Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jennifer Burden v. Michael G. Harrington

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-0440-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (15.2K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0440-24

JENNIFER BURDEN and CRAIG
BURDEN, her husband, per quod,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MICHAEL G. HARRINGTON,
NANCY E. MARTIN, JESSICA
M. GONZALEZ, and MANUEL
GONZALEZ,

Defendants,

and

FARMERS INSURANCE
COMPANY and MID-
CENTURY INSURANCE
COMPANY,

Defendants-Respondents.

Argued December 18, 2025 – Decided March 13, 2026

Before Judges Marczyk and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-8074-19.

Mitchell J. Makowicz, Jr., argued the cause for
appellants (Blume Forte Fried Zerres & Molinari, PC,
attorneys; Mitchell J. Makowicz, Jr. and Terrence J.
Hull, of counsel and on the briefs).

Walter F. Kawalec, III, argued the cause for respondent
Mid-Century Insurance Company (Marshall Dennehey,
PC, attorneys; David D. Blake and Walter F. Kawalec,
III, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiffs Jennifer and Craig Burden appeal from the August 2, 2024 Law

Division order denying their motion to lift the stay and file an amended

complaint, and the September 27, 2024 order denying their motion for

reconsideration. We affirm.

I.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleged negligence stemming from a November 19,

2017 motor vehicle accident. Jennifer1 was a passenger in a car when it was

struck by a vehicle operated by defendant Michael G. Harrington. Plaintiffs'

complaint against Harrington was settled, exhausting his automobile liability

insurance policy. Plaintiffs' third amended complaint asserted uninsured (UM),

1
Because plaintiffs share a common surname, we refer to them by their first
names, with no disrespect intended.
A-0440-24
2
underinsured motorist (UIM), and bad faith claims against plaintiffs' UM/UIM

carrier, Mid-Century Insurance Company (MCIC), improperly pled as Farmers

Insurance Company. The bad faith claim was stayed pending trial.

After a non-binding arbitration panel issued a $200,000 net award on the

UIM claim, MCIC requested a trial de novo. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a

$300,000 offer of judgment, to which MCIC counter-offered $25,000. MCIC

then filed a $125,000 offer of judgment.

A bar panel also reviewed the case, and the three attorneys valued the case

at $250,000, $300,000, and $400,000. MCIC tendered a high-low settlement

offer of $400,000 and $100,000. The parties did not settle the case, and the

matter proceeded to trial in April 2024.

The jury returned an award of $4,500,000 in favor of plaintiffs . The trial

court molded the verdict to $517,350.44, reflecting the $400,000 available UIM

coverage, costs, fees, and pre-judgment interest pursuant to the offer of

judgment and court rules.

Plaintiffs moved to lift the stay of the bad faith claim and for leave to file

an amended complaint to add a second cause of action under the New Jersey

Insurance Fair Conduct Act (IFCA), N.J.S.A. 17:29BB-1 to -3, which was

A-0440-24
3
enacted during the pendency of the litigation.2 Plaintiffs argued MCIC's

"[c]onduct constituting bad faith was on[]going and continuous, including the

refusal of the [o]ffer of [j]udgment in May 2023, and the trial of this matter

despite recommendations to the contrary, up until the verdict was rendered."

They claimed "[MCIC] acted in [b]ad [f]aith prior to and after trial of this matter

and, therefore, [wa]s in violation of [IFCA]."

MCIC opposed the motions and cross-moved to dismiss plaintiffs' bad

faith claim. MCIC argued the IFCA was prospective and therefore was

unavailable to plaintiffs as a remedy because "the accident took place on

November 19, 2017 and the complaint was filed in 2019. The new law was

enacted five years after the accident in this matter, three and a half years after

expiration of the contract between the parties and three years after

commencement of this litigation." MCIC further contended the court's final

order molding the verdict to the policy limits rendered any litigation involving

the common law bad faith claim moot.

2
The IFCA authorizes a claimant to file a civil complaint against a UM/UIM
insurer for "an unreasonable delay or unreasonable denial of a claim for payment
of benefits under an insurance policy." N.J.S.A. 17:29BB-3(a)(1). A successful
plaintiff may recover treble damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and
attorneys' fees. N.J.S.A. 17:29BB-3(d).
A-0440-24
4
In an oral decision, the court denied plaintiffs' motions to lift the stay and

file an amended complaint and granted MCIC's cross-motion to dismiss.3

Finding the IFCA to be prospective, it determined plaintiffs' claims were

precluded because they alleged an ongoing tort that commenced prior to the

enactment of the statute. The court then denied plaintiffs' subsequent motion

for reconsideration, finding "nothing in the moving papers demonstrate[d] any

matters or controlling decisions that th[e c]ourt overlooked or in which it ha[d]

erred."

On appeal, plaintiffs argue the court erred by denying their motion to

amend the complaint and dismissing the IFCA claim with prejudice. They

contend discovery was required, the IFCA requires a carrier to act reasonably

and timely throughout litigation, and a high-low parameter does not discharge a

carrier's duty under the IFCA.

II.

We review a trial court's order denying a motion to file an amended

complaint for abuse of discretion. Port Liberte II Condo. Ass'n v. New Liberty

Residential Urb. Renewal Co., 435 N.J. Super. 51, 62 (App. Div. 2014) (citing

3
Plaintiffs' common law bad faith claim was dismissed as moot and is not at
issue on appeal.
A-0440-24
5
Kernan v. One Wash. Park Urb. Renewal Assocs., 154 N.J. 437, 457 (1998)).

"'Rule 4:9-1 requires that motions for leave to amend be granted liberally' and

that 'the granting of a motion to file an amended complaint always rests in the

court's sound discretion.'" Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 501

(2006) (quoting Kernan, 154 N.J. at 456-57). In exercising its discretion, a court

must engage in "a two-step process: whether the non-moving party will be

prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile. "

Ibid. The question of futility is "whether the amended claim will nonetheless

fail and, hence, allowing the amendment would be a useless endeavor." Ibid.

We first address whether the Legislature intended the IFCA to apply

retroactively or prospectively, which we review de novo. See State v. G.E.P.,

243 N.J. 362, 382 (2020). "Our courts 'have long followed a general rule of

statutory construction that favors prospective application of statutes.'" State v.

Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 94 (2022) (quoting Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 521

(1981)). There are "three circumstances that will justify giving a statute

retroactive effect: (1) when the Legislature expresses its intent that the law

apply retroactively, either expressly or implicitly; (2) when an amendment is

curative; or (3) when the expectations of the parties so warrant." James v. N.J.

Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552, 563 (2014).

A-0440-24
6
"Discerning 'the Legislature's intent is the paramount goal when

interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the

statutory language.'" Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 255 N.J. 36, 46 (2023)

(quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). "[L]egislative intent

controls because 'statutes are to be read sensibly rather than literally and the

controlling legislative intent is to be presumed as consonant to reason and good

discretion.'" Haines v. Taft, 237 N.J. 271, 283 (2019) (quoting Roig v. Kelsey,

135 N.J. 500, 515 (1994)). "We must presume that the Legislature intended the

words that it chose and the plain and ordinary meaning ascribed to those words."

Paff v. Galloway Twp., 229 N.J. 340, 353 (2017).

The IFCA was enacted on January 18, 2022, and was to "take effect

immediately." L. 2021, c. 388, § 4. Our Supreme Court has "repeatedly

construed language stating that a provision is to be effective immediately, or

effective immediately on a given date, to signal prospective application." Lane,

251 N.J. at 96. Nothing in the plain language of the IFCA leads us to conclude

otherwise.

"A statutory provision also may be afforded retroactive application if it is

'curative,' that is, designed to 'remedy a perceived imperfection in or

misapplication of a statute.'" James, 216 N.J. at 564 (quoting Schiavo v. John

A-0440-24
7
F. Kennedy Hosp., 258 N.J. Super. 380, 386 (App. Div. 1992)). The IFCA was

not enacted "simply to explain and to clarify the existing law," Schiavo, 258 N.J.

Super. at 386 (quoting Carnegie Bank v. Shalleck, 256 N.J. Super. 23, 29 (App.

Div. 1992)); rather, it established a new cause of action. We are also

unconvinced the expectation of the parties warrants retroactive application of

the IFCA, as plaintiffs do not advance this argument.

Plaintiffs contend the prospective determination is not fatal to their

proposed amended complaint because they cabined their claim to MCIC's

conduct after the enactment of the IFCA. This argument is unavailing because

plaintiffs' claims are nevertheless tethered to the initial denial of the UIM claim,

which occurred pre-IFCA. We are unpersuaded plaintiffs may parse out acts

that were a continuation of MCIC's consistent denial of coverage in order to

formulate a viable cause of action. Allowing plaintiffs to do so would dispense

with the Legislature's clear intent for the IFCA to be applied prospectively.

A court need not permit amendment when "the amended claim will

nonetheless fail and, hence, allowing the amendment would be a useless

endeavor." Notte, 185 N.J. at 501. Because amendment here would have been

futile, we conclude there is no reason to disturb the trial court's denial of

plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend. We also decline to address plaintiffs'

A-0440-24
8
substantive arguments in support of their claims because the prospective

application of the statute is dispositive of the issues.

Having discerned no error in the trial court's decision, we perceive no

abuse of discretion in its denial of plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Branch

v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).

Affirmed.

A-0440-24
9