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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Matter of Leoffler Trust

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA0622

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.6K)

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Combined Opinion

25CA0622 Matter of Leoffler Trust 03-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0622
Kit Carson County District Court No. 24PR13
Honorable Stephanie M.G. Gagliano, Judge

In the Matter of Jerry Leoffler Trust.

Cortney Hancock,

Appellant,

v.

Shane Leoffler,

Appellee.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Yun and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 12, 2026

Cortney Hancock, Pro Se

Coan, Payton & Payne, LLC, Scott H. Challinor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3) and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Petitioner, Cortney Hancock, appeals the district court’s

dismissal of her petition for a writ of mandamus and her “Motion

for Removal of Trustee” filed against defendant, Shane Leoffler. We

reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

¶2 At the heart of this appeal is Hancock’s claim that she is Jerry

Leoffler’s1 daughter and, as such, is entitled to benefit from his

trust (the Trust). If Hancock is Jerry’s daughter, she is an

interested party in the Trust and has standing to pursue at least

some of her claims against Shane. If not, at least some of her

claims must be dismissed for lack of standing.

¶3 Based only on Hancock’s pleadings and Shane’s motion to

dismiss, the district court dismissed Hancock’s petition for a writ of

mandamus and her motion for removal of the trustee, apparently

finding as a factual matter that Hancock is not Jerry’s daughter.

Because the allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true

1 Jerry shares the same last name as Shane Leoffler, the

respondent-appellee in this proceeding. As such, we refer to them
by their first names and mean no disrespect in doing so.

1
at this stage of the proceedings, we conclude that the dismissal was

improper.

I. Background

¶4 After Jerry’s grandparents died, the Trust was created for

Jerry. Shane Leoffler became the trustee. Under the terms of the

Trust, if Jerry died before the final distribution, the remaining

income would go to his living descendants, or if he had no living

descendants, to descendants of Jerry’s grandparents.

¶5 Jerry died in December 2022. Before his death, he granted

Hancock power of attorney authorizing her to do “everything

necessary in [his] name and for [his] benefit which [he] could do if

[he] were personally present and able.” Hancock and Jerry had

discussed Jerry’s assets and wishes concerning his estate; and

while Jerry was still alive, Hancock attempted to contact Shane to

access information about the Trust and to remove him as trustee.

2
¶6 After Jerry’s death, his will was admitted to probate. In his

will, Jerry identified Hancock as one of his children2 and named her

as his personal representative.

¶7 Two years after Jerry’s death, Hancock — acting pro se — filed

several pleadings concerning the Trust. First, she petitioned to

compel Shane to provide annual reports, statements, and

accountings related to the Trust; provide “all sections” of the Trust

that affect her as Jerry’s child; and distribute the Trust assets to

her. Second, she filed a motion to remove Shane as the trustee of

the Trust. Third, she filed a motion to inspect and copy documents

related to the Trust.

¶8 Shane moved to dismiss Hancock’s pleadings. Hancock did

not file a response, and the district court granted Shane’s motion.

Specifically, the court concluded that Hancock (1) was not an

interested party as to the Trust; (2) lacked standing to bring an

action against Shane; and (3) did not have standing to seek court

intervention regarding the administration of the Trust or to view,

2 Jerry’s will lists “Courtney Irene Hancock” as one of his children,

misspelling Hancock’s first name as “Courtney.” There appears to
be no dispute, however, that this is a reference to petitioner Cortney
Hancock.

3
access, or receive any information regarding the Trust. Hancock

now appeals the dismissal.

II. Analysis

¶9 In her opening brief on appeal, Hancock contends that (1) she

has standing to seek relief as Jerry’s daughter and via the power of

attorney; (2) the district court demonstrated bias against her; and

(3) the district court violated her due process rights. We conclude

that Hancock’s allegations about her parentage in her petition for

writ of mandamus and her accompanying motion for removal of the

trustee were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, and on

this ground, we reverse. For the reasons explained below, we do

not reach Hancock’s remaining appellate arguments.

4
A. Standing

¶ 10 Hancock contends that as Jerry’s daughter, she has standing

to bring an action against Shane related to the Trust.3 We agree.4

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 For a court to have jurisdiction over a dispute, the plaintiff

must have standing. Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo.

2004). To establish standing, (1) a plaintiff must have suffered an

injury in fact, and (2) the injury must have been to a legally

protected interest. Id. If a plaintiff lacks standing, a court must

dismiss the case. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ. v.

Olson, 687 P.2d 429, 435 (Colo. 1984). We review de novo whether

a plaintiff has standing. Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856.

¶ 12 We apply the same pleading standards to mandamus actions

as we do to complaints. Hansen v. Long, 166 P.3d 248, 249 (Colo.

3 Although Hancock’s standing argument violates several

requirements of C.A.R. 28, Hancock is self-represented, so we
construe her arguments broadly, focusing on substance rather than
form. See Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. We exercise our
discretion to address Hancock’s standing argument to the extent
that we understand it.
4 Because we conclude that Hancock has standing as Jerry’s

daughter, we do not reach her argument that she has standing as
Jerry’s power of attorney.

5
App. 2007). Therefore, when assessing whether she has standing,

we accept as true Hancock’s factual allegations in the petition for a

writ of mandamus and the motion for removal of the trustee. See

Colo. Med. Soc’y v. Hickenlooper, 2012 COA 121, ¶ 23 (“In

determining whether standing has been established, all averments

of material fact in a complaint must be accepted as true.” (quoting

Olson, 687 P.2d at 434)), aff’d on other grounds, 2015 CO 41.

1. Injury in Fact

¶ 13 Hancock alleged that she suffered an injury in fact. See

Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856. While a remote possibility or future

speculation of harm does not constitute an injury in fact, Hancock

averred she has suffered both tangible and intangible harms.

Specifically, she contends Shane has denied her access to

information related to the Trust and to assets in the Trust. She

also alleges that Shane has violated her rights as an interested

party in the Trust. As alleged in the complaint, these injuries have

directly resulted from Shane’s actions and are neither speculative

nor incidental. Therefore, Hancock has alleged facts sufficient to

satisfy the first criterion for standing.

6
3. Legally Protected Interest

¶ 14 Hancock also adequately alleged that she has “a legal interest

protecting against the alleged injury.” Id.

¶ 15 The Colorado Uniform Trust Code recognizes the right of any

“interested person” to bring probate matters before the court. § 15-

5-201(1), C.R.S. 2025; see In re Estate of Little, 2018 COA 169,

¶ 38. An “interested person” is “a qualified beneficiary or other

person having a property right in or claim against a trust estate,

which right or claim may reasonably and materially be affected by a

judicial proceeding.” § 15-5-103(10), C.R.S. 2025. An interested

person “also includes fiduciaries and other persons having

authority to act under the terms of the trust.” Id. A “beneficiary” is

a person who either “[h]as a present or future beneficial interest in

a trust, vested or contingent,” or “holds a power of appointment

over trust property” in a capacity other than as trustee. § 15-5-

103(4)(a).

¶ 16 Jerry’s living descendants — to the extent that he has any —

are beneficiaries of the Trust and therefore interested persons. In

7
her complaint, Hancock alleges that she is Jerry’s daughter.5

Shane disputed that allegation in his motion to dismiss, asserting

“[u]pon information and belief” that Hancock is neither a “naturally

born nor adopted child[] of Jerry.” And on appeal, Shane asserts

that the record includes only “conclusory, unsupported references”

by Hancock that Jerry was her father. But the district court was

required to accept as true the facts Hancock alleged in her

complaint when deciding whether to dismiss the action. See

Hansen, 166 P.3d at 249.

¶ 17 Moreover, we cannot assume that Hancock has confessed to

not being Jerry’s daughter simply because she failed to respond to

the motion to dismiss. Cf. Hemmann Mgmt. Servs. v. Mediacell, Inc.,

176 P.3d 856, 858 (Colo. App. 2007) (“We conclude that, like

motions for summary judgment, motions to dismiss for failure to

state a claim must be considered on their merits and cannot be

deemed confessed by a failure to respond.”).

5 Although it has no bearing on our analysis, given that we must

accept Hancock’s well-pleaded facts as true, we note that Jerry’s
will also identifies Hancock as his daughter.

8
¶ 18 If, as she alleges in the complaint, Hancock is Jerry’s living

descendant, she is a beneficiary of the Trust. That status would

make her an interested party and thus establish that her petition

for a writ of mandamus and motion to remove the trustee involve a

legally protected interest.

¶ 19 Accordingly, because Hancock has alleged that she suffered an

injury in fact to a legally protected interest, we must reverse.

B. Unpreserved Arguments

¶ 20 Turning to the remaining issues on appeal, we decline to

consider Hancock’s bias and due process arguments for three

reasons. First, Hancock raised these arguments for the first time

after filing her notice of appeal, in a “Motion to[] Object to Order

Dismissing Case and all Other Forms Denied.” Although the

district court treated this filing as a motion to reconsider its order of

dismissal, it no longer had jurisdiction to consider the motion after

the notice of appeal was filed. See Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d

244, 246 (Colo. 2006) (filing a notice of appeal generally divests the

district court of jurisdiction to take further substantive action

related to the judgment on appeal). Second, to the extent that

Hancock requested a change of venue or judicial disqualification in

9
this motion, she failed to file supporting affidavits as required by

C.R.C.P. 98 (change of venue) or C.R.C.P. 97 (judicial

disqualification). Third, Hancock’s appellate briefing inadequately

developed her bias and due process arguments, failing to comply

with C.A.R. 28. See Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d

582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (appellate courts do not address

underdeveloped arguments).

C. Attorney Fees

¶ 21 Shane contends that Hancock’s appeal is frivolous, and as

such, he is entitled to attorney fees and costs. Given our

disposition, we decline to award Shane attorney fees and costs.

III. Disposition

¶ 22 We reverse the district court’s order of dismissal and remand

the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

10