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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In the Matter of Police Chief, Paterson

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1144-23

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (29.3K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1144-23

IN THE MATTER OF POLICE
CHIEF, PATERSON.

---

Submitted January 7, 2026 – Decided March 11, 2026

Before Judges Paganelli and Jacobs.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
Commission, Docket No. 2023-2167.

PRB Attorneys At Law, LLC, attorneys for appellant
City of Paterson (Peter P. Perla, Jr., of counsel and on
the briefs; Joseph P. Horan, II, on the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission
(Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Levi Klinger-Christiansen, Deputy Attorney General,
on the brief).

PER CURIAM

The City of Paterson (City) appeals from the July 3, 2024 final agency

decision of the New Jersey Civil Service Commission (Commission) denying its

request to convert the title of Police Chief to the unclassified service of the civil
service. Because the City fails to establish the Commission's decision was

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, we affirm.

We glean the procedural history and facts from the Commission's record.

In October 2022, the City requested "to have its Police Chief position converted

from the classified service to the unclassified service." In December, the

Commission denied the request because the statute "only permits unclassified

appointments to the title of Police Chief in cities of the first class operating

under the Mayor-Council Plan C form of government" and the City "is a Mayor-

Council Plan D form of government," (citing N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7).

The City appealed from the Commission's denial. In February 2023, the

Commission denied the City's appeal. The Commission considered the New

Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Newark Superior Officers Association v.

Newark, 98 N.J. 212 (1985), and determined "the [C]ourt found N.J.S.A.

40:69A-60.7 applie[d] to municipalities that are or 'may in the future become

first class cities operating under the Mayor-Council Plan C form of

government.'" Therefore, the Commission concluded, "N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7

remain[ed] applicable to cities of the first class that operate under the

Mayor-Council Plan C form of government." Further, the Commission

concluded the City was a Mayor-Council Plan D form of government, and

A-1144-23
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therefore, the City's reliance on N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7 was misplaced and it

could not appoint a Police Chief in the unclassified service.

In April 2023, the City requested the Commission to reconsider its denial

of the appeal. Among other reasons, and aside from its continued reliance on

N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7 and Newark, the City contended the Commission had "the

legal authority to make any position unclassified under other authority." The

City argued "a title []shall be allocated . . . to the unclassified service when" the

"Commission determines that it is not practicable to determine merit and fitness

for appointment in or promotion to that title by examination and that it is not

appropriate to make permanent appointments to the title," (citing N.J.S.A.

11A:3-5 and quoting N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.3(a)). The City repeated its request for

"the Commission [to] convert its [P]olice [C]hief into an unclassified position."

In November 2023, the Commission determined the City had "failed to

meet the standard for reconsideration." The Commission found the City did "not

present new evidence or additional information which was not presented at the

original proceeding which would change the outcome of the original decision,

nor ha[d the City] prove[d] that a clear material error ha[d] occurred in the

original decision."

A-1144-23
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Instead, the Commission noted, the City did "not contend that the

Commission . . . [had] either misinterpreted . . . N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7 or . . .

Newark," but rather asserted "that the Commission may ignore the plain

language of N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7 and grant its request on other grounds."

In December 2023, the City filed an appeal with the Appellate Division.

The City and the Commission participated in the Appellate Division's Civil

Appeals Settlement Program (CASP). After two CASP conferences, the appeal

was dismissed without prejudice after the parties agreed to remand to the

Commission for further proceedings.

On remand, the Commission "independently" considered the application

of N.J.S.A. 11A:3-5 and N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.3; N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7; and Newark.

The Commission "noted that our courts have recognized the State's strong public

policy . . . favoring the inclusion of as many titles as possible in the career

service." Further, the Commission noted that "the New Jersey Legislature

adopted the Civil Service Act 'primarily . . . to remove employment in the

classified service from political control, partisanship and personal favoritism,

and to maintain stability and continuity in ordinary public employment ,'"

(quoting Connors v. City of Bayonne, 36 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 1955)).

A-1144-23
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The Commission stated "N.J.S.A. 11A:3-5 provides various titles that are

statutorily placed into the unclassified service." Moreover, the Commission

noted titles could be placed in the unclassified service "as provided by statute or

as [it] may determine in accordance with criteria established by rule," (quoting

N.J.S.A. 11A:3-5(u)). The Commission contended N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.1(a) allows

it to allocate job titles to the unclassified service under certain circumstances.

The Commission found "[c]learly, the title of Police Chief is not

specifically designated as unclassified by N.J.S.A. 11A:3-5." Further, "the

parameters for reclassifying the Police Chief title are expressly provided for by

N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7, not N.J.S.A. 11A:3-5." The Commission rejected the

argument that, despite N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7, it could reclassify the title under

N.J.S.A. 11A:3-5(u).

The Commission interpreted "the relevant provisions of N.J.S.A. 11A:3-

5(u), as creating two mutually exclusive categories of titles that may be

reclassified: [1] titles that may be reclassified as provided by separate statutes

and [2] titles that may be reclassified in accordance with the Commission's

rules."

The Commission explained:

When the parameters for reclassification of a specific
title are established by a separate statute and those

A-1144-23
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parameters are not met, the Commission does not
interpret its enabling statute as granting it authority to
nevertheless allow for reclassification of that same title.
In other words, when the Legislature has enacted a
separate statute that establishes reclassification criteria,
as it has for Police Chief, the Commission cannot
reallocate that same title under the general authority of
Title 11A of the New Jersey Statu[t]es or Title 4A of
the New Jersey Administrative Code.

The Commission found that "[t]o interpret N.J.S.A. 11A:3-5(u) differently

would create a conflict between, Title 11A," its enabling statute and N.J.S.A.

40:69A-60.7. Moreover, the Commission found "agency rules are designed to

interpret or supplement but not contravene existing law." Further, the

Commission noted a "specific statute covering a subject" would prevail over a

general statute covering a subject, and thus N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7 must prevail

over N.J.S.A. 11A:3-5(u).

Nevertheless, the Commission stated, even if it "did have independent

authority to reclassify the title, which it does not, the Police Chief title in

[the City] does not meet the criteria for reclassification under

N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.3." (Emphasis added). The Commission found: (1) there was

no "specific statutory authority that designate[d] the Paterson Police Chief as

unclassified," (citing N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.3(a)(3)); (2) there was "no statute

providing for the appointment of an incumbent in the title to serve for a fixed

A-1144-23
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term or at the pleasure of an appointing authority," (citing N.J.A.C. 4A:3-

1.3(a)(4)); (3) "the job analysis for the Police Chief title identifies knowledge,

skills[,] and abilities that may be evaluated utilizing the competitive

examination process" and therefore, it was "practicable to determine merit and

fitness for appointment in or promotion to th[e] title by examination," (citing

N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.3(a)(5)); (4) the City's Police Chief was not "an unclassified

department head pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.3(b)"; and (5) the City's Police

Chief was not "a principal executive officer" and "independent of other

executive authority," (citing N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.3(c)).

Therefore, the Commission determined "none of the criteria pursuant to

N.J.S.A. 11A:3-5 and N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.3 to permit the reallocation of the Police

Chief title . . . to the unclassified service ha[d] been met."

Further, the Commission considered the City's argument that it could

"relax the provisions of N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.3 pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.2(c)."

However, the Commission determined that because "the reclassification of the

Police Chief [t]itle is governed by a separate statute," it could not "relax its rules

to allow for reclassification of that title." The Commission reiterated that

relaxation "would create a conflict between Title 11A, Chapter 4A, and N.J.S.A.

40:69A-60.7."

A-1144-23
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Moreover, the Commission stated that in Newark, the "[C]ourt did not find

that 'any' city of the first class could appoint an unclassified Police Chie f but

rather, [it] upheld the criteria that only a city of the first class operating under

the Mayor-Council Plan C form of government could appoint an unclassified

Police Chief." The Commission determined it could not "circumvent

'precedential case law.'"

Therefore,

[t]he Commission f[ound] it does not possess the
independent authority, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 11A:3-5
and N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.3, to reallocate the Police Chief in
[the City] to the unclassified service as this matter is
directly governed by N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7 which the
Commission does not have the jurisdiction to relax.

On appeal, the City argues the Commission's decision was arbitrary,

capricious, and unreasonable. It contends it needs the same flexibility to appoint

a Police Chief that is afforded to other large cities. The City argues it presents

with "special circumstances" and the Commission "simply placed form over

substance" in precluding relief based on the City's Mayor-Council Plan D form

of government under N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7. In addition, it asserts Newark

supports its position because the Supreme Court recognized "there were special

reasons why the largest cities in New Jersey needed the flexibility and discretion

to appoint and remove their [P]olice [C]hiefs on an unclassified basis."

A-1144-23
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Moreover, it argues the Legislature provided the Commission with "the ability

to place positions . . . into the unclassified service" under its rules, citing

N.J.S.A. 11A:3-5(u).

Our review of administrative agency actions is limited. See In re

Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). Therefore, "[a]n administrative agency's

final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that

it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the

record." Id. at 27-28. "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action

was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the

administrative action." J.B. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 444 N.J. Super. 115, 149

(App. Div. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super.

440, 443-44 (App. Div. 2006)). The review includes:

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
follow the law;

(2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support the findings on which the agency based its
actions; and

(3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the
facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion
that could not reasonably have been made on a showing
of the relevant factors.

A-1144-23
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[Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle
Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (quoting In re
Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).]

"When an agency's decision meets those criteria, then a court owes

substantial deference to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a

particular field." Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28.

"We must also acknowledge the deference that should be afforded to the

interpretation of the agency charged with applying and enforcing a statutory

scheme." Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 301 (2015). Although, we

are "not bound by an agency's determination on a question of law, our courts

give 'great deference' to an agency's 'interpretation of statutes within its scope

of authority and its adoption of rules implementing' the laws for which it is

responsible." Id. at 301-02 (citation omitted) (quoting N.J. Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs

v. Schundler, 211 N.J. 535, 549 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"In construing the meaning of a statute or the common law, our review is

de novo." Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013). "The objective of all

statutory interpretation is to discern and effectuate the intent of the Legislature."

Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 592 (2012). "[W]e begin by

looking at the statute's plain language," ibid., and give the language "its ordinary

meaning and . . . construe[ it] in a common-sense manner." State in the Interest

A-1144-23
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of K.O., 217 N.J. 83, 91 (2014). "We will 'neither rewrite a plainly[ ] written

enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended

something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.'" Sanchez v.

Fitness Factory Edgewater, LLC, 242 N.J. 252, 261 (2020) (alteration in

original) (quoting O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002)).

Applying this well-established law, we begin our analysis, like the

Commission did, with the statute. N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7(a) provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the
contrary, the governing body of any city of the first
class, which, . . . had adopted the form of government
designated as "Mayor-Council Plan C" . . ., may
provide, by ordinance, that the mayor shall appoint a
[P]olice [C]hief . . . who shall serve in the unclassified
service of the civil service of the city.

It is undisputed that while the City is a "city of the first class," its form of

government is Mayor-Council Plan D, not C. Therefore, applying the plain

language of the statute, there is no ability to provide for the Police Chief title in

the unclassified service. The City's argument that the Commission erred by

distinguishing it from Mayor-Council Plan C governments—Newark and Jersey

City—is misplaced, because the distinction between the forms of government

was not made by the Commission. Instead, the Legislature made the distinction

in the statute. "The Legislature, and not the court, is the proper place for policy

A-1144-23
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arguments given that courts are not charged with passing judgment 'on the

wisdom of the legislative enactment, but only on its meaning.'" Petro v. Platkin,

472 N.J. Super. 536, 570 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Cnty. of Bergen Emp.

Benefit Plan v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 412 N.J. Super. 126,

138-39 (App. Div. 2010)). Moreover, the City has not sought to change its form

of government. See N.J.S.A. 40:69A-1. The City has not sustained its burden

to establish the Commission did not follow the law. See Allstars, 234 N.J. at

157.

Further, we reject the City's argument that the Commission could sidestep

the clear terms of N.J.S.A. 40:69A-60.7 under its rules. Here, the Commission

followed the specific requirement of the statute, and its position that it could not

"contravene existing law" was not contrary to law, see Allstars, 234 N.J. at 157;

or "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." See Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 27.

Lastly, the City's reliance on Newark is overstated. The City recited the

Court's language as:

Applying this standard, we find it difficult to conceive
a rational basis for excluding other municipalities that
may in the future become first class cities . . . . The
reasoning that supports the constitutionality of the
statute prior to this amendment, . . . would apply as well
to municipalities that in the future become first class
cities.

A-1144-23
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[(Citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).]

However, the Court actually stated:

Applying this standard, we find it difficult to conceive
a rational basis for excluding other municipalities that
may in the future become first class cities operating
under the "Mayor-Council Plan C" form of government.
The reasoning that supports the constitutionality of the
statute prior to this amendment, would apply as well to
municipalities that in the future become first class cities
operating under the "Mayor-Council Plan C" form of
government.

[(Citations omitted).]

Thus, the City's omissions through the first ellipsis and at the end of their cited

language excludes language that supports the Commission's position. See

Newark, 98 N.J. at 231. Therefore, the Commission's position that it could not

"circumvent 'precedential case law'" was not contrary to law, see Allstars, 234

N.J. at 157; or "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." See Herrmann, 192 N.J.

at 27.

Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the City fails to establish the

Commission's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments, we

conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

A-1144-23
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Affirmed.

A-1144-23
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