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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Karen Lynn Grasmeyer v. Ronald Lee Grasmeyer II

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 375438
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (8K)

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Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

KAREN LYNN GRASMEYER, also known as UNPUBLISHED
KAREN LYNN WOLTERS, March 13, 2026
11:22 AM
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v Nos. 375438; 376413
Ottawa Circuit Court
RONALD LEE GRASMEYER II, LC No. 2023-100075-DM

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and BORRELLO and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals,1 defendant, Ronald Lee Grasmeyer II, appeals as of right the
trial court’s order granting physical custody of two of the parties’ minor children, KG and LG, to
plaintiff, Karen Lynn Grasmeyer, also known as Karen Lynn Wolters. Defendant also appeals the
trial court’s award of attorney fees to plaintiff. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arises from a contentious and extended divorce proceeding. Plaintiff initially
filed a complaint for divorce in Muskegon Circuit Court in March 2022; however, the action was
dismissed in March 2023 due to non-resolution or settlement within the statutory one-year period.
After dismissal, plaintiff relocated from the marital residence in Muskegon to a residence in
Hudsonville. In March 2023, plaintiff instituted the present divorce action in the Ottawa Circuit
Court.

During the marriage, the parties resided in Muskegon and had four minor children: RG,
TG, KG, and LG. They also assumed care for defendant’s adult child, JG, who was not a minor
during these proceedings. It is undisputed that in December 2021, defendant experienced a severe

1
See Grasmeyer v Grasmeyer, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 13,
2025 (Docket Nos. 375438 and 376413).

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case of COVID-19, requiring hospitalization for several weeks in early 2022. During this period,
plaintiff discovered defendant’s extramarital affairs, which precipitated her decision to seek
dissolution of the marriage. At trial, defendant conceded to engaging in relationships with other
women, including individuals who were family friends.

It is further undisputed that, by the time of the Ottawa County divorce filing, plaintiff’s
relationship with the two eldest minor children, RG and TG, had become significantly strained.
Both RG and TG absconded from plaintiff’s residence and frequently refused to participate in
parenting time with her. The record reflects that the contentious divorce proceedings, coupled
with the dissemination of information and expressions of opinion to the children by both parents,
adversely affected all four minors. In addition to absconding, RG was charged in juvenile court
for an incident in which he choked plaintiff during a dispute regarding electronic device usage.
TG, approximately 15 years old during the proceedings, consistently exhibited disrespectful and
oppositional behaviors toward plaintiff, including verbal and physical confrontations and recurrent
absconding. KG, who was approximately 13 years old at the time of the bench trial, had been
diagnosed with Smith-Magenis Syndrome and mild cognitive impairment, resulting in emotional
dysregulation and, at one point, juvenile charges for destruction of school property. The youngest
child, LG, made suicidal and homicidal statements and began absconding from plaintiff’s
residence during parenting time.

Following an extensive bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment of divorce awarding
the parties joint legal custody of the four minor children. Physical custody of RG and TG was
awarded to defendant, while physical custody of KG and LG was awarded to plaintiff. The trial
court subsequently awarded attorney fees to plaintiff. These appeals ensued.
II. BEST-INTEREST FINDINGS

Defendant contests the trial court’s award of physical custody of KG and LG to plaintiff,
asserting that the court’s factual findings are against the great weight of the evidence.

As set forth in the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., we must affirm a child custody
order on appeal unless the trial court’s factual findings were against the great weight of the
evidence, the trial court committed a palpable abuse of discretion, or the trial court made a clear
legal error on a major issue. See MCL 722.28; Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 876-877; 526
NW2d 889 (1994). As our Supreme Court explained in Sabatine v Sabatine, 513 Mich 276, 284;
15 NW3d 204 (2024):

MCL 722.28 incorporates three standards of review into the act: (1) “a reviewing
court should not substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless the factual
determination clearly preponderates in the opposite direction,” Pierron v Pierron,
486 Mich 81, 85; 782 NW2d 480 (2010) (cleaned up); (2) “an abuse of discretion
occurs if the result is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it
evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of
judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or
bias,” Maier v Maier, 311 Mich App 218, 221, 874 NW2d 725 (2015) (cleaned up);
and (3) clear legal error exists when “a court incorrectly chooses, interprets, or
applies the law,” Fletcher[, 447 Mich at 881 ].

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On appeal, defendant acknowledges that he does not challenge the trial court’s finding that
KG and LG maintained an established custodial environment with both parents. Under controlling
precedent, modification of such an environment is precluded absent a showing, by clear and
convincing evidence, that alteration would advance the children’s best interests. See Kuebler v
Kuebler, 346 Mich App 633, 670; 13 NW3d 339 (2023); Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App
499, 509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003). In conducting the best-interest analysis, the trial court must
evaluate the twelve statutory factors enumerated in MCL 722.23, apply the requisite evidentiary
burden, and make explicit findings and conclusions on each factor. See Kuebler, 346 Mich App at
671.
The trial court found that, at the outset of the divorce proceedings, both parties engaged in
conduct that undermined the children’s relationships with the other parent, including exposing the
children to ongoing personal and legal disputes between the parties. The court determined,
however, that plaintiff more effectively curtailed such deleterious conduct than did defendant. On
appeal, defendant challenges the weight the trial court accorded these findings when assessing
best-interest factors (b), (d), (f), (j), and (l), arguing that the evidentiary record fails to substantiate
the conclusion that his actions or statements toward plaintiff had a detrimental effect on the minor
children sufficient to warrant adverse findings on those factors.

MCL 722.23 provides in relevant part as follows:

As used in this act, “best interests of the child” means the sum total of the
following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court:

---

(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child
love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child
in his or her religion or creed, if any.

---

(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.

---

(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.

---

(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and
the other parent or the child and the parents. A court may not consider negatively
for the purposes of this factor any reasonable action taken by a parent to protect a
child or that parent from sexual assault or domestic violence by the child’s other
parent.

---

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(l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular
child custody dispute.

Defendant conceded that he made two inappropriate statements regarding plaintiff in the
presence of the minor children. Specifically, in March 2023, defendant stated in the presence of
TG that plaintiff had engaged in infidelity and had infected defendant with a sexually transmitted
disease (STD). Additionally, in February 2024, defendant informed a clinician, in the presence of
LG, that plaintiff did not have custody of LG’s older brothers due to plaintiff’s alleged domestic
abuse. Defendant contends, however, that the trial court erred by assigning undue weight to these
two statements and by applying them to multiple best-interest factors.

We conclude defendant’s argument is unavailing. The trial court did not limit its analysis
to the two statements defendant now concedes making in the presence of the children. Rather, as
set forth in its comprehensive 62-page opinion and order, the trial court identified numerous
instances wherein defendant made statements or engaged in conduct intended to undermine or
disparage plaintiff. The record establishes that, in addition to attributing plaintiff’s lack of custody
of LG’s brother to alleged abuse, defendant also informed LG’s clinician that LG had absconded
from plaintiff’s home on seven occasions. Moreover, plaintiff testified that the children repeated
statements to her that mirrored statements previously made by defendant, including allegations of
infidelity, transmission of an STD, and attempted homicide. Additional evidence demonstrated
that defendant blamed plaintiff, in the presence of the children, for delays in the divorce
proceedings and for the parties’ failure to reach a settlement.

Plaintiff acknowledged that, at the time she initiated divorce proceedings, she informed the
children that her decision was prompted by defendant’s infidelity. Plaintiff expressed regret for
making this disclosure to the children and testified that she has since refrained from similar
conduct. The trial court further observed that defendant continued to disparage plaintiff in the
presence of the children throughout the pendency of these proceedings. In 2024, defendant sent a
text message to plaintiff and to one or more of the minor children, accusing plaintiff of failing to
care for the children, exhibiting pettiness and negativity, and harming the children through her
actions. Defendant also instigated a confrontation that required police intervention when plaintiff,
accompanied by her brother, returned to the marital home to retrieve personal property. Testimony
was presented that defendant referred to plaintiff as “a money hungry b***” and “a terrible
mother” in the presence of the children and appeared to encourage the children to treat plaintiff
with disrespect.

The record further reflects that, despite the degrading, profane, and violent statements and
conduct exhibited by RG and TG toward plaintiff, defendant took minimal or no action to intervene
or correct such behavior. Defendant permitted TG to follow plaintiff throughout the home during
an appraisal, during which TG physically impeded plaintiff, yelled at her, and suggested that she
should harm herself, without significant intervention by defendant. Defendant testified that he
believed RG was acting in self-defense when he choked plaintiff after she entered RG’s room to
recover her belongings.

The evidence further demonstrated that defendant did not encourage RG or TG to
participate in plaintiff’s court-ordered parenting time. Defendant refused to assist plaintiff in

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arranging transportation for RG and TG following a court order and made little or no effort to
facilitate reunification counseling for RG, TG, and plaintiff. Defendant allowed the children to
leave their initial meeting with a reunification counselor and failed to intervene when RG and TG
refused to engage with a second counselor, choosing instead to engage in disruptive behavior.
Despite the counselor’s request for defendant’s assistance in addressing the children’s conduct,
defendant declined to intervene or provide support.

The trial court found that defendant’s persistent disparagement of plaintiff in the presence
of the children was the primary cause of the deterioration of plaintiff’s relationship with the two
older children. Significantly, the trial court determined that no credible evidence supported
defendant’s claims that plaintiff engaged in extramarital affairs, transmitted an STD to defendant,
or attempted to harm defendant by providing improper medical care during his illness with
COVID-19. While defendant admits to only two such statements, the evidence overwhelmingly
established a pattern of frequent disparagement by defendant, or encouragement of the children to
disparage plaintiff and to regard her as an unfit parent and person. Accordingly, the trial court’s
factual findings regarding defendant’s conduct were not against the great weight of the evidence.
See Sabatine, 513 Mich at 284.

Moreover, contrary to defendant’s contention that the trial court erred by considering this
conduct under multiple best-interest factors, the law recognizes that certain best-interest factors
may overlap, and a single fact or circumstance may properly be considered under more than one
factor. Fletcher v Fletcher, 229 Mich App 19, 24-25; 581 NW2d 11 (1998). This Court defers to
the trial court’s credibility assessments and acknowledges that the trial court is vested with
discretion to assign varying weight to the best-interest factors. See Kessler v Kessler, 295 Mich
App 54, 64; 811 NW2d 39 (2011).

Defendant’s remaining arguments as to the individual best-interest factors amount to a
request that this Court reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court,
which is inconsistent with the applicable standard of review. Accordingly, we decline to do so
and affirm the trial court’s determinations regarding the best-interest factors. See Sabatine, 513
Mich at 284. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s factual findings and assessment of the
best-interest factors were not against the great weight of the evidence, and the trial court’s custody
determination is affirmed. See MCL 722.28.

III. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in setting aside the settlement agreement reached
by the parties following mediation, contending that the court’s finding of fraudulent nondisclosure
on the part of defendant was improper.

Prior to trial, the parties executed a settlement agreement after mediation, which purported
to resolve all outstanding issues. Pertinent terms of the agreement included an award of the marital
home to plaintiff, contingent upon plaintiff’s buyout of defendant’s interest, mutual responsibility
for attorney fees and costs, and joint legal and physical custody of the minor children. Plaintiff,
however, moved to set aside the settlement before its entry as judgment, upon learning that
defendant acquired title to the lot adjacent to the marital home—referred to by the parties as “Lot

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6”—within three days of executing the agreement, and subsequently advertised for contractors to
build a residence on said property. Plaintiff maintained that defendant had, without disclosure
during mediation, intended to acquire and reside on Lot 6. Plaintiff further contended that it would
not be in the best interests of the children for the parties to reside as neighbors.

The court scheduled the matter for trial, reserving its findings on the disputed issues. On
the first day of trial, the parties placed certain settlement terms regarding property matters on the
record, including an agreement to sell both the marital home and Lot 6. The parties acknowledged
that custody issues remained in dispute and would require adjudication at trial. Upon conclusion
of the proceedings, the trial court clarified that it had declined to approve the parties’ settlement
agreement, concluding that permitting the parties to reside on adjacent lots would contravene the
best interests of the minor children.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting aside the entirety of the
settlement agreement. Defendant maintains that the trial court should have set aside only the
property division provisions, leaving undisturbed the parties’ agreement concerning custody of the
minor children, thereby obviating the need for protracted custody proceedings.

Defendant’s argument presumes that the trial court was compelled to accept the parties’
custody agreement and lacked authority to reject the stipulated arrangement. This premise is
without merit. Parties may not stipulate in a manner that circumvents the circuit court’s authority
to determine custody of minor children. See Harvey v Harvey, 470 Mich 186, 194; 680 NW2d
835 (2004). While courts encourage parental cooperation regarding custody, the circuit court
retains jurisdiction over the child until the child attains the age of majority. The court is not
permitted to adopt parental stipulations without independently determining the child’s best
interests. Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 21; 614 NW2d 183 (2000). Regardless of the
nature of alternative dispute resolution employed, the Child Custody Act mandates that the circuit
court independently determine the custodial arrangement that serves the best interests of the
children. Harvey, 470 Mich at 187 (citation omitted). In Harvey, our Supreme Court further
explained:

We recognize that parents sometimes reach agreements regarding custody
and visitation matters either informally through direct negotiations or through
mediation procedures made available by dispute resolution organizations. Our
decision does not restrict the ability of parties to address disputes through
alternative dispute resolution processes. We hold only that the statutory “best
interests” factors control whenever a court enters an order affecting child custody.
An initial agreement between the parties cannot relieve the court of its statutory
responsibility to ensure that its adjudication of custody disputes is in a child’s best
interests.

Likewise, parties must understand that a child custody determination
resulting from alternative dispute resolution processes is not enforceable absent a
court order. [Id. at 187 n 2.]

Accordingly, defendant has not shown that he is entitled to any appellate relief on this
ground. Id.

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IV. ATTORNEY FEES

Defendant also argues that the trial court should not have awarded plaintiff attorney fees
because he did not alienate the children from plaintiff and did not engage in misconduct with
regard to Lot 6.

We review a trial court’s decision to award attorney fees in a divorce action for an abuse
of discretion, and we review the trial court’s underlying factual findings for clear error. Richards
v Richards, 310 Mich App 683, 699-700; 874 NW2d 704 (2015). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when the result falls outside the range of principled outcomes,” and a “finding is clearly erroneous
if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted).

This Court discussed the generally rules for the award of attorney fees in divorce cases in
Colen v Colen, 331 Mich App 295, 300-301; 952 NW2d 558 (2020):

“Under the ‘American rule,’ attorney fees are not recoverable as an element
of costs or damages unless expressly allowed by statute, court rule, common-law
exception, or contract.” Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 164; 693 NW2d 825
(2005). “In domestic relations cases, attorney fees are
authorized by both statute, MCL 552.13, and court rule, [currently
MCR 3.206(D)].” Reed, 265 Mich App at 164. However, “attorney fees are not
recoverable as of right in divorce actions.” Id. [Second alteration in original.]

MCR 3.206(D) provides as follows:

(1) A party may, at any time, request that the court order the other party to
pay all or part of the attorney fees and expenses related to the action or a specific
proceeding, including a post-judgment proceeding.

(2) A party who requests attorney fees and expenses must allege facts
sufficient to show that:

(a) the party is unable to bear the expense of the action, including the
expense of engaging in discovery appropriate for the matter, and that the other party
is able to pay, or

(b) the attorney fees and expenses were incurred because the other party
refused to comply with a previous court order, despite having the ability to comply,
or engaged in discovery practices in violation of these rules.

MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) “considers only a party’s behavior, without reference to the ability to pay.”
Richards, 310 Mich App at 701. There is also a “common-law exception to the American rule that
an award of legal fees is authorized where the party requesting payment of the fees has been forced
to incur them as a result of the other party’s unreasonable conduct in the course of the litigation.”
Reed, 265 Mich App at 164-165 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A party requesting
attorney fees must establish that the fees were incurred and reasonable. Reed, 265 Mich App
at 165-166.

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In the present matter, defendant does not challenge on appeal the reasonableness of the
attorney fees awarded to plaintiff by the trial court, nor does defendant contend that such fees were
unrelated to services rendered by plaintiff’s counsel. Rather, defendant asserts that the trial court
committed factual error in concluding that defendant contributed to the children’s alienation from
plaintiff and engaged in misconduct with respect to the acquisition and recording of the deed to
Lot 6.
As previously articulated, the record contains substantial evidence supporting the trial
court’s finding of misconduct by defendant in relation to the alienation of the children from
plaintiff. Accordingly, the trial court’s factual finding in this regard is not clearly erroneous, and
the award of attorney fees to plaintiff on this ground does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
See Richards, 310 Mich App at 699-700.

With respect to the issue concerning Lot 6, the trial court found that defendant engaged in
misconduct by concealing, during mediation, his knowledge that he would be obtaining title to Lot
6, and by subsequently altering the deed to remove plaintiff’s name before recording an instrument
purporting to vest title solely in himself. The trial testimony of the prior owner of Lot 6
corroborated these findings. Upon review, this Court discerns no clear error in the trial court’s
determination. The award of attorney fees to plaintiff on this ground likewise does not constitute
an abuse of discretion. See Richards, 310 Mich App at 699-700. Accordingly, defendant is not
entitled to relief.

Affirmed. Plaintiff having prevailed is entitled to costs. MCR 7.219.

/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Michelle M. Rick

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