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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

City of Tampa, Florida v. Liberty Hospitality Management, LLC

District Court of Appeal of Florida

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 2D2024-2082

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (12K)

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Combined Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT

CITY OF TAMPA,

Petitioner,

v.

LIBERTY HOSPITALITY MANAGEMENT, LLC,

Respondent.

No. 2D2024-2082

March 6, 2026

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough
County; Anne-Leigh Gaylord Moe, Judge.

Chance Lyman and Hala Sandridge of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, PC,
Tampa; and Ursula D. Richardson and Toyin K. Aina-Hargrett, City
Attorney's Office, Tampa, for Petitioner.

Chris W. Altenbernd of Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., Tampa; Eleanor H.
Sills of Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., Tallahassee; and Ethan J. Loeb, E.
Colin Thompson, Allison C. Doucette, and Steven Gieseler of Bartlett
Loeb Hinds Thompson & Angelos, PLLC, Tampa, for Respondent.

Elizabeth W. Neiberger of Bryant Miller Olive P.A., Tampa; and Rebecca
A. O'Hara of Florida League of Cities, Inc., Tallahassee, for Amicus
Curiae, Florida League of Cities, Inc.

MORRIS, Judge.
The City Council for the City of Tampa denied a request by Liberty
Hospitality Management, LLC, to rezone its property on Harbour Island
in Tampa. Liberty filed a petition for writ of certiorari in circuit court,
seeking review of the City Council's denial of Liberty's rezoning request.
The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that it did not have
subject matter jurisdiction to review the City Council's action. Now, the
City of Tampa petitions this court for a writ of mandamus compelling the
circuit court to exercise its jurisdiction to review Liberty's petition for writ
of certiorari. For the reasons explained below, we grant the petition and
direct the circuit court to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction.
I. Background
In 2016, Liberty proposed to purchase the subject property on
Harbour Island in Tampa. Prior to the purchase and as a condition
thereof, Liberty had applied for and was granted a rezoning request.
Again in 2021, Liberty proposed to rezone the property for use as a hotel.
The rezoning request sought a change to the Harbour Island
Development of Regional Impact (DRI) by increasing the island's hotel
entitlements by 150 rooms and 160 parking spaces to be allocated
specifically to the subject property.
On May 12, 2022, the City Council held a public, quasi-judicial
hearing on the rezoning petition and proposed change to the DRI. After
the hearing, the City Council denied Liberty's requests in two separate
orders. Liberty filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court,
seeking review of the City Council's actions. Liberty invoked the circuit
court's jurisdiction under article V, section 5, of the Florida Constitution
and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c). See Broward County v.
G.B.V. Int'l, Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 843 (Fla. 2001) (holding that "Florida

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courts have adapted the common law writ of certiorari" to review quasi-
judicial "actions of local government agencies").
On February 21, 2024, the circuit court, sua sponte, issued an
order to show cause as to why Liberty's petition should not be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court cited its power to issue writs of
certiorari under article V, section 5, of the Florida Constitution and
asked the parties to address how the Florida Constitution or the City of
Tampa Charter provides for the City Council to exercise quasi-judicial
power. Both Liberty and the City agreed in their filings that the City
Council has the authority to engage in quasi-judicial action and that the
circuit court has authority to review the action by certiorari.
However, the circuit court concluded that it does not have
jurisdiction over Liberty's petition. The circuit court reasoned as follows:
From a separation of powers perspective, the issues can
be summarized as follows. As a branch of government that
exercises legislative power, the City Council cannot exercise
judicial power unless the Florida Constitution expressly
provides for it. Likewise, as a branch of government that
exercises judicial power, this circuit court cannot exercise
supervisory power through issuance of a supervisory writ over
a legislative branch unless the Florida Constitution expressly
provides for it. In neither case has an express authorization
been identified. As an additional complication, the Tampa
Charter itself requires separation of powers. That Charter
grants the City Council legislative power only; it grants the
Mayor "all" executive and administrative powers.
In light of this and for the reasons that follow, this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari pursuant to Article V, Section 5.
The circuit court dismissed Liberty's petition, and Liberty now
seeks review in this court.1

1 Liberty also filed a separate action against the City alleging (1) a

count under section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2020), (2) a count for a
3
II. Analysis
"Mandamus is appropriate to compel a lower court to exercise its
subject matter jurisdiction if that court has erroneously determined that
it lacks subject matter jurisdiction." Martinez v. State, 740 So. 2d 1231,
1231 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (citing Pino v. Dist. Ct. of Appeal, Third Dist.,
604 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1992)).2 Here, mandamus is warranted if the
circuit court had jurisdiction over Liberty's petition and wrongly refused
to exercise its jurisdiction.
In its petition before this court, the City argues that the circuit
court wrongly applied article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution—
Florida's separation of powers clause—to municipalities to conclude that
the City Council did not have authority to make a quasi-judicial decision
on a rezoning request. The City argues that, as a result, the circuit court
further misapplied articles V and VIII of the Florida Constitution. We
agree.
We start by setting forth the various provisions of the Florida
Constitution relied upon by the circuit court. Article II, section 3, titled
"Branches of government" and known as the separation of powers clause,
provides that "[t]he powers of the state government shall be divided into
legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one

claim of reverse spot zoning, and (3) a count for declaratory relief seeking
to void prior rezoning orders. The circuit court entered a partial final
judgment on count three, relying on its earlier conclusion that the City
Council was without authority to conduct a quasi-judicial hearing and
declaring void four quasi-judicial actions involving the subject property.
The City appeals the partial final judgment in case 2D2025-0069.
2 The City initially filed a notice of appeal seeking review of the

circuit court's order as a final order, but this court reclassified the
proceeding as one in certiorari. Upon a response by the City, this court
agreed that the case should proceed in mandamus.
4
branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other
branches unless expressly provided herein." Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const.
Article V, section 1, titled "Courts," provides in relevant part:
The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court,
district courts of appeal, circuit courts and county courts. No
other courts may be established by the state, any political
subdivision or any municipality. The legislature shall, by
general law, divide the state into appellate court districts and
judicial circuits following county lines. Commissions
established by law, or administrative officers or bodies may be
granted quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the
functions of their offices.
Art. V, § 1, Fla. Const. Article VIII, section 2, titled "Municipalities,"
provides the powers of municipalities: "Municipalities shall have
governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to
conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render
municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes
except as otherwise provided by law. Each municipal legislative body
shall be elective." Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const.
We next point out that it is undisputed by the circuit court and the
parties that the City Council conducted a quasi-judicial proceeding in
ruling on Liberty's rezoning request. Certain rezoning decisions are
considered quasi-judicial in nature for purposes of judicial review:
[R]ezoning actions which have an impact on a limited number
of persons or property owners, on identifiable parties and
interests, where the decision is contingent on a fact or facts
arrived at from distinct alternatives presented at a hearing,
and where the decision can be functionally viewed as policy
application, rather than policy setting, are in the nature of
. . . quasi-judicial action . . . .

5
Bd. of Cnty. Commr's v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993)
(alterations in original) (quoting Snyder v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 595 So.
2d 65, 78 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)).3
Turning back to the circuit court's order, the circuit court assumed
that article II, section 3, applies to local governments. It then went on to
state that
Article V, Section 1 makes no express provision for a
legislative body to exercise quasi-judicial power, and no other
part of the Florida Constitution has been identified that could
rationally be considered the express constitutional permission
required by Article II, Section 3 before a legislative branch
could also exercise judicial power.
The circuit court then addressed article VIII, section 2(b), concluding that
while it "allows a municipality to 'exercise any power for municipal
purposes except as otherwise provided by law,' the legislative branch of
municipal government cannot exercise all the powers of the
municipality."
The circuit court's reasoning is flawed at the outset because the
separation of powers clause in the Florida Constitution "was not
intended to apply to local governmental entities and officials." Locke v.
Hawkes, 595 So. 2d 32, 36 (Fla. 1992); see also Miami-Dade County v.
City of Miami, 315 So. 3d 115, 124 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (holding that the
circuit court erred in comparing the mayor's veto power to the State of
Florida's governor's veto power because article II, section 3, does not
apply to local governments). "Article II, section 3, identifies the branches

3 For these reasons, this case is distinguishable from West Villagers

for Responsible Government, Inc. v. City of North Port, 50 Fla. L. Weekly
D2479, D2480 (Fla. 2d DCA Nov. 19, 2025), in which this court recently
held that even though the city employed a quasi-judicial procedure in
ruling on a contraction petition, the decision was a legislative act that
was not reviewable by certiorari in the circuit court.
6
of our state government, and . . . this provision was intended to apply to
each branch's constitutional powers as enumerated in article III, the
legislature, article IV, the executive, and article V, the judiciary." Locke,
595 So. 2d at 36 (emphasis added). Numerous other states have also
held "that the concept of Constitutional separation of powers simply does
not exist at the local government level." Citizens for Reform v. Citizens for
Open Gov't, Inc., 931 So. 2d 977, 989 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (collecting cases
from thirteen other states). This is because "[l]ocal governments,
including counties and municipalities, are creatures of the State without
any independent sovereignty." Fried v. State, 355 So. 3d 899, 908 (Fla.
2023).
This initial incorrect reasoning by the circuit court led to the circuit
court's misapplication of articles V and VIII. The circuit court concluded
that
the Tampa City Council is not a lower court. See Art. V, § 1,
Fla. Const. (prohibiting the establishment of municipal
courts). Article V, Section 1 makes no express provision for a
legislative body to exercise quasi-judicial power, and no other
part of the Florida Constitution has been identified that could
rationally be considered the express constitutional permission
required by Article II, Section 3 before a legislative branch
could also exercise judicial power. While Article VIII, Section
2(b) allows a municipality to "exercise any power for
municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law," the
legislative branch of municipal government cannot exercise all
the powers of the municipality.
The circuit court was correct in concluding that the City Council is not a
"court" within the meaning of article V. But it was incorrect in
concluding that the City Council was exercising judicial power or that
article II, section 3, requires a granting of authority to the City Council,
as a legislative body, to engage in quasi-judicial decision-making. As
already stated, article II, section 3, does not apply to local governments.

7
Article V, section 1, vests judicial power in the state judicial branch only,
and it vests quasi-judicial power in commissions and administrative
bodies; it does not address or prohibit quasi-judicial action by elected
bodies of municipalities.
Rather, the source of the City Council's powers is article VIII,
section 2(b):
Powers. Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate
and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal
government, perform municipal functions and render
municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal
purposes except as otherwise provided by law. Each
municipal legislative body shall be elective.
Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const. This provision confers broad home rule
powers to municipalities, as recognized in section 166.021(4), Florida
Statutes (2020). See id. ("The provisions of this section shall be so
construed as to secure for municipalities the broad exercise of home rule
powers granted by the constitution."); Masone v. City of Aventura, 147
So. 3d 492, 494-95 (Fla. 2014) (" 'In Florida, a municipality is given
broad authority to enact ordinances under its municipal home rule
powers.' City of Hollywood v. Mulligan, 934 So. 2d 1238, 1243 (Fla.
2006). But municipal ordinances must yield to state statutes."). The
home rule powers include zoning powers. See § 166.041(3)(c);
Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. City of Temple Terrace, 332 So.
2d 610, 612-13 (Fla. 1976) (providing that the "zoning power of
municipalities . . . is derived from Article VIII, s 2(b) of the Florida
Constitution by way of the" home rule act of section 166.021). 4 There is
no language in article VIII, section 2(b), limiting a municipality's ability to

4 Numerous other statutes codify local government's power and

responsibility to regulate land. See, e.g., §§ 163.3161, .3164, .3167,
.3202, § 166.033, Fla. Stat. (2020).
8
engage in quasi-judicial action in ruling on a rezoning request, and as
noted, the provision states that a city "may exercise any power for
municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law." See id.
Indeed, as we have already noted, decisions on site-specific rezoning
requests are, by their nature, quasi-judicial because they affect
identifiable parties and interests and involve policy application. See
Snyder, 627 So. 3d at 474. Further, nothing in section 166.021, which
"contains general provisions governing the exercise of municipal powers
under the framework established in article VIII, section 2(b)," City of Palm
Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 114 So. 3d 924, 927 (Fla. 2013), prevents
a municipality from taking quasi-judicial action in ruling on a rezoning
request.5
The circuit court further concluded that the City's charter itself
requires separation of powers and that because it gives legislative power
to the City Council, the City Council cannot exercise judicial power.6
Article I, section 1.04, of the City of Tampa Charter provides:
There shall be a distinct separation of legislative and
executive powers; and, except as otherwise herein expressly
provided, all legislative powers shall be vested in and
exercised by the city council and all executive and
administrative powers shall be vested in and exercised by the

5 In fact, the applicable version of section 166.033(1) specifically

contemplates that a "quasi-judicial hearing" may be conducted for
applications of development permits, which can involve zoning or
rezoning. See § 163.3164(16) (including in the definition of development
permit "any . . . zoning permit, . . . rezoning, . . . or any other official
action of local government having the effect of permitting the
development of land").
6 Liberty argued below that the circuit court had jurisdiction to

review the City Council's decision. However, Liberty now argues before
this court that the City's charter does not "discuss, much less
distribute[,] quasi-judicial powers" to the City Council and that the City
Council's decisions here were ultra vires.
9
mayor. Any power, except a purely legislative power,
authorized or required by general law to be exercised by a
governing body of a municipality shall be exercised by the city
council upon the recommendation or with the approval of the
mayor.
Article II addresses the City Council. Article II, section 2.01, vests "all
legislative power" in the City Council. Section 2.05 provides that all
legislative powers shall be exercised by ordinance, and sections 2.06
through 2.14 govern the exercise of the City Council's legislative power.
Section 2.09(b) specifically addresses rezoning and provides that
"[e]nactment or ordinances initiated by the city council or its designee
which rezone private real property shall be enacted pursuant to the
uniform procedure set out in Chapter 166.041(3)(c), Florida Statutes
(including all amendments thereto), which is hereby adopted and made a
part of this charter." And section 2.14 provides, in relevant part, that
"[i]n the exercise of its legislative powers[,] the council . . . shall have the
power to conduct such investigations and hold such hearings as the
council shall deem necessary, expedient, and proper and shall have the
power to compel the attendance of witnesses and production of
evidence."
Section 166.041, referenced in section 2.09(b) of the charter,
provides procedures for the adoption of ordinances. Section
166.041(1)(a) provides that an ordinance is "an official legislative action
of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a general and
permanent nature and enforceable as a local law." Subsection (3)
provides procedures for the rezoning of a parcel of land, including notice
and public hearings. § 166.041(3).
Thus the charter and the statute both expressly provide that the
City Council, as a legislative body, has the power to pass an ordinance
on rezoning. Further, both the charter and the statute expressly allow
10
the City Council to conduct hearings as part of its process in passing an
ordinance. And when the ordinance is a rezoning decision that affects
site-specific land or identifiable parties and interests, such as the
decision in this case, that decision is a quasi-judicial action by the City
Council. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474-75; Mullen v. Bal Harbour Vill.,
241 So. 3d 949, 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) ("The quasi-judicial process for
site-specific development orders has become an unassailable principle of
the process of property development in Florida."); see also Verizon
Wireless Pers. Commc'ns, L.P. v. Sanctuary at Wulfert Point Cmty. Ass'n,
916 So. 2d 850, 855 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (providing that the term quasi-
judicial "is simply a characterization of the action itself—one that
imposes certain obligations on the City Council"); Webb v. Town Council
of Town of Hilliard, 766 So. 2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("Local
government decisions pertaining to building permits, site plans, special
zoning exceptions, and other development orders generally are deemed
quasi-judicial in nature . . . ."). In arriving at a quasi-judicial decision on
a rezoning request, the City Council is not exercising judicial power. See
Verizon Wireless, 916 So. 2d at 855 ("[A]lthough the City Council's action
. . . fell into the category commonly referred to as 'quasi-judicial,' this
term does not imply that the Council possesses judicial power.").
We recognize that neither the charter nor section 166.041(3)
specifically refer to "quasi-judicial" process, hearings, or actions. But as
noted above, the legislature intended "to extend to municipalities the
exercise of powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or proprietary
purposes not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special
law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or
otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so
expressly prohibited." § 166.021(4) (emphasis added). Nothing expressly

11
prohibits the City Council from taking quasi-judicial action on a site-
specific rezoning request; therefore, the City Council may take quasi-
judicial action in the exercise of its legislative powers.
In sum, the City Council's quasi-judicial action with respect to the
rezoning of Liberty's land was not ultra vires. Such a decision is
reviewable in the circuit court by certiorari. Art. V, § 5, Fla. Const.; Fla.
R. App. P. 9.030(c)(3); Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474 (holding that "the
rulings of a board acting in its quasi-judicial capacity are subject to
review by certiorari" in the circuit court); see also City of Ft. Myers v.
Splitt, 988 So. 2d 28, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ("[T]he decision of the City at
issue here was a quasi-judicial decision rather than a legislative decision
and thus subject to challenge in the circuit court by way of certiorari.").
Thus the circuit court erred in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction to
review Liberty's petition for writ of certiorari. Accordingly, we grant
mandamus and direct the circuit court to consider Liberty's petition for
writ of certiorari.
Petition granted.

SILBERMAN and SLEET, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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