What changed

The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in a non-precedential decision (J-S47030-25) filed on March 5, 2026, addressed the appeal of Lavasha Shannon (Docket No. 91 EDA 2025) concerning a judgment of sentence entered on July 15, 2024. The court granted the appellant's counsel's petition to withdraw, citing compliance with Anders v. California and Commonwealth v. Santiago, and concluded that the appeal was wholly frivolous. The court affirmed the appellant's judgment of sentence.

This decision primarily impacts the parties involved in this specific criminal appeal. For legal professionals and compliance officers, it serves as an example of the procedural requirements for withdrawing counsel in frivolous appeals and the court's independent review process. No new regulatory obligations or deadlines are imposed on broader entities. The outcome affirms the trial court's judgment, indicating that the appeal did not present grounds for reversal.

Source document (simplified)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Shannon, L.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Citations: None known
Docket Number: 91 EDA 2025
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Judges: Olson
Opinion
Authorities (16)
Cited By (0)
Summaries (0)
Similar Cases (21.9K)
PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Judith Ference Olson](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8241/judith-ference-olson/)

J-S47030-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LAVASHA SHANNON :
:
Appellant : No. 91 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 15, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0008093-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 5, 2026

Appellant, Lavasha Shannon, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered July 15, 2024, as made final by the denial of her post-sentence motion

by operation of law on November 19, 2024. In this direct appeal, Appellant's

counsel has filed both a petition for leave to withdraw as counsel and an

accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)

and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We conclude

that Appellant's counsel has complied with the procedural requirements

necessary to withdraw. Moreover, after independently reviewing the record,

we conclude that the instant appeal is wholly frivolous. Therefore, we grant

counsel's petition for leave to withdraw and affirm Appellant's judgment of

sentence.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this case as follows.
J-S47030-25

On September 15[,] 2022, while in the city and county of
Philadelphia[, Pennsylvania,] Renee Fox (hereinafter
“Complainant”) went to her grandmother’s home. Upon
arriving at the rear entrance . . . Complainant parked her car
and called out to her grandmother to open her back door. As
Complainant approached the house, she passed a man she did
not recognize. Complainant was then approached by
Appellant[, her cousin]. After the two women passed each
other, Appellant turned around and grabbed Complainant by
her hair which was fashioned in a ponytail. Appellant slammed
Complainant into a metal gate beside the walkway and pinned
her down. Appellant punched Complainant repeatedly with
closed fists while she was pinned against the gate and then on
the ground. During the fight, Appellant placed her foot on
Complainant’s chest and threatened her. The man, who the
Complainant previously walked past, recorded the incident on
his cell[ular tele]phone camera. Complainant’s grandmother
exited her home due to the altercation and the man who was
recording the encounter separated the Complainant and
Appellant. Following the incident, Complainant went to
Pennsylvania Hospital and received medical treatment for her
injuries. Subsequently, Appellant was arrested by Philadelphia
Police and charged with aggravated assault, terroristic threats
with intent to terrorize another, simple assault and recklessly
endangering another person.[1]

On December 8, 2023, Appellant waived her right to a jury trial
and proceeded to a waiver trial before the Hon[orable] Judge
Tamika Washington. [Ultimately, the trial court found Appellant
guilty of all charges.]

[Appellant’s sentencing hearing took place on July 15, 2024.
On that day, the trial court] sentenced Appellant to two [] to
four [] years of incarceration[, followed by two] years of
reporting probation with the domestic violence unit and
required anger management. [The trial court] stated that the
sentence of incarceration was for the aggravated assault
conviction and the probationary sentence was for the terroristic
threats conviction. [The trial court sentenced Appellant in the

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2706(a)(1), 2701(a), and 2705, respectively.

-2-
J-S47030-25

mitigated range] due to the circumstances of the case,
Appellant’s history and Appellant’s care of a child.

On July 22, 2024, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration
of sentence[, claiming that the trial court issued an excessive
sentence because it did “not factor the sentence on a qualitative
and quantitative basis by weighing aggravating and mitigating
factors.” Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 7/22/24, at *2
(unpaginated). Appellant’s post-sentence motion was denied
by operation of law on November 19, 2024. This appeal
followed.2]

Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/25, at 1-8 (footnotes added).

2 Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720, the trial court must “decide [a] post-sentence

motion, including any supplemental motion, within 120 days of the filing of
the motion.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). Otherwise, the post-sentence motion
is denied by operation of law. Id. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence
motion on July 22, 2024. The trial court did not rule on Appellant’s motion.
Hence, the 120-day period for decision on Appellant’s motion expired on
November 19, 2024. Accordingly, “the clerk of courts [was required] to enter
an order on behalf of the court . . . that the post-sentence motion [was]
deemed denied” in its entirety. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). Here, the clerk of
courts did not enter an order deeming Appellant's post-sentence motion
denied, nor did the clerk's office notify Appellant of the denial of her motion
by operation of law on November 19, 2024. Ordinarily, “[i]f the defendant
files a timely post-sentence motion, the notice of appeal shall be filed [] within
30 days of the entry of the order denying the motion by operation of law in
cases in which the judge fails to decide the motion.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
720(A)(2)(b). However, “[t]his Court has previously held that, where the
clerk of courts does not enter an order indicating that the post-sentence
motion is denied by operation of law and notify the defendant of same, a
breakdown in the court system has occurred and we will not find an appeal
untimely under these circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Perry, 820 A.2d
734, 735 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Thus, although Appellant filed
her notice of appeal on December 23, 2024, we consider the notice of appeal
timely filed. On January 13, 2025, the trial court directed Appellant to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). Appellant complied timely on February 4, 2025. On May 23, 2025,
the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

-3-
J-S47030-25

On appeal, Appellant's counsel filed a petition for leave to withdraw and

counsel accompanied this petition with an Anders brief. Before reviewing the

merits of this appeal, this Court must first determine whether counsel has

fulfilled the necessary procedural requirements for withdrawing as counsel.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 715 A.2d 1203, 1207 (Pa. Super. 1998).

To withdraw under Anders, counsel must satisfy certain technical

requirements. First, counsel must “petition the court for leave to withdraw

stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel

has determined that the appeal would be frivolous.” Miller, 715 A.2d at 1207.

Second, counsel must file an Anders brief, in which counsel:

(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts,
with citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the
record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3)
set[s] forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
and (4) state[s] counsel's reasons for concluding that the
appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts
of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Finally, counsel must furnish a copy of the

Anders brief to his or her client and advise the client “of [the client's] right to

retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points worthy of

this Court's attention.” Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa.

Super. 2007).

If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the

responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal

-4-
J-S47030-25

is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5; see also

Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc) (holding that the Anders procedure requires this Court to review “the

entire record with consideration first of the issues raised by counsel. ... [T]his

review does not require this Court to act as counsel or otherwise advocate on

behalf of a party. Rather, it requires us only to conduct a review of the record

to ascertain if[,] on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that counsel,

intentionally or not, missed or misstated. We need not analyze those issues

of arguable merit; just identify them, deny the motion to withdraw, and order

counsel to analyze them”). It is only when all of the procedural and

substantive requirements are satisfied that counsel will be permitted to

withdraw.

In the case at bar, counsel complied with all of the above procedural

obligations. We must, therefore, review the entire record and analyze whether

this appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. Our analysis begins with the claims

raised in the Anders brief, which are as follows:

Whether the trial [court] erred as a matter of law by allowing
a verdict of guilty on all counts in this case to stand [even
though] it was against the weight of the evidence[?]
Whether the trial [court’s sentence was unduly excessive?]

Anders’ Brief at 6 (superfluous capitalization omitted).

We first address Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence. We

note that, as counsel points out, this claim is waived. Indeed, Appellant did

-5-
J-S47030-25

not challenge the weight of the evidence either orally or by written motion

before sentencing, nor did she address this issue by way of a post-sentence

motion. Thus, this issue is waived. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A); see also

Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 983 A.3d 483, 494 (Pa. 2009) (stating that

a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived unless it is first presented

to the trial court). Accordingly, counsel correctly discerned that, because

Appellant waived this claim, “pursing th[e] matter on direct appeal is

frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 291 (Pa. Super.

2008).

We now turn to Appellant’s claim regarding the discretionary aspects of

her sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court “failed to state

the reasons for imposing an aggravated sentence without due consideration

for qualitative and quantitative factors.” Anders Brief at 15. This Court

previously explained:

It is well-settled that “the right to appeal a discretionary aspect
of sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20
A.3d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2011). Rather, where an appellant
challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence, we should
regard his[, or her,] appeal as a petition for allowance of appeal.
Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. Super.
2007). As we stated in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d
162 (Pa. Super. 2010):

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of
his[, or her,] sentence must invoke this Court's
jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine:
(1) whether appellant [] filed a timely notice of
appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether
the issue was properly preserved at sentencing

-6-
J-S47030-25

or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,
see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's
brief has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f);
and (4) whether there is a substantial question
that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

[Moury, 992 A.2d] at 170 [(citation omitted)]. We evaluate on
a case-by-case basis whether a particular issue constitutes a
substantial question about the appropriateness of sentence.
Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super.
2001).

Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2019) (original

brackets omitted). A substantial question is raised by demonstrating that the

trial court's actions were inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or contrary to

a fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process. Commonwealth v.

Bonner, 135 A.3d 592, 603 (Pa. Super. 2016). This issue is evaluated on a

case-by-case basis. Id. This Court will not look beyond the statement of

questions involved and the prefatory Rule 2119(f) statement to determine

whether a substantial question exists. Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180

A.3d 441, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Moreover, for purposes

of determining what constitutes a substantial question, “we do not accept bald

assertions of sentencing errors,” but rather require an appellant to

“articulat[e] the way in which the court's actions violated the sentencing

code.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. 2006).

Here, Appellant complied with the first requirement above by filing a

timely notice of appeal. See Anders Brief at 15. As previously noted,

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on July 22, 2024. The motion,

-7-
J-S47030-25

however, only challenged the trial court’s failure to consider “mitigating

factors” in fashioning Appellant’s sentence. More specifically, Appellant

averred:

[T]he sentence for the defendant is excessive in that there
are more mitigating factors that were not presented by prior
counsel on July 15, 2024 and was therefore ineffective for
failing to do so and that the court did not have a full picture
of the defendant in rendering her a state sentence.
[T]he petition alleges [that] the trial judge abused her
discretion in sentencing the defendant to a state sentence of
[two] to [four] years when a long period of probation is better
warranted, and that the judge did not factor the sentence on
qualitative and quantitative basis by weighing aggravating
and mitigating factors.

Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 7/22/24, at *2 (unpaginated) (numbering

altered). Hence, Appellant failed to raise her current challenge in her

post-sentence motion, which results in waiver on appeal. See Moury, 992

A.2d at 170.

However, when counsel files a petition to withdraw, pursuant to Anders,

we must review the merits of all claims set forth in the Anders brief in order

to determine whether to grant counsel’s petition to withdraw, despite the fact

that the issues were waived. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 831 A.2d 656, 659

(Pa. Super. 2003). In turning to Appellant’s current challenge, we would

conclude, as counsel suggests, that the issue is meritless. Our standard of

review of a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence is well-settled:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context,

-8-
J-S47030-25

an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in
judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference
to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied
the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable
decision.

In every case in which the court imposes a sentence for a felony
or a misdemeanor, the court shall make as a part of the record,
and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a
statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed.

When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider the
particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the
defendant. In considering these factors, the court should refer
to the defendant's prior criminal record, age, personal
characteristics and potential for rehabilitation. Where
pre-sentence reports [(“PSI report”)] exist, we shall presume
that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information
regarding the defendant's character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A [PSI]
report constitutes the record and speaks for itself.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760-761 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(internal citations, quotations, original brackets and ellipsis omitted).

Moreover, when sentencing a defendant to total confinement, a trial court

must impose a punishment consistent with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Thus, the

trial court “shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should

call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and

on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “The court shall also consider any guidelines for

sentencing and resentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on

-9-
J-S47030-25

Sentencing and taking effect under [S]ection 2155 (relating to publication of

guidelines for sentencing, resentencing and parole, risk assessment

instrument and recommitment ranges following revocation).” Id.

Appellant’s claim on appeal is belied by the record. First, the trial court

did not impose an aggravated range sentence in this instance. With respect

to aggravated assault, because Appellant had a prior record score of zero and

an offense gravity score of 11, the standard guideline range for aggravated

assault was 36 to 54 months’ incarceration, plus or minus one year. See 204

Pa. Code §§ 303.16, 303.15. The trial court set Appellant's minimum sentence

to two years' incarceration for her conviction for aggravated assault.

Similarly, with respect to terroristic threats, because Appellant had a prior

record score of zero and an offense gravity score of three, the standard

guideline range was restorative sanctions to one month of confinement. See

204 Pa.Code §§303.16(a), 303.15, and 303.9(f). The trial court sentenced

Appellant to two years’ probation for her conviction for terroristic threats.

Thus, Appellant’s sentence is in the mitigated, not aggravated, range of the

guidelines. Second, the trial court did, in fact, consider the “qualitative and

quantitative factors,” i.e., mitigating factors, in issuing her sentence. Anders

Brief at 15 and 21. Indeed, the trial court explicitly indicated that its’ sentence

was based upon this consideration. The court stated:

[Appellant’s sentence is] in the mitigated range. So that means
that I found there [were] circumstances in this case that would
allow me to go under what the guidelines are in this case.

10 - J-S47030-25

There is a history that [Appellant] has in her own life that allows
me to do that. Additionally, . . . the fact that she has a child.

Sentencing Hearing, 7/15/24, at 39. The trial court, therefore, cannot be said

to have abused its discretion in issuing Appellant’s sentence.

We have independently considered the issues raised within counsel’s

Anders brief and we have determined that the claims are frivolous. In

addition, after an independent review of the entire record, we see nothing that

might arguably support this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, wholly frivolous.

Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence and grant counsel's

petition for leave to withdraw.

Petition for leave to withdraw appearance granted. Judgment of

sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 3/5/2026

11 - J-S47030-25