Williams v. Gage - Legal Malpractice Appeal

IN THE SUP REME COURT, ST ATE OF W YOMI NG 2026 W Y 30 OCTO BER TERM, A.D. 2025 March 5, 202 6 WENDY R. WILLIA MS, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. RICHARD GAGE, in dividually, an d RICHARD GAGE, P. C. Appellees (Defendants). S-25-0206 Appeal from the Distri ct Court of Lara mie County The Honorable Cather ine R. Rogers, J udge Representing Appellan t: Wendy R. Williams, pr o se. Representing Appellee: Jordan M. Haack and Anna Reeves Olson, L ong Reimer Winegar, LLP, Casper, Wyoming. Before BOOMGAAR DEN, C.J., and GRAY, FENN, JAROSH, and HILL, J J. NOTICE: T his op inion i s subject to forma l revisi on before p ublicat ion in Pacific R eporter T hird. Readers ar e requested to notify the C lerk of the S upreme Cou rt, Supreme C ourt Build ing, Cheyen ne, Wyoming 82002, of any ty pographical or other for mal errors so that co rrect ion may be made b efore final publication in the permane nt volume.

1 HILL, Justice. [¶1] Wendy Williams sued Richard Gage and Ri chard Gage, P.C. (col lectively Mr. Gage) for legal malpractice. Ms. Wi lliams failed to desig nate a legal malpractice exper t within the time allowe d by the distri ct court ’s scheduling order, a nd the district court gra nted Mr. Gage’s motion for summ ary judgment. Ms. Willi ams appeals. Finding the district court did not er r, we affirm. ISSUE S [¶2] Ms. Williams raises ni ne issues, which w e rephrase and c ondense into three: 1 1) Did the district court a buse its discretion when it denied Ms. Williams’s motion to extend certai n deadlines? 2) Did the district court er r when it granted summ ary judgment to Mr. Ga ge? 3) Should this Court consider Ms. Willia ms’s arguments relate d to privacy act violations? FACTS [¶3] While serving in the mi litary, Ms. Willia ms received two doses of the hepatitis A/B vaccine. She received the first dose in April of 2010 and the s econd dose i n February of 2011. Within days of the second dose, Ms. Williams started to suffer s ignificant symptoms from multiple sclerosis (MS). Ms. Willia ms asserted the vaccines caused and/or aggravated her MS and sought to secure co mpensation for her injuries. [¶4] Ms. Williams hired an attorney to file a petitio n for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compe nsation Program. Ms. Williams believed her attorney missed the statute of limitations to include a claim for the 2010 vaccine and only included a claim for the 2011 vaccination. Ms. Williams, th erefore, terminated her r elationship with he r previous attorney and, in 2018, hired Mr. Gage to hopefully correct the perceived proble m. Ms. Williams appeared to want Mr. Gage to overcome the statu t e of limitations and add the 2010 vaccination to her petition. [¶5] Mr. Gage refiled Ms. Williams’s petition and proceeded with the case. In 2021, Ms. Williams received an e ntitlement hearing on her refiled petition. However, in 2022, whil e 1 These thre e issues are dispos itive but also rep resen t the issues suppo rted by cogen t argument. Ms. Williams’s othe r issues ar e not gene rally supported by cogent a rgument. W e consis tently decline t o consider issues not suppo rted by cogen t argument or pertinent a uthority, whether the brief is filed by a pro se litigant or filed by counsel. Adams v. Ga llegos, 2025 WY 71, ¶ 13, 571 P.3d 337, 339 (W yo. 2025) (cita tion omi tted).

2 her vaccination case was pending, Ms. Willia ms terminated Mr. Ga ge and proceeded with her vaccination case, pr o se. 2 [¶6] On January 11, 2024, Ms. Williams filed a complaint aga inst Mr. Gage. In her complaint, Ms. Williams asserted Mr. Gage did not include the 2010 vaccination when he refiled her petition. Ms. William s alleged her vaccination case was a “double injury” case and she should have a claim for both the 2010 vaccination and the 20 11 vaccination. She, therefore, asserted Mr. Gage committed malpractice by failing to adhere to the ethical standards applicable to attorneys that typi cally handle these type s of cases. Ms. Williams also asserted Mr. Gage consciousl y chose to commit mal practice and colluded with the judge assigned to her vaccination case to b ar her from d ouble reco very. Her complaint contained two causes of action, negligence/malpractice and ne gligent infliction of emotional distress. Mr. Gage fil ed a motion to dismiss, and t he district court dismissed the negligent infliction of emotional distres s claim leaving only the negligence/ma lpractice claim. [¶7] The district court e ntered a s cheduling or der which included a date for a jury trial. The order set a Jan uary 15, 2 025 deadline for Ms. Williams to design ate expert witnesses. Ms. Williams did not designate any expert witnesses by this date. On Jan uary 29, 2025, Ms. Williams asked for an extension of the dea dline to designate expe rt witnesses because her brother had been injured on January 1 3, 2025, two days befor e the deadline. Later, on March 31, 2025, Ms. Williams als o filed a motion to, in substance, extend the dis covery cut-off deadline. The c ourt denied her reque sts. [¶8] The scheduling order set Mr. Gage’s deadl ine to designate expert s as February 18, 2025. Mr. Gage de signated hims elf as an ex pert on February 17, 2018. In the designation, Mr. Gage certified he complied wit h the st andard of care for a ttorneys p racticing i n Wyoming, did not brea ch the standard of care, and his work did not injure Ms. Williams. Mr. Gage then filed a motion for su mmary judgment bec ause Ms. Williams faile d to designate an expert wit ness related to the s tandard of care a nd causation. [¶9] After a telephone heari ng, the district court gra nted Mr. Gage’s motio n for summary judgment. Ms. Willia ms appeals to this Court. ISSUE 1 Did the district court abuse its discre tion when it denie d Ms. Williams’s m otion to extend certain deadlines? 2 In July of 2023, the Court of Fede ral Claims determined Ms. William s had met her burden of proving the 2011 vaccine “significant ly aggravated her then - asy mptomat ic multip le sclero sis” and her case coul d proceed to the damag es pha se.

3 STANDARD OF RE VIEW [¶10] We review district court decisions denying motions for additional time for an abuse of discretion. Jacobson v. Cobbs, 2007 WY 99, ¶ 10, 160 P.3d 654, 657 (Wyo. 2007). “Judicial discretion is a compo site of many t hings, among which are conclus ions drawn from objective cri teria; it means exercising so und judgment w ith reg ard to what is right under the circumstance s and without doing so arbitrarily or ca priciously.” Hale v. City of Laramie, 2025 WY 133, ¶ 19, 580 P.3d 516, 520 (Wyo. 2025) (quoting Cornell v. Mecartney, 20 25 WY 97, ¶ 15, 575 P.3d 349, 353 (Wyo. 202 5)). “A court abuses its discretion if it acts ‘in a manner whic h exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.’ ” Id. The question for this Court to determine on appeal is “whether the trial court could reaso nably conclude as it did. ” Hutton v. Dykes, 2025 WY 94, ¶ 16, 575 P.3d 334, 3 41 (Wyo. 2025) (quoting Holloway v. Hidden Creek Outf itters, LLC, 2025 WY 59, ¶ 30, 569 P.3d 756, 763 (Wyo. 2025)). DISCUSSION [¶11] Wyoming Rule of Civi l Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 6(b)(1)(A) allow s a district court to extend a party’s time to meet deadlines. Th e rule provide s: (b) Extending Time. (1) In General. Wh en by these rules or b y a notice given thereunde r or by order of court an ac t is required or al lowed to be d one at or within a specified time, the court, or a commis sioner thereof, may for g ood cause and in its discretion: (A) with or without motion or notice order the p eriod enlarged if request therefor is made before the expira tion of the period ori ginally prescribed or as extend ed by a previous or der; or (B) upon motion made afte r the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be d one where th e failure to act was the result of excusable neglect[.] W.R.C.P. 6(b)(1). Accordingly, a district court may extend a deadl ine for good cause if the request for the ext ension is made before the deadline expires. If the request fo r an extension is made afte r the original dea dline has pass ed, the court must also determine whether the failure to meet the deadline is th e result of excusable n eglect. Ms. Williams filed her request for extension of time on January 29, 2025, fou rteen days after the designation was due. Thus, she had to demonstrate both good cause an d excusable neglect.

4 [¶12] When considering “good cause” un der Rule 6, the United States Court of Appeal s for the Tenth Cir cuit ha s explained good cause comes into play in situa tions in wh ich there is no fault and the nee d for an e xtension is u sually occasione d by something that is not within the control of t he movant. Utah Republican P arty v. H erbert, 678 F. App’x 697, 700– 01 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Bishop v. Cors entino, 371 F.3d 1 203, 1207 (10th Cir. 20 04) (interpreting good caus e for an extension o f time to appeal under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5)). “It requires the movin g party to show the deadline ‘can not be met despite the movant’s diligent efforts.’” Id. (quoting Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 2014) (interpreti ng good cause to modi fy a schedulin g order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 6(b)(4)). [¶13] “This Court has defined excusabl e neglect as being that behavior wh ich might b e the act of a reasona bly prudent person und er the circumstances. ” Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 553 (Wyo. 1997) (citing W hitney v. McDon ough, 892 P.2d 791, 7 94 (Wyo.1995)). We have further expla ined, “[e] xcusable ne glect is measured on a stric t standard to take car e of genui ne emergency conditions, such as death, sic kness, undue delay in the mails, . . . and other situations where such behavior might be the act of a reasonably prudent pe rson under the circumstances.” RDG Oil & Gas, LLC v. Jayne Morton Living Tr., 20 14 WY 102, ¶ 14, 33 1 P.3d 1199, 1202 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Crossan v. Ir rigation Developmen t Corp., 598 P.2d 812, 813 (Wyo.1979)). “Exc usable neglect has traditionall y been found where a p arty acts in a reaso nably prudent manner, but an outside force creates an undue del ay, resulti ng in an untimely filin g.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenu e, 2007 WY 62, ¶ 9, 15 5 P.3d 1041, 104 3 (Wyo. 2007). [¶14] Ms. Williams’s request for addit ional time to designate experts deta iled that two days before her designation was due, her brother had an accident an d broke his ribs, and she had to care for him. She also stated bec ause she is pro se she was having a diff icult time finding an e xpert. Her request d id not det ail any of her efforts to find an exper t. After reviewing the motion, response, and t he file, the district cou rt denied the extensio n. The district court provided no particular reason ing for the den ial, but the findings of a trial judge concerning conclusions of law and disposition of the issues are presumptively cor rect, and a general finding of the trial c ourt carries wit h it every sp ecific finding sup ported by the record. Whitt v. Sta te ex rel. Wrig ht, 2001 WY 128, ¶ 12, 36 P.3d 6 17, 621; Bloedow v. Maes-Bloedow, 2024 WY 115, ¶ 42, 5 58 P.3d 576, 58 9 (Wyo. 2024) (citation s omitted). Thus, it can be presum ed the distri ct court fo und Ms. W illiams did not show g ood cause and excusable neglect. [¶15] Our review of the record shows the distric t court could re asonably conclude M s. Williams did not ma ke the requ ired showing s of good cause and exc usable neglect. Ms. Williams brother’s i njury occur red two d ays before her deadline to designate an exper t. H is injury may have helped explain why Ms. Williams di d not ask for the extensi on until after the deadline, but it did not expl ain why she could not d esignate an expert within th e timeframe. Ms. Will iams ’s request provided no details of her attemp ts to find an expert or

5 any “diligent efforts” to compl y with the deadline. Ms. Williams ha d a reasonable period of time before her broth er’s injury to find an expert but di d not. She di d state it was diffic ult to find an expert beca use she was pro se but provided no detai ls of h er efforts to find one. A pro - se litigant is held to the same standar d as any other litigant a nd must expect and receive the same treatment as if represent ed by an attorney. Matt er of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 984 (Wyo. 1984) (citin g Suchta v. O.K. Rub ber Welders, I nc., 386 P.2d 931, 9 33 (Wyo. 1963)). Thus, the fact a person is pro se is alo ne not sufficient to de monstrate good cause or excusable ne glect. Without more, it is reasonable for the district court to find a lack of good cause and excusa ble neglect. [¶16] The same is true of Ms. Willia ms’s motion to extend th e discovery deadline, which she titled as a motion f or an extension of time to compel discovery. Again Ms. Williams did not demonstrate go od cause and excu sable neglect. Ms. Williams did i nclude more detail to show good cause and excus able neglect includi ng the passing of her br other. However, again she di d not explain w hy she could not accomplish d iscovery or the steps she took as a reasonabl y prudent person u nder the circums tances to complete di scovery. [¶17] Additionally, the timi ng of Ms. Williams’s reques t further contributed to a reasonable finding that her motion s hould be denied. In partic ular, Ms. Williams f iled her request on March 31, 2025, whe n discovery requests were to be serve d by March 3, 202 5. By the time Ms. Willia ms had file d this reque st for this extension, Mr. Gage had already filed his motion for su mmary judgment ba sed on Ms. Wi lliams’s failure to desi gnate an expert. Because the di strict court had already denied her request to extend the deadline to designate an expert witness, as we discuss below, an ext ension o f time to complete discovery would not ha ve aided Ms. Willia ms in her oppo sition to summary jud gment. [¶18] Accordingly, the distri ct court coul d reasonably conc lude Ms. Williams wa s not entitled to an extension because she had not sh own good cause and excusable negle ct. It, therefore, did not abuse its discretion w hen it denied Ms. Willia ms’s requests for an extension of her deadli nes. ISSUE 2 Did the district court err when it gran ted M r. Gage’s m otion for s umm ary judgment? STANDARD OF RE VIEW [¶19] “This court reviews summary judgmen t deci sions de novo, using the s ame mater ials and standards as the district court and gives no deference to the district court’s conclusions.” Hunter v. Unive rsal Precast C oncrete, Inc., 2025 WY 129, ¶ 19, 581 P.3d 686, 698 (Wyo. 2025) (citing Gr off v. McKellar Tiedeken & Scoggin, LLC, 2025 WY 54, ¶ 14, 568 P.3d 1164, 1167 (Wyo. 2025)). Summary j udgment is appropriate “if th e pleadings, depo sitions, answers to interrogatori es, and admissions on fi le, together with t he

6 affidavits, if an y, show that there is no genuin e issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entit led to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Weir v. Expert Training, LLC, 2022 WY 44, ¶ 15, 507 P.3d 442, 447 (Wyo. 2022)). We can affirm the district court’s grant of summary decision on any legal grounds provided in the record. Campbell v. Davidson, 2023 WY 100, ¶ 18, 537 P.3d 734, 741 (Wyo. 2023) (qu oting Page v. Meyers, 2021 WY 73, ¶ 9, 488 P.3d 9 23, 926 (Wyo. 2021)). DISCUSSION [¶20] “Wyoming Rule of Civil Pro cedure 56 gover ns summary judgment and im poses obligations on both the movant and the no nmovant.” Hu nter, ¶ 20, 581 P.3d at 698–99 (citing Che sapeake Expl., LLC v. Morton Pr od. Co. LLC, 2025 WY 15, ¶ 29, 562 P. 3d 1286, 129 5; Kaufman v. Rural Health Dev., Inc., 2019 WY 6 2, ¶ 14, 442 P.3 d 303, 307 (Wyo. 2019)). If the moving party has made a prima facie case showing there is no genuine dispute about any mate rial fact and the movan t is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present evid ence showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id.; Scra nton v. Woodhouse, 20 20 WY 63, ¶ 23, 463 P.3d 785, 790 – 91 (Wyo. 2020). “A prim a facie case has two elements: (1) ‘The establishment of a legally required rebut table presumptio n,’ and (2) ‘A party’s produc tion of enough evidence to allow the fact - trier to infer the fact at issue a nd rule in the party’s favor.’” Scranton, ¶ 23, 463 P.3d a t 790 (Wyo. 2020) (q uoting Bear Peak Res., LLC v. Peak Powder River Re s., LLC, 2017 WY 124, ¶ 27, 403 P.3d 1 033, 1044 (Wyo. 2017)) (citation omitted). If th e moving party does no t have the ultimate burden of persuasio n, it meets its burden to establish a prima facie ca se for summar y judgment by showing a lack of evidence on a n esse ntial element of the op posing party’s clai m. Id. (quoting Gowdy v. Cook, 2020 WY 3, ¶ 22, 455 P.3d 1201, 1207 (Wyo. 202 0)). [¶21] Mr. Gage sough t summary judgme nt on the basis that Ms. Willia ms could not establish the elemen ts of her claim. Mr. Gage argued that without an expert, Ms. William s would be unable to est ablish the standard of care, that M r. Gage failed to meet it, or that Mr. Gage caused her harm. [¶22] To succeed on a legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove thr ee elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Kappes v. Rhodes, 2024 WY 43, ¶ 18, 547 P.3d 298, 305 (Wyo. 2024) (citing Tozzi v. Moffett, 2018 WY 133, ¶ 36, 430 P.3d 7 54, 764 (Wyo. 2018); Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245, 12 48 (Wyo. 1993); Dockte r v. Lozano, 2020 WY 1 19, ¶ 28, 472 P.3d 362, 370 (Wyo. 2 020)). The plaintiff must sho w: “(1) t he accepted standard of care in the legal profession; (2) the attorney’s conduct departed from that standard; an d (3) the attorney’ s conduct was the le gal cause of the [plaintiff’s] i njuries.” Kappes, ¶ 18, 547 P.3d at 305 (quoti ng Tozzi, ¶ 36, 430 P.3d at 764). An attorney i s “held to that degree of care, skill, dilig ence, and knowledge commonly poss essed a nd exercised by a reasonable, careful, and prudent law yer in Wyoming.” Sc ranton, ¶ 25, 463 P.3d at 791 (citing Moore, 855 P.2 d at 1250).

7 [¶23] A party try ing to estab lish the elements o f a legal malpractice clai m will typical ly need to present exper t testimony. Id. Expert testimon y is necessa ry because most lay people are not qualifie d to pass judgment on legal questions. Id. (citing Moore, 855 P.2d at 1249; Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509, 516 (Wy o. 1995)). A party would not need expert testimony only if a lay person’s “c ommon sense and experience are suffi cient to establish the standard of care.” Id. (quoting Bevan v. Fix, 2002 WY 43, ¶ 40, 42 P.3d 1013, 1026 (Wyo. 2002)). [¶24] A lay per son’s commo n sense and exp erience would not be sufficient to est ablish the standard of care in this case. This case involved issues about whether the vaccines could cause or aggravate Ms. Williams ’s MS, the applicable stat ute of limitations and whether it could be overcome wit h a refiled petition, the requirements of the Na tional Vaccine Injury Compensation Progr am, whether double damag es were available, and whether Mr. Gage caused injur y to Ms. Wi lliams. These are not matters of common sense or in the experienc e of the average lay person. Because Ms. William s failed to desig nate an expert, she woul d not be a ble to prese nt evidence of the appropr iate standard of care. She would also be unable to show whether Mr. Gage adher ed to that stand ard of care or whether he caused he r injury. [¶25] Indeed, the ge neral rule is expert t estimony is necessa ry to demonstrate the causation element. Scr anton, ¶ 25, 463 P.3d at 791 (citation omitted). The plaintiff must employ another attorne y to prove the underlyi ng action would have been successful, but for the attorney’s misc onduct. Id. (quoting Horn v. Wooste r, 2007 WY 120, ¶ 9, 165 P.3d 69, 72 (Wyo. 2007)). The damages available to an aggrieved client from a negligent attorney are the amount the client would hav e expected to recoup if his underlying action had been successful. Id. (citing Horn, ¶ 15, 165 P.3d at 74). W ithout an expe rt, Ms. Williams would be una ble to provide any of this type of e vidence to a jury. [¶26] Thus, Mr. Gage met his burden. Ms. Williams then did not rebut Mr. Gage’s prima facie showing because t he failure to desi gnate an expert was fatal. Sum mary judgment was appropriate. ISSUE 3 Should this Court consider Ms. Willia ms’s assertions rela ted to privacy act violations? [¶27] Ms. Will iams asserts Mr. Gage breached mu ltiple privacy la ws and W.R.C. P. 5.2 related to privacy protections in filin gs he made with the court. Ms. Williams did not raise this issue in the district court. Generally, w e will not consider a n issue raised for the firs t time on appeal unle ss it is ju risdictional o r “of such a fun damental n ature that it must be considered.” Sharpe v. Evans, 2025 WY 70, ¶ 14, 570 P.3d 731, 736 (Wyo. 2025) (quoti ng

8 Evans v. Sharpe, 2023 WY 55, ¶ 42, 530 P.3d 298, 312 (Wyo. 2023)). “We follow this rule because it is unfair to reverse a ruling of a trial court f or reasons that were not presented to it, whether it be lega l theories or issues neve r formally raised in the pleadings nor argued to the trial court.” Id. (quoting Stevens v. Governing Body of Town of Saratoga, 2025 WY 35, ¶ 62, 566 P.3d 16 6, 180 (Wyo. 2025)) (citation m odified). Ms. Williams’s arg ument is neither jurisdictio nal nor fundamental; thus, we decline to conside r it for the first ti me on appeal. CONCLUSION [¶28] We affirm.