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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Michael Jerome Jennings v. Christopher Smith, Justin Gable, Jeremy Brooks, and the City of Childersburg (Certified Question from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Eastern Division: 1:22-cv-01165-RDP).

Supreme Court of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: SC-2025-0372

• Judges: Sellers, J.

• Opinion

• Authorities (36)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (17.1K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

Rel: March 13, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

---

SC-2025-0372

---

Michael Jerome Jennings

v.

Christopher Smith, Justin Gable, Jeremy Brooks, and the City
of Childersburg

Certified Question from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama, Eastern Division

(1:22-cv-01165-RDP)

SELLERS, Justice.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of

Alabama, Eastern Division ("the district court"), has certified to this
SC-2025-0372

Court a question pursuant to Rule 18, Ala. R. App. P. This Court

accepted and answers the question.

I. Certified Question

"Under [Ala. Code 1975,] § 15-5-30, when a law enforcement
officer asks a person for his name, address, and explanation
of his actions, and the person gives an incomplete or
unsatisfactory oral response, does the statute prohibit the
officer from demanding or requesting physical identification?"

II. Ala. Code 1975, § 15-5-30

Section § 15-5-30, the statute referenced in the certified question,

is often referred to as Alabama's "stop and identify" statute. That section

provides:

"A sheriff or other officer acting as sheriff, his deputy or
any constable, acting within their respective counties, any
marshal, deputy marshal or policeman of any incorporated
city or town within the limits of the county or any highway
patrolman or state trooper may stop any person abroad in a
public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has
committed or is about to commit a felony or other public
offense and may demand of him his name, address and an
explanation of his actions."

(Emphasis added.)

III. Factual Background and Procedural History

On May 22, 2022, Officers Christopher Smith, Justin Gable, and

Jeremy Brooks of the Childersburg Police Department responded to an

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emergency-911 call in which a female had requested that someone check

on her elderly neighbors' house. The caller conveyed that her neighbors

had gone out of town and that she had observed an unfamiliar vehicle

and a "younger black male" around their house. Officer Smith, who

arrived at the house first, saw a black male watering flowers with a

garden hose. In relevant part, Officer Smith asked the man if he lived at

the house, and the man responded that he did not. Officer Smith

explained that someone had called about a vehicle and a person being on

the property who was not supposed to be there. The man replied that he

was supposed to be there, that his name was Pastor Jennings, that he

lived across the street, that he was looking out for the house while the

neighbors were gone, and that he was watering their flowers. Officer

Smith then asked the man if he had any identification, at which time the

man became very agitated and stated that he would not provide any

identification. Officers Gable and Brooks subsequently arrived at the

house, at which time the conversation between the officers and the man

escalated. After repeatedly refusing to talk to the officers and to properly

identify himself, the man was placed under arrest and charged with

obstructing a governmental function in violation of Ala. Code 1975, §

3
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13A-10-2(a)(2).1 The man arrested was subsequently identified as

Michael Jerome Jennings.

After the obstruction charge against Jennings was dismissed, he

commenced in the district court an action against the officers under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful and retaliatory arrest, among other

things.2 He also sued the officers and the City of Childersburg ("the

City") under Alabama law, alleging false arrest. The officers moved for a

summary judgment, and the City moved to dismiss. Citing immunity,

the district court granted both motions. The district court found that, by

refusing to give his complete name, Jennings violated § 15-5-30, thus

intentionally preventing the officers from performing a governmental

function. See § 13A-10-2(a)(2).

Jennings appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit ("the Eleventh Circuit") entered an order reversing the

1Section 13A-10-2(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, makes it a crime to
"[i]ntentionally prevent[] a public servant from performing a
governmental function." A violation of that provision is a Class A
misdemeanor.

2Section 1983 imposes liability on a "person" who, under color of

law, deprives another "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4
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decision of the district court. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit relied on

Edger v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230 (11th Cir. 2023) (interpreting § 15-5-30

as prohibiting law-enforcement officers from requesting physical

identification from a suspect). On remand from the Eleventh Circuit, the

district court expressed its concern regarding an unpublished opinion

issued by the Eleventh Circuit that, the district court felt, created

uncertainty concerning how § 15-5-30 should be interpreted. See Metz v.

Bridges, No. 23-11275, Dec. 12, 2024 (11th Cir. 2024) (not reported in

Federal Reporter) (interpreting § 15-5-30 as giving probable cause to

arrest a suspect for his failure to comply with a law-enforcement officer's

request for identification during a lawful stop initiated under Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Thus, the district court certified its question

regarding the interpretation of § 15-5-30 to this Court pursuant to Rule

18(a), which provides that this Court may answer questions from federal

courts only when "there are no clear controlling precedents" and the

answer to the question is "determinative of said cause."

IV. Discussion

Under § 15-5-30, an officer may request a person's "name, address

and an explanation of his actions" when the officer reasonably suspects

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that the person "is committing, has committed or is about to commit a

felony or other public offense." In Hopkins v. State, 661 So. 2d 774, 778

(Ala. Crim. App. 1994), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated

that § 15-5-30 is a codification of the principles announced in Terry,

supra. In Terry, the United States Supreme Court established the

constitutional framework for brief investigatory stops, commonly known

as Terry stops. Under Terry, an officer is permitted to detain a person

for a brief investigatory stop if the officer has reasonable suspicion that

the person is engaged in, or is about to be engaged in, criminal activity.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 10. The officer's actions in briefly detaining a person

must be "justified at its inception" and "reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry,

392 U.S. at 20. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (noting

that, in analyzing the scope of a Terry stop, it is clear that "an

investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop" and that "the

investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means

reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short

period of time").

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In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt

County, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court applied

the principles of Terry in determining whether a Nevada statute, Nev.

Rev. Stat. 171.123, requiring a suspect to identify himself or herself

during a lawful Terry stop, was consistent with the Fourth Amendment

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In relevant part,

the Nevada statute permits a law-enforcement officer to detain a person

"only to ascertain the person's identity and the suspicious circumstances

surrounding the person's presence abroad." Nev. Rev. Stat. 171.123(3).

According to Hiibel, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the

statute as requiring only that a person disclose his or her "name" to an

officer when reasonable suspicion exists to detain the person. Hiibel, 542

U.S. at 185.

The central question in Hiibel was whether Larry Hiibel, a suspect

detained during a valid Terry stop, could be arrested and prosecuted for

refusing to identify himself as required by the Nevada statute.3 The

3The Court recounted the following pertinent facts in Hiibel:

"The sheriff's department in Humboldt County, Nevada,
received an afternoon telephone call reporting an assault. The
caller reported seeing a man assault a woman in a red and
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Hiibel Court began its analysis by explaining that "questions concerning

a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops."

542 U.S. at 186. The Court specifically noted that obtaining a suspect's

identity during a Terry stop serves important government interests:

"Obtaining a suspect's name in the course of a Terry stop
serves important government interests. Knowledge of identity
may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another
offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder. On the
other hand, knowing identity may help clear a suspect and

silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy Sheriff Lee
Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the officer arrived
at the scene, he found the truck parked on the side of the road.
A man was standing by the truck, and a young woman was
sitting inside it. The officer observed skid marks in the gravel
behind the vehicle, leading him to believe it had come to a
sudden stop.

"The officer approached the man and explained that he
was investigating a report of a fight. The man appeared to be
intoxicated. The officer asked him if he had 'any identification
on [him],' which we understand as a request to produce a
driver's license or some other form of written identification. …
The officer asked for identification 11 times and was refused
each time. After warning the man that he would be arrested
if he continued to refuse to comply, the officer placed him
under arrest."

542 U.S. at 180-81. Hiibel was charged and convicted under a Nevada
statute for obstructing a public officer in discharging or attempting to
discharge his duties; Hiibel challenged his conviction on Fourth and Fifth
Amendment grounds.

8
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allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere. …
Officers called to investigate [suspected criminal activity]
need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess
the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible
danger to the potential victim."

Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186. See also Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev.

868, 874, 59 P.3d 1201, 1205-06 (2002) ("Additionally, if suspects are not

legally required to identify themselves, what could an officer do if a

suspicious person were loitering outside a daycare center or school?

Perhaps that person is a sex offender. How are officers to enforce

restraining orders? Or, how are officers to enforce curfew laws for minors

without a requirement to produce identification? In these situations, it is

the observable conduct that creates a reasonable suspicion, but it is the

requirement to produce identification that enables an officer to

determine whether the suspect is breaking the law.").

The Hiibel Court went on to explain that, although it well

established that an officer "may ask a suspect to identify himself in the

course of a Terry stop, it has been an open question whether the suspect

can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer." 542 U.S. at 186 -

1. Hiibel confirmed that, although "the Fourth Amendment itself

cannot require a suspect to answer questions," id. at 187, in Hiibel's case,

9
SC-2025-0372

the source of the obligation to respond arose from the Nevada statute,

which, like § 15-5-30, is often referred to as a stop-and-identify statute.

See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 183 ("Stop and identify statutes often combine

elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to

regulate police behavior in the course of investigatory stops. The statutes

vary from State to State, but all permit an officer to ask or require a

suspect to disclose his identity."). In discussing whether the Nevada

statute satisfied the "reasonableness" standard for searches and seizures

under the Fourth Amendment, the Hiibel Court explained that

"reasonableness" is determined by balancing the degree of intrusion upon

a person's constitutionally protected rights against the statute's

promotion of legitimate government interests. 542 U.S. at 187-88. The

Hiibel Court reasoned that the public interest in police and public safety

outweighed Hiibel's interest in refusing to identify himself. The Court

further explained that a "request for identity" under the Nevada statute

has "an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical

demands of a Terry stop" and that "[t]he threat of criminal sanction helps

ensure that the request for identity does not become a legal nullity." 582

U.S. at 188. On the other hand, the Court noted that the Nevada statute

10
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did not alter the nature of a Terry stop, because the statute did not

change the nature or scope of the stop itself. Id. See also Royer, 460

U.S. at 500 (noting that "an investigative detention must be temporary

and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"

and that "the investigative methods employed should be the least

intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's

suspicion in a short period of time"). Thus, the Hiibel Court concluded

that a state law requiring a suspect to disclose his or her name in the

course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment

prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures:

"It is clear in this case that the request for identification was
'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified' the stop. Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,] 20 [(1968)]. The
officer's request was a commonsense inquiry, not an effort to
obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop
yielded insufficient evidence. The stop, the request, and the
State's requirement of a response did not contravene the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment."

542 U.S. at 188-89. Although the Hiibel Court concluded that the Nevada

statute was consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against

unreasonable searches and seizures, it left open the question whether a

request for identifying information beyond a name would be a violation

11
SC-2025-0372

of the Fourth Amendment or would be beyond the scope of the statute.4

See Hiibel, 542 U.S. 185 ("As we understand it, the [Nevada] statute does

not require a suspect to give the officer a driver's license or any other

document. Provided that the suspect either states his name or

communicates it to the officer by other means -- a choice, we assume, that

the suspect may make -- the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs.").

Based on the analysis provided in Hiibel, we conclude that § 15-5-

30 does not exclude from its purview a request for physical identification

when a suspect provides an incomplete or unsatisfactory response to an

officer's demand to provide his or her name and address and an

explanation of his or her actions. Obtaining a person's identity is a

crucial part of a Terry stop. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,

229 (1985) ("[T]he ability to briefly stop [a suspect], ask questions, or

check identification in the absence of probable cause promotes the strong

government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice.");

INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) ("[I]nterrogation relating to

4See Douglas v. City of Jeannette (Pennsylvania), 319 U.S. 157, 163

(1943) (noting that, with respect to state law, "state courts are the final
arbiters of its meaning and application, subject only to review by this
Court on federal grounds appropriately asserted").
12
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one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by

itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure."); and Wright v. State,

601 So. 2d 1095, 1096 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) ("Inherent in an officer's

right to stop a suspect and demand his name, address, and an

explanation of his actions is the right to detain him temporarily to verify

the information given or to obtain information independently of the

suspect's cooperation."). We also find persuasive the rationale stated in

City of Missoula v. Kroschel, 391 Mont. 457, 465, 419 P.3d 1208, 1217

(2018): "If not the functional or substantive equivalent of requesting a

person's name and current address, demanding available proof of

identification is typically likewise reasonably related to the purpose of an

investigative stop for Fourth Amendment purposes."5 Thus, although §

15-5-30 does not expressly authorize law-enforcement officers to request

information other than a person's name and address and an explanation

of his or her actions, nothing in the language or legislative history of the

statute indicates any legislative intent to prohibit officers from asking

5Much like § 15-5-30 at issue here, the statute in Missoula
permitted "law enforcement officers [to] request a person's name, current
address, and 'an explanation' of the person's conduct in relation to the
officer's particularized suspicion for the stop." 391 Mont. At 465, 419 P.3d
at 1217.
13
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questions regarding identity that would be permissible under the Fourth

Amendment within the limited scope of a valid Terry stop. The principles

of Terry presume that an officer's request for additional identifying

information will be reasonably related to the circumstances of the stop

and will not seek information unrelated to identifying the suspect.

In summary, Alabama law is clear -- once an officer has reasonable

suspicion to believe that a suspect is committing, has committed, or is

about to commit a felony or other public offense, § 15-5-30 empowers the

officer to demand that the suspect disclose his or her name and address

in a format that would allow the officer to affirmatively identify the

suspect. As indicated above, establishing a suspect's correct identity

furthers an important governmental function by allowing an officer to

confirm whether a suspect is violating the law or by eliminating the

suspect from suspicion. If the officer's demand for a name and address is

not heeded, then the officer is faced with choices. The officer can either

arrest the suspect for intentionally preventing the officer from

performing a governmental function in violation of § 13A-10-2(a)(2) or

delay the arrest and supplement the demand by asking for more

conclusive positive identification. Either way, the suspect bears the

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burden to completely identify himself or herself during a valid Terry stop;

thus, failing to provide sufficient identifying information when demanded

to do so violates Alabama law.

QUESTION ANSWERED.

Wise and Parker, JJ., concur.

Bryan and Cook, JJ., concur specially, with opinions.

Shaw, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.

Mendheim, J., dissents, with opinion, which Stewart, C.J., and

McCool, J., join.

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BRYAN, Justice (concurring specially).

Although I concur in the main opinion, I also agree with the

sentiments expressed in Justice Shaw's special writing.

16
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COOK, Justice (concurring specially).

I concur with the main opinion that § 15-5-30, Ala. Code 1975, does

not prohibit an officer from either "demanding or requesting physical

identification" when a suspect gives an "incomplete or unsatisfactory oral

response." (Emphasis added.)

I also agree with the main opinion that the statute authorizes an

officer to do so. While I recognize that this additional conclusion goes

beyond the strict bounds of the question that has been certified to us, the

parties have discussed this issue in the briefing, and I believe the textual

analysis for this question is interwoven with answering the certified

question before us, especially in light of the phrasing of an ancillary

question provided in a footnote by the federal court in this case.6

6I note that, in its order certifying the question now before us, the

United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
included the following related question in a footnote:

"Is the word 'demand' meaningfully different from a
word like 'request' in that it allows an officer to both ask for
the information specified in § 15-5-30 and take follow-up steps
to verify the information if the suspect answers those
questions in an incomplete or non-credible way."

Jennings v. Smith, No: 1:22-cv-01165-RDP, May 22, 2025 (N.D. Ala.
2025) (emphasis added). That question is the next logical step after
determining whether a demand for identification is prohibited and, thus,
17
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I write separately to explain why a textual analysis supports the

main opinion's conclusions and to emphasize the precision of our answer.

I. Alabama Courts Construe Statutes According to Their Plain
Language

When interpreting statutes, we " ' determine and give effect to the

intent of the legislature as manifested in the language of the statute.' "

Pruitt v. Oliver, 331 So. 3d 99, 111 (Ala. 2021) (quoting Ex parte State

Dep't of Revenue, 683 So. 2d 980, 983 (Ala. 1996)). "[T]he process of

ascertaining a law's intent is an objective exercise focused on the statute's

text, not a subjective one focused on lawmakers' unexpressed goals or

desires." Jay Mitchell, Textualism in Alabama, 74 Ala. L. Rev. 1089, 1101

(2023); see also Maxwell v. State, 89 Ala. 150, 161, 7 So. 824, 827 (1890)

(" ' The court knows nothing of the intention of an act, except from the

words in which it is expressed, applied to the facts existing at the time;

the meaning of the law being the law itself.' " (citation omitted)). This

is also before us. See, generally, Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Shelby Realty
Holdings, LLC, 83 So. 3d 469, 471 n.2 (Ala. 2011) (" ' [T]his Court will
rephrase a question certified to it in order to address the "basic issue
implicated by th[e] question" and "contemplated by the [court] in its
certification." ' " (quoting Holcim (US) Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 38 So. 3d
722, 726-27 (Ala. 2009), quoting in turn John Deere Co. v. Gamble, 523
So. 2d 95, 99 (Ala. 1988))).
18
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means that " ' the language of the statute is conclusive.' " Pruitt, 331 So.

3d at 111 (quoting State Dep't of Revenue, 683 So. 2d at 983). We will

thus give the words their " ' natural, ordinary, commonly understood

meaning' " and will bind ourselves to " ' interpret that language to mean

exactly what it says.' " Id.

Here, the language of § 15-5-30 says that an officer "may stop any

person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is

committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or other public

offense and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of

his actions."

A. An Officer Is Not Prohibited From "Requesting" Physical
Identification

To begin with the easiest part of the question before us, the text of

the statute does not "prohibit" an officer from "request[ing]" "physical

identification," and it certainly does not do so if the officer has met the

reasonable-suspicion standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).7 I do

7The reasonable-suspicion standard articulated in Terry mirrors
the standard set forth in § 15-5-30. Under Terry, an officer may conduct
a brief investigatory stop "where [he] observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot." 392 U.S. 1 at 30. Section 15-5-30 similarly
authorizes an officer to "stop any person abroad in a public place whom
19
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not view this as a close question. First, the text of the statute says

nothing that could remotely be interpreted as prohibiting a request for

identification or anything else. Certainly, "the broad background rule is

that the police may ask members of the public questions and make

consensual requests of them." Edger v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230, 1239

(11th Cir. 2023) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991));

see also T.D.F. v. State, 264 So. 3d 108, 117-18 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018)

("[U]nless the police have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop

an individual, the police may be ignored.").

And, if there was any doubt in this case, even Michael Jerome

Jennings agrees. During oral argument, his counsel expressly conceded

that the officer could "request" or "ask" for physical identification.8 His

he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to
commit a felony or other public offense." Alabama courts have recognized
this correspondence and have applied Terry's framework directly to the
statute. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 380 So. 2d 381, 383 (Ala. Crim. App.
1980) (treating § 15-5-30's reasonable-suspicion requirement as
coextensive with Terry).

8See Supreme Court of Alabama, Supreme Court O/A Montgomery,

Alabama, YouTube (January 7, 2026, 7:43-7:55) ("Well, [the officer] can
ask for ID. The question is can they compel ID. And the officer can ask
for ID initially when they -- when they approach the person. They can
ask for it. But the question is not whether they can ask. The issue is not
ask. The issue is demand." (emphasis added)) (at the time this decision
20
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counsel also expressly conceded during oral argument that the stop in

this case was a valid stop.9

Finally, while the statute does not use the word "request," it states

that an officer may "demand" certain information. "Demand" is certainly

stronger than "request." Thus, if the officer can "demand" the physical

identification, the officer can certainly "request" it.

B. An Officer Is Not Prohibited From Demanding Physical
Identification Under These Facts

i. The Meaning of the Terms in § 15-5-30

As to whether an officer can "demand" physical identification under

§ 15-5-30, I start with the operative definitions of the key words in that

statute: "demand," "name," and "address."10

was issued, this oral-argument session could be located at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-U3qeHk2rFk).
9See Supreme Court of Alabama, Supreme Court O/A Montgomery,

Alabama, YouTube (January 7, 2026, 3:30-3:32) ("I would agree this was
a valid Terry stop." (emphasis added)) (at the time this decision was
issued, this oral-argument session could be located at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-U3qeHk2rFk).

10As I have written before: "I believe that we are required to apply

the 'original public meaning' of the words in a statute or our
Constitution, thus ensuring that we do not apply our own subjective
meaning to the words used." Ex parte Underwood, [Ms. SC-2024-0263,
June 7, 2025] ___ So.3d __, __ n.4 (Ala. 2025) (Cook, J., concurring
specially) (citing Ne w Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105, 113
21
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A "demand" is the assertion of a legal right and in its verbal form

can mean "[t]o claim as one's due" or "to require." Black's Law Dictionary

516-17 (4th ed. 1951).11 It can involve "requiring [a person] to do or yield

something." Id. These definitions indicate that an officer may require

identifying information because he or she has an affirmative legal right

to it. The officer is not at the mercy of an unwilling suspect. Rather, the

officer must be able to receive that to which he or she has a right.

(2019) (" ' [I]t's a "fundamental canon of statutory construction" that
words generally should be "interpreted as taking their ordinary ...
meaning ... at the time Congress enacted the statute." ' " (citations
omitted))); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 82-83 (Thomson/West 2012) ("Originalism
is the only approach to text that is compatible with democracy. When
government-adopted texts are given new meaning, the law is changed;
and changing written law, like adopting written law in the first place, is
the function of the first two branches of government -- elected legislators
and … elected executive officials and their delegates."); Jay Mitchell,
Textualism in Alabama, 74 Ala. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (2023) ("[T]he
meaning of a law is its original public meaning, not
its modern meaning.").

11I cite the fourth edition of Black's Law Dictionary here because it

is a contemporaneous dictionary to the original passing of this statute in
1966. See, e.g. Maxwell v. State, 89 Ala. 150, 161, 7 So. 824, 827 (1890)
(emphasizing connecting the language of a statute to " ' facts existing at
the time' " (citation omitted)); National Labor Rels. Bd. v. Canning, 573
U.S 513, 527 (2014) (citing founding-era dictionaries to determine the
meaning of "recess"); Wisconsin Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274,
277-78 (referencing a 1942 dictionary in interpreting the meaning of
"money" in a 1937 statute).
22
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Applying those definitions to the statute now before us, it seems clear to

me that the plain language of § 15-5-30 gives an officer the right to

receive the suspect's name and address.

Next, a "name" is "[t]he designation of an individual person, or of a

firm or corporation." Black's Law Dictionary 1174 (4th ed. 1951). This

consists of "one or more … given names and one surname or family

name." Id. Applying this definition to § 15-5-30, we must conclude that

an officer has the right to a given name and a surname.

As the Supreme Court has recognized, this reading "serves

important government interests." Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court of Nev.,

Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004). Our appellate courts have

agreed and have acknowledged that the statute's purpose is investigatory

in nature. See, e.g., Manning v. State, 612 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1992) ("The State of Alabama has codified the investigative stop at

§ 15-5-30 …." (emphasis added)); Scurlock v. State, 487 So. 2d 286, 289

(Ala. Crim. App. 1986) ("Under the authority of § 15-5-30 … a police

officer has authority to stop and question a person for investigatory

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purposes …." (emphasis added)).12 The only kind of name that can

affirmatively identify a person for the purposes of a police investigation

is at least a given name and a surname. Cf. Ex parte Jefferson Cnty. Bd.

of Educ., [Ms. SC-2024-0756, Apr. 4, 2025] ____ So. 3d _, __ (Ala.

2025) (recognizing that for civil-pleading purposes "a pleader who knows

only a person's partial name does not know that person's identity …."). A

suspect who says that his name is "Bob" or "Sparky" does not give an

officer the required information to which he or she has a right.

Finally, an "address" is a "[p]lace where mail or other

communications will reach [a] person" and is "[g]enerally a place of

business or residence." Black's Law Dictionary 60 (4th ed. 1951). Like a

name, the address must include enough information to allow an officer to

verify if the person is who he or she says. If you can write the suspect's

response on an envelope and it will make its way to the suspect's

12Speculating about a statute's legislative "purpose" is often
hazardous, particularly when it would require divining the collective
mental processes of 140 members of the Alabama Legislature. But no
such speculation is necessary here. The statute's purpose is evident from
its text. An "investigation" involves "examin[ing] and inquir[ing] into
with care and accuracy." Black's Law Dictionary 960 (4th ed. 1951). By
its very nature, asking a person for his or her name and address and an
explanation of his or her conduct serves an investigatory function.
24
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residence, then that is good enough. However, like the hypotheticals

above, if a suspect were to give a vague response, such as his house is

"across from the grocery store" or is "the blue one down the street," the

response would not meet the demands of the statute. So, officers making

a valid stop under § 15-5-30 have not only the right to demand, but also

the right to receive, a full legal name and a mail-worthy address.

ii. The Plain Language of § 15-5-30 Answers the
Question Before Us

But what happens when the suspect gives an incomplete name or

an imprecise address? What are the next steps that the officer can take?

The question as certified to our Court asks whether, under those

circumstances, the officer is "prohibited" from demanding, like the name

and address, physical identification to confirm the information. The

answer is no.

Jennings, in his brief, says that the statute, "by its plain text, does

not permit law enforcement to demand physical identification."

Jennings's brief at 14-15. He then proceeds to quote the statute without

further analysis, other than to cite Edger v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230, 1238-

39 (11th Cir. 2023), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit determined that § 15-5-30 was "so clear that no
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reasonable officer could have interpreted it to permit [an] arrest for

failing to produce [physical identification]."

I interpret Jennings's argument, much like the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals' decision, to be primarily based on the expressio unius

canon of statutory interpretation, also known as the negative-implication

canon. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts at 107 (Thomson/Reuters 2012). The Latin

name from which the canon is derived means that the "expression of one

thing implies the exclusion of others." Id. Stated simply, it appears to me

that Jennings is arguing that because the statute expressly provides for

a demand for three things -- a name, an address, and an explanation of

actions -- an officer is permitted to demand nothing more. In other words,

because physical identification is not on the list, an officer is prohibited

from demanding it.

However, this canon only works to exclude other items in the same

category. When the statute in this case limits the demands to name,

address, and explanation of actions, it limits the officer to the types of

information he or she can demand, not how he or she can demand them.

So, an officer cannot demand the suspect's Social Security number or date

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of birth, but that does not mean that he or she cannot demand the name

and address in a verifiable form. As the main opinion makes clear, the

statute limits the information an officer can demand, but not the ways he

or she can demand it. Because this Court is the ultimate authority on the

interpretation of Alabama law, its decisions define how Alabama law is

applied and understood. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.

v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406, 1413 (11th Cir. 1997) ("The final arbiter of

state law is the state supreme court, which is another way of saying that

Alabama law is what the Alabama Supreme Court says it is.").

As stated above, officers have a right to the information that the

statute lists when a suspect gives an incomplete or unsatisfactory oral

response. That right authorizes them to demand physical identification

of that information in at least these circumstances. It is of no matter to

say, as Jennings does here, that the physical identification contains

information that the suspect is not compelled to provide, like height,

weight, and organ-donor status. That is true. But the physical

identification contains the information that the suspect is compelled to

provide in verifiable form and that is sufficient. It is the presence of the

authorized information that makes the demand lawful. The presence of

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other information does not then make the demand unlawful.

Authorization to demand physical identification is also a correct

application of the predicate-act canon, which provides that, when a

statute authorizes an agent to perform specified acts, it also authorizes

the agent to employ reasonable and appropriate means necessary to carry

those acts into execution. See Riley v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc.,

57 So. 3d 704, 720 (Ala. 2010) (" ' " When a [provision of law] gives a

general power or enjoins a duty, it also gives by implication, every

particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance

of the other." ' " (citations omitted)). It is no defense that an officer might

have pursued other methods of obtaining a suspect's full name. The

existence of alternatives does not negate implied authority to use a

reasonably adapted means of verification.13 Nor does the law require a

hierarchy of investigative baby steps, such as continued oral questioning,

13In fact, Jennings agreed at oral argument that "the statute is in

place here to give law enforcement the tools in order to ascertain the
information …." See Supreme Court of Alabama, Supreme Court O/A
Montgomery, Alabama, YouTube (January 7, 2026, 10:05-10:13)
(emphasis added) (at the time this decision was issued, this oral-
argument session could be located at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-U3qeHk2rFk). On this point,
Jennings is correct.
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before requesting physical identification to confirm the information an

officer is statutorily authorized to demand.

Yet another canon counsels in favor of this Court's interpretation:

the presumption against change in the common law. See Scalia and

Garner, supra, at 318-19. Under that canon, "[a] statute will be construed

to alter the common law only when that disposition is clear." Id. at 318.

At common law, law-enforcement officers possessed limited

authority to stop and question individuals reasonably suspected of

criminal activity, which included an obligation on the part of the suspect

to provide his or her name. As the Supreme Court has explained, this

authority traces to early English law permitting officers to detain

suspicious persons unless they gave " 'a good Account of themselves.' "

Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 183 (quoting 15 Geo. 2, ch. 5, § 2 (1744)). Alabama

adopted this common-law framework.14 Nothing cited by Jennings draws

a distinction in that common-law tradition between oral identification

14See § 1-3-1, Ala. Code 1975, which reads:

"The common law of England, so far as it is not inconsistent
with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall,
together with such institutions and laws, be the rule of decisions,
and shall continue in force, except as from time to time it may be
altered or repealed by the Legislature."
29
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and other ordinary means by which identity might be conveyed. Absent

any indication that the Legislature intended a clear departure from this

background rule, the common-law supplies no presumption against

reading the statute to permit an officer to demand physical identification.

Jennings responds that traditional vagrancy and stop-and-identify

laws -- like the statute at issue in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358

(1983) -- raise constitutional vagueness concerns. He argues that

applying a test based on whether a response was "incomplete or

unsatisfactory" renders the statute void for vagueness. But Kolender

involved a materially different statute and a materially different judicial

construction. In that case, California courts construed their stop-and-

identify law to require "credible and reliable" identification -- an

interpretation that "contain[ed] no standard for determining what a

suspect has to do" to comply and "vest[ed] virtually complete discretion

in the hands of the police." Id. at 358.

We do not read § 15-5-30 so broadly. Our interpretation today

permits an officer to demand only identification containing the specific

information enumerated in the statute when the suspect provides an

incomplete or objectively insufficient oral response. An answer is

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"incomplete or unsatisfactory" not because an officer doubts its

truthfulness or plausibility, but because it fails to supply the information

the statute expressly requires or is nonresponsive to the inquiry posed.

Thus understood, the statute does not turn on an officer's subjective

assessment of "credibility" or "reliability," but on whether the required

identifying information has been provided at all.15

This construction is consistent with the constitutional framework

governing investigative stops under Terry that the main opinion explains

in detail. Whether a Terry stop may continue once a suspect provides

complete identifying information is a question addressed by Hiibel, and I

see nothing in § 15-5-30 -- or in the main opinion's interpretation of it --

that extends beyond what Hiibel permits. Properly construed, the statute

does not authorize enforcement based on whatever an officer might

subjectively deem "credible and reliable," and it therefore does not suffer

15For that matter, Jennings again conceded at oral argument that

it is "not [his] position that they could have ran his name with [the]
information he originally provided." See Supreme Court of Alabama,
Supreme Court O/A Montgomery, Alabama, YouTube (January 7, 2026,
9:16-9:20) (emphasis added) (at the time this decision was issued, this
oral-argument session could be located at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-U3qeHk2rFk). In any event,
whatever the statute requires, Jennings knew what information he was
obligated to provide.
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from the vagueness defect identified in Kolender.

iii. What We Do Not Decide

In the last paragraph, the main opinion states: "In summary,

Alabama law is clear -- once an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe

that a suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a

felony or other public offense, § 15-5-30 empowers the officer to demand

that the suspect disclose his or her name and address in a format that

would allow the officer to affirmatively identify the suspect." ____ So. 3d

at ____ (emphasis added). I understand the phrase "in a format that

would allow the officer to affirmatively identify the suspect" to mean that

the officer need not accept "an incomplete or unsatisfactory oral

response." Instead, under § 15-5-30, the officer may in that circumstance

take all proper investigatory means, consistent with Terry, to obtain

complete and satisfactory information allowing the officer to

affirmatively identify the suspect, including demanding physical

identification. See also Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 188-89 ("It is clear in this case

that the request for identification was 'reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified' the stop." (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20)).

I do not read the main opinion as reaching the question of whether an

32
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officer may "demand" physical identification after a suspect provides

complete and satisfactory responses regarding the three requested pieces

of information.

II. Conclusion

In sum, I agree with the main opinion that, when a suspect gives

an incomplete or unsatisfactory oral response, an officer is not prohibited

from requesting or demanding the suspect's name and address in the

form of physical identification and, in fact, is authorized to do so.

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SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result).

Section 15-5-30, Ala. Code 1975, provides that a law-enforcement

officer "may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably

suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or

other public offense and may demand of him his name, address and an

explanation of his actions." This Code section does not provide that

officers may randomly demand identification. It instead provides that

certain officers, in certain places, in certain situations, may "demand"

certain information.

It is beyond cavil that the word "name" refers to a person's actual

name. Giving a false name, a nickname, or an occupational or

professional title in place of all or part of a person's actual name is not

answering with one's "name"; such answers do not respond to the

"demand" of a person's "name" under § 15-5-30 and are nonresponsive.

The Code section allows an officer to demand an "address." The

word "address" refers to a street name and number. A reference to a

general geographical location where one lives is nonresponsive.

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When a person refuses to answer following a demand under § 15-5-

30 or when that person's answer is nonresponsive, the person has not

responded to the demand.

The Code section does not specify the manner in which a person

may respond to the demand. While, in context, an officer engaging a

person in a public place would naturally imply an oral interaction,

nothing in the Code section requires that an answer be in the form of an

oral response. Indeed, a person might not be able to answer orally.

The Code section authorizes an officer to demand and obtain a

person's actual name and address. It does not allow nonresponsive

answers. The language in the Code section does not limit an officer to

demanding only an oral answer.

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MENDHEIM, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. Regarding the answer to the certified

question, I agree with the main opinion that Ala. Code 1975, § 15-5-30,

does not prohibit a law-enforcement officer from demanding physical

identification when a person whom the officer reasonably suspects is

about to commit a felony or other public offense fails to provide an

adequate name, address, or explanation of his or her actions for purposes

of identification. Nevertheless, I dissented from the Court's decision to

accept the question before us and believe we should decline to answer the

question due to basic principles of comity with the federal courts.

Based on the materials before us, neither United States District

Court Judge R. David Proctor nor any party sought to certify a question

to this Court regarding the meaning or application of § 15-5-30 before

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision reversing the merits-

based judgment against Michael Jerome Jennings and in favor of the City

of Childersburg and police officers Christopher Smith, Justin Gable, and

Jeremy Brooks. See Jennings v. Smith, No. 23-14171, Sept. 27, 2024

(11th Cir. 2024) (not reported in Federal Reporter) ("Jennings II").

Instead, Judge Proctor initially addressed the meaning and application

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of that statute, expressly after considering the "decision in Edger v.

McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230 (11th Cir. 2023)," when entering the

aforementioned judgment. Jennings v. Smith, No. 1:22-cv-01165-RDP,

Dec. 21, 2023 (N.D. Ala. 2023) (not reported in Federal Supplement)

("Jennings I"). In Jennings II, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

disagreed with the decision in Jennings I, specifically determining that

"this case falls within the purview of Edger[ v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230

(11th Cir. 2023)]," as to the meaning and application of § 15-5-30. Thus,

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has made its determination

regarding Alabama law for purposes of this case, and this Court is now

presented with a question that will require us to state or infer either that

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals erred in Jennings II because Edger

v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230 (11th Cir. 2023), does not accurately reflect

Alabama law; that that court erred in Jennings II because Edger was

correctly decided but is distinguishable from or irrelevant to this case; or

that that court correctly understood and applied Alabama law in

Jennings II. In other words, this case is postured such that this Court

essentially is reviewing the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals in Jennings II rather than entertaining a question from that

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court regarding Alabama law for purposes of prospective application to

the case. I do not believe that reflects a proper use of Rule 18, Ala. R.

App. P.

As counsel for Smith, Gable, and Brooks acknowledged in their

"Preliminary Brief in Support of Accepting the Certified Question" ("the

brief in support") filed with this Court, on May 19, 2025, Judge Proctor

entered "a memorandum opinion and order granting the motion of

[Smith, Gable, and Brooks] and their employer, the City of Childersburg,

to certify a question regarding Alabama Code § 15-5-30 to this Court."

The brief in support, p.6. The May 2025 order, a copy of which was

attached as Appendix B to the brief in support, states: "This matter is

before the court on [Smith, Gable, and Brooks's] Motion to Certify

Controlling Question to the Supreme Court of Alabama. … For the

reasons discussed below, the Motion … is GRANTED."

The motion to certify referenced in the May 2025 order was filed in

response to a March 4, 2025, order entered by Judge Proctor, a copy of

which was attached as Appendix F to the brief in support. The March

2025 order was entered after a status conference. We have no transcript

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of what was said at that conference, but Judge Proctor stated as follows

in footnote 1 of the March 2025 order:

"At the status conference, the court candidly acknowledged
that it is not at all convinced that the Eleventh Circuit
correctly interpreted Alabama Code § 15-5-30. But, that is of
no moment. It is simply irrelevant what the undersigned,
sitting as a lower court, thinks. After all, unless there is a
change in controlling law or a presentation of new facts to the
trier of fact, the Eleventh Circuit's holding is law of the case
here. Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1120 (11th Cir.
1985)."

In the March 2025 order, Judge Proctor then questioned whether the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had properly relied on Edger, and he

proceeded to discuss exceptions to the law-of-the-case doctrine,

specifically noting that an exception to the application of the doctrine

existed " ' "when there has been a change in controlling authority.' " "

(Quoting Newman v. Ormand, 456 F. App'x 866, 867 (11th Cir. 2012),

quoting, in turn Jackson v. Alabama State Tenure Comm'n, 405 F.3d

1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005).) Judge Proctor then opined that the question

might be certified to this Court (which might generate a change in

controlling authority for purposes of establishing an exception to the law-

of-the-case doctrine), and he requested briefs on the issue whether to

certify a question to this Court and how that question should be framed.

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In response to the March 2025 order, Smith, Gable, and Brooks filed a

brief that included a motion for certification, which they attached as

Appendix D to the brief in support. As noted above, Judge Proctor

granted that motion.

I dissented from the Court's decision to accept Judge Proctor's

request that we answer the certified question, and I still believe that we

should decline to answer the question. In Palmore v. First Unum, 841

So. 2d 233 (Ala. 2002), this Court declined to answer a certified question,

noting that principles of comity weigh in favor of declining to answer a

question in circumstances similar to those before us:

"As stated above, on June 29, 2001, the district court issued a
memorandum opinion in this case in which it held, based upon
its previous opinion in Gilbert v. Alta Health & Life Insurance
Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2000), that Alabama's
tort of bad faith was not preempted by ERISA. The Eleventh
Circuit reversed this holding in its Gilbert decision, which was
released on December 27, 2001. On January 17, 2002, the
district court certified its question to this Court, noting the
reversal but stating that the Eleventh Circuit's mandate in
Gilbert had not yet been released. We accepted the certified
question on February 15, 2002. However, after refusing to
hear the Gilbert case en banc, the Eleventh Circuit issued its
mandate to the district court on March 22, 2002. The issuance
of this mandate (which, of course, binds the district court)
raises a serious question regarding the propriety of the
outstanding certified question, which is an apparent
challenge to the Eleventh Circuit. To say the least, these
events place this Court in an unenviable position -- a position
40
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that at least favors, if not demands, that we decline to answer
the certified question."

841 So. 2d at 236 n.3; see also Gerber Prods. Co. v. Mitchell, Williams,

Selig, Gates & Woodyard, PLLC, No. CV-22-326, Mar. 2, 2023 (Ark. 2023)

(not published in South Western Reporter) (discussing a certified

question from the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Arkansas, following remand, and stating: "This certified question

comes before us in an unusual procedural posture. As stated above, the

Eighth Circuit has directly addressed the issue involved in the certified

question presented to this court. Therefore, exercising our broad

discretion under Rule 6-8, [Ark. R. Sup. Ct.], we rescind our decision to

answer the certified question.");16 Broadview Sav. & Loan Co. v.

Riestenberg, 49 Ohio St. 3d 133, 134, 550 N.E.2d 949, 949 (1990)

(refusing to consider a certified question, following remand, and stating:

"Since the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has given its answer, we believe

it would be inappropriate to intervene between the federal appellate and

16Pursuant to Rule 5-2(c), Ark. R. Sup. Ct., "[e]very Supreme Court

and Court of Appeals opinion issued after July 1, 2009, is precedent and
may be relied upon and cited by any party in any proceeding." The
Comments to Rule 5-2 state: “Subdivision (c) eliminates the distinction
between unpublished opinions. All opinions issued after July 1, 2009, are
precedent and may be cited in any filing or argument in any court."
41
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district courts. This decision does not preclude the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals from seeking our opinion should this case again reach it on

appeal.").

Although I understand that the decision whether to certify a

question generally is a discretionary one for the pertinent federal court,

certification after the receipt of an adverse decision on the merits is not

favored in the federal system, and the certification in the present case

has come only after a significant expenditure of federal judicial resources

in answering the question that has now been certified to this Court. See,

e.g., Boyd Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency, 178 F. 3d

1363, 1365 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a request for certification that was

made for the first time on rehearing, noting that the request was made

only after an adverse decision on the merits, and stating that granting

certification "at this late hour would be inefficient and wasteful of the

parties' and the federal courts' previously expended time, energy, and

resources"); see also City of Columbus v. Hotels.com, L.P., 693 F.3d 642,

654 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[C]ertification is disfavored where a plaintiff files in

federal court and then, after an unfavorable judgment, 'seek [s] refuge' in

a state forum. Local 219 Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. Pension Fund v.

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Buck Consultants, LLC, 311 Fed. Appx. 827, 831 (6th Cir.2009). 'The

appropriate time to seek certification of a state-law issue is before a

District Court resolves the issue, not after receiving an unfavorable

ruling.' Id. at 832."). And I am particularly troubled by that prospect

when no judge on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' panel that

decided Jennings II, which included the judge who authored Edger,

Judge Charles R. Wilson, and who was on the panel for another case

pertinent to Judge Proctor's decision to certify, namely Metz v. Bridges,

No. 23-11275, Dec. 12, 2024 (11th Cir. 2024) (not reported in Federal

Reporter), even suggested that certification might be appropriate. See

Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1974) (noting that a

dissenting judge on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had urged that

court to certify the state-law question at issue to the Florida Supreme

Court and remanding the case to the Court of Appeals "so that that court

may reconsider whether the controlling issue of Florida law should be

certified to the Florida Supreme Court"); see also Hiji v. City of Garnett,

248 Kan. 1, 4, 804 P.2d 950, 952 (1991) (accepting a certified question

and noting that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

had suggested that the federal district court, on remand, either certify

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the state-law question to the Kansas Supreme Court or reexamine

Kansas caselaw).

Stewart, C.J., and McCool, J., concur.

44