Meyer v. State of Wyoming - Supreme Court Opinion

IN THE SUP REME COURT, ST ATE OF W YOMI NG 20 26 WY 29 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 20 25 March 4, 2026 JACOB ALEXANDE R MEYER, Appellant (Defendant), v. THE STATE OF WY OMING, Appellee (Plaintiff). S-25-0138 Appeal from the Distri ct Court of Sheridan C ounty The Honorable Benjam in S. Kirven, Judge Representing Appellan t: Office of the State Public Defender: Brandon T. Booth, Wyoming State Public Defender; Kirk A. Mor gan, Chief Appellate C ounsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan. Representing Appell ee: Keith G. Kautz, Wyoming Attorn ey General; Jenny L. Craig, De puty Attorney General; Kristen R. Jo nes, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Darr ell D. Jackson, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Banaz Wadi, Student Director, Prosecution Assistance Program. Argument b y Ms. Wadi. Before BOOMGAAR DEN, C.J., GRAY, FE NN, JAROSH, and HI LL, JJ. NOTI CE: This op inion i s subject to forma l revisi on before p ublicat ion in Pacific R eporter T hird. Readers ar e requested to notify the C lerk of the S upreme Cou rt, Supreme C ourt Build ing, Cheyen ne, Wyoming 82002, of typo graphical or oth er formal e rrors so corr e ction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.

1 JAROSH, Justice. [¶1] A jury convicte d Jacob Meyer of sec ond - degree sexual assa ult of a student a t Sheridan High School, where Mr. Meyer was employ ed as an assi stant principal. On appeal, Mr. Meyer alleges the dist rict court err ed when it grant ed a motion in limine related to evidence of contact or perceived attempts by the victim to have contact wit h Mr. Meyer after the end of the school yea r. Mr. Meyer also alleges the district court erred when it admitted irrelevant a nd prejudicial victim imp act testimony. Finding no error, we affirm. ISSUE S [¶2] Mr. Meyer raises two i ssues on appeal, which we rephrase as follows: 1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the State’s motion in limine related to evidence of t he victim’s contact with or perceived attempts to c ontact Mr. Meyer at the end of the school year? 2. Did the district court commit plain err or when it admitted victim impact testimony? FACTS [¶3] Mr. Meyer was e mployed by Sherid an High Sc hool as an assista nt principal. In the fall of 2023, he was thirty - three years o ld when he met L.J., a senio r in high school, at a school activity just before the school yea r started. The two began to ta lk every day because L.J. worked in the front office as a teacher’s assistant, near Mr. M eyer’s office. As the semester went on, L.J. began receiving gift ca rds and notes from Mr. Meyer. [¶4] Mr. Meyer eventually gave L.J. his phone number. The two began texting every day, and their conversations progres sed to sharing details about their personal lives. Mr. Meyer’s messages evolved into compli menting L.J. ’s physical appearance and how she smelled. [¶5] On April 19, 2024, during L.J. ’s seni or year, Mr. Mey er and L.J. texted each other about making plans that night. 1 Mr. Meyer knew L.J. wa s drinking alcohol with her friends, and the text messages led to Mr. Meyer inviting L.J. to his house for “Fun. One time.” Mr. Meyer warned, “You realize if you tell one person we’re both f*cked.” Mr. Meyer gave L.J. his address and told her not to park in his dr iveway and to avoid his neighbors. 1 On this date, L.J. w as 18 y ears old.

2 [¶6] L.J., who was intoxicated at the time, arrived at Mr. Meyer’s apartment just after 10:30 p.m. While wa tching TV, Mr. Meyer and L.J. began kissin g and moved to the bedroom where they e ngaged in oral sex and sexual intercourse twi ce. Soon after, L.J. texted her friends to pi ck her up, and before le aving Mr. Meyer’s apa rtment, he kissed her goodbye and told her he would see her at school on Monday. Mr. Meyer and L.J. exchanged text messages the next mornin g, where Mr. Meyer sent te xt messages that said, “Drained / Get it?” Mr. Meyer also asked L.J., “We good still? ” She replied, “ Why wouldn’t we be?” He responded, “Just par anoia.” [¶7] A few weeks later, on May 4, 2024, the night of pro m, a friend of L.J. ’s saw text messages between L.J. and Mr. Meye r and reported to Sheridan Hi gh School principal Scott Cleland that L.J. and Mr. M eyer “had a sexual relationship.” Principal Cleland reported the messages to law enforce ment. After a brief in vestigation by Stu dent Resource Officer Meagan Phillip s and the Sheridan Poli ce Department, the Stat e arrested Mr. Meyer and charged him with one count of sexu al assault in the second degree, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -2-303(a)(ix)(2025). 2 The State alleged Mr. Meyer, an employee of Sheri dan High School who was four years older than h is victim, inflicted sexual intrusion on L. J., who was a student at th e same school. Trial Proceedings [¶8] Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine requesting t he district court “prohib it any mention of contact or perceived att empts to have contact bet ween [L.J. ] and [Mr. Meyer] since the school year ended i n 2024.” The motion explained, “The [d]efense has apprised the [S]tate tha t L.J. and [Mr. Meyer] have been at th e gym at the same time. It is the defendant’s per ception that [L.J. ] w as going to the gym a t the same time because he was present. L.J. disputes this as she was a member of the gym as wel l.” The State arg ued any discussion about L.J. going to the sam e gym as Mr. Meyer was irr elevant to whether a sexual assault occurr ed on April 19, 2024. [¶9] On the first day of trial, the parties argued the motion before jury s election. Mr. Meyer argued the gym evidence coul d be relevant for impeachment “in the event that it comes across that she is scared, nervous, not wanting him.” Mr. M eyer argued he co uld foresee using the gym evidence if L.J. testifi ed she was “scared or felt pressured or … [p]ushed into this.” The district court grant ed the State’s motion, but stated, “if the issue comes up as to [ ] her current state of mi nd, then we can address that issue in the event that it comes up[.]” Mr. Me yer’s counsel then state d, “What I would fores ee, Judge, is I wo uld just ask for a sideba r before I ever approache d it and address it.” Th at never occurred. 2 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -2-303(a)(ix) cr iminalizes “sexua l intru sion” on a vict im if the actor is “an employ ee or volunteer of an elem entary or secondar y public or private schoo l who, by virtue of the actor’s emplo ymen t or volun te er r elatio nsh ip wi th th e sc hoo l, has in terac tion with th e vi ctim who is a stud ent or participant in the a ctivities of the school and is more th an four (4) years ol der than the v ictim.”

3 [¶10] During trial, the jury heard evidence from L.J., tw o of L.J. ’s friends, Pr incipal Cleland, Officer Philli ps, Mr. Meyer’s ex - girlfriend, a nd a computer forensi c analyst. Also, forty - five pages o f text messages betwee n L.J. and Mr. Meyer were admitte d at trial. L.J. testified in detail a bout her interactions with Mr. Meyer, and the night they had sex. She further testified prom was “the worst day of [he r] life,” and after ward, she did not go to school for two week s after prom because it was “the most traumati zing thing.” She also testified that she was concerned about her mom finding out about wh at happened with Mr. Meyer. There was no testimony at trial re garding L.J. and Mr. Meyer interacting at the gym after she graduate d. [¶11] The jury found Mr. M eyer guilty of sex ual assault in the secon d degree. The court sentenced him to three to five years in pris on, with credit for one hun dred five (105) days served. This appeal fol lowed. STANDARD OF RE VIEW [¶12] We review a district court’s ruling o n the admissibility of evidence f or an abuse of discretion. Sullivan v. State, 2025 WY 5, ¶ 19, 561 P.3d 780, 785 (Wyo. 2025) (citing Munda v. State, 2023 WY 90, ¶ 21, 535 P.3d 523, 528 (Wyo. 2023)). “Judicial discretion is a composite o f many things, among which ar e conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercise d with regard to what is right un der the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.” State v. Col e, 2026 WY 19, ¶ 20, -- P. 3d -- (quoting Marti n v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)). “A trial court a buses its discretion when it coul d not have reasona bly concluded as it did.” Klingbeil v. State, 2021 WY 89, ¶ 38, 492 P.3d 279, 287 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting King v. State, 2013 WY 156, ¶ 7, 315 P.3d 639, 643 – 44 (Wyo. 2013) (quotation omitted)). Even if the evidenc e was improperly admitted, t he appellant bears the burden of establishi ng the error cau sed material prejudice. Sullivan, ¶ 19, 561 P.3 d at 786 (citation modified). To establish material prejudice, the appellant must show a reasonable proba bility of a more favorable verdict absent the err or. Id. [¶13] When no objection is made at trial to evidence challenged on appe al, our review is for plain error. See Ingersoll v. St ate, 2022 W Y 74, ¶ 9, 511 P.3d 480, 484 (Wyo. 2022). Plain error is sa tisfied when a n appellant sho ws (1) the recor d is clear about the incident alleged as error; (2) a violation of a clear and u nequivocal rule of law; and (3) the denial of a substantial right resu lting in material prejud ice. Id. Failure to establish each elemen t precludes a finding of p lain error. Klingbeil, ¶ 40, 492 P.3 d at 288 (quoting Lewi s v. State, 2018 WY 136, ¶ 13, 430 P.3d 774, 777 (Wyo. 2018) (citation omitted)). “Where appropriate, we addre ss the prejudice element of the plain error test first, without addressing whether th ere has been a violati on of a clear an d unequivocal ru le of law.” Klingbeil, ¶ 4 3, 43 0 P.3d at 288 (quoting Leners v. State, 2021 WY 67, ¶ 23, 486 P. 3d 1013, 1018 (Wyo. 202 1) (citations omitted)).

4 DISCUSSION The district court did not abuse its discreti on when it granted th e State’s Motion in Limine. [¶14] Mr. Meyer first challe nges the district court’ s pretrial ruling granti ng the State’s motion in limine whi ch sought to exclude potential impeachme nt evidence that L.J. attended Mr. Meyer’s gym after her graduation (and after the assa ult). He argues the excluded evidence wa s relevant u nder Wyoming Rule of Evidence (W.R.E.) 401, not unduly prejudicial und er W.R.E. 403, and t hat excluding the evidence was ultimately prejudicial. [¶15] Under W.R.E. 401, evidence is cons idered relevant if it has “any t endency to mak e the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determinatio n of the action more probable or less prob able than it would b e without the eviden ce.” W.R.E. 401. Furthermore, this Cou rt has said “evi dence is always rele vant if it tends to prove or dispro ve one of the elements of t he crime charged.” Hill v. State, 2016 WY 27, ¶ 30, 371 P.3d 553, 562 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Hernandez v. State, 976 P.2d 67 2, 676 (Wyo. 1999)). “Before evidence can be admissib le, it must be relevant. ” Hill, ¶ 2 9, 371 P.3 d at 562 (quoting Thomas v. Sta te, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 28, 131 P.3d 348, 356 (Wy o. 2006)). [¶16] Here, Mr. Meyer arg ues the gym e vidence wo uld have been useful to impeach L.J. if she testified that sh e was afraid of Mr. Meyer or tha t she had been “pressured” or “[p]ushed into” having sex with him. However, L.J. never testified i n that manner. As a result, Mr. Meyer nev er attempted to introd uce the gym evidence at trial, as d iscussed during the hearing o n the motion in limine, likely beca use L.J. neve r claimed during her trial testimony that she felt scared or nervous because of Mr. Meyer. Further, with respect to Mr. Meyer’s claimed inability to imp each L.J., the record shows Mr. Meyer exten sively cross-examined her an d, in fact, did impeach her on other grounds. [¶17] In any event, the gym e vidence was not releva nt because it did not ma ke any fact of consequence to the charged offense more or less probable. See Gu tierr ez v. State, 2020 WY 150, ¶ 12, 477 P.3d 528, 532 (W yo. 2020) (finding evidenc e of citizenship was irrelevant and inadmiss ible when citizenship was not an element o f a crime, nor did it make “fact of consequence more or less p robable”). The excluded ma terial was irrelevant and collateral to the centra l issue before the jury, which was whether Mr. Meyer co mmitted sexual intrusion on L.J., for which there was a mple evidence to find Mr. Meyer guil ty. Any later decisions or actions by L.J. relate d to going to the same gym as Mr. Meyer, mont hs after the assault, do not bear on whether or not the assault happened.

5 [¶18] T he district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Stat e’ s motion to exclude the gym evidence. The district court could have reaso nably concluded as it did under the circumstan ces of the case. Finding no abuse of discretion, we need not con sider whether Mr. Meyer was materially preju diced by the exclusion of the evidence in questi on. See T esterman v. State, 2025 WY 58, ¶ 34, 568 P.3d 1206, 121 6 (W yo. 2025) (“Fin ding no error, we d o not need t o consider whether M r. T esterman was ma terially prejudiced b y the admission of either of t hese statements.”). Mr. Meyer was not materially prejudiced by admission of purp orted victim impact testimony. [¶19] In his second ar gument, Mr. Meyer contends the State introduc ed improper victim impact testimony at trial when L.J. testified a bout her negative prom experience, mi ssing school for two weeks, and not wanting her mom to learn about her r elationship with Mr. Meyer. Mr. Meyer did not object to this evid ence at trial. As a result, our revie w is for plain error, whic h requires an appellant sho w (1) th e record is cle ar about the incident alleged as error; (2) a violation of a clear and u nequivocal rule of law; and (3) the denial of a substantial right r esulting in material prejudi ce. Ingersoll, ¶ 9, 5 11 P.3d at 484. [¶20] We find this case is one where it is appropr iate to “address the prejud ice element of the plain error test first, without addressing w hether there has been a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.” Klingb eil, ¶ 43, 492 P.3d at 288 (quoting Leners, ¶ 23, 48 6 P.3d at 1018). We review the entire record to determine prejudice. Id., ¶ 44, 492 P.3d at 289 (quoting Hathaway v. State, 2017 WY 92, ¶ 33, 399 P.3d 625, 634 -35 (Wyo. 2017)). Importantly, Mr. Me yer must show he suffered material prejudice from the errors he alleges by showing a reason abl e probability he woul d have received a m ore favorable verdi ct if those errors were not made. Id. In other words, Mr. Meyer must show prejudice under circumstances whic h manifest inherent unfairn ess and injustice or con duct which offends the public sense of fair play. See Leners, ¶ 24, 486 P.3d at 1018 (cit ation omitted). [¶21] We have said before the single most significan t factor in weighing whether an error was harmful is the stre ngth of the case agains t the defendant. Sulliv an, ¶ 34, 561 P.3d at 789 (citation omitted). Other factors t hat may be considered when d etermining prejudice are: 1) whether the evidence furnished imp ortant corroboration of other testimony; 2) whether it related to a material, con sequential fact; 3) whether c ounsel relied on the evidence in argument; 4) whether th e evidence was cumulative; and 5) the effect of any instructions given to th e jury. Id. (citation modified). [¶22] Here, Mr. Meyer fails to show any reasonabl e probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to him had the vic tim impact testimony been excluded. The State’s case against Mr. Meyer was st rong, and the evidenc e against him was overwhelming — parti cularly the forty - five p ages of text messages between him and L.J. In the time leading up t o their physical encoun ter, the following exch ange took place:

6 Mr. Meyer: Fun. One t ime. Is that what you want[? ] LJ: Is that what you w ant? Mr. Meyer: Does once work for you[?] I do trust you. I don’t want the people or things ahead of us interfered with and believe we’re both on the same page about that. Job, scholarships, friends and communit y. Is that what you want[? ] LJ: Yeah[.] Mr. Meyer: You reali ze if you tell one per son we’re both f*cked[?] LJ: I understand[.] Mr. Meyer: My life w ould be ruined an d [I] also fear for your relationship with y our parents and scholarship[.] Not trying to scare you off but maki ng this as real as [I] ca n[.] LJ: OK. Understood. Mr. Meyer: Tomorrow? Since you’re drinking tonight? LJ: Nah tonight. Mr. Meyer: How will t hat work[?] You’ll be drinking[.] Not good[.] What time[?]? LJ: When I’m hammer ed[.] Mr. Meyer: That’s not good[.] LJ: It’s the only way[.] Then, the day after, the text messages were ex plicit that the two had s exual intercourse: Mr. Meyer: I didn’t ev en make you finish [.] LJ: You did enough[.] Mr. Meyer: YOU did more than enough – How are you fe eling today? LJ: Great -You? Mr. Meyer: Drained – Get it? LJ: Yes. I did. [¶23] The jury also heard dire ct testimony from L.J. t hat corroborated those t ext messages. L.J. testified in part, Prosecutor: So when h e asked you, “Fun. One time,” you believed that was a bout sex? Is that w hat you said? LJ: Yeah

7 … LJ: And then we get in to his bedroom … and he pulled [my clothes off]. And he prompts me to give him oral sex, and I do. And – which later turned int o oral sex for me. Prosecutor: And then y ou did – did he go ahea d and – LJ: Yes. Have sex. Prosecutor: Did he ejac ulate? LJ: Yes. LJ: … [W]e agreed we would go again. And that – he prompted me to perform oral sex again … [a]nd then he inserted his penis i nto my vagina agai n … and then that was the end of that. [¶24] Other testimony fro m L.J. ’s friends and Officer Phill ips a lso corro borated L.J.’s testimony about having sexual intercourse wit h Mr. Meyer. Two of L.J. ’s friends testifie d that L.J. gave details a bout what happened th at were “sexual in natu re” and that L.J. and Mr. Meyer had sex on April 19, 2024. Officer Phillips testified, “… I asked her if — so I could say that there w as a basis — she underst ood what sex was. I asked her if that is what happened, and she c onfirmed that that is what happened.” [¶25] Regarding the perceived victim imp act testimony with whic h Mr. Meyer takes issue, L.J. testified about prom being the “worst day of her life,” that she did not return to school for two weeks after prom, and that she worried about her mom “fi nding out [about th e assault].” The testi mony was brief and arose in the course of descri bing the aftermath of the assault. The defense even cross - ex amined L.J. about prom night and going bac k to school. And althou gh the State mentioned those statements in cl osing, they were not emphasized by the State as independe nt proof of Mr. Meyer’s guilt — they did not need to be, as there was already strong evi dence of M r. Meyer’s sexual intrusion on L. J. In light of the overw helming evidence of the sexual assault a nd the limited role the comp lained -of testimony played in the State’s case, there is n o reasonable probabilit y that the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to Mr. Meyer had the tes timony been excluded. Accordingly, any error did not result in materi al prejudice and does n ot warrant reversal. CONCLUSION [¶26] The district court did n ot abuse its discretion when it granted the State’s motion in limine, nor was Mr. M eyer materially prejudi ced when the district c ourt admitted victim impact testimony. Affi rmed.