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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Marriage of Kline

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA0412

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

25CA0412 Marriage of Kline 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0412
Weld County District Court No. 22DR30214
Honorable Kimberly B. Schutt, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Rachel D. Kline,

Appellant,

and

Christopher W. Kline,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Yun and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 5, 2026

Hampton & Pigott LLP, David J. Pigott, Natalie T. Chase, Broomfield, Colorado,
for Appellant

Paige Mackey Murry LLC, Paige Mackey Murray, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellee
¶1 Rachel D. Kline (mother) appeals the district court’s order

allocating parental time and decision-making responsibilities. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Mother and Christopher W. Kline (father) married in 2005

after father’s first tour of duty in Iraq. Father completed three tours

of duty in Iraq and ceased serving in the Marine Corps in 2006. As

a result of his military experience, father struggles with anxiety and

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).1

¶3 The marriage produced three children, all of whom now attend

secondary and primary school.

¶4 Mother testified and the district court found that there were

several instances of domestic abuse and coercive control during the

marriage. For example, mother testified that father lost his temper,

threw and destroyed their property, restricted mother to certain

spaces through intimidation, abandoned her in a foreign country,

sexually assaulted her, tracked her movements, and engaged in

1 Mother was also diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder in

2024.

1
other acts of harassment and intimidation. No police were involved

in any of the reported incidents.

¶5 After father had an extramarital affair, he and mother began

verbally fighting, sometimes in front of the children. They began

living separately in 2021, and mother filed for divorce in 2022.

Mother and father spent a year attempting to reconcile and

temporarily split child custody during this time. The court entered

a decree of dissolution of marriage in July 2023.

¶6 In November 2023, the court granted mother a temporary

protection order against father after he entered her home uninvited.

The couple then agreed to a temporary 5-2-2-5 custody

arrangement and agreed to the appointment of Dr. Jane Derk as the

expert for the parental responsibility evaluation (PRE) to

recommend a permanent parental responsibility arrangement.

¶7 Meanwhile, the Colorado General Assembly passed House Bill

24-1350 (H.B. 24-1350), a law that focuses on child safety in court

proceedings affecting the child’s care and custody when there are

instances of intimate partner violence. H.B. 24-1350, 75th Gen.

Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2024); Ch. 344, sec. 1(1)(a), 2024

Colo. Sess. Laws 2332. The law took effect on August 7, 2024, and,

2
as relevant here, it added “coercive control” as a type of intimate

partner violence and instructed the court to consider evidence,

certain factors, and make certain statements when determining

parental responsibilities in cases involving allegations or findings

related to intimate partner violence. H.B. 24-1350; Ch. 344, secs.

3, 5-6, §§ 14-10-124(1.3)(a), (4)(e), (9), -127(11)(a), -127.5(2)(a.3),

(3.5), 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws 2336 -38, 2341-44.

¶8 The PRE was filed in July 2024, before H.B. 24-1350 went into

effect. After the PRE was filed, the district court held several

hearings to address remaining issues, including parenting time,

decision-making, and child support and whether to issue a

permanent restraining order against father. The court made oral

rulings on these issues in October 2024, followed by a subsequent

written order incorporating those rulings in January 2025. In its

order, the district court

• vacated the temporary protection order and, instead,

limited contact between mother and father and set

restrictions on necessary communications;

3
• continued and made permanent the 5-2-2-5 child

custody arrangement except for holidays, which followed

a separate schedule; and

• directed mother and father to “attempt to make all the

major decisions for the children jointly” but gave mother

tiebreaking authority in the event of an impasse, among

other caveats.

¶9 Mother appeals these orders, contending that the district court

erred when it “ordered a 5-2-2-5 schedule and joint decision

making” despite having found husband had engaged in “domestic

abuse” and “coercive control.” Relatedly, she argues that the court

“misapplied the law in adopting the recommendations of the PRE

because the PRE failed to conform to statute.” We address each

contention below.

II. Sufficiency of the PRE

¶ 10 For the first time on appeal, mother contends that the district

court should not have relied on the PRE because it did not meet the

minimum requirements set forth in section 14-10-127, C.R.S. 2025.

We do not reach the merits of this argument, however, because it is

unpreserved.

4
¶ 11 When a party in a civil case fails to present an argument to the

trial court, the argument is deemed waived; thus, we will not

consider it for the first time on appeal. O’Connell v. Biomet, Inc.,

250 P.3d 1278, 1283 (Colo. App. 2010). A party need not use any

“talismanic language” to preserve an argument for appeal. In re

Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 21. But the party’s argument

must be specific enough to alert the district court to the issue and

to provide the court an adequate opportunity to rule on it. Id. A

general argument does not necessarily preserve all related

subsidiary arguments. In re Estate of Ramstetter, 2016 COA 81, ¶

67. Moreover, a party’s mere opposition to its adversary’s request

does not preserve all potential avenues of relief on appeal; instead,

only the specific arguments a party pursued before the district

court are reviewed. Valentine v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252

P.3d 1182, 1188 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 12 Regarding preservation, mother — without citing to the

record — asserts that she “raised the issue of [father’s] domestic

violence, [and] its impact on the family throughout the dissolution

proceedings,” noting that “[t]he trial court ruled on the question of

domestic violence.” But mother did not contend in the district court

5
that the PRE did not satisfy the requirements of section 14-10-127

when it was completed, nor did she argue that the PRE should be

revised to conform to the 2024 amendments. Because mother did

not raise this issue in the district court, it is not preserved and we

do not consider it further.

III. Parenting Schedule and Decision-Making

¶ 13 Mother contends that the district court’s findings do not

support its adopted 5-2-2-5 parenting time schedule or its

assignment of parental decision-making responsibilities.2 We are

not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 14 We uphold the district court’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous. C.R.C.P. 52. We review its ruling on parenting

time for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA

2 Once again, mother’s preservation citations only state that she

generally objected to issues related to domestic violence throughout
the proceedings. However, specific objections to a court’s orders are
generally not required to preserve arguments for appeal. See In re
Marriage of Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶ 17 (“[A] party is not required to
object to the trial court’s findings in the trial court to preserve a
challenge to those findings.” (citation omitted)); C.R.C.P. 52
(“Neither requests for findings nor objections to findings rendered
are necessary for purposes of review.”).

6
116M, ¶ 8. We also review for an abuse of discretion the district

court’s allocation of decision-making responsibility. In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15.

¶ 15 A district court abuses its discretion when it acts in a

manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable manner. In re

Marriage of Page, 70 P.3d 579, 581 (Colo. App. 2003). It also

abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law. In re Marriage of

Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶¶ 64-65.

¶ 16 We disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does

not affect the substantial rights of the parties. C.R.C.P. 61; see

C.A.R. 35(c).

B. Parenting Time Schedule

¶ 17 Mother asserts that the district court abused its discretion

when it incorporated “the legal standard by which it denied

[mother’s] request for permanent protection order” into its

allocation of parenting time. She also argues that the court failed to

make sufficient findings to demonstrate that its allocation of

parenting time prioritized the children’s safety, especially given its

parallel finding that father committed domestic violence.

7
1. Additional Facts

¶ 18 After holding a two-part evidentiary hearing, the district court

issued an oral ruling on whether to make the temporary protection

order against father permanent, as well as rulings on the allocation

of parenting time, child support, and decision-making

responsibilities.

¶ 19 The court first addressed the protection order. It recited the

legal standard for entering a permanent order and then found by a

preponderance of the evidence that father had committed acts “that

would rise to the level of being domestic abuse — and certainly

coercive control” as defined in the recently enacted H.B. 24-1350.

The court observed that father had engaged in verbal abuse and

“threats that would . . . [make mother] feel like she was in some sort

of physical danger.” It then reiterated that it found credible

evidence of “domestic abuse.” See § 13-14-101(2), C.R.S. 2025

(defining domestic abuse as a “threatened act of violence, stalking,

harassment, or coercion that is committed by a person” against

another living in the same domicile).

¶ 20 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the abuse by father did

not “rise to the level of needing — a permanent protection order.”

8
See § 13-14-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. However, relying on its

authority under section 14-10-124, C.R.S. 2025, the court did

decide to limit contact between the parties in order to ensure that

their communications were safe and would have a minimal impact

on the children.

¶ 21 Turning to the allocation of parenting time under section 14-

10-124, the court noted the PRE’s conclusions that “the children

have a good relationship with each of their parents,” that the

children were “bonded with both of the parents” and “want to spend

time with both of their parents,” and that they “struggle when

they’re away from either parent for any great length of time.” The

court also acknowledged that the children had been struggling with

the divorce, as demonstrated by poor school performance,

bedwetting, and other behavioral issues.

¶ 22 According to the PRE, the eldest child requested that the 5-2-

2-5 parenting schedule stay in place, and Dr. Derk also

recommended the schedule remain unchanged. The court agreed.

It concluded that it could not find any

compelling reason to ignore the
recommendations of [the parental
responsibilities evaluator] or the[] other factors

9
to order that [father’s] parenting time be
reduced. Notwithstanding the fact that there
has been a finding of domestic violence, there’s
not evidence that there’s been any sort of
abuse involving the children. — The evidence
is that he is a good parent.

¶ 23 The court added that the children “have been safe in [father’s]

care” and expressed concern that further change would add to the

children’s current struggles.

¶ 24 The court incorporated its oral findings and rulings into a

written order, issued a few months later.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 25 A district court must allocate parenting time based on the best

interests of the child, applying the factors in section 14-10-

124(1.5)(a) and giving paramount consideration to the physical,

mental, and emotional conditions and needs of the child. In re

Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, ¶ 17. However, if domestic

violence is an issue in the case, the court must also consider the

factors in section 14-10-124(4). § 14-10-124(1.5)(a); Morgan, ¶ 18.

¶ 26 Applicable here, when the court finds that one party, by a

preponderance of the evidence, has committed an act of domestic

violence, it shall consider “conditions on parenting time that ensure

10
the safety of the child and abused party, giving paramount

consideration to the safety and the physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs of the child and abused party.” § 14-10-

124(4)(e). This includes limiting contact between the parties. § 14-

10-124(4)(e)(I).

¶ 27 If there “is any information” that a parent has committed

domestic violence or coercive control, the court shall also “make a

statement in writing or orally on the proceeding record regarding

why unsupervised parenting time” for said parent was “determined

to be in the best interests of the child with paramount consideration

given to the child’s safety and the physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs of the child.” § 14-10-124(9).

¶ 28 In addition, if allegations of domestic violence are made, the

district court “shall give strong consideration to a child’s stated

preference” if the stated preference is consistent with the

“paramount consideration given to the child’s safety and the

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs of the child.”

§ 14-10-127.5(3.5), C.R.S. 2025. And when allocating parental

responsibilities, the court shall, among other factors, “[c]onsider

11
evidence related to the use of coercive control by a party.” § 14-10-

127.5(3)(a)(III).

1. Analysis

¶ 29 As we understand it, mother contends that the court’s findings

that father engaged in domestic violence and coercive control were

inconsistent with its decision to allocate equal parenting time.

Noting that the court was free to deviate from the PRE’s

recommendation, she argues that the court “erroneously

incorporated the legal standard by which it denied [mother’s]

request for [a] permanent protection order and failed completely to

apply the standards of [section] 14-10-127.5” because it did not

make “specific findings of fact[] as to the children’s safety while in

the care of an abusive intimate partner.”

¶ 30 We discern no legal error. Nothing in the court’s order

suggests that it did not give “paramount consideration” to the

children’s safety, as well as their “physical, mental, and emotional

conditions.” § 14-10-127.5(3.5). To the contrary, the court noted

that it was taking into account the new legislative requirements,

and, based on the evidence from the permanent orders hearing, the

recommendations in the PRE, and the eldest child’s stated wishes,

12
it determined that an equal parenting time schedule remained

appropriate. While the court found that father had engaged in

domestic violence and coercive control, it went on to state “why

unsupervised parenting time” with father remained in the children’s

best interests. See §§ 14-10-124(9), -127.5(3.5).

¶ 31 The court first addressed the children’s “physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs.” § 14-10-127.5(3.5). It found that

maintaining the 5-2-2-5 schedule was justified for “all of the

reasons” it had previously mentioned and that it had no “compelling

reason” to depart from the recommendations of the parental

responsibilities evaluator and no “other factors to order” that

father’s parenting time be reduced. The court emphasized that the

children’s emotional needs included their parental bonds,

acknowledged their desire “to spend time with both of their

parents,” and found that a “further change” in the allocation of

parental time would be “a greater source of struggle for them.” It

accepted the PRE’s finding that the children had difficulties when

they were away “from either parent for any great length of time” and

found that the children’s physical, mental, and emotional

struggles — such as wetting the bed, struggling in school, and

13
behavioral issues — were due to “severe family adjustment due to

the divorce” rather than other circumstances. In the same vein, the

court recognized that, by “put[ting] the children in the middle of

[the divorce],” the parties were causing the children physical,

mental, and emotional harm. The court therefore ordered mother

and father to take a co-parenting class for high-conflict divorces to

help them recognize their own “control[] issues.”

¶ 32 The court also addressed the children’s safety. Again, it

observed that — aside from findings of domestic violence and

coercive control — nothing in the record warranted a reduction in

father’s parenting time. The court found that there was “no

evidence that there’s been any sort of abuse involving the children”

and that “[the children] have been safe in [father’s] care.” The court

also acknowledged statements in the PRE indicating that father

sought treatment for his PTSD after the marriage fell apart and

that, according to the PRE, father had “good behavior management

skills” and “expressed a lot of love” for his children, who were “very

comfortable with him.” It also noted there had been no further

evidence of domestic violence since the temporary protection order

was put in place. Nonetheless, as discussed above, the court still

14
ordered that the parties have limited contact to ensure the

children’s safety.

¶ 33 These findings were sufficient to support a conclusion that the

court gave “paramount consideration” to the children’s “safety and

the[ir] physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.”

§§ 14-10-124(9), -127.5(3.5). The court, with record support, found

that an equal parenting time schedule would not endanger the

children and that reducing father’s parenting time would likely

cause immediate physical, emotional, and mental harm. It also

took measures to reduce the likelihood that the children would be

unsafe in his custody. As a result, we discern no error in the

court’s permanent adoption of the existing 5-2-2-5 schedule.

C. Parental Decision-Making

¶ 34 Mother next contends that the district court abused its

discretion by awarding joint decision-making and appointing a

parenting coordinator and decision-maker (PCDM). We conclude

that these arguments are waived.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 35 Section 14-10-124(4)(a)(II) provides, in pertinent part:

15
If the court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that one of the parties has committed
domestic violence:

(A) It shall not be in the best interests of the
child to allocate mutual decision-making
responsibility over the objection of the other
party . . . unless the court finds that there is
credible evidence of the ability of the parties to
make decisions cooperatively in the best
interest of the child in a manner that is safe
for the abused party and the child; and

(B) The court shall not appoint a parenting
coordinator solely to ensure that mutual
decision-making can be accomplished.

§ 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A)-(B).

1. Additional Facts

¶ 36 In her written closing argument, mother requested joint

decision-making with tiebreaking authority:

The PRE recommended a hybrid form of joint
decision making, whereby the parties try to
make major decisions jointly, and exchange
discussions at least twice, but in the end if the
parties cannot make the decision jointly,
[m]other would have the final say. Mother
believes that this form of decision making
would serve the children’s best interest while
encouraging the parties to engage in
coparenting.

¶ 37 The district court adopted this recommendation, ordering that

the parties must have “two notifications and a minimum of two

16
exchanges of information and investigation of the options,” but if

they reached an impasse, “[m]other would have the final say or be

the tie breaker and be able to make the decision.” And the court

gave mother even more authority than she requested, ruling that

she would have the final say in “major issues such as therapy,

medical decisions, [and] educational decisions that need[ed] to be

made right away.” In addition, the court also found that for all non-

major, non-pressing issues, the parties had “agreed to engage [with]

a [PCDM] . . . if they’ve reached an impasse.”

1. Analysis

¶ 38 Father argues that mother waived her challenge to the court’s

allocation of decision-making (or invited any error) because she

proposed the joint decision-making allocation that the court

granted and also agreed to the PCDM. Mother did not address the

preservation of this issue in her opening brief. In her reply brief,

however, she generally asserts that “[t]he parties litigated domestic

abuse throughout the case” and that the district court’s “factual

findings of domestic violence preserve the court’s erroneous order

for a PCDM under [section] 14-10-127.5.” In the alternative, she

asserts that “[t]he request for a PCDM in the record is a result of

17
attorney incompetence, and therefore preserved and reviewable on

appeal.”

¶ 39 Our review of the record confirms that mother, through

counsel, affirmatively requested joint allocation of decision-making,

with her acting as a tiebreaker. And the court determined — based

on a representation by mother’s counsel that she “believe[d] there

was a stipulation” regarding father’s request for a PCDM3 — that

the parties had “agreed to engage a [PCDM] . . . if they’ve reached

an impasse.”

¶ 40 A party may waive an issue by intentionally relinquishing a

known right. Bernache v. Brown, 2020 COA 106, ¶ 10. “Waiver

may be express, as when a party states its intent to abandon an

existing right, or implied, as when a party engages in conduct which

manifests an intent to relinquish the right or acts inconsistently

with its assertion.” In re Marriage of Hill, 166 P.3d 269, 273 (Colo.

App. 2007).

3 Regarding father’s request for a PCDM, mother’s counsel made the

following representation: “I believe there’s a stipulation to
appointing a PCDM. We just haven’t gotten to the identity of one
but that was talked about. So I wanted to make a record.”

18
¶ 41 We conclude that mother waived any challenge to the court’s

allocation of decision-making responsibility by requesting the relief

that the district court granted. We likewise conclude that counsel’s

representation to the court that there had been “a stipulation” to

the PCDM also amounted to a waiver. Accordingly, because

mother’s arguments are not properly before us, we decline to

address them further.

IV. Attorney Fees

¶ 42 Father requests an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant

to section 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2025, and C.A.R. 38(b) and 39.1.

He argues that mother’s appeal was substantially frivolous because

mother failed to preserve her arguments or had waived them. He

also asserts that mother’s arguments were misleading and based on

misrepresentations and exaggerations of the record evidence.

¶ 43 We decline to award fees under section 13-17-102(4).

Although unsuccessful, mother’s appeal was not so lacking in merit

as to constitute frivolity or bad faith. See Mission Denv. Co. v.

Pierson, 674 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1984) (“Standards for determining

whether an appeal is frivolous should be directed toward penalizing

egregious conduct without deterring a lawyer from vigorously

19
asserting his client’s rights.”); see also In re Marriage of Boettcher,

2018 COA 34, ¶ 38 (“Fees should be awarded only in clear and

unequivocal cases . . . .”), aff’d, 2019 CO 81.

V. Disposition

¶ 44 We affirm the district court’s order allocating parental time

and decision-making responsibilities.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

20