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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Barba v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA0859

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.4K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
March 12, 2026

2026COA15

No. 25CA0859, Barba v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office —
Workers’ Compensation — Medical Impairment Benefits —
Final Admission of Liability

A division of the court of appeals addresses a novel issue

regarding the impact of section 8-42-107(8)(f), C.R.S. 2025, a

provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado, on the

information employers may include in a final admission of liability.

That statute requires employers submitting a final admission of

liability to “admit liability for related reasonable and necessary

medical benefits by an authorized treating physician” in all claims

when “an authorized treating physician recommends medical

benefits after maximum medical improvement,” and the record does

not contain a “contrary medical opinion.”

The division interprets the statutory provision stating that the

“related reasonable and necessary medical benefits” admitted in a
final admission of liability “are not limited to any specific medical

treatment” to mean that an employer cannot limit maintenance

medical benefits to any specific medical treatment and that any

attempt to do so is a nullity. In addition, the division concludes

that section 8-42-107(8)(f) neither prohibits an employer from

referring to a physician’s report in a final admission of liability

when admitting liability for maintenance medical benefits nor

implies that such a reference constitutes an impermissible

limitation on benefits.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026COA15

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0859
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
WC No. 4-972-041

Fredy Barba,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Cardinal Health
200, Inc.,

Respondents,

and

Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. TPA,

Insurer-Respondent.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Welling and Tow, JJ., concur

Announced March 12, 2026

Elliott & Montgomery, Mark D. Elliott, Erin Montgomery, Arvada, Colorado for
Petitioner

No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office

Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Douglas J. Kotarek, Matthew J. Hegarty, M. Taylor Feero,
Denver, Colorado for Respondent Cardinal Health 200, Inc. and Insurer-
Respondent Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. TPA
¶1 This case presents a novel issue regarding the impact of

section 8-42-107(8)(f), C.R.S. 2025, of the Workers’ Compensation

Act of Colorado (the Act) on the information employers may include

in a final admission of liability (FAL). That statute requires

employers submitting a FAL to “admit liability for related reasonable

and necessary medical benefits by an authorized treating physician”

in all claims when “an authorized treating physician recommends

medical benefits after maximum medical improvement” and the

record does not contain a “contrary medical opinion.” Id.

¶2 The parties dispute the meaning of the statutory language

providing that the “related reasonable and necessary medical

benefits” admitted in a FAL “are not limited to any specific medical

treatment.” Id.

¶3 Claimant, Fredy Barba, sustained a back injury in the course

and scope of his employment with Cardinal Health 200, Inc., in

1. In this appeal, Barba contends that Cardinal’s insurance

carrier — XL Specialty Insurance Company — and XL’s third-party

administrator — Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.

TPA — violated section 8-42-107(8)(f) by adding, next to the FAL’s

“Yes” box for maintenance care after maximum medical

1
improvement, a reference to a physician’s report recommending a

specific maintenance program. (We refer to XL and Sedgwick jointly

as “insurer.”) He asserts that the administrative law judge (ALJ)

who presided over the hearing on his penalty claim (the penalty

hearing) erred by not imposing statutory penalties for this alleged

statutory violation. Barba’s counsel clarified at oral argument that

Barba sought penalties from Cardinal and insurer. Section

8-43-304(1), C.R.S. 2025, permits the assessment of penalties

against “[a]ny employer or insurer, or any officer or agent of either,

or any employee, or any other person who violates” the Act.

¶4 Barba also contends that the ALJ erred at the penalty hearing

by permitting a claims adjuster to explain why she added the

reference to the physician’s report to the FAL and that the facts did

not support the ALJ’s rejection of his penalty claim. For these

reasons, Barba asks us to reverse the order of the Industrial Claim

Appeals Office (the Panel) affirming the ALJ’s decision.

¶5 We disagree with Barba’s interpretation of section

8-42-107(8)(f) and his other arguments. Therefore, we affirm the

Panel’s order.

2
I. Background

¶6 Following his back injury, Barba underwent surgery and

engaged in physical therapy. Barba’s authorized treating physician

placed him at maximum medical improvement (MMI) — the “point

in time when any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment as a result of injury has become stable and when no

further treatment is reasonably expected to improve the condition,”

§ 8-40-201(11.5), C.R.S. 2025 — on December 1, 2015. The

authorized treating physician assigned a 25% whole person

impairment rating and recommended a specific course of post-MMI

maintenance treatment.

¶7 On behalf of Cardinal, insurer filed a FAL form that was

consistent with the authorized treating physician’s report. Barba

objected to the FAL and requested a Division Independent Medical

Examination (DIME). A DIME physician confirmed the MMI date of

December 1, 2015, and assigned a 24% whole person impairment

rating. In January 2017, insurer filed an amended FAL consistent

with the DIME. Barba’s case was then closed.

¶8 Barba continued to receive post-MMI maintenance care from

his authorized treating physician. But in October 2018, Barba

3
reported that his condition had worsened after he bent down to pick

up a piece of paper. He sought to reopen his workers’

compensation award. An ALJ determined that reopening was

warranted based on proof that Barba had experienced a change in

condition causally connected to his original work injury.

¶9 Barba received further monitoring and treatment for his back

injury. In 2024, he underwent another DIME, which Dr. Bryan

Alvarez performed. In his DIME report dated March 28, 2024 (the

Alvarez report), Dr. Alvarez concluded that Barba had reached MMI

on December 1, 2015, and assigned a 17% whole person

impairment rating. Dr. Alvarez recommended that Barba undergo

physical therapy for three months.

¶ 10 In April 2024, the Division of Workers’ Compensation

(Division) issued a notice of “DIME Process Concluded” that

required “the insurance carrier” either to (1) “admit liability

consistent with the DIME report” or (2) “file an application for

hearing.” Blayre Spring, a claims adjuster for Sedgwick, filed a FAL

on behalf of Cardinal and insurer. The FAL said that Cardinal and

insurer admitted liability consistent with the report, including

liability for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits totaling

4
$62,451.20 and maintenance medical benefits. As relevant to this

appeal, on the FAL form, Spring checked the “Yes” box for

“[a]dmit[ting] to [m]aintenance [c]are after MMI.” On the same line

as the “Yes” box, Spring wrote, “Pursuant to Dr. Bryan Alvarez’s

medical report dated 03/28/2024.” On the next line, next to

“[r]emarks and basis for permanent disability award,” Springer

summarized Cardinal and insurer’s position regarding the PPD

benefits to which Barba was entitled “[p]ursuant to” the Alvarez

report.

¶ 11 Barba asserted that he was entitled to penalties under section

8-43-304(1) because the reference to the Alvarez report in the FAL

violated section 8-42-107(8)(f). That statute says:

In all claims in which an authorized treating
physician recommends medical benefits after
maximum medical improvement, and there is
no contrary medical opinion in the record, the
employer shall, in a [FAL], admit liability for
related reasonable and necessary medical
benefits by an authorized treating physician,
which benefits are not limited to any specific
medical treatment.

(Emphasis added.) Barba specifically argued that he was entitled to

recover penalties because insurer had limited his maintenance

5
medical benefits by “t[ying]” them to the treatment recommended in

the Alvarez report.

¶ 12 At the penalty hearing, the ALJ permitted Spring to explain

why she had inserted the reference to the Alvarez report in the FAL.

She testified that “there was no intention to tie maintenance to a

specific physician” or “limit the maintenance [liability] that

[Cardinal and insurer] were admitting to,” but, rather, she only

sought to show the source of her “information regarding

maintenance.” She said that because, in some instances, “the same

doctor” does not issue findings regarding both “PPD or

maintenance,” she indicates on the appropriate lines of the FAL

form which physician’s report supports the PPD award and which

report addresses maintenance treatment. Spring said that she

added the reference to the Alvarez report near the “Yes” box solely

to note that Dr. Alvarez was the physician who had recommended

maintenance treatment for Barba.

¶ 13 When counsel for Sedgwick asked Spring whether she

“intend[ed] to limit [Barba]’s maintenance treatment to any specific

treatment recommended by Dr. Alvarez,” Barba’s counsel objected

that Spring’s “intention [was] irrelevant.” The ALJ overruled the

6
objection, explaining that “there exists a question of fact here as to

whether or not” the reference to the Alvarez report was “a limitation

on maintenance medical benefits” and that Spring’s intent was

relevant to such question.

¶ 14 Spring then testified that she had not limited Barba’s

maintenance medical benefits to “Dr. Alvarez’s recommendations.”

In addition, she testified that, at Barba’s request, she had removed

the reference to the Alvarez report from an amended FAL she issued

on June 28, 2024.

¶ 15 After the penalty hearing, the parties submitted proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law. In his proposed findings

and conclusions, Barba asserted that he was entitled to penalties

because, even though Spring “claimed no intention to limit

maintenance medical treatment,” that was “exactly what [she] did.”

According to Barba, the reference to the Alvarez report in the

context of the admission regarding maintenance medical benefits

“specifically contradicted” section 8-42-107(8)(f)’s “clear statutory”

mandate that such benefits “cannot be limited to any specific

medical treatment.” He asserted that the reference also violated

Rule 5-5(A)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure.

7
See Div. of Workers’ Comp. Rule 5-5(A)(1), 7 Code Colo. Regs.

1101-3 (WCRP 5-5(A)(1)).

¶ 16 The ALJ denied Barba’s request for penalties and determined

that whether the reference to the Alvarez report in the FAL

constituted an improper limitation on maintenance benefits was a

question of fact. The ALJ found that Spring’s reference to the

Alvarez report was neither intended to limit nor, in fact, limited

Barba’s maintenance medical benefits. Rather, crediting Spring’s

testimony, the ALJ found that the language “merely indicated the

rationale” for Cardinal and insurer’s general admission to such

benefits.

¶ 17 Barba sought review from the Panel, which affirmed the ALJ’s

order. The Panel rejected Barba’s assertion that Spring’s

identification of the Alvarez report on “the maintenance section of

the [FAL was] necessarily a denial of or limitation on maintenance

medical benefits.” In addition, the Panel concluded that section

8-42-107(8)(f) “does not provide an express prohibition against

mentioning a ‘doctor’s report’ in connection with an admission of

liability for maintenance medical benefits” because the statute only

8
requires that “the admission not limit benefits to any specific

medical treatment.”

II. The Panel Did Not Misinterpret Section 8-42-107(8)(f)

¶ 18 Barba contends that the Panel erred by affirming the ALJ’s

order declining to impose penalties for the alleged violation of

section 8-42-107(8)(f), which he asserts that the Panel

misinterpreted. Although he presents several arguments in support

of this contention, he acknowledges that his appeal focuses on “the

proper interpretation” of section 8-42-107(8)(f). As we understand

Barba’s argument, he asserts that he is entitled to recover penalties

because the language of section 8-42-107(8)(f) providing that related

reasonable and necessary maintenance medical benefits “are not

limited to any specific medical treatment” prohibits an employer,

when admitting liability for maintenance medical benefits in a FAL,

from referring to a physician’s report recommending specific

medical treatment. We disagree.

A. Statutory Interpretation

¶ 19 We review the Panel’s interpretation of section 8-42-107(8)(f)

de novo. See Destination Maternity v. Burren, 2020 CO 41, ¶ 22,

463 P.3d 266, 273 (“We review the proper construction of statutes

9
de novo.” (quoting Williams v. Kunau, 147 P.3d 33, 36 (Colo.

2006))). When interpreting a statute, we must determine and give

effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Davison v. Indus. Claim

Appeals Off., 84 P.3d 1023, 1029 (Colo. 2004). We begin with the

plain language of the statute, giving words and phrases their plain

and ordinary meanings, and construing them according to the rules

of grammar and common usage. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44,

¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389. We respect the General Assembly’s choice

of language, and we may not add words to or subtract words from

the statute. UMB Bank, N.A. v. Landmark Towers Ass’n, 2017 CO

107, ¶ 22, 408 P.3d 836, 840. If the statutory language is

unambiguous, we look no further. McCoy, ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389.

B. Analysis

¶ 20 As noted above, section 8-42-107(8)(f) says that when an

authorized treating physician recommends maintenance medical

benefits, and there is no contrary medical opinion, the employer

shall admit in its FAL “liability for related reasonable and necessary

medical benefits . . . , which benefits are not limited to any specific

medical treatment.” (Emphasis added.) This language is clear: In a

10
FAL, an employer cannot limit maintenance medical benefits to any

specific medical treatment, and any attempt to do so is a nullity.

¶ 21 Contrary to Barba’s argument, however, section 8-42-107(8)(f)

does not prohibit an employer from referring to a physician’s report

in a FAL when admitting liability for maintenance medical benefits,

nor does it imply that such a reference would constitute an

impermissible limitation on benefits. See UMB Bank, ¶ 22, 408

P.3d at 840. If the General Assembly had intended that section

8-42-107(8)(f) direct what employers must — and must not —

include in an admission for maintenance medical benefits, it knew

how to do so. See, e.g., § 8-43-203(2)(b)(II)(A), C.R.S. 2025

(requiring that a FAL “must include” certain statements and saying

that, when “predicated upon medical reports, the reports must

accompany the final admission”); see also Students for Concealed

Carry on Campus, LLC v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 280 P.3d 18, 23

(Colo. App. 2010) (“Had the legislature intended to exempt

universities, it knew how to do so.”), aff’d, 2012 CO 17, 271 P.3d

496. If the General Assembly believes that employers should be

subject to penalties if they refer to a physician’s report in a FAL, it

can amend section 8-42-107(8)(f) to say so. It is not our role to

11
rewrite the statute to achieve this result. See People v. Rau, 2022

CO 3, ¶ 34, 501 P.3d 803, 813 (“It is for the legislature, not our

court, to rewrite a statute.”).

¶ 22 Thus, because section 8-42-107(8)(f) lacks an express

prohibition against referring to a physician’s report when an

employer admits liability for maintenance medical benefits, we may

not read such a prohibition into the statute. See Kraus v. Artcraft

Sign Co., 710 P.2d 480, 482 (Colo. 1985).

¶ 23 Nor are we persuaded that the principle of liberal construction

of the Act to effectuate its beneficent purposes, see § 8-40-102(1),

C.R.S. 2025, mandates a different outcome. “[L]iberal construction

does not grant us authority to disregard the Act’s plain language or

read nonexistent provisions into the Act.” Salazar v. Indus. Claim

Appeals Off., 2022 COA 13, ¶ 31, 508 P.3d 805, 813.

¶ 24 Accordingly, we perceive no error in the Panel’s interpretation

of section 8-42-107(8)(f). And because we conclude that the statute

is clear, we need not reach Barba’s legislative history arguments.

See McCoy, ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389 (holding that courts may only

resort to “other aids to statutory construction, including . . . the

statute’s legislative history,” when statutory language is

12
ambiguous). (To the extent Barba relies in his opening brief on the

history of amendments to WCRP 5-5(A)(1), we do not consider such

argument because he did not raise it before the Panel. See

McClaflin v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 126 P.3d 288, 289 (Colo.

App. 2005) (declining to consider argument not raised to the

Panel).)

III. The Panel Did Not Otherwise Err by Affirming the ALJ’s Order

¶ 25 We next turn to Barba’s contention that the Panel erred by

accepting the ALJ’s resolution of two factual issues. He argues that

the ALJ admitted irrelevant evidence at the penalty hearing and

that the undisputed facts do not support the ALJ’s finding that

Cardinal and insurer did not violate section 8-42-107(8)(f).

¶ 26 We reject this contention in light of our reading of the plain

language of section 8-42-107(8)(f) and, therefore, need not reach

Barba’s arguments regarding the admission of allegedly irrelevant

evidence and the purported lack of factual support for the ALJ’s

determination.

¶ 27 Barba asserts that Cardinal and insurer are liable for a

penalty because they “failed to take an action that a reasonable

insurer would have taken to comply with a statute or rule” and,

13
under the applicable standard, “violated an order, statute, or rule

and failed to take an action that a reasonable insurer would have

taken.” See § 8-43-304(1); Pioneers Hosp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals

Off., 114 P.3d 97, 99 (Colo. App. 2005) (“An ALJ may impose a

penalty under [section] 8-43-304(1) if it is shown that the employer

failed to take an action that a reasonable employer would have

taken to comply with a rule.”).

¶ 28 Significantly, Barba’s penalty argument rests on his

contention that Cardinal and insurer violated section

8-42-107(8)(f) — not that they attempted to violate the statute.

Thus, we need not address whether Cardinal and insurer’s alleged

attempt to violate section 8-42-107(8)(f) subjects them to a penalty.

Cf. Delta Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2021 COA

84, ¶¶ 45-46, 495 P.3d 984, 995 (affirming a penalty award entered

against a medical provider that violated section 8-42-101(4), C.R.S.

2025, which bars employers and insurers from seeking to recover

medical costs or fees from an employee following an admission of

liability or the entry of a final order regarding liability for those

costs or fees).

14
¶ 29 Because, as a matter of law, Cardinal and insurer could not

limit Barba’s maintenance benefits by referring to the Alvarez report

in the FAL, even if Cardinal and insurer intended to limit Barba’s

benefits, Cardinal and insurer did not violate section 8-42-107(8)(f).

Thus, it is of no consequence that the ALJ may have erroneously

considered irrelevant evidence or that the undisputed facts may not

have supported the ALJ’s decision. No matter what evidence the

parties presented or what facts they established at the penalty

hearing, Cardinal and insurer did not violate section 8-42-107(8)(f).

Thus, they cannot be held liable for a penalty under section

8-43-304(1).

¶ 30 Moreover, in light of our interpretation of section

8-42-107(8)(f), we disagree with Barba’s policy argument that,

because “injured workers” cannot “divine the subjective intent of an

adjuster from an incorrectly filled out” FAL, the ALJ’s “subjective

intent approach,” as reflected in the ALJ’s consideration of Spring’s

testimony regarding her reasons for inserting the reference to the

Alvarez report in the FAL, will “result in multiple, unnecessary

applications for hearing.” This opinion makes clear that injured

workers have no reason to fear that a reference to a physician’s

15
report in a FAL will limit the future medical treatments they will

receive under the Act.

IV. Disposition

¶ 31 The Panel’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE TOW concur.

16