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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Estate of Elmer Gordon Waggoner v. Anonymous Health System, Inc.

Indiana Supreme Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 26S-CT-00071
• Panel: Mark S. Massa, Loretta H. Rush
• Judges: Rush, Massa, Slaughter, Goff, Molter

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.1K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

                        by Justice Goff

FILED
Mar 04 2026, 2:04 pm

CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court
Supreme Court Case No. 26S-CT-71

Shantel Waggoner, Individually and as Executrix of
the Estate of Elmer Gordon Waggoner,
Appellant (Plaintiff below),

–v–

Anonymous Health System, Inc., et al.,
Appellees (Defendants below).

Argued: September 25, 2025 | Decided: March 4, 2026

Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court
No. 82D01-2308-CT-3727
The Honorable Leslie C. Shively, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
No. 24A-CT-469

Opinion by Justice Goff
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Molter concur.
Goff, Justice.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, our state and federal
governments declared a state of emergency to prevent the spread of the
virus. To protect healthcare workers at the frontlines, the legislature
enacted statutes to immunize them from civil liability in certain cases
where a patient’s injury arose from actions taken in response to COVID-
19. Here, a patient was medically immobilized and placed on a ventilator
as part of his COVID-19 treatment. He developed a bed sore and
ultimately died from the wound. His estate filed a proposed complaint
under the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) against over eighty Healthcare
Providers (or just the Providers), alleging negligence. In response, the
Providers argue they are immune from liability under statute. The issues
here are (1) whether the trial court can make a preliminary determination
on immunity without expert opinion from a medical-review panel, and (2)
whether the Providers are entitled to statutory immunity. Concluding that
the court can make a preliminary determination on immunity and that
Providers are immune here, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary
judgment for the Providers.

Facts and Procedural History
On March 6, 2020, Governor Eric Holcomb issued Executive Order 20-
02, declaring the COVID-19 pandemic a state public-health emergency
under Indiana Code subsection 10-14-3-12(a). The emergency was
rescinded on March 3, 2022. Exec. Order 22-09. Similarly, the Secretary of
the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
issued a federal public-health emergency on March 17, 2020. 85 Fed. Reg.
15198, 15198 (Mar. 17, 2020). The public-health emergency under the
Public Health Service Act was rescinded on May 11, 2023, with some
liability protections under the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act (PREP Act) extending longer. 89 Fed. Reg. 99875, 99876,
99882 (Dec. 11, 2024).

In January 2022, while the state and federal health emergencies were
still in effect, Elmer Waggoner was hospitalized in Kentucky after testing

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 2 of 15
positive for the COVID-19 virus and developing pneumonitis. As his
symptoms worsened, he was transported to a second Kentucky hospital
where he was intubated and put on a ventilator. Then, on January 27, he
was transferred to Anonymous Hospital 1 in Indiana where he was
medically paralyzed and kept on a ventilator. The ventilator was briefly
removed in early February but replaced within four days. On February 10,
2022, Elmer developed a pressure wound, also known as a bed sore, on his
lower back and began wound care.

On March 3, 2022, Elmer was still on a ventilator but was not testing
positive for the COVID-19 virus when he was transferred to Anonymous
Hospital 3, also in Indiana. The same day, Governor Holcomb rescinded
the COVID-19 state of emergency. The federal public-health emergency
was still in effect. Elmer’s bed sore continued to worsen and showed signs
of necrosis. On March 17, Elmer was transferred back to Anonymous
Hospital 1 where he died twelve days later.

Elmer’s death certificate listed his cause of death as cardiopulmonary
arrest with the following conditions leading to the arrest: acute hypoxic
and hypercapnic respiratory failure, sepsis, and necrotizing fasciitis.
When he died, Elmer’s bed sore spanned from the outside of his left thigh
to his lower back.

In March 2023, Elmer’s wife and the executrix of his estate, Shantel
Waggoner (the Estate), filed a proposed complaint with the Indiana
Department of Insurance. The Estate alleged that over eighty proposed
defendants, including hospitals and doctors, had committed medical
malpractice while treating the bed sore. In May 2023, the federal
government rescinded its declaration of a public-health emergency for
COVID-19. In July 2023, one of the Providers requested the formation of a
medical-review panel. In August 2023, before the panel could be
established, Providers filed a petition for preliminary determination and
motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were immune from
liability under Indiana Code chapter 34-30-13.5 (the Healthcare Immunity
Act), Indiana Code chapter 34-30-32 (2022) (expired December 31, 2024)
(the Premises Immunity Act), and 42 U.S.C. section 247d-6d (the PREP
Act) (collectively, the Immunity Statutes). Providers argued they were

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 3 of 15
immune from liability because they provided medical care to Elmer
during the COVID-19 emergency, and all his care was in treatment of his
COVID-19 infection and its complications.

The Estate moved to dismiss or stay the Providers’ petition, arguing
that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make a
preliminary decision on immunity. The Estate argued that the Providers’
motion for summary judgment required the trial court to address medical
causation, which falls within the medical-review panel’s subject-matter
jurisdiction under the MMA.

The trial court issued an order granting Providers’ motion for summary
judgment and dismissing the complaint with prejudice after finding the
Providers entitled to statutory immunity. The trial court found that
immunity was an issue for the court, not the medical-review panel. The
trial court then determined the Providers were immune under the
Immunity Statutes because Elmer’s care arose from the COVID-19
emergency, even though he received some care after the state-emergency
order expired. The Estate appealed.

In a unanimous, published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that whether the Providers are entitled to immunity is an issue
reserved for the medical-review panel. Waggoner v. Anonymous Healthcare
Sys., Inc., 250 N.E.3d 1091, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Although Elmer was
originally hospitalized and treated for his COVID-19 symptoms, the court
explained, the Estate’s expert opined that Elmer’s death was caused by
inadequate treatment of the pressure wound, not by his COVID-19
symptoms. Id. at 1099. Therefore, the court concluded that “the question of
causation should be left to the medical review panel,” and it was “too
early in the proceedings to determine” whether the Immunity Statutes
immunized the Providers. See id. at 1100. The Governor also rescinded the
state disaster emergency during Elmer’s treatment, so the court concluded
the Healthcare Immunity Act did not immunize treatment after that date.
Id. at 1099.

Providers petitioned for transfer, which we now grant, vacating the
opinion of the Court of Appeals. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 4 of 15
Standards of Review
We will grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We will draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d
1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). We review a trial court’s summary-judgment ruling
under a de novo standard. Id. In addition, the scope of the trial court’s
preliminary-determination jurisdiction and interpretation of the Immunity
Statutes are legal questions we review de novo. See Gierek v. Anonymous 1,
250 N.E.3d 378, 384 (Ind. 2025); see ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police
Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016).

Discussion and Decision
Because it is undisputed for summary-judgment purposes that the
alleged negligent treatment arose from COVID-19, we conclude that the
trial court can make a preliminary determination on immunity by
interpreting the relevant statutes without the opinion of the medical-
review panel. We also conclude the Providers here are immune from
liability under the Immunity Statutes because Elmer’s treatment arose
from COVID-19.

I. The MMA permits the trial court to assert
jurisdiction on the threshold question of
immunity.
Under the MMA, a medical-review panel typically must first “render
an opinion on a claimant’s proposed complaint before the claimant can
sue a health-care provider in court.” Gierek, 250 N.E.3d at 394 (quoting
Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368, 376 (Ind. 2022)).
Although a “claimant may commence an action in court for malpractice at
the same time the claimant’s proposed complaint is being considered by a
medical review panel,” Ind. Code § 34-18-8-7 (a), the trial court has
“limited authority to assert jurisdiction over threshold issues while a

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 5 of 15
proposed complaint is pending before the medical review panel,” Lorenz
v. Anonymous Physician #1, 51 N.E.3d 391, 396 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing
I.C. § 34-18-8-7(a)(3)). “[A]n issue that does not require expert opinion is
not reserved to the medical review panel and may be subject to
preliminary determination by the trial court.” Gierek, 250 N.E.3d at 396
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The limited authority under the MMA to assert jurisdiction over
threshold issues permits the trial court to “preliminarily determine an
affirmative defense or issue of law or fact that may be preliminarily
determined under the Indiana Rules of Procedure.” Id. at 394 (quoting I.C.
§ 34-18-11-1(a)(1)). But the MMA prohibits a trial court from issuing a
preliminary determination on “any affirmative defense or issue of law or
fact reserved for written opinion by the medical review panel.” I.C. § 34-
18-11-1(b). This can include opinions on whether the “defendants failed to
comply with the appropriate standard of care” and whether the “conduct
complained of was or was not a factor of the resultant damages.” Id.; I.C.
§§ 34-18-10-22(b)(1), (4). In other words, questions about the standard of
care and causation are generally reserved for the medical-review panel.

The Estate argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the trial court
cannot make a preliminary determination on statutory immunity here
because the medical-review panel needs to first opine on the cause of
Elmer’s death. Providers, on the other hand, argue that the trial court can
make a preliminary determination on statutory immunity because it does
not require expert opinion.

We agree with the Providers.

Asserting the affirmative defense of immunity “assumes negligence but
denies liability.” Putnam Cnty. Sheriff v. Price, 954 N.E.2d 451, 453 (Ind.
2011). By arguing they are immune, the Providers, for purposes of the
preliminary determination, admit the Estate’s essential allegation that
Elmer died from negligent treatment of an infected bed sore and related
complications. Assuming Elmer died from the bed sore, there is no need
for expert opinion to determine whether Providers’ treatment of the bed
sore was related to COVID-19. See Haggerty v. Anonymous Party 1, 998
N.E.2d 286, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding the trial court had

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 6 of 15
jurisdiction to preliminarily determine the issue of immunity where expert
opinion was not necessary to the determination); Ashley v. Anonymous 1,
245 N.E.3d 658, 2024 WL 4142508, * 3 (Ind. Ct. App. Sep. 11, 2024) (mem.)
(holding that, given the admission a patient developed bed sores while
being treated for COVID-19, “no expert opinion was required to
determine whether [the patient’s] injury was related to the actions taken
by [p]roviders (i.e., placing him on a ventilator for an extended period of
time) to treat him for complications of COVID-19”), trans. denied. In other
words, while expert opinion would have been necessary if the Immunity
Statutes required COVID-19 to be the cause of Elmer’s death, no expert
opinion is needed here to determine if treatment of the bed sore was related
to COVID-19. See infra Section II. So, expert opinion from the medical-
review panel is not needed, and the court can interpret the relevant
statutes to make a preliminary determination on immunity.

Having concluded that a court can make a preliminary determination
on immunity here, we turn to the Immunity Statutes.

II. The Providers are immune from civil liability
under state and federal law.
Providers are immune from liability under the state Healthcare
Immunity Act and state Premises Immunity Act because Elmer’s
treatment arose in response to the state disaster emergency for COVID-19.
Likewise, Providers are also immune from liability under the federal
PREP Act because Elmer’s death arose from use of a covered
countermeasure, a ventilator, to treat COVID-19.

A. Providers are immune from civil liability under state
law.
The Providers are immune from civil liability for Elmer’s death under
the Healthcare Immunity Act and Premises Immunity Act because his
treatment arose from COVID-19.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 7 of 15
The Healthcare Immunity Act was enacted as part of broader
legislation to insulate and protect areas of public life at risk from the
COVID-19 pandemic. See Mellowitz v. Ball State Univ., 221 N.E.3d 1214,
1218–19 (Ind. 2023). The Healthcare Immunity Act provides in pertinent
part that a healthcare provider “may not be held civilly liable for an act or
omission relating to the provision or delay of health care services or
emergency medical services arising from a state disaster emergency
declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19.” I.C. § 34-30-13.5-
1(b)(1) (emphases added). Damages arising from a state disaster emergency
means an injury or harm “caused by or resulting from an act or omission
performed in response to a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-
14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19,” and “arising from COVID-19.” I.C. § 34-
6-2.1-13 (formerly codified at I.C. § 34-6-2-10.5 (2022)) (emphasis added).
“Arising from COVID-19” means an injury or harm caused by “services,
treatment, or other actions performed for COVID-19.” I.C. § 34-6-2.1-
14(b)(2) (formerly codified at I.C. § 34-6-2-10.4(b)(2) (2022)). This
immunity applies “during a period of a state disaster emergency declared
under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19, if the state of disaster
emergency was declared after February 29, 2020, and before April 1,
2022.” I.C. § 34-30-13.5-1(b).

Furthermore, the Premises Immunity Act protects healthcare providers
from civil liability for providing services during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Under the Premises Immunity Act, “a person is immune from civil tort
liability for damages arising from COVID-19: (1) on the premises owned
or operated by the person” or “(2) on any premises on which the person or
an employee or agent of the person provided property or services to
another person.” I.C. §§ 34-30-32-6(1), (2) (2022). Damages “arising from
COVID-19” means “an injury or harm caused by or resulting from: (1) the
actual, alleged, or possible exposure to or contraction of COVID-19” or
“(2) services, treatment, or other actions performed for COVID-19.” I.C. § 34-
30-32-2 (2022) (emphases added). Although it expired on December 31,
2024, the Premises Immunity Act applies to causes of action that accrued
on or after March 1, 2020. I.C. §§ 34-30-32-1, -11 (2022).

Here, the Estate argues that Elmer’s death did not arise from a state
disaster emergency or arise from COVID-19 because he was not testing

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 8 of 15
positive for COVID-19 when he died, and instead, his death was caused
by Providers’ failure to treat his bed sore. Appellant’s Br. at 22;
Appellant’s App. Vol. 4, pp. 88–89 (sworn affidavit of Elmer’s wife);
Appellant’s App. Vol. 3, p. 109 (the Estate’s expert opining that Elmer’s
bed sore progressed to necrotizing fasciitis which “caused and hastened
his death”). The Estate therefore also argues that the medical-review panel
needs to decide if Elmer’s death was caused by COVID-19, the bed sore, or
something else. But assuming the facts alleged in the complaint are true—
Elmer developed a bed sore and then died—Elmer’s treatment still arose
from COVID-19, making the Providers immune under the state immunity
statutes.

At least two decisions from the Court of Appeals support our
conclusion. In Ashley, the Court of Appeals held that medical providers
were immune from liability when the patient developed bed sores during
his treatment for COVID-19. 2024 WL 4142508 at 1–2. The court
concluded that the patient’s injuries arose from services provided for
COVID-19 because he developed the bed sores while medically
immobilized for an extended period of time to be placed on a ventilator as
part of his COVID-19 pneumonia treatment. Id. at *4. And in Fluhr v.
Anonymous Doctor 1, the Court of Appeals held that medical providers
were immune from liability under the Healthcare Immunity Act when
they delayed treating the patient’s stroke to conduct COVID-19 isolation
procedures. 234 N.E.3d 912, 915, 917, 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.
Even though the patient did not have COVID-19, the delay in treatment
arose from measures taken to limit the spread of COVID-19. Id. at 917.

Like the patients in Ashley and Fluhr, Elmer’s injuries arose from
treatment in response to COVID-19. According to the Estate’s own expert,
when Elmer developed COVID-19, he suffered from intractable
respiratory failure and needed mechanical ventilation to live. Appellant’s
App. Vol. 3, p. 109. By being immobilized for an extended period of time
as part of his COVID-19 treatment, the expert opined, Elmer developed
the bed sore. Id. Even assuming the Estate is correct that Elmer died from
a failure to treat his bed sore rather than COVID-19, he would not have
developed the bed sore in the first place had he not developed COVID-19
and needed the assistance of a ventilator. Therefore, his injuries arose

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 9 of 15
from services provided in response to the “state disaster emergency” or from
“services, treatment, or other actions performed for COVID-19,” making
the Providers immune under the Healthcare Immunity Act and Premises
Immunity Act.

Still, the Estate argues that the Healthcare Immunity Act does not apply
because the state disaster emergency expired before Elmer died. The
Governor first declared the state disaster emergency on March 6, 2020,
and Elmer began treatment at Anonymous Hospital 1 on January 27, 2022,
during the emergency. The Governor then rescinded the state disaster
emergency on March 3, 2022, and Elmer died later that month on March
29, 2022. Although Elmer died after the emergency expired, the Providers’
care still arose in response to and during the state disaster emergency. That
some of the Providers’ care extended beyond the expiration of the
emergency does not change the fact that their services still arose during the
emergency. Therefore, the civil immunity afforded by the Healthcare
Immunity Act could “appl[y] to medical services provided either before or
after the actual disaster emergency declaration from the Governor.” 2017
Ind. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 8, at 6 (Dec. 4, 2017). And even if the Healthcare
Immunity Act no longer applied, the Premises Immunity Act still applied
because it did not expire until 2024, after Elmer’s death.

Finally, the Estate argues that the Providers are not immune or that the
medical-review panel should decide immunity because the Estate alleged
that Providers were grossly negligent. Under the Healthcare Immunity
Act, a provider “is not immune from civil liability if the damages resulting
from the act or omission relating to the provision or delay of the health
care services resulted from the person’s gross negligence, willful or
wanton misconduct, fraud, or intentional misrepresentation.” I.C. § 34-30-
13.5-2. The Premises Immunity Act also does not provide immunity for
“gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.” I.C. § 34-30-32-7
(2022). “Gross negligence” is the “conscious, voluntary act or omission in
reckless disregard of … the consequences to another party.” N. Ind. Pub.
Serv. v. Sharp, 790 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind. 2003) (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1057 (7th ed. 1999)). For willful or wanton misconduct, the
wrongdoer must intentionally engage in misconduct or be conscious of

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 10 of 15
the misconduct and the probability it will cause injury. Hershberger v.
Brooker, 421 N.E.2d 672, 678, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).

The Estate alleged for the first time that Elmer’s injuries were due to
gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, fraud, or intentional
misrepresentation in its response to Providers’ motion for summary
judgment. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 22, 187, 192. But the Estate failed to
designate any evidence to support finding gross negligence. The Estate
provided a report where an expert opined that necrotizing fasciitis caused
and hastened Elmer’s death and that Elmer’s bed sore was “inadequately
treated,” Appellant’s App. Vol. 3, p. 109, but the Estate provided no
evidence that Providers consciously or intentionally mistreated Elmer, see
McGowen v. Montes, 152 N.E.3d 654, 660–62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (finding
summary judgment proper where the designated evidence undisputably
showed that the defendant was not grossly negligent and did not commit
willful or wanton misconduct), trans. denied. Therefore, the exception to
immunity for gross negligence does not apply.

B. Providers are immune under the federal PREP Act.
Even if expiration of the state disaster emergency deprived the
Providers of immunity, and even if the Estate designated evidence of
gross negligence, the Providers are still immune from liability under the
federal PREP Act.

The PREP Act authorizes the HHS to issue a declaration in the event of
a public-health emergency. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a). Once the declaration is
issued, the PREP Act immunizes “covered person[s]” from “suit and
liability under Federal and State law with respect to all claims for loss caused
by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the
use by an individual of a covered countermeasure” to respond to the
emergency. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1) (emphases added). In other words,
the PREP Act preempts claims under state law, such as negligence, as it
relates to the administration of covered countermeasures. A “covered
countermeasure” includes a “qualified pandemic or epidemic product.”
42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(1)(A). A medical device is a “qualified pandemic or
epidemic product” when it is used “to diagnose, mitigate, prevent, treat,

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 11 of 15
or cure a pandemic or epidemic” or “to limit the harm such pandemic or
epidemic might otherwise cause,” and is “authorized for emergency use”
by the FDA. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(7)(A)(i); 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(7)(B)(iii).
And a “covered person” includes those qualified to administer
countermeasures. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(2)(B)(iv). If a patient alleges
injuries caused by the administration of covered countermeasures, the
plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is to seek compensation from the federal
“Covered Countermeasures Process Fund.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6e(a), (b)(4),
(d)(4).

Here, the HHS Secretary issued an emergency declaration on March 17,
2020, triggering the PREP Act and declaring “the spread of” COVID-19 “a
public health emergency.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 15198. The federal public-health
emergency under the Public Health Service Act ended in May 2023, with
some PREP immunity extending even longer, meaning the entirety of
Elmer’s treatment and death occurred while PREP immunity was in effect.
89 Fed. Reg. at 99876, 99882. What’s more, Elmer’s injuries were “caused
by, ar[ose] out of, relat[ed] to, or result[ed] from” the provision of a
covered countermeasure—a ventilator—in response to COVID-19. Elmer’s
ventilator was a covered countermeasure because it was used to treat
COVID-19, and ventilators were authorized by the FDA for emergency
use. See Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, FDA, to
Manufacturers and Other Stakeholders (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/136423/download?attachment. Next, the
Estate’s own expert opined that Elmer’s bed sore was caused by being
medically immobilized for an extended period so that he could be placed
on a ventilator. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3, p. 109. Because the Estate’s claims
arise from the Providers’ provision of a covered countermeasure during
the public-health emergency, the Providers are “covered persons” and
immune under the PREP Act from civil liability for both federal and state-
law claims. Although the Estate argues Elmer’s death arose from a bed
sore, not COVID-19, the “chain of events cannot be separated from the
administration of a covered countermeasure.” See Cowen v. Walgreen Co.,
No. 22-CV-157-TCK-JFJ, 2022 WL 17640208, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 13,
2022). Elmer would not have developed the bed sore and needed a

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 12 of 15
ventilator as a treatment had he not suffered respiratory failure from
COVID-19.

Nor does the PREP Act’s exception to immunity for willful misconduct
apply here. Under the PREP Act, “the sole exception to the immunity from
suit and liability of covered persons ... shall be for an exclusive Federal cause
of action against a covered person for death or serious physical injury
proximately caused by willful misconduct.” 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1)
(emphases added). Willful misconduct consists of acts or omissions taken
“(i) intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; (ii) knowingly without
legal or factual justification; and (iii) in disregard of a known or obvious
risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that harm will outweigh
the benefit.” 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(c)(1)(A). A plaintiff asserting a willful-
misconduct claim must first seek compensation from the Covered
Countermeasures Process Fund. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(d)(1). If the plaintiff is
eligible for compensation but chooses to instead file suit, the plaintiff must
file in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42
U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(1). Because the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction
over any willful misconduct claim, and because the Estate did not make
such a claim in federal court, the PREP Act’s exception to immunity does
not apply.

Because the Providers are immune from civil liability here, the trial
court did not err in granting summary judgment to Providers.

Conclusion
Our lawmakers chose as a matter of policy to immunize healthcare
providers working the frontlines in response to the COVID-19 emergency.
Assuming the patient here died from his bed sore rather than COVID-19,
his bed sore still arose from treatment he was receiving due to his COVID-
19. Therefore, the Providers’ services here fall within the Immunity
Statutes. We affirm.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 13 of 15
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ANONYMO US P HYSI C IANS
Arie J. Lipinski 1–3 , 5 –12, 14–17 , 19 , 21, 23–
Lipinski Law 27 , 30 , 32 , 34 , 39 , 43–4 7 , 5 0 , 5 2
Indianapolis, Indiana & 54, ANONYMOUS
PHYSICAL THERAPISTS 1–3,
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
AN D ANONYMOUS
ANONYMOUS SURGERY OCCUPAT I ONAL
CENTER 1 AND ANONYMOUS THERAPISTS 1–3
PHYSICIANS 18, 20, 22, 28, Colleen O. Davis
31, 48, & 56
Thompson Miller & Simpson, PLC
Katherine M. Haire
Louisville, Kentucky
Trenton W. Gill
Reminger Co., LPA ATTORNE YS FOR A P P EL LE ES
Indianapolis, Indiana ANONYMOUS HOS PITAL 3 ,
ANONYMOUS HOS PITAL 3 ,
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
L LC , A NONYMOUS
ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN 29
OCCUPAT I ONAL
Ryan T. Wood
THERAPISTS 4 & 5 , AND
Kyle L. Childress
ANONYMOUS P HYSI CAL
Barnes Maloney, PLLC
THERAPIST 4
Louisville, Kentucky
Allyson R. Breeden
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Alyssa F. Ricker
ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN 55 Stoll Keenon Ogden, PLLC
David S. Strite Evansville, Indiana
Nicholas J. Davis
O’Bryan, Brown & Toner, PLLC ATTORNE YS F OR A P P EL LE E

Louisville, Kentucky S ANONYMO US P HYSI C IANS
13 , 3 5 –38, 40–42
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES Margaret M. Christensen
ANONYMOUS HEALTH Moncerrat Z. Alvarez
SYSTEM, INC., ANONYMOUS Dentons Bingham Greenebaum LLP
HOSPITAL 1 INC, Indianapolis, Indiana
ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN
GROUPS 1–4, ANONYMOUS
HOSPITAL 2, ANONYMOUS
HOSPITAL 2, LLC,
ANONYMOUS CLINIC, INC.,

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 14 of 15
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN 4 ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN 51
Patrick P. Devine Mark E. Hammond
Sam S. Zabaneh Morgan N. Blind
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP O’Bryan, Brown & Toner, PLLC
Schererville, Indiana Louisville, Kentucky

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN 53
Jon M. Pinnick
Schultz & Pogue, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 15 of 15