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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Robert Longrey v. Department of Corrections

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 370064
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (23.3K)

• PDF

Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT LONGREY, UNPUBLISHED
March 13, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 9:39 AM

v No. 370064
Branch Circuit Court
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, LC No. 2022-080391-CD

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and BORRELLO and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Robert Longrey, appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendant,
Department of Corrections’ (MDOC), motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7)
(immunity granted by law). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working for the MDOC in 1999 as a Power Plant Operator in Jackson,
Michigan. In 2018, the facility where plaintiff worked became automated, leading to the
elimination of some positions, but plaintiff continued working as a Power Plant Operator until
being hired as a Maintenance Mechanic in 2019. Plaintiff underwent multiple surgeries, including
knee replacements in 2000 and 2003, and faced various medical challenges that required
workplace accommodations and medical leaves.

In 2016, plaintiff underwent surgery to implant a back stimulator, leading to temporary
work restrictions, which the MDOC approved. Plaintiff had another knee surgery in April 2019,
resulting in further workplace restrictions, but he was informed that restrictions could not be
maintained for more than six months. After a hospitalization in late 2019, plaintiff was declared
absent without leave but later had the leave extended to cover the illness. In January 2020, plaintiff
was placed on a Waived Rights Leave of Absence due to permanent disability, and by
February 2020, he was informed he was no longer a state employee. Plaintiff filed a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in October 2020, alleging discrimination
based on disability and age, and he received a notice of the right to sue in February 2022.

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In August 2022, plaintiff filed a civil action alleging employment discrimination and
retaliation by the MDOC, which denied all allegations and cited several affirmative defenses,
including immunity. The MDOC moved for summary disposition in August 2023, arguing that
plaintiff’s failure to file a notice of intent with the Court of Claims barred the claim. The trial
court granted the MDOC’s motion for summary disposition. It is from this order that plaintiff
appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

The first dispositive question presented in this matter is whether our Supreme Court’s
decision in Christie v Wayne State Univ, 511 Mich 39; 993 NW2d 203 (2023), warrants
prospective application.
“This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition de novo.”
Pugno v Blue Harvest Farms, LLC, 326 Mich App 1, 11; 930 NW2d 393 (2018).

Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq.,
guarantees an individual “[t]he opportunity to obtain employment, housing, and other real estate
and full and equal utilization of public accommodations, public services, and educational facilities
without discrimination because of a disability.” MCL 37.1102(1). Under the PWDCRA, “a
person shall accommodate a person with a disability for the purposes of employment, public
accommodation, public service, education, or housing unless the person demonstrates that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship.” MCL 37.1102(2). Similarly, a person shall
not “[r]etaliate or discriminate against a person . . . because the person has made a charge, filed a
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
[PWDCRA].” MCL 37.1602(a). For the purposes of the PWDCRA, a “person” “includes . . . this
state, or any other legal, commercial, or governmental entity or agency.” MCL 37.1103(g).

The Court of Claims Act (COCA) outlines notice procedures that must be followed before
an individual is permitted to file a suit against the state of Michigan or a state government entity.
MCL 600.6431. The COCA’s notice provision, MCL 600.6431(1), provides, in relevant part, as
follows:

[A] claim may not be maintained against this state unless the claimant, within 1
year after the claim has accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims
either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against this state
or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.

In 2020, this Court held that plaintiffs were not required to comply with the notice
provisions of the COCA to pursue claims against the State or its agencies in circuit court. Tyrrell
v Univ of Mich, 335 Mich App 254, 272; 966 NW2d 219 (2020). This holding was expressly
overruled by our Supreme Court in 2023, which clarified that the notice requirements set forth in
MCL 600.6431(1) are applicable to all claims against the State, irrespective of whether the action
is filed in circuit court or the Court of Claims. Christie, 511 Mich at 45.

In Christie, the parties did not dispute that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice
requirements of MCL 600.6431(1) within one year of the claim’s accrual. Id. at 64-65. The Court
held that strict compliance with MCL 600.6431 is a prerequisite to imposing liability on the State

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or its agencies. Id. at 49-50. The Court’s ruling was grounded in the plain statutory language and
legislative history of MCL 600.6431, as well as the underlying purpose of the COCA in waiving
sovereign immunity only under narrowly circumscribed circumstances. Id. at 52. Accordingly,
the Court remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of the State. Id. at 45. The Court
contemporaneously ordered reinstatement of summary disposition for the defendant in Elia Cos,
LLC v Univ of Mich Regents, 511 Mich 66, 69; 993 NW2d 392 (2023).

As a general rule, Michigan judicial decisions are afforded full retroactive effect. Pohutski
v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 695; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). However, courts recognize that
prospective application may be warranted to avoid manifest injustice, particularly where settled
precedent is overruled. Id. at 696. The dispositive inquiry in the civil context is whether the
decision at issue articulated a new principle of law. Id. A rule of law is considered “new” for
retroactivity purposes when it either overrules established precedent or addresses a matter of first
impression not foreshadowed by prior appellate authority. People v Phillips, 416 Mich 63, 68;
330 NW2d 366 (1982). Upon determining that a new rule has been established, courts examine
three factors to determine whether prospective application is appropriate: (1) the purpose to be
served by the new rule, (2) the degree of reliance on former law, and (3) the impact of retroactive
application on the administration of justice. Pohutski, 465 Mich at 696.

In 2024, this Court directly addressed the retroactivity of the Christie decision in Flamont
v Dep’t of Corrections, ___ Mich App __, _; __ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367863); slip
op at 2-3. In Flamont, the plaintiff, an employee of the Michigan Department of Corrections,
failed to file the requisite notice of intent in the Court of Claims prior to initiating suit in circuit
court alleging sex discrimination. Id. at __; slip op at 2. The plaintiff asserted that compliance
with MCL 600.6431 was unnecessary because the action was not commenced in the Court of
Claims and further argued that Christie and Elia should not be applied retroactively. Id. This
Court rejected this argument, holding that Christie “clearly declared the meaning of the law as it
existed, based on the unambiguous statutory language, and corrected a relatively short-lived
misinterpretation of the law . . . .” Id. at __; slip op at 6. Because Christie did not announce a
new rule, the decision was given full retroactive effect. Id. This Court reversed the trial court’s
refusal to apply Christie retroactively and directed entry of summary disposition in favor of the
defendant. Id.

In the instant matter, there is no dispute that plaintiff failed to comply with the COCA’s
notice requirements prior to instituting his PWDCRA action against the Michigan Department of
Corrections in circuit court. See MCL 600.6431(1). While plaintiff accurately points out that the
Tyrrell standard had not yet been overruled at the time of filing, the Michigan Supreme Court
subsequently made clear that noncompliance with MCL 600.6431 bars such claims. See Christie,
511 Mich at 45, 49-50; see also Elia, 511 Mich at 69. Plaintiff’s contention that Christie should
be limited to prospective application as a newly established rule of law is foreclosed by our
decision in Flamont, which held that Christie did not constitute a new rule and is to be applied
retroactively. See Flamont, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6. Consequently, examination of the
Pohutski factors is unnecessary, as the retroactive application of Christie is controlling. Pohutski,
465 Mich at 696.

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III. WAIVER

Plaintiff next contends that the MDOC waived its governmental immunity by neglecting
to plead it as an affirmative defense and by its conduct before the trial court.

“The doctrine of sovereign immunity has long been firmly established in the common law
of this state, and it may not be held to have been waived or abrogated except . . . by an express
statutory enactment or by necessary inference from a statute.” Mead v State, 303 Mich 168, 173;
5 NW2d 740 (1942). Similarly, “[i]t is well established that governmental immunity is not an
affirmative defense but is instead a characteristic of government.” Fairly v Dep’t of Corrections,
497 Mich 290, 298; 871 NW2d 129 (2015). Therefore, “it is the responsibility of the party seeking
to impose liability on a governmental agency to demonstrate that its case falls within one of the
exceptions [to governmental immunity].” Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 201; 649 NW2d 47
(2002).

Plaintiff’s argument that the MDOC waived its immunity is unavailing, as governmental
immunity is intrinsic to the MDOC’s status as a governmental agency. Fairley, 497 Mich at 298.
Although the MDOC asserted both governmental immunity and immunity by operation of law as
affirmative defenses in its answer, this does not alter the fundamental legal principle that immunity
is not an affirmative defense. The burden was on plaintiff to demonstrate that an exception to
governmental immunity applied, a burden plaintiff failed to carry by not complying with the
requirements of the COCA. See MCL 600.6431(1); Mack, 467 Mich at 201. While the Court
recognizes that the MDOC’s conduct in the trial court resulted in extended proceedings and
unnecessary discovery, plaintiff’s reliance on nonbinding authority does not warrant reversal of
the trial court’s grant of summary disposition. Controlling precedent in Michigan unequivocally
holds that governmental immunity may only be waived by legislative action. See Mead, 303 Mich
at 173.

Affirmed. No costs are awarded to either party, a public question being involved. MCR
7.219(A). Bay City v Bay Co Treasurer, 292 Mich App 156, 172; 807 NW2d 892 (2011).

/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Michelle M. Rick

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