Jump To

Top Caption Disposition Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Yonathan Michael v. Bethlehem Desta

Court of Appeals of Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A25A1960

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (8K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
HODGES and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 4, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A25A1960. MICHAEL v. DESTA.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from an order directing the partition of property in which

appellant Yonathan Michael and appellee Bethlehem Desta both have interests as

tenants in common. Michael argues that the trial court erred in adjusting the parties’

accounts when considering the partitioning of the property. We hold that Michael has

not shown that the trial court abused his broad discretion. So we affirm.

1. Background

Because this appeal arises from a ruling after a bench trial, “we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s rulings, defer to the trial

court’s credibility judgments, and will not set aside the trial court’s factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous.” Smith v. Northside Hosp., 302 Ga. 517, 520 (807

SE2d 909) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). The trial court has broad

discretion in making an award on an equitable partition claim, and we review the

court’s ruling for an abuse of that discretion. Bagwell v. Trammel, 297 Ga. 873, 878-79

(3) (778 SE2d 173) (2015). See also OCGA § 44-6-140 (authorizing equitable partition

“whenever the remedy at law is insufficient or peculiar circumstances render the

proceeding in equity more suitable and just”); OCGA § 44-6-141 (court in equitable

partition proceeding must “mold its decree to meet the general justice and equity of

each cotenant”).

So viewed, the evidence shows that the parties were in a romantic relationship

during which they purchased two properties, a townhouse, which they later sold, and

the house that is the subject of the partition proceeding.

In 2019, they purchased the townhouse for $135,000. Michael paid the down

payment of $9,486. Desta paid $1,350 in earnest money. Desta, a real estate agent,

alone engaged in the process of purchasing the townhouse. The process was

complicated because the property was a foreclosure involving the Department of

Housing and Urban Development.

2
The title and $128,250 mortgage were solely in Desta’s name because an issue

with Michael’s previous business affected his ability to get financing. Desta testified

that although she was the only person listed on the title, the parties intended to own

the property equally because they intended to get married.

The parties established a joint bank account to pay their living expenses,

including the mortgage on the townhouse. They commingled their funds in the

account, each depositing their income, although Michael earned more money than

Desta.

The parties made at least $50,000 worth of renovations to the townhouse.

Michael testified that he paid for the renovations; he withdrew money from his

personal and business accounts, deposited the money into the joint bank account, and

used that money to pay for the renovations. But Desta testified that they used her

credit card to buy more than $10,000 of materials to renovate the townhouse,

although Michael made payments on that card; that she paid some contractor

expenses; that she oversaw the renovations; and that they shared the expenses jointly.

The trial court found that the renovations were paid for from the funds in the joint

bank account.

3
Michael and Desta sold the townhouse in 2022, netting $140,137. Desta

deposited the proceeds check — which was issued solely in her name — into the

parties’ joint bank account.

In the meantime, in 2021, the parties purchased a house for $515,100, which

they own as joint tenants in common and which is the subject of the petition for

partition. The source of the funds for the $109,461 down payment was a gift to

Michael from his father. Desta paid $3,000 for the earnest money deposit. She

testified that they shared the expenses for the property jointly and that the parties

intended to own the property equally, given their plans to marry.

The parties ended their relationship in 2022. Around the time their relationship

was ending, Michael transferred the proceeds from the joint bank account into an

individual bank account. Other than $9,800 that was used to pay off Desta’s car, she

received no funds from the proceeds of the sale of the townhouse.

4
In April 2023, Michael filed this petition for partition of the parties’ interests

in the house.1 As of June 1, 2024, the equity in the house was $169,723. Michael

intends to remain in the property.

Desta filed an answer and counterclaim, seeking partition and asserting claims

of conversion and trover related to the funds from the sale of the townhouse deposited

into the parties’ joint bank account.

“In ruling on a claim for an equitable partition, a trial court has broad discretion

to consider all of the circumstances that make a proceeding in equity more suitable and

just, including the need to adjust the accounts or claims of the co-tenants.”Bagwell,

297 Ga. at 877 (3). The court conducted a bench trial, and in his final order, the court

adjusted the parties’ claims as follows.

1
Michael filed a petition for a statutory partition under OCGA § 44-6-160 et
seq., but he alleged that he sought equitable partition. The trial court treated the
petition as one for equitable partition under OCGA § 44-6-140 et seq. “[B]ecause the
Civil Practice Act provides for ‘one form of action,’ OCGA § 9–11–2, if the petition
states a claim for either equitable or statutory partitioning, a court having the requisite
jurisdiction and venue is authorized to proceed with a just and prompt determination
of the action, regardless of whether the true nature of the partition is equitable or
statutory.” Pack v. Mahan, 294 Ga. 496, 499 (755 SE2d 126) (2014). Michael does not
argue that the trial court erred in treating the petition as one for equitable partition.
5
The court subtracted from the $169,723 equity in the house the $109,461 gift

from Michael’s father for the down payment, leaving a total of $60,261 of equity to

be allocated to the parties and divided that $60,261 by two, equaling $30,130.

Then the court determined that $60,268 should be added to Desta’s share of

the equity for a total of $90,399. The court reached the $60,268 figure by first dividing

the net proceeds from the sale of the townhouse by two, which equals $70,068, and

then subtracting from that amount the $9,800 that was used to pay off Desta’s car.

The court held that upon Michael’s payment to Desta of $90,399, Michael

would be entitled to exclusive ownership, use, and possession of the property. The

court held that if Michael is unable to make that payment within six months, then the

property would be sold. In that case, Michael would be entitled to the first $119,261

of the proceeds (which equals the amount of the father’s gift plus the amount used to

pay off Desta’s car), with the remaining proceeds to be split equally between the

parties. The court dismissed Desta’s counterclaims for conversion, trover, and

punitive damages, to the extent those claims were not addressed in the remainder of

the order.

Michael filed this appeal from the trial court’s order.

6
2. The joint bank account

Michael argues that the trial court erred by treating the parties as a married

couple for purposes of adjusting their interests in the joint bank account. Instead,

Michael argues, the trial court should have applied OCGA § 7-1-812 (a) to assess each

party’s interest in the account. That statute provides: “A joint account belongs,

during the lifetime of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net contributions

by each to the sums on deposit, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a

different intent.” Michael fails to point to any place in the record where he argued to

the trial court that the court should apply OCGA § 7-1-812 (a). So this issue was not

preserved for appeal. See City of Atlanta v. Hofrichter, 291 Ga. App. 883, 891 (5) (663

SE2d 379) (2008) (“Where enumerated errors on appeal attempt to raise for the first

time questions not raised in the trial court, they present nothing for decision.”)

(citation and punctuation omitted); see also Court of Appeals Rule 25 (d) (1) (i).

In any case, the trial court never stated that he was treating the parties as a

married couple. Rather, he seemed to compare the parties’ relationship to that of a

married couple as a factor in determining their intent regarding the joint account, in

which they had commingled their funds and which they used for all of their finances.

7
He noted that Desta had not received any of the proceeds from the sale of the

townhouse, other than the payoff of her car.

In a proceeding for equitable petition, the court may “make necessary and

equitable adjustments for improvements and expenditures made and paid for by the

respective parties.” Borum v. Deese, 196 Ga. 292, 295 (1) (26 SE2d 538) (1943).

“[T]he concept of equitable partitioning encompasses the need for flexibility in

fashioning a remedy.” Chaney v. Upchurch, 278 Ga. 515, 516 (2) (603 SE2d 255)

(2004). Further, “[e]quitable relief is generally a matter within the sound discretion

of the trial court and should be sustained on review where such discretion has not been

abused. . . . We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court here.” Brown v. Koi

Pond Crickets, 376 Ga. App. 863, 868 (2) (921 SE2d 406) (2025) (citations and

punctuation omitted).

1. Renovations to the townhouse

Michael argues that the trial court erred in failing to take into account his

expenditures on the two properties.

He focuses on the trial court’s alleged failure to credit him with the amounts he

paid for the renovations of the townhouse. But the trial court did consider the

8
amounts paid for the renovations. In rejecting Michael’s proposed adjustment of

accounts, the trial court held that Michael ignored “that all of the payments made

toward both residences, with the exception of the down payments, were made using

the parties’ joint banking account” and that he discounted Desta’s “financial

contributions to almost no contribution at all . . . despite their funds being

commingled.”

As detailed above, a trial court in an equitable partition action has broad

discretion to consider all of the circumstances when adjusting the parties’ accounts

and claims. Bagwell, 297 Ga. at 877 (3). “Given the evidence presented, we find

neither clear error in any of the court’s factual findings nor any abuse of discretion in

the manner in which the trial court divided the [parties’ interests].” O’Connor v.

Bielski, 288 Ga. 81, 83 (1) (701 SE2d 856) (2010). So we affirm.

Judgment affirmed. Hodges and Pipkin, JJ., concur.

9