
felony conviction, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a). (Id.) The first of these offenses criminalizes
carrying “in any vehicle . . . any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm” whenever “the
person possessing the firearm has not been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner’s
Identification Card.” 720 ILCS 5/24–1.6(a)(1)–(3)(c). Dorsey himself alleges that (1) officers
found a key on his person, (2) that key opened a gun safe in his vehicle, and (3) that gun safe
contained a firearm belonging to another person. (FAC ¶ 10.) He has not alleged that he had a
valid permit to carry that firearm or that he has no previous criminal record. These facts do not
suggest the lack of probable cause—to the contrary, they strongly suggest that there was cause
for his arrest on these charges. The court understands that the charges were later dismissed (on
Fourth Amendment grounds, according to Dorsey), but subsequent dismissal of charges does not
mean that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him on the night of July 3, 2021. See Lee, 127 F.4th at 676 (“The existence of probable cause . . . serves as a defense against both federal
and state-law malicious prosecution claims.”); see also Abbott, 705 F.3d at 714)–715 (observing
that officers will likely receive qualified immunity so long as there is “arguable probable cause”).
The § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is dismissed.

III. Monell Liability

In Monell, the Supreme Court held that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 for its
own violations of the U.S. Constitution or federal law. 436 U.S. at 690–91. To prove that conduct
is properly attributable to a municipality itself, the plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation
was caused by a governmental “policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” First Midwest Bank v. City of
Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
The Monell liability doctrine has no application here. Because Monell liability is predicated
on a violation of § 1983, “a municipality cannot be liable under Monell when there is no underlying
constitutional violation by a municipal employee.” Doxtator v. O'Brien, 39 F.4th 852, 864 (7th Cir.
2022) (quoting Sallenger v. City of Springfield, 630 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2010)). As explained
above, each of Dorsey’s federal-law claims against employees of the City of Chicago must be
dismissed, either on timeliness grounds or for failure to state a claim. Without a predicate violation
by an employee, his claim against the City must be dismissed as well. The court observes, further,
that if he had a cognizable claim, Dorsey would be entitled to just one recovery; that the City is
indemnifying its officers likely means the court need not separately determine whether City policy
is behind any alleged violation.

Dorsey also contends that opposing counsel’s conduct during this litigation itself
constitutes a constitutional violation that supports his Monell claim. In the FAC and in a separate
95-page filing entitled “Supplemental Evidence in Support of Economic and Punitive Damages,
and to Establish Pattern and Practice,” he asserts that the City’s decision to participate in this
litigation at all “further evidences” a “policy, practice, and custom of obstructing accountability for
police misconduct.” (FAC ¶¶ 36–42.) He points to numerous examples of alleged misconduct of
opposing counsel: counsel (1) argued that his claims were not timely; (2) asserted that his failure
to rebut arguments results in forfeiture; (3) filed “serial motions to dismiss”; (4) sought to “stay or
limit discovery” while motions are pending; (5) “coordinated” “identical defenses across multiple
officers”; and (6) was involve[d] in the “City’s practice of providing full legal defense and
indemnification to officers.”4 (Id. ¶¶ 38–44; Supp. Evid. [128] at 9–10.) His brief in opposition
echoes many of these same arguments, accusing opposing counsel of “misuse of legal
formalities” and “demoralizing the self-represented plaintiff” through “legal technicalities such as
statute of limitations, failure to plead plausibly, etc.”5 (Opp’n [108] at 4.) He also sees impropriety
in Defendants’ refusal to accept his multi-million dollar “global settlement demand,” which he
claims "falls well below the City’s median and high-exposure case ranges and aligns with the
Department of Law’s own fiscal precedent for non-fatal constitutional violations.” (Supp. Evid.
[128] at 11, 51–52.)

The court sees little reason to dwell at length on this argument, beyond noting that
settlement proposals and responses are inadmissible to prove or disprove any claim. FED. R.
EVID. 408(e). The other conduct he rails against are instances of routine litigation practice, not
bad-faith activity by the City or counsel. Defendants have a right to vigorously defend themselves
in this lawsuit, and their filing of motions and refusal to accept his settlement demand do not
amount to a policy or practice of constitutional violations sufficient to trigger Monell liability.

Further, while timeliness rules and pleading standards are no doubt confusing and demoralizing,
the court has given Dorsey great latitude here, yet he makes no allegations that suggest he has
a timely or plausible claim for relief.

4    The court notes that the operative complaint demands that the City indemnify the 

police officers involved in this case (FAC ¶ 19), but simultaneously argues that the City’s practice
of doing just that constitutes a violation of the Constitution (id. ¶ 45).

5    Dorsey also accuses opposing counsel of adopting contradictory positions:  he 

states that Defendants’ “strategy of dismissing claims based purely on procedural grounds”
conflicts with their “admitting misconduct in the factual allegations.” (Opp’n [108] at 4.) But at the
pleading stage, the court and opposing counsel operate under the presumption that Dorsey’s
allegations are true—that Defendants’ arguments assume, arguendo, his allegations are accurate
does not constitute an admission that they are, in fact, factually accurate.
IV. Injunctive Relief

In the FAC, in a section entitled “Equity-Based Claims,” Dorsey asks for an injunction
ordering various policy reforms at CPD; he notes that “monetary damage alone are [sic]
inadequate to redress Plaintiffs injuries, as Defend unconstitutional policies persist and continue
to endanger private individuals.” (FAC ¶ 28–29.) These claims are dismissed for lack of standing.

Article III of the U.S. Constitution “confines the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and
‘Controversies.’” FDA v. All. For Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 378 (2024). For there to be a
“Case” or a “Controversy,” each plaintiff in federal court must demonstrate standing—a “personal
stake” in the case and its outcome. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). The
“irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing is composed of three elements: (1) an injury in
fact, (2) caused by the defendant, (3) that would likely be redressed by judicial action. Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “As the party invoking federal jurisdiction,” Mr. Dorsey
bears the burden of establishing standing. In re Recalled Abbott Infant Formula Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.4th 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Silha v. ACT, Inc., 808 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015)).
Because he requests injunctive relief, Mr. Dorsey must demonstrate “a substantial risk of
future injury.” Murphy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 69 (2024). His injury need not be “literally certain,”
but “it must be ‘certainly impending.’” Scholl v. Ill. State Police, 776 F. Supp. 3d 701, 709 (N.D.
Ill. 2025) (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410, 414 n.5 (2013)). As the
Supreme Court explained in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), a “federal court
may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that certain practices of
law enforcement officers are unconstitutional.” Id. at 111. To establish standing to seek injunctive
relief, therefore, Dorsey must do more than simply point to past mistreatment by the police; he
must show “a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way.” Id. Dorsey has not done so. The criminal case against him has been dismissed, and he
presents no facts or allegations that suggest he is in imminent danger of being harmed in the
same manner. In fact, his brief in opposition entirely ignores Defendants’ arguments as to
standing, suggesting that he concedes the matter. (See generally Opp’n [108].) All claims for
injunctive or equitable relief are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
V. Remaining State Law Claims
Because the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 (c)(3).
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motions to dismiss [97, 99] are granted. Because Plaintiff has had ample
opportunities to adequately plead his case, all of his federal claims are dismissed with prejudice.
His pending motion to relate back [107] is stricken without prejudice to renewal in his other matters
before this court. With respect to this case, the Clerk is directed to enter judgment on all federal
claims in favor of Defendants with prejudice and against Plaintiff. Dorsey’s state law claims are
dismissed without prejudice to proceeding in state court.

                               ENTER: 

Dated: February 24, 2026 Repreca Hiferrdnespe
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER
United States District Judge

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