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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Admiral Insurance Company v. Lippert Components, Inc., Kinro Texas Inc., Kinro, Inc., LCI Industries F/K/A Drew Industries, Inc., Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Quinton Williams

Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 10-23-00250-CV
• Nature of Suit: Administrative Law - Summary Judgment

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (26.3K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Lead Opinion

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-23-00250-CV

Admiral Insurance Company,
Appellant

v.

Lippert Components, Inc., Kinro Texas Inc., Kinro, Inc.,
LCI Industries f/k/a Drew Industries, Inc.,
Appellees

On appeal from the
40th District Court of Ellis County, Texas
Judge Bob Carroll, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 111895

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an insurance coverage case related to an underlying personal

injury lawsuit filed by Quinton Williams against Lippert Components, Inc.

(Lippert), and its subsidiaries Kinro, Inc., Kinro Texas, Inc. (Kinro), and LCI

Industries as successor in interest to Drew Industries, Inc. (LCI). 1 The case

1 Other defendants that are not parties to this appeal were named in the original, amended, and/or

supplemental petitions filed by Williams in the trial court.
involves competing claims for declaratory relief regarding whether Admiral

Insurance Company (Admiral) had a duty to defend Lippert, Kinro, and LCI

against Williams’s underlying lawsuit.

A. Background

Prior to Williams’s injury, Admiral had issued a commercial general

liability insurance policy to Lippert, covering Lippert, Kinro, and Drew

Industries, Inc., along with other entities. The policy provided general liability

coverage for claims that sought damages due to bodily injuries. Admiral

denied the insureds a defense to Williams’s lawsuit, claiming the policy’s

“Injury to Workers Exclusion” precluded coverage.

Admiral filed an original petition and request for declaratory judgment

against Lippert, Kinro, LCI, and non-parties to this appeal Liberty Mutual

Insurance Company (Liberty), and Quinton Williams. In Admiral’s lawsuit, it

sought, among other relief, a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or

indemnify the insureds under the commercial general liability policy with

respect to the underlying lawsuit. In response, Lippert, Kinro, and LCI filed a

counterclaim for declaratory judgment in which they sought a declaration that

the insureds were entitled to insurance coverage under the commercial general

liability policy for the defense and indemnification of the underlying lawsuit.

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 2
Pursuant to a Rule 11 agreement, the parties filed cross motions for

partial summary judgment on their competing claims for declaratory judgment

solely on the issue of whether Williams’s operative petition, including all

subsequent amended or supplemental petitions filed by Williams in his

underlying lawsuit, invoked Admiral’s potential duty to defend the insureds

against Williams’s claims.

The trial court denied Admiral’s motion for partial summary judgment,

granted Lippert’s motion for partial summary judgment, and found that

Admiral owed a duty to defend based on Williams’s allegations because the

trial court could not find that the allegations unambiguously foreclosed the

possibility of coverage, as required to excuse Admiral’s duty to defend. The

trial court also excluded Admiral’s extrinsic “work status” evidence that was

submitted to support Admiral’s assertion Williams’s claims were not covered

because the policy’s “Injury to Workers Exclusion” precluded coverage.

Admiral, Lippert, Kinro, and LCI filed an unopposed joint motion to

sever the trial court’s declaratory judgments on the duty to defend issue so that

the ruling on Admiral’s duty to defend would be immediately appealable. The

trial court granted the motion to sever, and Admiral appealed the trial court’s

order granting Lippert’s motion for partial summary judgment and denying

Admiral’s motion for partial summary judgment. Admiral contends the trial

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 3
court erred in (1) granting Lippert’s motion for partial summary judgment, and

in denying Admiral’s motion for partial summary judgment, and (2) granting

Lippert’s motion to strike Admiral’s extrinsic summary judgment evidence.

We will affirm.

B. Issue One

1. Standard of Review

“We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, taking as true

all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulging every reasonable

inference in the nonmovant’s favor.” JLB Builders, L.L.C. v. Hernandez, 622

S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex. 2021) (citing Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164

S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005)). “When reviewing a traditional motion for

summary judgment, we must determine whether the movant met its burden

to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” James v. Young, No. 10-17-00346-

CV, 2018 WL 1631636, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 4, 2018, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211,

215 (Tex. 2002)). Once the movant produces sufficient evidence to establish

the right to summary judgment, the nonmovant must present evidence

sufficient to raise a fact issue. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195,

197 (Tex. 1995). When both sides move for summary judgment and the trial

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 4
court grants one motion and denies the other, we review the summary

judgment evidence presented by both sides, determine all questions presented,

and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered. See Mann

Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.

2009) (citing Comm’rs Court of Titus County v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex.

1997)).

1. Applicable Law

An insurer’s duty to defend is determined by applying the eight-corners

rule that looks to the third-party plaintiff’s petition, which is considered in

light of the policy provisions, without regard to the truth or falsity of the

allegations contained in the pleadings. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc.,

268 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex. 2008). A third-party plaintiff’s factual allegations

that potentially support a covered claim are all that is needed to invoke the

insurer’s duty to defend. See Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex.

Political Subdivisions Prop./Cas. Joint Self Ins. Fund, 642 S.W.3d 466, 471

(Tex. 2022). An insurer’s obligation to defend can be invoked even if the

allegations in the third-party plaintiff’s petition are groundless, false, or

fraudulent. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 268 S.W.3d at 491. “However, we only

defer to a [third-party plaintiff’s] characterization of factual allegations, not

legal theories or conclusions.” Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 370

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 5
S.W.3d 377, 380 (Tex. 2012). “In reviewing the [third-party plaintiff’s]

pleadings and making the foregoing determinations, courts look to the factual

allegations showing the origin of the damages claimed, not to the legal theories

or conclusions alleged.” Ewing Const. Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 420

S.W.3d 30, 33 (Tex. 2014) (citing Evanston, 370 S.W.3d at 380; Nat’l Union Fire

Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139,

141 (Tex. 1997)). “It is not the cause of action alleged which determines

coverage but the facts giving rise to the alleged actionable conduct.” Adamo v.

State Farm Lloyds Co., 853 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]

1993, writ denied). “If the [third-party plaintiff’s] pleadings do not contain

factual allegations sufficient to bring the case clearly within or without the

coverage terms, the general rule is that the insurer is obligated to defend if

there is any potential claim under the pleadings that falls within the coverage

of the policy.” GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., v. Austin Power Inc., 357 S.W.3d 821, 824

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). If the underlying third-

party plaintiff’s petition is ambiguous, the court may not read facts into the

pleadings, look outside the pleadings, or imagine factual scenarios which might

invoke coverage. Id. Even easily ascertained facts outside the third-party

plaintiff’s pleadings are not ordinarily material to the determination of

whether the duty to defend exists. Weingarten Realty Mgmt. Co. v. Liberty

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 6
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 343 S.W.3d 859, 862 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011,

pet. denied). “The duty to defend is not affected by facts ascertained before

suit, developed in the course of litigation, or by the ultimate outcome of the

suit.” Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 268 S.W.3d at 491 (citing Trinity Universal Ins. Co.

v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 829 (Tex. 1997); see also 14 COUCH ON

INSURANCE § 200:19 (noting that duty to defend is unaffected by “what the

parties know or believe the alleged facts to be, the outcome of the underlying

case, or the merits of the claim”)).

“However, the eight-corners rule does not require us to ignore those

inferences logically flowing from the facts alleged in the petition.” GEICO Gen.

Ins. Co., 357 S.W.3d at 824 (citing Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Gulf Coast Marine

Assocs., Inc., 252 S.W.3d 450, 456 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet.

denied)). An inference is a fact or proposition drawn from an admitted or

otherwise proven fact that is a logical consequence flowing from a fact. Gen.

Star Indem. Co., 252 S.W.3d at 456. “In other words, we may draw inferences

from the petition that may lead to a finding of coverage.” Id.

As to the policy, if a term is susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation, we must resolve that uncertainty in favor of the insured.

Evanston Ins. Co., 370 S.W.3d at 380. Appellate courts should resolve all

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 7
doubts regarding the duty to defend in favor of the duty and construe the

pleadings liberally. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 268 S.W.3d at 491.

1. Discussion

There is no dispute that under the commercial general liability policy,

Admiral agreed to defend and indemnify the insured parties for covered claims.

Whether Admiral owes a duty to defend under the commercial general liability

policy is a question of law which we review de novo. See Solvent Underwriters

Subscribing to Energy Ins. Intern., Inc. Cover Note No. EII-3824 v. Furmanite

Am., Inc., 282 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet.

denied). If Williams’s operative petition does not allege facts within the scope

of coverage, Admiral is not legally obligated to defend the suit against its

insureds. See Furmanite Am., Inc., 282 S.W.3d at 667 (citing Nat’l Union Fire

Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 939 S.W.2d at 141).

The dispute in this case is whether the “Injury to Workers Exclusion” in

the Policy bars coverage. Admiral contends its broad “Injury to Workers

Exclusion” comprises four separate exclusions—Absolute Employers Liability,

Injury to Leased Worker, Injury to Independent Contractors, and Injury to

Temporary/Volunteer/Casual Worker—and bars coverage for bodily injury to

every conceivable class of worker if the exclusion applies to any insured.

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 8
Admiral argues in its brief that the four separate exclusions, including related

definitions, significantly limit coverage as follows:

(1) The Absolute Employers Liability Exclusion bars
coverage for bodily injury to any “employee” of “any insured”
arising out of and in the course of employment by any insured, or
performing duties related to the conduct of any insured’s business,
regardless of whether any insured may be liable “as an employer
or in any other capacity.”

The Policy defines an “employee” to include a “leased
worker.”

(2) The Injury to Leased Worker Exclusion bars coverage for
bodily injury to any “leased worker,” regardless of whether the
insured may be liable “as an employer or in any other capacity.”
The Policy defines “leased worker” to mean a person leased to a
named insured by a labor leasing firm under an agreement
between a named insured and a labor leasing firm, to perform
duties related to the conduct of the named insured’s business.

Because the Policy defines “employee” to include a “leased
worker,” the Injury to Leased Workers Exclusion is also subsumed
within the Absolute Employers Liability Exclusion, and the latter
applies to both an “employee” and a “leased worker.”

(3) The Injury to Independent Contractors Exclusion bars
coverage for bodily injury to any independent contractor hired
directly or indirectly by any named insured or on behalf of a named
insured. The exclusion also applies to employees of the
independent contractor. The exclusion applies whether the
insured may be liable “as an employer or in any other capacity.”

(4) The Injury to Temporary, Volunteer or Casual Worker
Exclusion eliminates coverage for bodily injury to a “temporary
worker,” “volunteer worker,” or “casual worker.” The exclusion
defines a “temporary worker” as a person who is furnished to any
insured to substitute for a permanent “employee” on leave or to
meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions. “Casual worker”

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 9
means a person, other than a person furnished to a named insured
by a labor union, who acts at the direction of and within the scope
of duties determined by any insured, and is employed by any
insured for a short time and for a limited and temporary purpose;
or a person for whom any insured, or a labor leasing firm acting on
behalf of any insured, does not withhold federal income taxes and
pay federal unemployment tax.

Admiral further argues that under the eight-corners rule, reasonable

inferences from Williams’s operative petition and supplemental petitions

establish that Williams was at least an employee or leased worker of Kinro (a

named insured), or otherwise fell within one of the enumerated worker

categories while assigned to work at the Kinro facility with Lippert’s or Kinro’s

equipment; thus the exclusionary endorsement defeats any duty to defend for

all insureds.

Lippert, Kinro, and LCI contend the operative petition controls and,

when read liberally in favor of coverage, does not unambiguously place

Williams within any category of the policy’s “Injury to Workers Exclusion.”

Lippert, Kinro, and LCI rely upon Williams’s allegations that he was an

employee of Diversified Sourcing Solutions, was denied workers’ compensation

because he was not an employee of Lippert, Kinro, LCI, or a subsidiary, and

that Williams’s only relationship with Lippert, Kinro, or LCI was as an invitee

at the Kinro facility—none of which falls within the exclusion’s enumerated

worker statuses. Because exclusions are strictly construed against the insurer

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 10
and doubts are resolved in favor of the duty to defend, Lippert, Kinro, and LCI

argue that Admiral failed to conclusively eliminate the potential for coverage.

Under the general liability policy, coverage is invoked by an “occurrence”

that takes place in the policy period, in the “coverage territory,” and causes

“bodily injury” to which the insurance policy applies. “Occurrence” is defined

as “[s]omething that happens or takes place; specif[ically], an accident, event,

or continuing condition that results in personal injury or property damage that

is neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of an insured party.” 2

Williams’s petition alleged that he “was moving large plates of glass with a

cart . . .” that “. . . unexpectedly shifted due to the fact the cart was not properly

equipped for holding or transporting the glass plates . . .” and caused “. . . the

plates to fall onto [Williams] causing him severe, permanent and disabling

injuries.” The period of coverage for the policy was from January 1, 2015, to

January 1, 2016, and the operative petition alleged that Williams was injured

on August 28, 2015. The policy defined the coverage territory as “[t]he United

States of America . . .” and the petition alleged that the location of the facility

where Williams was injured was in Waxahachie, Texas. Williams’s operative

petition satisfies the policy’s terms that there be an “occurrence” that takes

place in the “coverage territory” and causes “bodily injury” during the policy

2 OCCURRENCE, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 11
period. Consequently, absent any applicable exclusion, a review of the

operative petition and the policy establish that the alleged incident was

potentially covered by the policy, which would obligate Admiral to defend the

insureds.

Turning to whether the employee exclusion applies, we again look to

Williams’s operative petition, specifically where he alleged he was an employee

of Diversified Sourcing Solutions, initially in section five and again in section

six. In section five Williams alleged he “was an employee of Diversified

Sourcing Solutions and assigned to work at a facility located at 101 Mushroom

Road, Waxahachie Texas” and that “[h]e was on the premises of the Facility

with the permission of owner KINRO TEXAS.” In section six, Williams alleged

that he was “[a]t all times material hereto . . . the employee of DIVERSIFIED

and in the course and scope of his employment when he was injured due to a

dangerous activity, condition and/or hazard existing on the premises, causing

him serious and permanent and [sic] bodily injuries.”

Williams did not allege he was employed by or doing work for Lippert,

Kinro, or LCI, nor as the trial court noted in its conclusions of law that

Williams did not allege the existence of a “staff leasing agreement” between

Diversified and any insured. We further note that Williams did not allege he

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 12
was a temporary worker, volunteer worker, casual worker, leased worker, or

independent contractor, as those terms are defined in the policy.

Admiral contends that Williams’s factual allegations in the operative

petition and supplemental petition clearly alleged that Williams was an

employee of Kinro. In support, Admiral directs us to Williams’s allegations

that he was assigned to work at a facility owned by Kinro, that he was an

“invitee,” and that he was working with equipment, products and

instrumentalities owned by Kinro as sufficient to trigger an Employer’s

Liability Exclusion. Admiral also identifies Williams’s allegation that Kinro

did not subscribe to workers’ compensation insurance to support its contention

that “[o]nly an ‘employer’ can be a non-subscriber to workers’ compensation.”

Admiral argues such an allegation is only relevant when asserting a claim

against an employer. Admiral further argues that Williams’s supplemental

petition—which alleges Kinro and Liberty fraudulently conspired to create

workers’ compensation coverage to invoke the statutory bar—amounts to a

non-subscriber claim. Consequently, Admiral contends the only conclusion

that can be reached is that Williams was alleging that he was an employee of

Kinro.

The trial court appropriately concluded that “an equally plausible

inference could be made that Mr. Williams was not working in any excluded

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 13
capacity for any insured, particularly in light of the allegations that: (a) ‘[a]t

all times material hereto, [Mr. Williams] was the employee of Diversified and

in the course and scope of [that] employment when he was injured,’ and (b) Mr.

Williams ‘was expressly denied workers compensation benefits for not being

an employee of Lippert Components or its subsidiaries.’ ” (brackets in original).

Williams’s allegation that there was a collateral decision that Williams

was not an employee of either Lippert, Kinro, or LCI for purposes of eligibility

for workers’ compensation benefits does constitute a factual allegation

regarding Williams’s “worker status.”

Here an inference could be made that Williams’s work duties were

directed by Diversified based on Williams’s allegation that he was assigned to

work at Kinro’s facility while an employee of Diversified and was in the course

and scope of his employment when injured.

The trial court concluded that Admiral could not meet its burden of

proving that the “Injury to Workers Exclusion” applied to the allegations in

Williams’s operative petition. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that

the operative petition did not allege any facts that triggered the exclusion and

that the operative petition “unambiguously assert[ed]” the opposite: that

Williams was an employee of Diversified Sourcing Solutions—not Lippert or

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 14
its subsidiaries—and was acting within the scope of that employment when he

was injured.

The trial court further concluded that the only relationship the operative

petition alleged between Williams and Lippert or its subsidiary entities was

his status as an “invitee” on the premises. We agree with the trial court’s

analysis that since Admiral’s proposed inferences did not necessarily flow from

the allegations, the operative petition did not “unambiguously foreclose the

possibility of coverage,” which is required to excuse an insurer’s duty to defend.

See Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 268 S.W.3d at 491; Gen. Star Indem. Co., 252 S.W.3d

at 456. Because the Injury to Workers Exclusion does not bar suits by invitees,

we reject Admiral’s argument that Williams’s allegations support an inference

that he was an employee of the insureds.

Admiral argues that the trial court should have considered extrinsic

evidence regarding Williams’s “worker status” under the exception to the eight-

corners rule established by Monroe Guaranty Insurance Company, v. BITCO

General Insurance Corporation. See generally Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. BITCO

Gen. Ins. Corp. 640 S.W.3d 195 (Tex. 2022). However, we decline to consider

Admiral’s extrinsic evidence regarding Williams’s “worker status” under the

Monroe exception, because: (1) There was no gap in the operative petition that

prevented the court from conducting a standard eight-corners analysis, (2)

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 15
Admiral’s extrinsic evidence regarding Williams’s employment status

contradicted the facts alleged in the operative petition, and (3) Admiral’s

argument regarding Williams’s relationship to Lippert overlapped with the

merits of the underlying liability dispute. See Monroe Guar. Ins. Co., 640

S.W.3d at 201–02. The circumstances in this case do not meet the

requirements of the Monroe exception which would allow for the consideration

of the extrinsic evidence regarding William’s “worker status.” Accordingly, we

look only to the operative petition and the policy.

We conclude that because the four corners of the policy and the four

corners of the operative petition established the potential for a covered claim,

but did not unambiguously trigger an exclusion, Admiral’s duty to defend was

invoked. See Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Indep. Sch. Dist., 642 S.W.3d at 471; see

also GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 357 S.W.3d at 824.

We overrule Admiral’s first issue.

C. Issue Two

In its second issue, Admiral contends that the trial court erred in

granting Lippert, Kinro, and LCI’s motion to strike its extrinsic summary

judgment evidence.

Because it is not “initially impossible to determine whether coverage is

potentially implicated,” we need not reach this issue. See Allstate Cnty. Mut.

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 16
Ins. Co. v. Wootton, 494 S.W.3d 825, 835 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2016, pet. denied).

D. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s order granting Lippert’s motion for partial

summary judgment and denying Admiral’s partial motion for summary

judgment.

MATT JOHNSON
Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: March 12, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
CV06

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Lippert Components, Inc. et al. Page 17