In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of E.K. - Civil Commitment Case Opinion
Summary
The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division dismissed an appeal concerning the civil commitment of E.K. as moot because the individual had been discharged. The court noted that while E.K. was initially committed due to psychiatric issues, his condition had improved, leading to discharge plans.
What changed
The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division dismissed the appeal in the matter of the civil commitment of E.K. (Docket No. A-3029-24) as moot because E.K. had been discharged from Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital. The appeal concerned an April 15, 2025 order continuing his civil commitment under a Conditional Extension Pending Placement (CEPP). The court noted that E.K. was initially committed on February 28, 2024, due to psychiatric issues, but subsequent reviews indicated his condition had improved to the point where he was no longer considered a danger, and discharge plans were in progress.
This decision has limited practical implications for regulated entities as it pertains to a specific individual's case and an appellate court's procedural ruling on mootness. The document is non-precedential and binding only on the parties involved. No new compliance obligations or deadlines are imposed. The primary takeaway is the procedural outcome of the appeal due to the appellant's discharge.
Source document (simplified)
Jump To
Support FLP
CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.
Please become a member today.
March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of E.K.
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: A-3029-24
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Combined Opinion
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3029-24
IN THE MATTER OF THE
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF
E.K.1
Submitted February 4, 2026 – Decided March 10, 2026
Before Judges Gummer and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Docket No. MECC-000571-
24.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant E.K. (Karol Y. Ruiz, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, on the brief).
Jerome M. St. John, Essex County Counsel, attorney for
respondent State of New Jersey (Thomas M. Bachman,
Assistant County Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
1
We use initials to identify appellant because records of civil commitment
proceedings are excluded from public access under Rule 1:38-3(f)(2).
E.K. appeals from an April 15, 2025 order continuing his civil
commitment at Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital (Greystone) under a
Conditional Extension Pending Placement (CEPP) pursuant to Rule 4:74-
7(h)(2). Because E.K. has been discharged, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
On February 28, 2024, E.K. was civilly committed to Greystone because
of psychiatric issues. The court held several review hearings after the initial
commitment. At the February 18, 2025 review hearing, Dr. Lizette Garcia
testified regarding E.K.'s psychiatric history, treatment and status. Dr. Garcia
explained that E.K. was initially committed to Greystone because he had refused
to eat, his weight had sharply declined, and he had stopped taking the medication
necessary to treat his catatonic schizophrenia due to extreme side effects.
Dr. Garcia opined during the February 18 hearing that because E.K.'s
medication needs had been addressed, his mental illness no longer rendered him
a danger to himself, others, or property. Thus, Greystone employees were
working to discharge E.K. to his brother's care in Pennsylvania, which required
coordination of out-of-state aftercare services. The judge entered an order
pursuant to Rule 4:74-7(h)(2) placing E.K. on CEPP status and scheduling a
review hearing for April 15.
A-3029-24
2
A social worker assigned to E.K.'s case testified at the April 15 review
hearing that Greystone had not yet effectuated its plan to discharge E.K. to his
brother because a new psychiatrist had observed renewed symptoms. The
assigned social worker explained E.K. had reacted to unidentified internal
stimuli, and the new psychiatrist had to treat E.K.'s revived auditory
hallucinations before E.K. could be discharged. The assigned social worker
explained Greystone's staff felt it was "essential" to have sufficient time to
address these symptoms before discharge.
Counsel for E.K. argued the availability of E.K.'s placement with his
brother required immediate discharge. Counsel also asserted the change in
E.K.'s treating psychiatrist was an insufficient basis to continue his commitment,
despite the availability of placement, and argued aftercare services were
sufficient to help E.K. "cope with any auditory hallucinations that he may have."
Counsel for E.K. interposed a multitude of evidentiary objections to the judge's
consideration of the assigned social worker's testimony, but the judge did not
rule on them.
At the judge's request, the assigned social worker further explained the
reports of E.K.'s behavior reflected he had been yelling and "calling witches
from . . . his home, chasing them[,] and so forth." Greystone's medical staff
A-3029-24
3
instructed E.K.'s assigned social worker to reach out to E.K.'s brother, who had
stated similar behavior led to E.K.'s initial commitment. E.K.'s brother asked
that Greystone take the necessary action to ensure the symptoms were resolved
before E.K. was discharged to his care.
In an April 15, 2025 order, the judge continued E.K.'s CEPP status for
thirty days and directed the new psychiatrist to furnish a report to counsel and
the court as soon as possible, without making specific findings underpinning his
decision. The judge scheduled a review hearing for May 13, 2025, reasoning
E.K.'s new psychiatrist needed time to address the revived auditory
hallucinations. Greystone discharged E.K. on May 13.2
E.K. argues on appeal that continuation of his CEPP status under the April
15 order was contrary to constitutional, statutory, and rule-based requirements
because the judge did not find by clear and convincing evidence an appropriate
placement was not immediately available or E.K. again had become dangerous
to himself, others, or property. Because the issues on appeal relate only to the
April 15 CEPP order and E.K. has since been discharged, we conclude the appeal
is moot for the reasons that follow.
2
The record does not contain E.K.'s discharge order. However, E.K.'s discharge
is undisputed based on the unopposed assertion in his merits brief that Greystone
discharged him on May 13.
A-3029-24
4
CEPP status applies to "individuals who are legally entitled to leave a
mental hospital because they are not considered dangerous" but "'are incapable
of competently exercising' the right to be discharged because of a diminished
capacity to survive in the outside world." In re Commitment of M.G., 331 N.J.
Super. 365, 378 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting In re Civ. Commitment of S.L., 94
N.J. 128, 137 (1983)). Rule 4:74-7(h)(2) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
At all placement review hearings the court shall inquire
into and receive evidence of the patient's placement as
is necessary to support the entry of an order
conditionally extending the patient's hospitalization.
. . . . If the court is advised at a hearing that an
appropriate placement is available, it shall forthwith
order such placement. If an appropriate placement
becomes available during the interval between
scheduled hearings, the patient may be administratively
discharged to said placement.
Thus, where a person is "no longer dangerous to self" but cannot "survive in the
community independently or with the help of family or friends," a judge can
order the person to remain hospitalized under CEPP status until appropriate
placement is arranged. In re M.C., 385 N.J. Super. 151, 162 (App. Div. 2006);
see R. 4:74-7(h)(2).
Although a civil commitment for mental-health treatment implicates the
constitutional rights of the person committed, see S.L., 94 N.J. at 137, well-
settled legal principles also require us to avoid resolving legal issues in the
A-3029-24
5
abstract and to refrain from deciding moot cases. N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Parsons, 3
N.J. 235, 240 (1949); In re J.S., 444 N.J. Super. 303, 313 (App. Div. 2016). "An
issue is 'moot' when the decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have
no practical effect on the existing controversy." Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of
Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting N.Y. Susquehanna
& W. Ry. Corp. v. State Dep't of Treasury, 6 N.J. Tax 575, 582 (Tax 1984)).
Although we may consider an issue notwithstanding its mootness if it
"presents a question that is both important to the public and likely to recur ,"
Clymer v. Summit Bancorp., 171 N.J. 57, 65-66 (2002), neither circumstance is
present here. Cf. In re Civ. Commitment of C.M., 458 N.J. Super. 563, 568-70
(App. Div. 2019) (referencing prior decisions where we addressed civil
commitment matters on the merits "despite their technical mootness" because
the issues were of "great public importance" and "also capable of repetition
while tending to evade disposition on their merits"). The arguments on appeal
relate only to E.K.'s individualized circumstances and are not of "great public
importance"; nor does the record demonstrate the issues relating to E.K. are
capable of repetition while evading review. C.M., 458 N.J. Super. at 568-70.
Although we are mindful of the importance of E.K.'s right to be free from
unjustified confinement, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the
A-3029-24
6
merits because any available remedy would be futile. State v. Hughes, 230 N.J.
Super. 223, 227 (App. Div.1989).
Any arguments not specifically addressed in this opinion lack sufficient
merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Appeal dismissed.
A-3029-24
7
Related changes
Source
Classification
Who this affects
Taxonomy
Browse Categories
Get State Courts alerts
Weekly digest. AI-summarized, no noise.
Free. Unsubscribe anytime.
Get alerts for this source
We'll email you when NJ Superior Court Appellate Division publishes new changes.