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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Apache Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. Village of Ridgefield Park Zoning Board

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-3919-23

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (16)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (923)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3919-23

APACHE AUTO WRECKERS,
INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VILLAGE OF RIDGEFIELD
PARK ZONING BOARD,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued January 26, 2026 – Decided March 12, 2026

Before Judges Natali and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-6579-23.

Thomas T. Kim argued the cause for appellant (Law
Offices of Thomas T. Kim, attorneys; Thomas T. Kim,
on the briefs).

Jennifer Alampi argued the cause for respondent (Law
Office of Carmine R. Alampi, LLC, attorneys; Jennifer
Alampi and Carmine R. Alampi, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Apache Auto Wrecker's Inc. appeals from a Law Division order

remanding its application to defendant Village of Ridgefield Park Zoning Board

("Board"), after concluding the Board had wrongfully denied plaintiff cross-

examination of the Village of Ridgefield Park's witnesses at the initial hearing.

Despite the trial court's remand order, the Board declined to hold a hearing,

determining plaintiff's application was moot, relying on the trial court's written

opinion, finding use as a junkyard was not a pre-existing non-conforming use

for the property. Based on our review of the record and application of the

relevant legal principles, we affirm the trial court's order remanding the matter

to the Board to re-open the hearing. We further remand to the trial court to enter

an amended order consistent with our determinations herein.

I.

Plaintiff has operated a junkyard on the subject property in Ridgefield

Park since at least 1978; first as a lessee and then as an owner. Prior to plaintiff's

tenancy, the Village of Ridgefield Park enacted its zoning ordinance in 1968,

while the property was being used as a junkyard by previous operators. In 1978,

plaintiff obtained a certificate of occupancy to operate a junkyard at 2 Mt.

Vernon Street, and in 1998 obtained another certificate for 14 Industrial Avenue

in connection with acquisition and expansion into the larger site.

A-3919-23
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In January 1998, the Board granted plaintiff a use variance subject to

several conditions. Those conditions included: storage and warehousing of only

plaintiff's own vehicle parts in buildings; prohibiting sales from the buildings;

limiting sales to the trailer located on-site; restricting the servicing of vehicles

to only its own vehicles; and requiring plaintiff to obtain site plan approval

before any further expansion. Site plan approval was granted by the Board in

July 1998.

In 2021, plaintiff was issued two municipal summonses by the Village

Construction Official: one was for stacking junk above the fence height and the

other for storing junk outside required enclosures. At the municipal court

hearing, plaintiff agreed to seek clarification from the Board concerning the

nonconforming nature and extent of its use.

On August 2, 2022, plaintiff filed an application to the Board for a

Certificate of Non-conformity under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 to formalize

recognition of its operations, asserting that its junkyard use predated the zoning

ordinance and should be protected as a lawful nonconforming use. Plaintiff

specifically sought confirmation that its activities—including junk and scrap

storage above fence height and throughout the expanded site—were lawful

continuations of pre-1968 operations. Plaintiff did not claim that the 1998

A-3919-23
3
variance had affirmatively granted it the right to operate as a junk yard; rather,

it claimed that the approving resolution did not prohibit the activities for which

it was cited.

Hearings before the Board occurred in September and October 2023, with

the Village construction official objecting to the breadth of plaintiff's claimed

rights and maintaining that the 1998 Resolution governed all uses for the

property. Testimony was received from Board member Garofalow concerning

his knowledge of the historic use of the site without being sworn or subject to

cross-examination by plaintiff. Cross-examination of then-Construction

Official Hansen was cut short by the Board before plaintiff completed its

questioning. Plaintiff attempted to call its own witnesses, including the attorney

who handled its 1998 application and the current owner, to demonstrate the

continuity and scope of its use prior to 1998. However, the Board refused to

hear these witnesses' testimony.

Thereafter, the Board voted to deny plaintiff's application for a certificate

of nonconformity, relying solely on the terms of the 1998 Resolution and

concluding that plaintiff's current operations—including broad outdoor junk and

scrap storage—were not permitted.

A-3919-23
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Plaintiff timely filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs, claiming the

Board's denial was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and violative of due

process; specifically asserting that it was denied a meaningful opportunity to

present evidence and challenge the Board's interpretation of the 1998

Resolution. The trial court held a trial de novo in May 2024, where the court

heard argument and reviewed the evidence presented at the Board hearing,

including the transcript of the proceedings.

In a May 29, 2024 written decision, the trial court found plaintiff's due

process rights had been violated because the Board failed to permit plaintiff to

complete cross-examination of Hansen or Garofalow. The court ordered a

limited remand requiring the Board to permit plaintiff cross-examination of the

Board's witnesses and to issue supplemental findings. However, in its written

decision, the trial court also found that the 1998 Resolution was clear on its face,

controlled the property's use and did not authorize the full scope of plaintiff's

claimed junkyard operations, including outdoor storage of scrap and junk for

which it was cited. The court concluded its decision, finding: "by virtue of

applying for and receiving a variance . . . it is clear that the junkyard use sought

to be determined as pre-existing non-conforming, clearly was not, and the uses

A-3919-23
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to which plaintiff is entitled are detailed in the 1998 resolution and subject to

the conditions therein."

The trial court's order addressed the remand but did not include any

disposition surrounding its findings regarding the effect of the 1998 Resolution

on plaintiff's application to the Board. Presumably, in light of the trial court's

written decision surrounding its interpretation of the 1998 Resolution, the Board

declined to re-open the hearing as directed by the trial court's remand order.

In the interim, plaintiff moved for reconsideration, urging the court to

retract the substantive findings it made in its prior decision and permit it to

complete its cross-examination of witnesses and present its own witnesses

before the court enters findings regarding the prior uses of the property or

interpreting the 1998 resolution. Plaintiff also requested the court to clarify its

order as to the scope of plaintiff's presentation on remand.

The court denied the reconsideration motion, finding "the clarification

issue is moot . . . [as] the Village has conceded plaintiff shall be permitted to

cross-examine witnesses and present relevant witness testimony." The court

also denied plaintiff's application to require completion of the remand hearing

before the court enters substantive findings regarding the 1998 Resolution's

effect on plaintiff's application. In denying this relief, the court found it did not

A-3919-23
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fail "to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence, and there

is no allegation the court based its decision upon a palpably incorrect or

irrational basis . . . [and] if further contrary evidence arises . . . the court will

consider such applications as may be made." The court further found

"[h]owever[,] currently [it is] clear from the testimony of Mr. Landolfi that the

storage of scrap metal and junk commenced in or about 2016, contrary to the

assertions of plaintiff's counsel, and contrary to the 1998 Resolution."

On appeal, plaintiff contends: (1) its due process rights were violated by

the Board not permitting cross-examination of certain key witnesses or

permitting it to present its own witnesses and evidence; and (2) the trial court's

decision on the merits that the 1998 resolution precluded plaintiff's application

for a certificate of non-conformity was erroneous because it was premature and

entered prior to the remand hearing.

II.

A municipal agency decision "is subject to review in the Law Division in

an action in lieu of prerogative writs[,] . . . and the Law Division's review of the

. . . decision must be based solely on the agency record." Willoughby v.

Planning Bd. of Twp. of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super. 266, 273 (App. Div. 1997)

(internal citation omitted) (citing R. 4:69). "The Law Division reviews the

A-3919-23
7
record to determine whether the . . . factual findings are based on 'substantial

evidence' and whether its discretionary decisions are 'arbitrary, capricious and

unreasonable.'" Id. at 273-74 (citation omitted).

Like the trial court, our review is limited. Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v.

Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309, 327 (1998). "When we

consider an appeal of a trial court's review of a municipal board's action, we are

bound by the same standard as the trial court. We give deference to a municipal

board's decision, and such decisions should be overturned only when proven

arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." Cohen v. Bd. of Adjustment of Borough

of Rumson, 396 N.J. Super. 608, 614-15 (App. Div. 2007) (internal citation

omitted). "[T]he law presumes that boards of adjustment and municipal

governing bodies will act fairly and with proper motives and for valid reasons."

Fallone Properties, L.L.C. v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd., 369 N.J. Super.

552, 560-61 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt,

45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965)). However, "[a] determination predicated on

unsupported findings is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action." Bryant

v. City of Atl. City, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1998). Additionally,

"appellate review of a municipal appeal to the Law Division is limited to the

'action of the Law Division and not that of the municipal [board].'" State v.

A-3919-23
8
Hannah, 448 N.J. Super. 78, 94 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Palma, 219

N.J. 584, 591-92 (2014)).

We first address the plaintiff's due process argument that center around

the Board's failure to allow plaintiff to cross-examine the Village's witnesses

and to present affirmative evidence and testimony. Plaintiff argues that because

the Board refused to permit it to cross-examine and present witnesses, the Board

and the trial court interpreted the 1998 Resolution without any additional

important evidence that may be garnered at the remand hearing. These due

process violations, according to plaintiff, warrant an unencumbered remand to

allow for it to develop a full record.

Procedural due process requires agencies and municipalities to follow

procedural requirements prior to making a binding legal determination, which

directly affects the legal rights of a party. "Administrative hearings in contested

cases must 'operate fairly and conform with due process principles.'" In re

Kallen, 92 N.J. 14, 25 (1983) (quoting Laba v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 23 N.J.

364, 382 (1957)). However, such hearings "may conform to procedural due

process standards that are less restrictive than those imposed in court

proceedings." Id. at 26. "As long as principles of basic fairness are observed

and adequate procedural protections afforded, the requirements of

A-3919-23
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administrative due process have been met." Kelly v. Sterr, 62 N.J. 105, 107

(1973); see also In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 185 N.J.

452, 466-67 (2006) (recognizing in State actions, "due process is a flexible and

fact-sensitive concept," and "a function of what reason and justice require under

the circumstances").

A planning board must "afford plaintiffs and all objectors a fair

opportunity to address the full range of planning issues." Witt v. Borough of

Maywood, 328 N.J. Super. 432, 454 (Law Div. 1998), aff'd, 328 N.J. Super. 343

(App. Div. 2000). For example, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(d) requires:

The testimony of all witnesses relating to an application
for development shall be taken under oath or
affirmation by the presiding officer, and the right of
cross-examination shall be permitted to all interested
parties through their attorneys, if represented, or
directly, if not represented, subject to the discretion of
the presiding officer and to reasonable limitations as to
time and number of witnesses.

"[T]he Board 'has the choice of accepting or rejecting the testimony of

witnesses. Where reasonably made, such choice is conclusive on appeal.'"

Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268, 288 (1965) (quoting Reinauer Realty

Corp. v. Nucera, 59 N.J. Super. 189, 201 (App. Div. 1960)).

We are unclear whether the due process claim raised in this appeal is now

moot as stated in the trial court's July 29, 2024 written decision. Our lack of

A-3919-23
10
clarity is based on the Board's assertion, on appeal, that the trial court correctly

concluded the 1998 Resolution controls and remand is unnecessary.

Due to the lack of clarity in the record, we shall assume the remand issue

is not moot. We are not persuaded by the Board's contentions and concur with

the trial court's determination that the Board failed to provide plaintiff

procedural due process at the initial Board hearing and a remand hearing is

necessary to permit plaintiff to fully cross-examine the witnesses called by the

municipality. We further conclude, to the extent the trial court's order did not

specifically address such, that plaintiff shall also be permitted to present its own

affirmative witnesses and other evidence in support of its application. Despite

the Board's position that the wording of the 1998 Resolution is clear, and no

further testimony is required, due process mandates that plaintiff be permitted

to cross-examine and present witnesses that may present relevant evidence

surrounding its application, notwithstanding the 1998 use variance. Even should

the Board ultimately arrive at the same conclusion on remand, plaintiff's due

process rights must remain intact.

We now turn to plaintiff's contention the trial court erred by interpreting

the 1998 Resolution prior to the completion of the remand hearing. We note the

court's order of May 29, 2024 does not include any provisions regarding its

A-3919-23
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interpretation of the 1998 Resolution and only required a remand to the "Board

for the purposes of permitting plaintiff to complete its cross-examination of Mr.

Hansen, and to allow its cross-examination of Mr. Garofalow for purposes of

completion of the record." The order also stated "[f]ollowing the completion of

the cross-examinations, the Board may pass such further resolution as it sees

fit."

We note appeals are taken from orders and judgments, not a trial judge's

statement of reasons or written decisions. T.B. v. Novia, 472 N.J. Super. 80, 93

(App. Div. 2022) citing Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199

(2001) ("[I]t is well-settled that appeals are taken from orders and judgments

and not from opinions, oral decisions, informal written decisions, or reasons

given for the ultimate conclusion."); see also R. 2:2-3(a).

The court's order on appeal does not enter a final disposition on the merits

of plaintiff's complaint, limiting its order that the Board shall hold a remand

hearing. The record is unclear as to the reasons the court entered substantive

findings in its written decision concerning the 1998 Resolution but did not

include the disposition of these issues in the order. The record is also unclear

concerning the court's basis to order a remand hearing because its written

decision had essentially determined junkyard use was not a permitted use in the

A-3919-23
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1998 Resolution and did not constitute a prior non-conforming use, which

effectively obviated the need for the remand hearing it previously determined

was necessary. We surmise this may have been a reason the Board denied

hearing plaintiff's application on remand as ordered.

The trial court order under appeal reflects the court's written decision

concerning only plaintiff's due process claims, yet the court's decision also

addressed the merits of plaintiff's application before the Board, which we

conclude was confusing and inconsistent, requiring this matter be remanded to

the trial court with directives. Therefore, we remand to the trial court to enter

an order directing the Board to re-open the hearing to permit plaintiff to engage

in full cross-examination of the Village's witnesses and to further permit

plaintiff to present its own witnesses and evidence. In addition, for purposes of

clarity, we vacate the court's substantive findings in its written decision of May

29, 2024 order determining the 1998 Resolution did not permit junk yard use,

which prematurely served as a denial of plaintiff's application for a certificate

of non-conformity. We conclude the court's substantive determinations in this

regard were a misapplication of its discretion because a full record before the

Board had not yet been developed on remand, including the complete testimony

A-3919-23
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of all witnesses and other affirmative evidence that may be offered by plaintiff

in support of its application before the Board.

Affirmed and remanded as modified. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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