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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In the Matter of Gregory Rindosh, Etc.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1322-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (8.9K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1322-24

IN THE MATTER OF
GREGORY RINDOSH,
BURLINGTON COUNTY,
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES.

---

Submitted February 23, 2026 – Decided March 13, 2026

Before Judges Natali, Walcott-Henderson, and
Bergman.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
Commission, Docket No. 2023-0201.

Bedi Rindosh, attorneys for appellant Gregory Rindosh
(Jason A. Rindosh, of counsel and on the briefs).

Malamut & Associates LLC, attorneys for respondent
Burlington County, Department of Human Services
(Margaret E. McHugh, on the brief).

Jennifer Davenport, Acting Attorney General, attorney
for respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission
(Mark A. Gulbranson, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, on
the statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM
Petitioner Gregory Rindosh appeals from a November 27, 2024 final

administrative action of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirming the

findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ)

initial decision, removing him from employment as a fiscal analyst with the

Burlington County Department of Human Services (County) during the working

test period.

In this administrative appeal, we consider whether the CSC's decision to

adopt the ALJ's findings and uphold petitioner's removal was arbitrary,

capricious, or unreasonable, particularly given petitioner's more than twelve

months of service in the subject position as a provisional employee. Relatedly,

we also consider whether petitioner is entitled to reinstatement, back pay, and

other benefits. Discerning no error by the CSC, we affirm.

I.

In November 2017, petitioner commenced employment as a grant

accountant with Rowan College of Burlington County (RCBC) working

pursuant to the federal Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA)

grant. In this role, petitioner reported to Kelly West (Supervisor West), who

oversaw the Workforce Development Board for the County.

A-1322-24
2
In early fall 2020, the WIOA program was transferred from the RCBC to

the County and in a letter dated October 15, 2020, the County offered petitioner

a "position with the County . . . in the Human Services Department as a full time

[f]iscal [a]nalyst, at a salary of $50,000.00." This offer letter informed petitioner

that his employment would be:

"[C]onsidered provisional based upon appointment
from a Civil Service list and completion of a [ninety]
day (probationary) working test period." (emphasis in
original). It is [petitioner's] "responsibility to watch for
the announcement on the NJ Civil Service website.
When announced, [he] will be required to file an
application for the examination prior to the deadline
date. For a permanent appointment, [he] must place
within the first [three] interested individuals on the
certification list, provided there are no interested
veterans or disabled veterans."

(Emphasis in original).

The offer letter further advised petitioner that his "union status will be

represented" by the Communications Workers of America (CWA) Local 1036

and provided instructions on how he could contact the union if he was interested

in enrolling as a member. Within weeks, union representative Billie Scelza

contacted petitioner to inquire into whether he would be interested in joining the

union.

A-1322-24
3
Petitioner accepted the County's offer and worked as a provisional

employee starting on November 2, 2020. Following his transfer to the County,

petitioner's job duties, office location, and supervisor remained unchanged.

Petitioner also became active with the union, attending collective bargaining

sessions, participating in the union negotiation committee, and engaging in other

union-related activities during working hours. According to petitioner,

Supervisor West, County Management, and the Director of Human Resources

Richard Lombardo were repeatedly notified about the nature and scope of his

involvement with the union throughout his employment with the County.

In January 2022, the CSC announced an examination for the fiscal analyst

title. Supervisor West encouraged petitioner to apply for the fiscal analyst

position, which he did. The CSC later issued a certification list of five eligible

candidates, but only two candidates expressed interest in the position.

Through the interview process, the CSC used a "qualifying unassembled

examination" mode based on education and experience to score the applicants,

and according to the record, all eligible candidates received identical test scores.

Petitioner appealed the scoring decision to the CSC, arguing that his score failed

to reflect his experience and qualifications, given that he had performed the

duties of the position for more than three years, including the time before the

A-1322-24
4
position was transferred to the County. In denying his appeal, a CSC human

resource consultant explained that only one candidate—a disabled veteran—

ranked first on the eligible list, while the other three candidates, including

petitioner, all ranked second, and there was no basis to disturb his score and rank

on the subject eligible list. By that time, petitioner had been serving in the

position of fiscal analyst with the County for more than one year following his

November 2020 appointment.

Petitioner was subsequently offered permanent appointment to the fiscal

analyst position and the County notified petitioner that his working test period

would relate exclusively to his new appointment and not any prior provisional

service. Petitioner's ninety-day working test period commenced as of April 1,

1. Petitioner was evaluated by Supervisor West three times during his test

period: at the thirty, sixty, and ninety-day mark. During this time, he also

became a more active participant in union activities, including joining the CWA

contract negotiation committee, attending negotiation meetings, and organizing

a town hall forum to discuss work-related issues.

In his first evaluation at the thirty-day mark, petitioner's work product and

communication skills were noted as having "met expectations," but his

"Attendance/Punctuality" was noted as being "Below Standard." Petitioner's

A-1322-24
5
second evaluation at the sixty-day mark, noted improvement in punctuality, an

"Outstanding" mark for attendance, and "Above Standard" for compliance with

policies and procedures. Time management, however, was noted as requiring

improvements. The record also shows that around this time, Supervisor West

exchanged several emails with petitioner complaining about the poor quality of

his work and citing deficiencies in time management and delays in processing

invoices. Petitioner's third and final evaluation at the ninety-day mark was

markedly negative. In fact, apart from "Attendance/Punctuality," all other

categories were marked "Below Standard" for the first time and included a

comment noting that his compliance and communication "with [S]upervisor

[West], coworkers and vendors is at best poor at times."

The County subsequently scheduled a meeting to discuss the evaluation

with petitioner; however, he called out sick the same day and was thereafter on

a pre-approved vacation. With the probationary period set to expire on July 1,

2022, the County attempted to serve petitioner with a termination letter and

notice of appeal rights via email and later at his home address.1 The record

includes a "hand-delivered" July 1, 2022 letter to petitioner, in which the County

1
According to the County, they attempted to serve petitioner electronically by
email to both his work and personal accounts, as well as by mail, via the sheriff's
office.
A-1322-24
6
wrote that petitioner would be terminated due to "poor job performance" by the

end of his working test period—June 30, 2022—and that he had "the right to

appeal this termination within [twenty] days to the [CSC]." Petitioner would

later assert that he was not personally served until July 8, 2022, when he met

with Director Lombardo in the presence of Scelza and received his evaluation

and termination notice.

On July 19, 2022, petitioner filed a timely appeal before the CSC and the

matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for a hearing

as a contested case in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act,

N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1. The OAL held a plenary hearing on three non-consecutive

days—October 25, October 26, and December 22, 2023, in which, petitioner,

Scelza, Supervisor West, and Director Lombardo all testified.

Scelza testified that he approached petitioner to participate in the union

contract negotiations

[b]ecause he was a newer employee. He's . . . younger,
had some good ideas. . . . [and Scezla] thought that . . .
he would be a good fit for the contract negotiations plus
we had no one from human services on the contract
negotiations for at least three contracts, maybe longer.

When asked about petitioner's provisional employment status, Scelza

explained that "there w[ere] a lot of people that were in a provisional status

A-1322-24
7
because the delay from civil service of announcements because of COVID

[-19]." In response to the question whether the County was required to make a

provisional employee permanent after a certain amount of time, Scelza

responded "no."

In his testimony, petitioner did not dispute any of the facts regarding his

hiring by RCBC, the County or his duties both as a provisional employee and

later during the ninety-day test period. He testified that he performed his duties

and using one example where Supervisor West had asked him to prepare "the

cap and allocations set up, and by thirty days," he explained he found this

assignment

a little bit unreasonable considering it was a persistent
problem and had been prior to my time for over four
years namely . . . because there w[ere] critical questions
that had to be answered and it would change the
structure of how we could obligate and save grant
funds.

Petitioner explained his responsibilities within the union, and how he

informed other employees about their legal rights and permanent status.

Petitioner further testified that after he joined the contract negotiation committee

and increased his union involvement, "[Supervisor West] nitpicked me on

anything and everything she possibly could have and it was apparent . . . that

she leaned in even more as time progressed."

A-1322-24
8
Regarding permanency in the fiscal analyst title, petitioner testified that

he believed he would attain permanent status within one year and stated that

"[he] didn't know exactly, but [he] actually kind of thought [he] was already a

permanent employee based on the time [he] had served." However, petitioner

acknowledged on cross-examination that the 2020 October offer letter from the

County specifically addressed his provisional appointment. In response to

counsel's question whether there is anything in the letter supporting his position,

petitioner's response was, "I don't believe so, not by this letter. . . . I don't know,

I think it depends, I don't know."

Supervisor West testified that her post-appointment evaluations of

petitioner were performed as if he were new to the organization and she did not

consider his prior years in the subject position as a provisional employee.

Regarding petitioner's ninety-day evaluation, Supervisor West testified it was

below standard because he was not working to improve the deficiencies noted

in the thirty or sixty-day evaluations. She explained that "there were numerous

findings that had to be done by July 1 of the new program year and nothing was

done," including an audit and invoices for computers that were left unpaid and

that vendors were contacting her regarding payment. She further testified that

following the thirty-day review, when she gave it to petitioner, "he laughed

A-1322-24
9
hysterically and was very upset with the review," and demanded to be scored as

"Outstanding." Similarly, when she gave him the sixty-day review, petitioner

got very upset and threw it at her, and she recalled that he was very rude.

Supervisor West further acknowledged that the decision to remove petitioner

from employment was made directly before the ninety-day evaluation by herself,

County management, and human resources.

Following the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision

on October 18, 2024, finding that much of petitioner's work with the County was

similar to his work with RCBC, that petitioner was active in union activities,

and was permitted time off during working hours to engage in those functions.

The ALJ further found that between the sixty-day and ninety-day review,

there were a series of emails starting June 8, 2022, demonstrating that the

supervisor-employee relationship became acrimonious, referring specifically to

the following June 15 email from Supervisor West stating:

I will not be providing day-to-day correspondence to
you in writing. However, we spoke about your lack of
time management skills in your last review period you
need to be able to manage your time better period
especially since we are not very busy due to the job
center customer flow being very slow.

You need to be better able to answer questions from the
vendors and make the fiscal decisions in accordance to
financial guidelines issued by the state and federal

A-1322-24
10
governments. I do not make arbitrary decisions, I abide
by those guidelines. If you would like to discuss
further, please do not e-mail, communicate in person.

The ALJ next reviewed the applicable statutory framework governing

public employee rights under N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1, as well as the provisions

addressing provisional appointments under N.J.S.A. 11A:4-13(b), which state

that "[i]n no case shall any provisional appointment exceed a period of 12

months."

Relying on our Supreme Court's opinion in O'Malley v. Dept. of Energy,

109 N.J. 309, 316-17 (1987), the ALJ concluded that petitioner's argument is

misplaced since a provisional appointment that exceeds twelve-months does not

create an automatic conversion from provisional to permanent appointment.

Additionally, relying on the express language of the County's offer letter, the

ALJ further concluded that "there is an absolute dearth of facts adduced that

[petitioner] reasonably believed that he was in a permanent position or that he

was not subject to the working test period." The ALJ also emphasized that

petitioner's provisional employment occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic,

observing that it was commonly understood at the time that timelines were

frequently extended as a result of the pandemic.

A-1322-24
11
The ALJ next addressed petitioner's argument that the County acted in bad

faith in terminating him based on anti-union animus and used his alleged poor

performance as a pretext for his firing. The ALJ explained that the burden is on

petitioner and that the facts are in equipoise: petitioner argues "he was a model

employee, one who ensured absolute compliance, and who was provided with

Herculean tasks, setting him up to fail," and according to Supervisor West, "he

was a difficult employee, one who, by the end of his working test period, could

not be trusted and could not complete the tasks assigned." In the ALJ's words,

"the truth—and whatever additional facts which were not adduced—lies in-

between."

The ALJ found that petitioner was free to engage in union activities, and

that he failed to file any union grievances during his employment, stating "the

absence of contemporaneous writings, notes, conversations, and the like, all lead

to the inevitable conclusion that, if it existed at all, it did not rise to the level of

bad faith." The ALJ concluded that because the facts are well balanced,

petitioner did not meet his burden of proving bad faith by a preponderance of

the evidence and denied petitioner's appeal.

The CSC substantively accepted and adopted the ALJ's findings of fact,

conclusions, and recommendations. The CSC added that petitioner failed to

A-1322-24
12
prove that the ALJ failed to analyze his contentions of anti-union animus,

referring to the ALJ's reasoning in the initial decision and concluding petitioner

"presented no persuasive evidence that leads the Commission to come to a

different conclusion." The CSC noted that having conducted its de novo review,

it found no persuasive evidence to demonstrate the ALJ's credibility

determinations were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Thus, the CSC

affirmed the ALJ's findings of fact and legal determinations. This appeal

followed.

II.

Petitioner appealed the CSC's final administrative action, arguing the

following points:

POINT I

THE [ALJ] ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
[HIS] ATTAINMENT OF PERMANENT EMPLOYEE
STATUS THROUGH OPERATION OF LAW.

A. Appellant Has a Presumption of Permanent
Employee Status Under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-
4.1(c).

B. The County Wrongfully Deprived
Appellant of Permanent Employee Status
Through Its Abuse of the Provisional
Appointment Process.

A-1322-24
13
POINT II

THE [ALJ] FAILED TO PROPERLY ANALYZE THE
EVIDENCE OF RETALIATORY ANTI-UNION
ANIMUS IN APPELLANT'S TERMINATION.

POINT III

THE [ALJ] ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THE
PRETEXTUAL NATURE OF THE COUNTY'S
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR APPELLANT'S
TERMINATION.

POINT IV

THE ALJ ERRED BY CONCLUDING
[PETITIONER] FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN
WITHOUT WEIGHING CONTEXTUAL EVIDENCE
FAVORING APPELLANT.

POINT V

THE [ALJ] ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
APPROPRIATE REMEDIES, INCLUDING
REINSTATEMENT, BACK PAY, AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF [PETITIONER].

"Judicial review of agency determinations is limited." Allstars Auto.

Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Com'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (citing In re

Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)). The "final determination of an

administrative agency . . . is entitled to substantial deference." In re Eastwick

College LPN-to RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533, 541 (2016); see also In re

Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001) (finding a "strong

A-1322-24
14
presumption of reasonableness attaches to the actions of the administrative

agencies").

A reviewing "court ordinarily should not disturb an administrative

agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the

agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In

re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413,

422 (2008). The party challenging the agency's action has the burden of proving

the action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J.

163, 171 (2014). In determining whether the agency's decision is arbitrary,

capricious, or unreasonable, we must examine:

(1) whether the agency's decision offends the State or
Federal Constitution;

(2) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative policies;

(3) whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support the findings on which the agency based its
action; and

(4) whether in applying the legislative policies to the
facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion
that could not reasonably have been made on a showing
of the relevant factors.

A-1322-24
15
[In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999) (quoting Brady
v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210-11 (1997)).]

A.

Petitioner first argues the final agency decision of the CSC was arbitrary

and capricious in adopting the ALJ's legal and factual findings without properly

considering his lengthy provisional service as a fiscal analyst prior to the

commencement of the working test period. He further asserts that the CSC

improperly denied him permanent employment status and his termination was

motivated by bad faith and retaliatory animus, entitling him to appropriate

remedies.

Under the Civil Service Act, N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 to -12.3, civil service

appointments are based on the employee's merit and abilities. N.J.S.A. 11A:1-

2; Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. N.J. Dep't of Pers., 154 N.J. 121,

128 (1998). Permanent status in the career service is achieved only after

appointment from a certified eligible list and successful completion of a working

test period. See N.J.S.A. 11A:4-15. Provisional appointments, by contrast, are

strictly temporary and do not confer any protections of permanent status. See

N.J.S.A. 11A:4-13(b); O'Malley, 109 N.J. at 316-17. The CSA provides that

"[i]n no case shall any provisional appointment exceed a period of 12 months ."

N.J.S.A. 11A:4-13(b). However, for competitive positions, "the working test

A-1322-24
16
period shall not include any time served by an employee under provisional . . .

employment." Azzara v. Twp. of Waterford, 392 N.J. Super. 322, 327-28 (App.

Div. 2007) (citing N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1; N.J.A.C. 4A:4-5.2(a)).

Guided by the well-established legal principles enunciated above and

given our limited standard of review, we reject petitioner's arguments and affirm

substantially for the reasons stated in the ALJ's comprehensive initial decision.

We add the following brief comments to amplify our opinion rejecting

petitioner's claims that he believed he was hired as a permanent employee in

2020 or that he attained permanent status in the subject position after serving in

that position for twelve months.

First, the record before us makes clear that petitioner was hired by the

County in a provisional capacity, with explicit written notice that both a

competitive examination and successful completion of a working test period

were required to attain permanent status. The October 2020 offer letter

expressly advised petitioner that his appointment was "provisional," required

him to monitor the Civil Service website for the examination announcement, and

explained that permanent status would be attained only after appointment from

a certified list and successful completion of a ninety-day working test period.

A-1322-24
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We also observe petitioner's testimony to be significant on this issue.

When presented with the County's 2020 offer letter on cross-examination,

petitioner acknowledged the County's offer letter specifically addressed

provisional employment and there was nothing in the letter to support his claim

that he was being appointed to a permanent position in 2020. We are satisfied

that this admission constitutes persuasive evidence that petitioner understood

that he had been offered only provisional employment and that he knew it was

his responsibility to apply for the position once the CSC announced the

examination. Moreover, petitioner also knew that any permanent appointment

was contingent upon his ranking among the top three interested candidates on

the certification list, and that any appointment remained subject to the statutory

preference afforded to disabled veterans and veterans.

Second, we are unpersuaded by petitioner's assertion that his provisional

service entitles him to retroactive credit toward permanent status. N.J.S.A.

11A:4-13(b) sets a maximum duration for such service, but does not operate to

convert an overlong provisional appointment into a permanent one. Permanency

arises only after appointment from an eligible list and successful completion of

the full working test period. O'Malley, 109 N.J. at 316-17 (1987). As the CSC

correctly concluded, neither the Civil Service Act nor the applicable regulations

A-1322-24
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permit the time served in provisional or temporary status to count toward, or to

be tacked onto, the statutory working test period required for permanent service.

See N.J.A.C. 4A:4-5.2(a); Azzara, 392 N.J. Super. at 328; Capibianco v. Civil

Service Comm'n, 60 N.J. Super. 307, 319 (App. Div. 1960) (holding that the

mere passage of time in a temporary appointment, or the CSC's failure to hold

an examination, cannot convert temporary status into permanent status). Thus,

despite the delay in the CSC's posting of the position, likely due to delays caused

by the COVID-19 pandemic, petitioner's admittedly lengthy service as a

provisional employee did not automatically result in a permanent appointment.

B.

In points II, III, and IV of petitioner's brief, he asserts that his termination

was motivated by bad faith, improper purpose, and retaliatory anti-union

animus. Petitioner argues the ALJ failed to properly consider the context and

circumstantial evidence surrounding his termination. This argument, however,

is belied by the record and lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Again, we add the following brief

comments to amplify our opinion.

Bad faith "'contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with a

furtive design or some motive of interest or ill will.'" Lustrelon, Inc. v.

A-1322-24
19
Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128, 144 (App. Div. 1981) (quoting New Amsterdam,

etc., Co. v. Nat'l Newark, et al., Co., 117 N.J. Eq. 264, 277 (Ch. 1934)).

Moreover, bad faith "requires a showing of some indicia of dishonest conduct

or a showing of facts and circumstances . . . so cogent and obvious that to remain

passive would amount to a deliberate desire to evade knowledge because of a

belief or fear that inquiry would disclose a defect in the transaction." Ibid.

(citing Factors & Note Buyers, Inc. v. Green Lane, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 43, 49-

50 (Law Div. 1968)). In a working test period appeal, the burden rests squarely

on the employee to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

appointing authority acted in bad faith. N.J.A.C. 4A:2-4.3(b).

In addressing this issue, the ALJ found no evidence to suggest the County

acted in bad faith in terminating petitioner, and that petitioner failed to meet his

burden of showing bad faith animus. More particularly, the ALJ noted "the

absence of contemporaneous writings, notes, conversations, and the like," to

support petitioner's claim of retaliation during his employment, in any

grievance, or in his rebuttal to the ninety-day evaluation. Instead, these

allegations came to light only after his termination and within the context of an

appeal to the CSC. The ALJ further credited both Supervisor West and Scelza's

testimony in finding that petitioner was permitted to engage in union activities

A-1322-24
20
during work hours and concluded that if anti-union animus existed, "the union

representative, Ms. Scelza, would be particularly attuned to anti-union/labor

activities—none of which she observed." The ALJ determined that if this

animus or hostility existed at all, "it did not rise to the level of bad faith."

Petitioner's claim that Supervisor West's criticism of his performance was

merely a pretext for his termination is equally unavailing. Rather, the record

shows that petitioner's thirty and sixty-day reviews identified areas requiring

improvement, specifically time management and communication, which

persisted during the working test period. In his ninety-day review, petitioner

was rated "below standard" in all areas except punctuality, with documented

concerns about the quality and timeliness of his work, compliance, and team

communication.

Additionally, petitioner offers no evidence that he remediated any of these

concerns over his performance. Indeed, in his testimony, he explains that he did

not have an opportunity to address certain issues raised by West just prior to his

termination. Additionally, we note that petitioner failed to avail himself of the

opportunity to meet with Supervisor West and the County management team

prior to his termination when he called out sick and promptly left on a pre-

approved vacation toward the end of his tenure, having failed to complete

A-1322-24
21
assignments. Such actions are not indicative of an employee who was concerned

about redressing issues raised by his employer. Even so, the record shows the

ALJ thoughtfully and carefully considered the evidence presented and candidly

concluded that "[b]ecause the facts as adduced are in equipoise and the burden

here is on [petitioner] to show bad faith," petitioner did not meet his burden of

persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence.

Similarly, we discern no error in the rejection of petitioner's reliance on

temporal proximity between union activity and the adverse action taken against

him. As the ALJ correctly recognized, "temporal proximity is, at most, a

circumstance that may support an inference of a causal connection," but it is not

sufficient by itself to warrant a finding of bad faith. See Maimone v. City of

Atl. City, 188 N.J. 221, 237 (2006). Thus, based on this record, including the

testimony and documentary evidence showing the number of times petitioner

participated in union activity and the lack of any evidence to support his claim

the County interfered in that work, the CSC decision is not arbitrary, capricious

or unreasonable.

C.

Because we reject petitioner's claims in points I through IV, we need not

specifically address his final point, which includes a request for benefits: the

A-1322-24
22
CSC erred in declining to grant equitable relief, including reinstatement, back

pay, benefits, seniority, and reasonable attorney's fees. We note only that such

remedies are available only where "the employee demonstrates that the

appointing authority took adverse action against the employee in bad faith or

with invidious motivation." N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.5(b). We are thus satisfied that

the CSC's well-supported decision the County's conduct "did not rise to the level

of bad faith," and we observe no basis to grant the equitable relief sought by

petitioner.

Lastly, because petitioner did not prevail on his claims, we reject his

application for counsel fees, which shall be awarded "where an employee has

prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues before the Board." In

re Hearn, 417 N.J. Super. 289, 303 (App. Div. 2010) (citing N.J.A.C. 4A:2-

2.12(a)). All of petitioner's claims were properly rejected by the CSC, and thus,

the necessary threshold for any equitable relief under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.5(b) has

not been met.

In sum, given our limited review of agency decisions and deferring to the

expertise of the ALJ in assessing the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude

the CSC's final agency decision was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

See Lavezzi, 219 N.J. at 171.

A-1322-24
23
To the extent that we have not addressed any of petitioner's remaining

claims, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written

opinion, and the administrative decision is supported by sufficient credible

evidence on the record as a whole. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D) and (E).

Affirmed.

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