Allen v. Allen - Marital Property Division Appeal

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STAT E OF WYOMI NG 20 26 W Y 28 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2025 February 26, 202 6 CAMERON ALLEN, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. LISA ALLEN, Appellee (Defendant). S-25-0183 Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County The Honorable Cat herine E. Wilking, Judge Representing Appellan t: Abigail E. F ournier, M atthew R. Misslin of St einer, Fournier, Zook & Case, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Representing Appellee: Stacy E. Casper, Caspe r Law Office, LLC, Casper, Wyo ming. Before BOOMGAAR DEN, C.J., GRA Y, FENN, JAROSH, a nd HILL, JJ. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers ar e reque sted to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supre me Co urt Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of t ypographical or other formal errors so correction ma y be mad e befor e final publication in the p ermanent volum e.

1 JAROSH, Justice. [¶1] Cameron Allen (Husband) and Lisa Allen (W ife) married in 1989 and divorced in 2025. Following a ben ch trial, the district court divided the marital property and ordered Husband to make an $ 850,000 equalization p ayment to Wif e. Husb and appeals, as serting the district court abused its discretion in valu ing certain assets and by ordering an excessive equalization payment. We affirm. ISSUES [¶2] Husband presents two i ssues for review which we consolidate and rep hrase as: Did the district court ab use its d iscretion in its distribution of m arital pr operty pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114(a)? FACTS AND PROCE EDINGS [¶3] Husband filed for divorce on November 3, 202 3, after thirty -fou r years of marriage to Wife. The couple share two adult daug hters and a son who pa ssed away in 2014. Accordingly, Husband only sought the dissolution of the marriage and division of the marital estate. The Marital Estate [¶4] Husband and Wife married in 1989. In 2013 and 2014, Husband built the couple’s marital home — a 2,800 square foot custom h ome sit uated on twenty -six acre s outside of Casper. The marital home includes fences for livestock, a large barn, and other improvements the c ouple made whi le owning the home. [¶5] A year before their separation, Husband and Wife purchased propert y in Alaska for $20,000. T he plot is largely undeveloped but for Husband’s efforts to construct a road and remove vegetation. Husband’s improvements cost approximately $27,000 and were made while the divorce petiti on was pending. [¶6] At the time of separation, the marital e state also included six vehicles, three campers, two tractors with implements, sno wmobiles, side -by -sides, an ATV, and a n assortment of trailers. Husband and Wife als o identified a variety of fixtures, furniture, artwork, and other personal propert y for division. [¶7] Husband and Wife each hold individual retirement accounts. Husband sells medical devices both as an employee and independent contractor. He has a 401(k) account, stock options, and multiple investment accounts. Wife previously worked as a teacher and currently serves as an educational administrator. She holds a pension with the State of

2 Utah fro m her first tea ching exp erience and a State of Wyo ming pension with her current employer. Wife also has a 457 def erred compensation ret irement account. Trial [¶ 8] The bench trial com menced on March 10, 2025. Husband state d the value of the marital home an d the value of Wife’s pensio ns were the t wo mater ial issues befor e the district court. Husba nd testified tha t he want ed to be awarded the marital hom e because he had used a significa nt portion of his retirement and stock opt ions to build and maintain the house. As a result, he considered the hou se his retirement (i.e., he could finance hi s retirement by selling the house). [¶9] One of Hus band’s witnesses was Ms. Janci Baxter, a certified public accountant, who provided expert testimony on the value of Wife’s pensions. Ms. Baxter estimated the overall value and m onthly benefit for Wife’s S tate of Utah and State of Wyoming pen sions. She testified that bas ed upon the present value method, those accounts wer e wort h $737,000 at the time of separation and $765,957 on the d ate of trial. [¶ 10] Wife test ified that the balance of her pensions w as a co mbined $291,720.53 as of the date of trial. One of Wife’s witnesse s was Cynthia Whitlock, a certified residential appraiser. Wife enga ged Ms. Whitlock, an acquaintance from church, to conduct an appraisal of the marital home around the tim e of Husband an d Wif e’s separation. Ms. Whitlock conducted her first apprais al in Janu ary 2024 and valued th e home at $1,044,00 0. At that time, Ms. Whitlock only identified five comparable properties ranging from four to eighteen acres in size. [¶11] Ms. Whitlock testified she was asked to apprai se the property again in January 2025 and appraised the marital home at $1,541,0 00. Whe n aske d why the value increas ed between appraisals, Ms. Whitlock stated that the Casper market was appreciating, the 2024 appraisal used incorrect sales prices for two comparable properties, an d the 2025 appraisal included comparable land sale propertie s more like the twenty -six acres occupied by the marital home. [¶1 2] Ms. Tricia Lichty, a loc al real estate agent, also testified. She compared two market analyses she did on th e marital home in 2023 and 2025, the latter of which resulted in a market value of $1, 666,833. [¶1 3] In his closing, Husband asked the district court to value the marital home consistent with the January 2024 appraisal and to award Wife her pension and retirement acco unts, valuing them in accordance with Ms. Baxter’s testimony. He also asked the court to award him the marital home and “if the Court determined that there should be an equalization payment” he have sixty days to comply because “that would be equitable under these circumstances.” Wife asked the district c ourt to co nsider that Husband ha s subs tantially

3 higher earning power and for the division to reflect that disparity. The bench trial concluded on March 11, 2025. Divorce Decree [¶1 4] The district court issued its oral ruling on April 8, 2025, and divided the property as the parties gener ally had requeste d. The court also awar ded Wi fe a n $850,000 equalization payment and gave H usband ninety days to complete the trans action. The district court entered the written decree on May 19, 2025. Husband was awarded the marital home and the Alaska property, and any debts associated with those properties. The district court also awarded Husband four vehicles, three campers, two tractors and impl e ments, t wo snowmobiles, t wo side -by-sides, an ATV, multiple trailers, and nearly all the fixtures associated with the marital home. Wife was awarded two vehicles, some fur niture, three pieces of art, and cloth ing. Finally, the district court divided the party’s joint bank accounts and awarded each thei r own respective reti rement accounts. Importantly, neit her party requested special findings of fact under W.R.C.P. 52(a)(1)(A), nor did the distri ct court make any. Husban d appealed. STANDARD OF RE VIEW [¶1 5] We review a tr ial court’s divis ion of marit al property f or an abuse of discreti on. Bailey v. Bailey, 2024 WY 65, ¶ 26, 550 P.3d 537, 547 (Wyo. 2024) (citing Hyatt v. Hyatt, 2023 WY 129, ¶ 11, 5 40 P.3d 873, 880 (W yo. 2023)). We consider whether the c ourt could reasonably have concluded as it did and, when a party contests the sufficiency of the evidence, we affo rd “t he prevailing par ty every favorable inferenc e while omitti ng any consideration of evide nce prese nted by the unsuccessf ul par ty.” Id. (c itin g Snyder v. Snyder, 2021 WY 115, ¶ 8, 496 P.3d 12 55, 1257 (Wyo. 2021) (citations o mitted)). “Property settlements present compl ex probl ems requiring district courts to asses s the respective merits an d needs of the parties.” R ansom v. Ransom, 201 7 WY 132, ¶ 31, 404 P.3d 118 7, 1194 (Wyo. 2017) (citing DeJohn v. DeJohn, 20 05 WY 140, ¶ 11, 121 P.3d 802, 807 (Wyo. 2005)). We do not disturb a property division in a divorce except on clear grounds, because “the trial cou rt is us ually in a better positio n th an the appellate c ourt to judge the parties’ needs and the merit s of their positions.” Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383, 385 (Wyo. 2003) (citations omitted). An abuse of discretion will be found if the property divi sion shocks the conscience o f the Court and appears to be “so unfair and inequitable that reaso nable people ca nnot abide it.” Hyatt, ¶ 11, 540 P.3d at 880 (quoting Innes v. Innes, 2021 W Y 137, ¶ 16, 500 P.3d 259, 262 (Wyo. 20 21)). DI SCUSSION [¶1 6] Husband chall enges the district court’s division of the marital estate. First, Husband alleges the district cour t improperly valued the parties’ marital home and Wife’s pension accounts. Second, h e alleges that an $850,000 equalization payment was an a buse of

4 discretion and resulted in a distribution of m arital assets that should shock the conscience of this Court. [¶1 7] The disposition of prop erty in a divorce is gov erned by Wyoming stat ute: [I]n granting a d ivorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of t he parties as a ppears just and equita ble, having regard for the r espective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party throu gh whom the property was acquired and the burde ns imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children. Wyo. S tat. Ann. § 20- 2-114(a) (2025). The district court has discr etion to decid e what weight to give each fac tor. Inn es, ¶ 15, 500 P.3d at 262 (citation o mitted). Additionally, the statute does not require an equal division of the property. Bailey, ¶ 27, 550 P.3d at 547 (citing Engebretsen v. Engebretsen, 2022 WY 164, ¶ 24, 522 P.3d 156, 163 (Wyo. 2022)). In fact, a just a nd equit able divisio n is as likely as not to be unequal. Bloedow v. Maes - Bloedow, 2024 WY 11 5, ¶ 17, 558 P.3d 576, 582-83 (W yo. 2024) (c itations omitted). I. The district court was not required to m ake written findings of fact. [¶1 8] Husband disputes the valuation of the marital home an d Wife’ s pension accou nts but also suggests the district cour t erred when it did not ass ign a value to either asset. As Husband acknowledges, “[i]t is unclear exactly what value the district court assigned to the marital home, ” althoug h he presumes the district court relie d on the 2025 apprais al. He also presumes th e district court accepted test imony Wife presented a bout the value of her pensions, as opposed t o his expert’s testimon y, based on the amount of the equalization payment awarded to W ife. [¶1 9] Neither party requested that the district court make special findings of fact under W.R.C.P. 52(a)(1)(A). When no such reques t is made, “it shall not be necessary for the court to state its findings, except generall y for the plaintiff or the def endant.” Morrison v. Hinson -Morrison, 202 4 WY 96, ¶ 20, 555 P.3d 944, 953 (Wyo. 20 24) (citing W.R.C.P. 52(a)(1)(A)). [¶ 20] This Court does not know how the marital home or Wife’s pensions were valued by the district cour t. But we cannot fault the district court becaus e the p arties did not request special findings of fact. “In t he absence of special findings of fact, this Court must conside r that the tria l court’s judgment carries with it ev ery finding of fact to support that judgment.” Morrison, ¶ 20, 5 55 P.3d at 953 (citing Barney v. Barney, 705 P.2d 342, 345 (Wy o. 1985)). So here, we must cons ider that the district co urt’ s decree carries with it every finding of

5 fact to support the distribution of pr operty, including t he value of the marital home and Wife’s pensions. II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital estate. [¶2 1] Husband presume s tha t the district court val u ed the m arital h ome at $1,541, 000 based on the 2025 appraisal. Hu sband also presumes t he court valued Wife’s pension accounts consistent with Wife’s testimony, no t Husb and’s expert’s testimony. Husband then asserts such valuations were not reasona ble based on th e evidence. 1 Consequen tly, Husband maintai ns th e district court disreg arded the division sta tute and abused it s discretion when it awar ded Wife an $850,0 00 equalization paymen t. A. Assuming the distr ict court valued the m arital hom e as Husband alleges, the evi dence presented reasonably supports the valuation. [¶2 2] Husband asserts that the district court overlooked inconsistencies in the 2025 appraisal and that the weight of the evidence presented at trial indicates the marital home is actuall y worth $1,0 44,000 as documente d in the 202 4 appraisal, not $1,541,000 as documented in the 2025 appraisal. As discussed above, this Court c an only presume for purposes of Hu sband’s argument that the district court relied on the 2025 appraisal beca use the parties did not r equest Rule 52 special findings of fac t. [¶2 3] Under the ap plicable st andard of review, the Court does not reweig h the evidence presented at trial; inste ad, we consider whether the district court co uld reasonably hav e concluded as it did. Bailey, ¶ 26, 550 P.3 d at 5 47; see also Metz, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d at 385 (recognizing the C ourt does not disturb a property division in a divorce except on clear grounds, because “the trial cou rt is us ually in a better positio n th an t he appel late court to judge the parties’ needs and the merits of their po sitions.”). And in doing so, we must also afford Wife every favorable inference. See id. (recognizing we afford “ the prevailing p arty every fav orable inference while omi tting any consideratio n of evid ence presented by the unsuccessful party.”) (quoting Snyder, ¶ 26, 496 P.3d at 1261). [¶2 4] At trial, both parties re lied on differing appraisals Ms. Whitlock pr epared for the marital home. The initial appraisa l Ms. Whitlock prepare d valued the marital ho me at $1,044,000 in Januar y 2024. A year late r, M s. Whitlock app raised the home at $1,541,000. The marital estate occupies twent y- six acres. Ms. Whitlock’s 2024 a ppraisal included six comparable property sales which ranged from four to twenty acres. During trial, Ms. Whitlock tes tified tha t when she conducted the 2024 appraisal, she lacked co mparable properties with similar acreage. She e xplained during the 2025 appr aisal “the land value 1 Husband essentially contends that a lower house valuation and a higher valuation of Wife’s pension accounts should ha ve result ed in a different d istribution of the marital estate.

6 came up a lot because I had a much better, mo re recent land sale that was definitel y more credible.” [¶2 5] Husband claims Ms. Whitlock did not just ify the substantial in crease in the appraised value between 2024 and 2025. We disagree. Ms. Whitlock testified to the methodology used to support her conclusi on that Casper was in an a ppreciating market: For one thing, a year has passed and w e have an appreciating market. I know this because of the studies that my office does. We do an ongoin g paired sales analy sis in which we take two sales, one that sold maybe two years ago and on e that resold recently, we compare them, and we com e up with the difference in the va lues between the firs t sale and the second sale. When you have enough of th ose, then you can kind of average it and get an average appreciate [sic], right, for the - - for the Casper market. [¶2 6] Ms. Whit lock also ex plained tha t the 2024 appraisal mistakenly included ol der comparables w hich w ere corrected in the 2025 appraisal. While Ms. Whitlock not ed federal hous ing stu dies only indicated a seven percent increa se in housing prices, she sta ted the combination of fa ctors discussed — updated comparable properties with sim ilar acreage, corrected mistakes, an d an appreciati ng local market — ex plained the su bstantial increase in the apprai sed value in t he marital home over th e course of on e year. [¶2 7] Finally, Ms. Lichty, a local real estate agent, testified about her Ja nuary 2025 market analyses of the marital home, wherein she assigned the home a market value of $1,666,833.00. [¶2 8] Applying our standard of review, as we must, we give Wife every favorable inference relat ed to this evidence and omit from our con sideration Husband’s evidence. When we do so, we find the distric t court could have reasonably co ncluded the value of the marital home wa s $1,541,000, con sistent with Ms. Whitlock’s 2025 appra isal. It was also well within the district court’s discretion to rely upon the 2025 appraisal, performed closer to the trial date, as opposed to the 202 4 appraisal, performed closer to the dat e of separation. Wallop v. Wallop, 2 004 WY 46, ¶ 12, 88 P.3d 1022, 10 26-1027 (Wyo. 2024) (finding the di strict co urt has broad di scretion in terms of the appro priate date for val uing marital as s ets). Thus, if the district court indeed valued the marital home as H usband alleges, it did not abuse its discretion in d oing so. B. Assuming the district court valued Wife’s p ension accounts as Husband alleges, the evidence p resented reasona bly supports t he valuation.

7 [¶2 9] Husband also q uestions the sufficiency of the evidence presented regarding th e value of Wife’s pension s. His expert witness, Ms. Baxter, provid ed testimony on the estimated value of Wife’s pension accounts from the States of Utah and Wy oming. Wife testified to th e values of her account s based upo n their the n-current balances. Husband does not dispute Wife’ s testimony but argues that the district court should have accepted his expert’s testimony on the value of the accounts, not Wife’s testimony. Just as with the home valuation, we do not know the value the district court assig ned to the accoun ts. [¶ 30] Even if we assume the district court did in fact accept Wife’s testimony as establishing the value of her pensi on acc ounts, it was no t error for it to do so. Again, Husband asks the Cou rt to re weigh the e vidence presen ted at trial. But o ur standard of review does not permit the Cour t to reweigh t he evidence or to revisit the credibility of witnesses. Se e Bis hop v. Bisho p, 20 17 WY 130, ¶ 28, 404 P.3d 117 0, 1178 (Wyo. 2017) (stating the district court has “the duty to weigh the evidence, including any expe rt testimony, and de termine the credibility of th e witnesse s’ state ments and opinions”); see also Morrison v. Rubi o, 2022 WY 26, ¶ 17, 504 P.3d 251, 255 (Wyo. 2022) (s ame). Instead, we examine w hether the district court could reasonably have concluded as it did with the eviden ce that was presented. Bailey, ¶ 26, 550 P.3d at 547. While Ms. Baxter testified to the val ue of Wife’s pe nsion accoun ts using the prese nt value method ology, the district court was free to disregard that testimony in favor of Wife ’s uncontested testimony about the value of her deferred compensation account. More import antly, on revie w we are required to give Wife every favorable inference while omitting consideration of Husband’s evidence. [¶3 1] Even if the dis trict court a ccepted Wife’s testi mony as to the value o f her pension accounts as oppos ed to Ms. Bax ter’s, th e court reasonably could hav e concluded as it did and, therefore, did n ot abuse its discretion. C. The district court had regard for t he factors in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20 -2- 114(a). [¶ 32] Husband asserts the district court’s di stribution of the marital estate wa s inconsistent with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20 -2-114(a) [¶ 33] Because neit her party requested special findin gs of fact, the district c ourt was only required to ha ve “regard” for the statutory factors when it divided t he marital pro perty rather than e xpressly c onsidering each fact or. Vassilop oulos v. Vass ilopoulos, 2024 WY 87, ¶ 22, 557 P.3d 725, 732 (Wyo. 2024) (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114(a)). Our case law does not man date any concrete rules gov erning how the district court shoul d analyz e the factors. Id. That is, “[t]here are no specific guidelines as to th e weight the district court must af ford the statutory consideration s w hen making a prope rty division.” Mo rrison, ¶ 18, 504 P.3d at 255 (qu oting Innes, ¶ 15, 500 P.3d at 26 2).

8 [¶3 4] Husband cannot cred ibly claim the district cour t failed to give “regard” to the factors in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2 0-2-114(a). In its oral ruling, the district court expressly i dentified some of the st atutory factors it considered and noted its list “is not an exhaustive list.” The significant length of the marriage, the condition the parties will be left in after the divorce, and the fact Husband “has historically had and will continue to have a substantially higher income” than Wife were factors that primarily influenced the district court’s division, as it explained in its oral ruling. In additio n, the distribution itself demon strates that the c ourt had regard for the statu tory factors. The district court awarded Husba nd the marital home, which he testified he wanted to keep because of all the money he put into building it. It also awarded hi m most of the remaining rea l and personal property. Considering th e distribution to Husband and Husban d’s higher income, the district court then order ed him to make an equali zation payment to Wife. T h ese things dem onstrate the c ourt’s consideration of respective merits of the parties and the conditi on each party will be left in after the divorce. The district co urt did not abuse its discretio n by f ailing to have regard for the statutory factors for distrib uting the marital estate. D. The division of the marital estate doe s not shock the conscience of th is Court. [¶3 5] Finally, Husband maintains the district court’s award of an $850,0 00 equalization payment to Wife res ults in a distribution that shocks the conscience and is so unfair and inequitable that reason able persons cannot abide by the decree. His argument is ba sed in part on the errors he alleges the district court made re garding the value of the marital home and Wife’s pension accounts. Once again, Husband is plagued by the circumstance where neither party requested Rule 52 special findings of fact. See Morrison, ¶ 20, 555 P.3d at 953 (stating we “must consider that the trial court’s judgment carries with it every finding of fact to support that j udgment.”). [¶3 6] Claiming the d istrict court gave too mu ch “deference ” to Wif e in dividing the marital estate, Husband asks this Court to reweigh the evidence contra ry to our standard of review. See Amadio v. Amadio, 2025 WY 21, ¶ 42, 564 P.3d 259, 271 (Wyo. 2025) (dismissing argument that suggested the s tatutory factors and evidence favored hi s preferred division of property i n the absenc e of special findi ngs). We need not consid er Husband’s contention t hat the district court conducted “h aphazard val uations” of per sonal items when it did not, nor was it re quired to as sign a particular value t o any such items. [¶3 7] Husband’s challenge to the equalizati on payment fails on similar gr ounds. A court abuses its discretion w hen “the property disp osition shocks the con science of this Court and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people cannot abide it. ” Morrison, ¶ 16, 504 P.3d at 255 (citations and internal quotations omitted). When determining whethe r a property distribut ion is equita ble, we c onsider it “ from the perspective of the over all distributio n of marital assets and liabilitie s rather than fr om a

9 narrow focus on the effects of any particular disposition.” Begley v. Begley, 2020 WY 77, ¶ 22, 466 P.3d 276, 283 (Wyo. 2020) (citation omitted). [¶3 8] Importantly, Husband asked the district cour t to award him the mari tal residence, provide Wife with her pensions, and split the remaining person al property. T he district court did just that whi le also rejecting Wife’s request for alimony, and to make up the difference, awar ded Wife the equalization payment. In addition to an undeveloped property in Alaska, the district court awarde d the bulk of t he couple’s remaining personal property to Husband — four vehicles, three camper trailers, two tractors with implements, side -by-sides, snowmo biles, trailers, furnitur e, and home fixtures. The equalizati on payment awarded to Wife was not just tied to the value of the marital house. The equalization payment was also tied to the dis tribution of other real and personal property, as well as to the fact that Husband would cont inue to have a substant ially higher incom e than Wife. [¶3 9] The overall distribu tion of the marital estate, including the $850,00 0 equalizati on payment, does not shock the consci ence of the Court. See Innes, ¶¶ 24-25, 500 P.3d at 264 (finding the district court did not abuse its di scretion in dividing the entire marital estate after applying the factors in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114(a)). To the contrary, it appears to be a deliberate, reaso nable distribution of the marital assets and liabil ities. CONCLUSION [¶ 40] In the absence of a req uest for special findings of fact under W.R.C. P. 52(a)(1)(A), the district court was not required to ma ke any additiona l writte n findings wit h respect to the valu e of the marital home or Wife’ s pension accounts. Nonetheless, the partie s presented su fficient ev idence at trial fo r the di strict court to divide th e marital estat e as it did in the decree. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the marital estate, inclu ding in it s awa rd to Wife of an $850,000 equal ization paymen t. [¶ 41] Affirmed.