Castaner v. State of Wyoming - Sentencing Appeal

IN THE SUP REME COURT, ST ATE OF W YOMI NG 20 26 WY 25 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 20 25 February 24, 2026 EAVAN CASTANER, Appellant (Defendant), v. THE STATE OF WY OMING, Appellee (Plaintiff). S-25-0107 Appeal from the Distri ct Court of Natrona C ounty The Honorable Daniel L. Forgey, Judge Representing Appellan t: Ryan A. Semerad, Fuller & Semerad, LLC, Casper, Wyoming. Representing Appell ee: Keith G. Kautz, Wyoming Attorn ey General; Jenny L. Craig, De puty Attorney General; Kristen R. Jo nes, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Arg ument by Ms. Jones. Amic us Curiae Juveni le Law Center: Ian Sandefer, Sandefer & Woolsey Trial Lawy ers, LLC, Casper, Wyo ming. Before BOOMGAAR DEN, C.J., and GRAY, FENN, and JAROS H, JJ., and WESTBY, D.J. NOTI CE: This op inion i s subject to forma l revisi on before p ublicat ion in Pacific R eporter T hird. Readers ar e requested to notify the C lerk of the S upreme Cou rt, Supreme C ourt Build ing, Cheyen ne, Wyoming 82002, of typo graphical or oth er formal e rrors so corr e ction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.

1 WESTBY, District Ju dge. [¶1] Eavan Castaner, who was fifteen years old at the time of his crime, plead guilty to an amended charge of second-degree murder. On appeal, Mr. Castaner argues that the district court’s sentenc e was illegal and violated Article 1, Sec tion 14 of the Wyom ing Constitution’s prohibit ion on cruel or unusual punishment. Finding that Mr. Castaner’s sentence was within the permissible statutory s entencing range and w as not unusual 1 under the Wyoming Constitut ion, we affirm. ISSUES [¶2] Mr. Cast aner presents two issues which questi on whether the district court imposed a legal sentence. The first issue challenges the lawfulness of his sentence und er two separate Wyoming stat utes while the remai ning issue challe nges his sentenc e under the Wyoming Constitution. We organize and reph rase those issues as: I. Does Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) apply to a juvenile of fender who received a term of years sentence? II. Was the district court ’s sentence consiste nt with the punishment authorized by Wyoming statute for se cond- degree murder? III. Did the district court’ s sentence violate the prohibitio n against cruel or unusual punishment under Arti cle 1, Section 14 of the Wyoming Constitution? FACTS [¶3] On May 14, 20 24, shor tly after midnight, law enforcement officers were dispatched to Buckboard Park in Casper for a reported shooting. The caller identified the victim as 17- year - old L.B. and the shooter as 15-yea r-old Eavan Castaner. Upon arrival, law enforcement observed L.B. laying i n the middle of the street w ith a gunshot wou nd to the head. Shortly after L.B. arrived at the hospital, it was determined she was deceased. [¶4] During the investigation, officers learned Mr. Castaner had dated L.B. for approximately a year but they had broken up around April 18, 2024. Mr. C astaner began seeing another girl, J. B. Despite the breakup and his new re lationship, Mr. Castaner continued to call L.B. and send harassing a nd threatening messages to her, even th ough she asked him to leave her alone. Examples of messages Mr. Castaner sent to L.B. included “Ur a b *** h I hope you die slowly im go an celebrate when you die,” “Ur useless waste of air J.B s] way better than you idk why I wasted a year of my life on ur hoe a **,” and “I 1 See infra ¶ 26. W e do not analyze whe ther the s enten ce was crue l, as M r. Castan er concede d that point in his sup plement al brief.

2 hope you die in the mo st painful way possible. ” Mr. Castaner sent these messages the day before the shooting. L. B. responded by telling Mr. Castaner to quit te xting her. [¶5] Some of L.B.’s family members saw the mess ages, including her cousin, R.R. R.R. reached out to L.B. about the messages. L.B. told R.R. that t he messages were from Mr. Castaner and that he w ould not leave her alone. R.R. then messag ed Mr. Castaner and told him to leave L.B. alon e. This interaction esc alated to Mr. Castaner wanting to fight R.R. in Buckboard Park, t o which R.R. agr eed. Mr. Castane r sent R.R. a video of a gun and a message threatening to shoot R.R. L.B. told R.R. that Mr. Castaner did not have a gun. However, Mr. Castane r did possess a gun. While his mother was out of town, Mr. Castan er took a handgun that his mother kept in a conce aled carry case in her closet. Mr. Castaner took that handgun to th e park to confront R.R. [¶6] Before going to the park, Mr. Castaner’s friend, R.S., tried to convinc e Mr. Castaner not to go through w ith hurting anyone. R.S. went to the park to try to stop Mr. Castaner, including trying to physically restr ain him and pinn ing h im to the ground at one point. When his attempts failed, R.S. walked back to his car and Mr. Castaner remained at the park. [¶7] According to witnesses, L.B. arrived at the park with R.R. a nd two other individual s. R.S. was in his ca r watching the interac tion. R.R. and L.B. walke d towards Mr. Ca staner while the other two individuals stay ed behind and went behind a tree. R.R. was carrying a baseball bat but did not threaten Mr. Castaner with the bat. While ap proaching, R.R. heard a slide on a pistol rack and Mr. Castane r saying “What!” R.R. then began to walk backwards away from Mr. Castaner. L.B. continued t owards Mr. Ca staner and raised her fist as if to hit him. Mr. Castaner then shot L.B. in the face and she fell immediately to the ground. An other individual w ho came to the park with L. B. had a fir earm and fired a few rounds towards Mr. Ca staner as he fled the pa rk area. [¶8] Mr. Castaner was apprehended at J.B.’s house sho rtly after the s hooting. Mr. Castaner spoke with law enforcement and his story mostly ma tched the witness es’ accounts. Mr. Castaner admitted that he shot one round fro m his pistol at L.B. when she was approximately thre e to four feet awa y from him after she ap proached him and appear ed to be preparing to pun ch him. Mr. Castaner told law enforcement he had retrieved the pistol from his mother’s residence a few days prior, and he knew the magazine was loaded. [¶9] On May 15, 2024, the State charged Mr. Castaner with first- de gree murder, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -2- 101(a) (2024), and misdemeanor stalking, und er Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506 (2024). P ursuant to a plea agreemen t, Mr. Castaner plea d guilty to an a mended charge of second - degree murder, u nder Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -2-104 (2024), and misdemeanor stalking. T he plea agreement did not include a specific sentence recommendation for the second - deg ree murder charge. For the mis demeanor stalking, the sentence recommendati on was for time served.

3 [¶10] Sentencing in t his case became an issue because of c onstitutional considerations related to juvenile sentencing arising fro m Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. 460 (2012) and its progeny cases, our Be ar Cloud line of cases, a nd Wyoming statute s that generally prohibit life sentences for juven iles without an individ ualized sentencing hea ring and a finding of permanent incorrigibil ity. 2 The Bear Cloud line of c ases 3 and Wyoming statutes effectively define a juvenile life sente nce as one without pa role eligibility and use twenty- five years as a benchmark for par ole eligibility where the sente nce is life. Prior to sentencing, the district court held a status conf erence to discuss some of these preliminar y issues related to the sentencing hearing. B oth the prosecuto r and defense cou nsel agreed that the sente ncing hearing app eared to be an indivi dualized sentenc ing hearing. At the status conference, the State informed the district court that it believed the case was governed by Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98, 401 P.3d 834 (Wyo. 2017). The Court requested sentencing memorand a from both the State and defense counsel regarding the district court’s lawful sente ncing options. [¶11] In its sentencing mem orandum, the State asserted it was not asking the district cour t to consider the question of incorrigi bility, but instead argue d the 45/61 rule announced in Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014) (Bear Cloud III) applie d t o Mr. Castaner and that the State’s sentenc ing recommendation wo uld comply with the limitations set by Bea r Cloud III. Based on that understandi ng of the law, the St ate recommended a sentence of forty-four to seventy-five years of incarceration for the second - degree murder charge. For the misdemeanor stalking charge, the State asked for a sentence of 330 days of in carceration with cred it for 330 days already served a nd that the sentence run concurrent to the se cond- degree murder sentence. [¶12] The defense objected to the State’s sentencing recommendation a nd argued it violated the Wyoming Constitutio n. Instead, the defense asked the district court to sentence Mr. Castaner to a sentence of twent y-two to thirty year s of incarceration. In the defense’s sentencing memorandum, Mr. Castaner argued a life sentence for a juvenile was 2 Under Mi ller, the Uni ted States Supr eme Court di d not categor ically bar l ife without paro le sentences f or juveniles, but ins tead, require d that before a life witho ut parol e senten ce was imposed, th e sentencing court hold an individualized sen tencing hearing to c onsider “an offender’s you th and attendant circu mstances.” 567 U.S. at 483. Under Wyoming law, p ermanent incorrig ibility has b een d escribed as “irre parable corruption,” Sen v. S tate, 2013 WY 47, ¶ 51, 301 P.3 d 106, 127 (Wyo. 2013) (Sen I), and distinguished from “ tran sien t im matur ity. ” D avis v. State, 2018 WY 40, ¶ 54, 415 P.3 d 666, 684 (Wyo. 2018). 3 See, e.g., Davis v. S tate, 2 020 WY 122, 472 P.3d 10 30 (Wyo. 2020); Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104, 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2 019); Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30, 390 P.3d 769 (Wyo. 2017); Be ar Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 1, 334 P.3d 132, 135 (Wyo. 2014) (B ear Cloud I II); Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 1 8, ¶ 1, 294 P.3d 36, 39 (Wyo. 201 3) (Bear Cl oud II); Bear Clou d v. State, 2012 WY 16, ¶ 17, 275 P.3d 377, 385 (Wyo.), cert. gran ted, judgment vacat ed, 568 U.S. 802, 133 S. Ct. 183, 184 L. E d. 2d 5 (2 012) (Bear Clou d I).

4 twenty-five years according to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) (2024) 4 and Bear Cloud III, and therefore, was the maximum sentence a juvenile homicide off ender could receive. When Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7 -13-201 (202 4) 5 was applied, the max imum bottom number of the indeterminate sente nce 6 a juvenile homicide offender could receiv e was 22.5 years or 90% of twenty-five years. Therefore, the defense argued the maximu m sentence a juvenil e convicted of second - de gree murder co uld receive was 22.5 years to l ife. Mr. Castaner also argued that if the district court impo sed a term of years sentence ins tead, that it could not impose a minimum term of incarcerat ion that exceeded forty-three years, based on Be ar Cloud III and Wiley v. State, 2020 WY 49, 461 P.3d 413 (Wyo. 20 20), because essentially, that would be imposing a functional life witho ut parole sentence. [¶13] The district court acknowledged the State was not requesting the court to impose a life sentence on Mr. Castaner. The d istrict court also discussed so me of the differences between the sentencing structures for fir st - degree and second -degree murder. Ultimately, t he district court sentenced Mr. Cas taner to time served on the mi sdemeanor stalking charge. As to the sec ond - degree murde r charge, the distr ict court se ntenced Mr. Castane r to 42-to-75-years of in carceration with credit for 330 days for prior ti me served. STANDARD OF RE VIEW 4 The relevant por tion of Wyo. St at. Ann. § 6 - 10- 301(c) reads: “A person sen tenced to life imprisonmen t for an offense committed b efore the person re ached the age of eighteen (18) years shall be eligible for pa role after co mmutati on of h is senten ce to a ter m of years or af ter having serve d twenty - five (2 5) years o f incarceration . . . . ” 5 When a person is convicted of and sen tenced to a felo ny, the sentencing cou rt: shall no t fix a def inite te rm of imp rison ment bu t shall e stab lish a max imu m and min imu m term w ithin the lim its a uth orize d for th e sta tute v iola ted. The ma ximu m ter m sha ll not b e greater than the maxi mum provided by law f or the statute v iolated, and the min imum term shall not be less than the minimum p rovided by law for the statute v iolated, no r greater than n inety per fect (90%) of th e ma ximu m ter m imp ose d. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13- 201. 6 An indeterminate sen tence is a senten ce with “[a ] maximum jail term th at the pa role boar d can redu ce, through statutory authorization, aft er the inmate h as served the minimum time r equired by law. ” Indeterminate S entence, Bl ack’s Law D ictionary (12th ed. 2024). Ind ete rmin ate s enten cin g for felo nie s in Wyoming is required, unle ss a life sentence is impo sed. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-20 1. Mr. Castan er asks us to reconsider the ho lding in Ryan v. S tate, 988 P.2d 46, 62 - 63 (Wyo. 1999) (interpreting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13- 201 “to m ean that the district c ourt is not r equired to establish a minimu m term wher e a life sent ence is imposed b ut was n ot required by stat ute.”), o r at least declare Ryan does not apply to juveni les. Howe ver, we do n ot need to add ress tha t issu e because Mr. Ca staner was no t given a lif e sentence and in stead was given an in determi nate sen tence wit h a minim um and maximum. Th erefo re, Ry an does not apply to Mr. Castaner. See Ryan, 988 P. 2d at 62 -63.

5 [¶14] Mr. Castaner argues th e district court’s sentence was illegal 7 and unconstitutional under the Wyoming C onstitution. We appl y the following standar d of review to Mr. Castaner’s allegation th at the sentence was ille gal: “An illegal sentence i s one which exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for th e same offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the la w.” Sanchez v. State, 982 P.2d 14 9, 150 (Wyo.1 999) (citing Duran v. State, 949 P.2d 885, 887 (Wyo.1997)). The determinati on of whether a sentence is illegal is made by reference to the authorizing statute or applicable cons titutional provisions an d is, therefore, a matter of statutory inte rpretation. Interpretation of statutes is a question of la w, which we review de novo. French v. Ama x Coal West, 960 P.2d 102 3, 1027 (Wyo.1998); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 91 8 P.2d 980, 983 (Wyo.1996). Bush v. State, 79 P.3d 1178, 1182 (Wyo. 20 0 3) (quoting Ryan v. Sta te, 988 P.2d 46, 62 - 63 (Wyo. 1999)). [¶15] Mr. Castaner ’s challenge of t he constitutionali ty of his sentence is a question of law. Hicks v. State, 2025 WY 113, ¶ 25, 578 P.3d 366, 378 (Wyo. 2025). Issues of constitutionality are re viewed “ under a de novo stan dard of review and [we] af ford no deference to the district court’s determination s on the issues.” Bear Cloud III, ¶ 13, 334 P.3d 132, 137. DISCUSSION [¶16] To determine whether Mr. Cas taner’s sentence for s econd - degree mu rder was legal and within the confines of Wyoming law, we f irst must establish what statutes govern Mr. Castaner’s case. The parties agr ee Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -2- 104(a) 8 applies. The parties also agree Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7 -13- 201 app lies because Mr. Casta ner was sentenced to a term of years. However, the parties disagree as to whethe r Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -10-301(c) applies. Mr. Castaner argues § 6 -10- 301(c) applies because the maximum sentence for a violation of second - degree murder is a life s entenc e which mea ns the maximum parole ineligibility period for a juvenile offender con victed of second - degre e murder is twenty - five years based on § 6 -10- 301(c). Therefore, according to Mr. Castaner, the sentencin g 7 Although M r. Castaner d id not file a request t o correct an illegal s entence in the district cour t, it is proper for us to consider h is appea l becaus e “[a] cla im of an u nlawful s entence. . . c an be rai sed in a di rect ap peal. . . .” Leger v. State, 855 P.2d 359, 363 (Wyo. 1993). 8 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -2- 104(a) prov ides: “whoever purposel y and maliciously, but without premedita tion, kills any human be ing is guil ty of murder in the second degr ee, and shall be i mprisoned in the penitentiary for any term not less than twenty (20) yea rs, or during life.”

6 court is limited by the twenty-five- year parole ineligibility peri od. The State argues § 6 - 10- 301(c) does not apply to second - de gree murder because the Le gislature’s modification to that provision was in response to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) which held a mandatory life -withou t- parole sentence for a juvenile homicide o ffender violated the Eighth Amendment. 5 67 U.S. at 470. I n light of this disagreement, we must engage in statutory interpretation to determine whet her § 6-10-301(c) applies to Mr. Castaner befor e we can analyze whethe r Mr. Castaner was giv en a legal sentence. I. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6- 10 -301(c) does not apply to Mr. Castaner’ s sentence. [¶17] When interpreting statutes, our primar y goal is to asc ertain legislative intent. State v. Mares, 2014 WY 12 6, ¶ 23, 335 P.3 d 487, 497 (Wyo. 2014) (citing Rock v. Lankfor d, 2013 WY 61, ¶ 19, 301 P.3d 107 5, 1080 (Wyo. 2013)). To achieve this goal, courts construe statutes in pari materia and interpre t “statutes relating to the same subject or having the same gener al purpose” in harmony. Id. Courts begin b y looking to the plain language of the statute and use the ord inary and everyday meaning. Id. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, “we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory con struction.” Id. “We construe the statute as a who le giving effect to every wor d, clause, and sentence” and “wil l not enlarge, stretch, expand, or exte nd a statute to matters t hat do not fall within its express provisions.” Id. With those well s ettled statutory interpretation princip les in mind, we turn to the interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10- 301(c). [¶18] The relevant portion of § 6 -10-301(c) states “[a] person sentenced to life imprisonment for a n offense committe d before the person reached t he age of eighte en (18) years shall be eligible for parole after c ommutation of his sentence t o a term of years or after having served t wenty - five (25) y ears o f incarceration . . ..” Based on the plain language of the statute, subsection (c) applies only to juv enile offender s who received a life sentence. In re sponse to Miller, the Legi slature amend ed the law to ensure juvenile homicide offenders who received a sentenc e of life imprisonment had a meaningful opportunity for relea se by eithe r (1) having their life senten ce commuted to a term of y ears sentence, or (2) if the sentence remained life imprisonment, the juve nile would be parole eligible after serving twenty-five years in prison. § 6 -10-3 01(c); see Davis v. State, 201 8 WY 40, ¶ 30 n. 4, 415 P.3d 666, 677 n. 4 (Wyo. 2018) (“As recognized by the Supreme Court in Montgomery, Wyoming ha s accounted for juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment. By operation of Wy o. Stat. An n. § 6 -10- 301(c). . . .”); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (citi ng Gra ham v. Florida, 560 US 48, 75 (2010)) (“A State is not required to guarantee eventua l freedom, “but must provide “som e meaningful opportunity to obta in release based on demo nstrated maturity and r ehabilitation.”). Upon commutation of a life sentence to a term of years, the indivi dual would be eligible for parole and to receive goo d time. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7 -13-402(a) (2024) (“The b oard may grant a parole to any person imprisoned in any institution under sentence, exce pt a sentence of lif e imprisonment without parole or a life sentence . . . .”); Wyo. Rules an d Reg. 001.0001.0 § 2(e) (“An

7 inmate serving a life sentence or a sen tence of death is n ot eligible for good time allowances.”); see also Bird v. Wyo. Bd. of Parole, 2016 WY 100, ¶¶ 13 - 14, 382 P.3d 56, 63- 64 (Wyo. 2016). In the alternative, if the life sentence was not commuted to a term o f year s sentence, the Legislature ensured that a juvenile ho micide offender would still be eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years in priso n. § 6 -10- 301(c); Wy o. Stat. Ann. § 7 -13- 402(a) (“The board may als o grant parole to a person servi ng a sentence for an offense committed bef ore the person reached the age of eighteen (18) years of age as provided in W.S. 6-10- 301(c).”). [¶19] Because Mr. Castaner was sent enced to a ter m of years and not a life sentenc e, § 6 - 10- 301(c) does not apply. To apply the statute to a juvenile hom icide offender who received a term of years sentence, we would ha ve to ignore the plain language of the statute. Subsection (c) applies t o juveniles “sentenced to life imprisonment.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 - 10- 301(c). To reac h Mr. Castaner’s interpretation, we would hav e to read a dditional language in to the statu te which would be an impermissible overstep by the courts. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 - 10 -301(c); Mares, ¶ 23, 335 P.3d at 497. I n addition, if we were t o follow Mr. Castaner’s interpretation, the phrase “after commutat ion of his sentence t o a term of years” would serve no purpose. We cannot interpre t a statute in a way that woul d render a portion of th e statute meaningless. Ma tter of U.S. Currency Totaling $470,040. 00, 2020 WY 30, ¶ 22 n. 5, 459 P.3d 430, 436 n. 5 (Wyo. 2020). If § 6 -10-301(c) a pplied to juvenile offenders who were already sentence d to a term of year sentence, there would be no need for the Legislature to include the alternative that the gover nor could commute a life sentence to a term of years sentence. [¶20] We are cogniz ant of the important doctrine of separation of powers tha t is implicated when courts engage in statutory int erpretation. As we have expl ained previously, our role is to interpret the statut e as written: [C]ourts are not free to legislate. The first rule of statutory construction is that leg islative intent, not a c ourt’s perception of fairness, controls. It is not the court’s prer ogative to usurp the power of the legi slature by deciding what should ha ve be en said. The courts must follow, an d cannot e xtend, statutory definitions. For over a century, cour ts in Wyoming have recognized that it is their duty only to interpret and declare what the law is, not to be responsib le for its defects. And of specific importance to the instant case is the precept that exceptions not mad e by the legisla ture in a statute cannot be read into it. Delcon Partners, L LC v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue, 2019 WY 106, ¶ 10, 450 P.3d 682, 685 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Seherr- Tho ss v. Teton Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 2014 WY 82, ¶ 20, 329 P.3d 936, 945 (W yo. 2014)). If the lang uage of a statute is clear, “a court ris ks an

8 impermissible substitu tion of its own views, or those of others, f or the intent of the legislature if a ny effort is made to interpret or construe statutes on an y basis other than the language invoked by the legislature.” Sinclai r Wyo. Refining Co. v. Infrassure, Lt d., 2021 WY 65, ¶ 13, 486 P.3d 990, 995 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety and Comp. Div., 2003 WY 83, ¶ 10, 72 P.3d 799, 8 02 (Wyo. 2003)). This is a n important rule of statutory interp retation because “[t]his inhibi tion upon statutory construction offers ass urance that the legisla tive efforts and determinations of elected representatives will be made effective without judicial adju stment.” S inclair Wyo. Refining Co., ¶ 13, 486 P.3d at 9 95 (quoting Taylor, 72 P.3d at 802). [¶21] Therefore, based on th e plain language of the statute, we hol d that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -10-301(c) does not apply to Mr. Casta ner, a juvenile who was se ntenced to a term of years because he was not sentence d to “l ife imprisonment ” and already has the possibility of being paroled in the future. II. Mr. Castaner’s sente nce does not exceed the punishment for seco nd - degree murder established b y Wyoming statute. [¶22] This Court has explained an illegal sentence “exceeds statutory li mits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for t he same offense, or otherwise vio lates constitutions or the law.” Bush, 79 P.3d at 1182 (citing Rya n, 988 P.2d at 62 -63). To determine whe ther a sentence is illega l, courts ref er to “the aut horizing statute or applicable constituti onal provisions [which] is, therefore, a matter of st atutory interpretation.” Id. “[A] court may only impose a sentenc e of incarceration that falls within the mini mum and maximum punishment prescribed by statute.” Daug herty v. State, 44 P.3d 28, 34 (Wyo. 2002). [¶23] Turning to M r. Castan er, he was sentenced f or second - degree murd er under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -2-104(a). The punishment for se cond - degree murder is “not less than twe nty (20) years, or duri ng life.” § 6 -2-104(a). Furth er, “Wyoming is a n indeterminate senten cing state that requires court s to prescribe a minimu m and maximum term of confinement when a sentence for a felony is imposed.” Cothren, ¶ 29, 310 P.3d at 9 16. The minimum and maximum terms must be within the li mits set by the st atute violated an d the minimum term imposed cannot be higher than 90% of the ma ximum term imp osed. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7- 13-201. Mr. Casta ner received a senten ce of 42 -to- 75 years of incarce ration. This sentenc e falls within the permissible statutory lim it set by the Legislature for second - degree murder and complies with § 7 - 13-201. As currently w ritten, there is no exception in the statute for juvenile’s convicted of second - degree murder. Compare Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -2- 104 (“. . . whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditat ion, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the second - degree, and sha ll be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any term not less than twenty (20) years, or during life.”), with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -2-101(b) (2024) (“ A person convicted of m urder in the first degree shall be p unished by death, life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment accordi ng to law, except that a person convicted of murder in the first degree who was under the age of eighteen (18) year s at the

9 time of the offense shall be punished by life i mprisonment. ”). A contrary determinati on would usurp the power of the Legislature. Daugherty, 44 P.3d at 34 (“The legislative branch has the exclusive power to define cri mes and to prescribe punishments for those crimes.”). Mr. Castaner’s sentence is not illegal based on the applica ble Wyoming statute. Having determined th at the sentence complie s with Wyoming Statutes, we next address whether it violates Arti cle 1, Section 14 of the Wyoming Constitution. III. Mr. Castaner’s sente nce does not violate Article 1, Section 14 of the Wyom ing Constitution. [¶24] Mr. Castaner argues his sentence is unconstitutional a nd violates Wyomin g’s prohibition against c ruel or unusu al punishment un der Article 1, Section 14 of the Wyoming Constitution. 9 The Wyoming Constitution prohibits the imposition of “cruel or unusual punishment” upon its citiz ens. Art. 1, § 1 4, Wyo. Const. In Hicks v. State, 10 this Court recently determined “a challenger is onl y required under Se ction 14 to sh ow that the sentence was either cruel or un usual before they are en titled to relief.” 2025 WY 113, ¶¶ 78- 79, 578 P.3d 366, 388 (Wyo. 2025) (emph asis added). This Court then explained the bifurcated approach tha t courts must use to analyze whether a specific punishmen t is either cruel or unusual under t he Wyoming Constituti on. Hicks, ¶¶ 110 - 1 19, 578 P.3d at 395 -97. We will analyze below whether Mr. Castaner’s sentence wa s cruel or u nusual u sing the Hicks test. A. Mr. Castaner’s sente nce is not cruel under the Wyoming Constit ution. [¶25] Under Article 1, Section 14, “a punishment i s ‘cruel’ . . . if the punishment is so grossly disproportionat e to the offense that it shocks the mo ral sense of the people.” Hicks, ¶ 116, 578 P.3d at 396. Courts should consider “the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.” Id., ¶ 117, 578 P.3d at 396 -97. In this analysis, c ourts are not comp aring the offender and his or her characteristics with the harshness of the penalty but rather are comparing “the gravity of the offense with th e harshness of th e penalty.” Id., ¶ 122, 578 P.3d at 397. 11 In doi ng so, courts s hould consider “the offender’s actua l criminal 9 M r. Castane r did not put forth a sepa rate argument u nder the Eighth A mendment of the Uni ted States Constitution; therefore, this Court will analyze Mr. Castaner ’s argu ment solel y under the Wyomin g Constitution. Se e Woods v. State, 2017 WY 111, ¶ 1 8, 401 P.3d 962, 969 (Wyo. 2017) (explaini ng that courts will not consider issues that were not thorough ly raised by the parties); see also Klomlia m v. S tate, 2014 WY 1, ¶ 17, 315 P.3d 665, 669 (Wyo. 201 4) (limit ing the court’s analysis to the Wy oming Constitu tion becau se the appel lant did no t assert a s eparate arg ument un der the Uni ted States Co nstitut ion). 10 While Hicks was issued after t he oral argu ment in thi s matter, the parties we re given the opportun ity to provide supplement al briefing in light of the new bifurcated test est ablished in H icks fo r Arti cle 1, Sec tion 14 challenges. 11 In Hicks, this Court was no t asked to decide whether a defendan t’s juven ile stat us shoul d be facto red in to the propo rtional ity analys is b ecause Hi cks was an adul t when he commit ted his c rimes. Hi cks, ¶ 4, 122, 578 P.3d at 375, 397. We once again do not have to addr ess the question of whether a defendan t’s juvenile

10 conduct[,]” not simply the offense f or which the offender was convicted. Id., ¶ 117. “Only if the Court concludes t he punishment is grossl y disproportionate to th e crime does it then determine whether that punishment shocks th e moral sense of the people.” Id. It will be the “very extreme case s” that a punishme nt is deemed cruel. Id. [¶26] Mr. Castaner orig inally argue d his punishment was cruel; however, after the Hic ks opinion was issued, he conceded in supplemen tal briefing that his 42 -to-75- year se ntence for second - degree mur der is not a cru el punishment b ased on his act ual criminal conduct. Because Mr. Castaner concedes his punishme nt is not cruel under Ar ticle 1, Section 14, of the Wyoming Constitu tion, we will not analyze his sentence und er the “cruel” portion of the Hicks test. B. Mr. Castaner’s sen tence is not unus ual under the Wyom ing Constitution. [¶27] To ascertain whether a sentence is “unusual” under Article 1, Section 14, courts must determine if “the punishmen t is obsolete or contravenes c ontemporary standards as measured by a clear consensus of state legisla tures or courts.” Hicks, ¶ 118, 578 P.3d at 397. Obsolete punishments are modes of punishment deeme d antiquated by historica l standards. See In re McDonald, 33 P. at 21 (identifying exam ples of obsolete punish ments); see also In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. at 446, 10 S.Ct. 930 (discussin g “the duty of courts” to invalidate p unishments considered objectionable at the time of founding). To determine whethe r a punishment is unu sual by c ontemporary standard s we compare the punishme nts imposed for the commission of the same crime in other st ate jurisdictions. Norgaard, ¶ 11, 339 P.3d at 271 (quoting So lem, 463 U.S. at 292, 1 03 S.Ct. 3001)). A punishment is unus ual by con temporary standards w hen a clear consensus of state legislatures has abandoned the practice, or courts have deemed the puni shment contrary to law. See id., ¶¶ 27 - 28 (comparing jurisdict ions). The mere fact a punishment is unique to Wyomi ng is not sufficient to demonstrate it is an unusual pu nishment. See Johnson, ¶ 3 7, 61 P.3d at 1249 (rejecting argument the “uniqueness” of a sentencing scheme ren dered it unusual). status should fa ctor into the cruel analysis under Ar ticle 1, Sec tion 14, of the Wyomi ng Constitution because Mr. Castaner conceded his punishm ent was not crue l.

11 Id., ¶ 119. [¶28] Mr. Castaner ar gues that his 42 -to-75- year sentence 12 is unusual because, based on § 6 -10- 301(c), the Legi slature has rejected per iods of incarceration ex ceeding twenty-five years for juvenile offenders. In addition, he argues that thirty-five other states have also abandoned the practice of imposing parole ineligibility periods on juvenile homici de offenders that are great er than twenty-f ive yea rs. C onversely, the Sta te argues that, even if Wyoming is in the minority of states that would allow this sent ence, no clear national consensus exists whic h reject s Wyoming’s sentencing p ractices for juvenile offenders convicted of second- degree murder. [¶29] When discussing punishments that would be consider ed obsolete, courts have looked at the form of the punishment rath er than the length of i ncarceration. In re MacDonald, 33 P. 18, 21 (Wyo. 1893) (discussing obsol ete punishments such as the whipping post and larceny and forgery being c apital offenses); see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 - 47 (1890); Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 542 (Ind. 1998) (“Generall y, the constitutional prohibiti ons against cruel an d unusual punishm ents . . . are pr oscriptive of atrocious or obsolete punishments and are aimed at the kind and fo rm of the punishme nt, rather than the duration and amount.”). Mr. Castaner ’s argument is that his sentence is unusual because of the length of his sentence, not the for m of punishment. Therefore, Mr. Castaner fails to meet h is burden that his sentence was obsolete. [¶30] Second, Mr. Ca staner’s 42 -to- 75 - year sentence is not unusual under Article 1, Section 14, of the Wyoming Constit ution because the punis hment does not contravene contemporary sta ndards as measured by a clear consen sus of state l egislatures or courts. Here, in compliance w ith Hicks, Mr. Castane r provides sufficient state - level analysis to consider the unusua lness of his sentence. Hicks, ¶¶ 124-131, 578 P.3d at 398-99. [¶31] To be successful, Mr. Castaner must demonst rate there is a clear con sensus amon g state legislatures or cou rts that a 42 -to- 75- year sentence fo r a juvenile convicted of second - degree murder contra venes contemporary s tandards and the practice has either been abandoned by state legislatures or co urts have deemed the sentence contrary to law. To accomplish this, Mr. Castaner pr ovided information re garding other state stat utes and 12 The Court notes that Mr. Castan er’s sen tence sati sfies t he 4 5/61 s tandard announced in Bear Cloud I II. See Davi s, ¶ 10, 472 P.3d at 1033-34. Bear Clo ud III determined that when a juve nile ’s earli est pos sib ility of parole was a fter serving 45 years of i mprisonment, and th e juvenile wou ld be released at the age o f sixty - one, that sentence amounted to “the functiona l equivalent of life without pa role.” Id., ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 142. Mr. Bear Cloud w as convicted of first - degree murder, among other offenses, for which life without parol e was a possible sentenc e. Id., ¶ 4, 334 P.3d at 135. However, M r. Castaner plea d guilty to se cond - degree mu rder, for whic h lif e wit hout par ole i s not a poss ibl e se nte ncin g opt ion. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -2-104(a). Since Mr. Castaner ’s sentence w as under the 45 /61 standard, we do no t have to determine whethe r the 45/61 standard in Bear Cloud III s hould be extended to juve niles convicted of second - d egree murder. We leave that question for another day.

12 argues his minimum t erm of forty-two years in prison would only be le gal in fourteen other states. Further, when the maximum term of seventy-five years is considered, Mr. Castane r argues his sen tence is only legal in eight states. Even if we consider Mr. Castaner ’s data and information as true, 13 he fails to meet the considerable burden of demonstrating a clear consensus of state legislatures has abandone d the practice of sentencing juvenile s to a sentence similar to Mr. Castaner’s. While the data demonstrat es Wy oming may be in the minority of states that would allow Mr. Ca staner’s sentence, there is not an obvious and generally accepted opinion amon g state legislatures that a 42-to- 75 -five- year sent ence for a juvenile convicted of second-degree mu rder is never permi ssible or warranted. See e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.55.125(b) (2024) (“A defendant convicted of murder in the second degree. . . shall be sentenced to a definite te rm of imprisonme nt of at least fifteen years but not more than ninety-nin e years.”); Neb. Rev. S tat. § § 28-105(1), -304(2) (20 24) (second- degree murder is pun ishable by a minimu m of twenty yea rs to a maximum of life imprisonment); Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1102.1(c)(1) (2024) (“A person w ho at the time of the commission of the off ense was fifteen years of age or older s hall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment the minimum of which s hall be at least thirty years to life.”). Even if Wyoming was the only state that allowed this particular sentenc e, that may still be insufficient to demonstrate that Wyomi ng’s law contravenes contem porary standards by a clear consensus. Hicks, ¶ 119, 578 P.3d at 397. It will be a rare situ ation where an appellant can meet this considerable burden. Cf. Ten nessee v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49, 63 (Tenn. 2022) (determining t hat a mandator y sentence of sixty years, with release after serving fifty- one years if all good time credit is recei ved, for a juvenile convi cted of felony murder offended contemporary standards of decency because “Tenne ssee is a clear outlier . . . [and] is the harshest of any sentence in the co untry” when the next closest punishment in severity in another state would have a juvenil e offender released after serving [thirty-five] years o f incarceration). Some state legislatures hav e enacted statutes tha t address allowable sentence ranges and p arole eligibility of juv enile offenders convict ed of second -degree murder. E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119, § 72B (202 4); 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Sta t. Ann. § 1102.1. Wyoming does not ha ve such a statute, and it is not this Court’s ro le to legislate. Delc on Partners, ¶ 10, 450 P.3d at 685. Mr. Castaner has failed to show that a clear consensus of state legislatures has abandoned t he practice of sentencing juveniles convicted of second- degree murder to a peri od of incarceration of 4 2-to-75 years. 13 While Mr. Ca staner’s data ap pears to mostl y be ac curate, there are some discrep ancies f rom lack of context. For exa mple, Mr. Castaner claims th at the ma ximu m ter m of i mprison me nt for a viola tio n of Co lo. Rev. Stat. § 18 -3- 103(3)(a) is twe nty -four years of inc arceratio n; however, that is the ma xi mum term f or the presumptive sentencin g range. Colo. Rev. Sta t. § 18 -1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A). In fac t, Co lora do la w allows a sen tencing co urt to devi ate from the pr esu mptiv e range up to twic e the maximu m o f the presump tive range fo r various rea sons inc luding th e presence o f certain agg ravating fac tors. Colo. Rev. St at. § 18 -1.3- 401(1) (b)(I), (c)(I V)(6), (8)(a). Consequently, a sent encing court coul d determine th at a sentence of 48 years is appr opriate for a convictio n of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18 - 3- 103(3)(a), even fo r a juvenile. See Armstrong v. Colorado, 2017 C O 51, 395 P.3d 74 8 (Colo. 2017) (affir ming the trial court’s aggr egate sentence o f nine ty -six years for two counts of second - degre e murder, fort y - eigh t years for each count, fo r a juvenile w ho was sixtee n years old at the time of the m urders and was convi cted under a complicity theory).

13 [¶32] Mr. Castaner similar ly has not met his burde n of demonstrating a cle ar consensus of courts have conclu sively determined sentences for second - degr ee murder like Mr. Castaner’s contravene contemporary standards. Some state courts that have affirme d sentences for second - degree murder c ommitted by juveni les are lengthier than Mr. Castaner’s sentence. S ee e.g., Louisiana v. Brown, 51,41 8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/17), 27 3 So.3d 442 (affirming juvenile’s sente nce of life without the possibi lity of parole, with stat utory parole eligib ility after serving thirty-five years in prison, for second - degree murder); Nebrask a v. Cardeilhac, 876 N.W.2d 876 (Neb. 20 16) (affirming a juvenil e’s sentence of sixty t o life for second - degree murder); South Dakota v. Quevedo, 2020 S.D. 42, 947 N.W.2d 402 (affirming a juve nile’s sentence of nine ty yea rs to life, with paro le eligibility after forty-five years, for second - d egree murder). Other state courts are currently grappling with the same issue presented here. Michigan v. Eads, ---N.W.3d ---, 2025 WL 223470 (Mich. Ct. Ap p. 2025) (appeal granted, 25 N.W.3 d 118 (Mem), Sept. 10, 2025) (finding that a juvenile ’s sentence of fifty to seventy-five years for second - degree murder was cruel and unusual). As such, there is not a clear consensus in c ourts throughout the nation that Mr. Castane r’s sentence is contra ry to the law. [¶33] Considering the da ta and research presente d to this Court, there is not a clear consensus among eithe r state legisla tures or courts that lead s us to conclude Mr. Ca staner’s sentence contravenes c ontemporary stan dards. While Wyoming is in the mino rity of states that permit sentences a s lengthy as Mr. Cas taner’s, the sentence is consistent with those permitted in various other state legislatu res. In addition, there are various state courts that have affirmed sentencing juvenile o ffenders to longer sentences tha n Mr. Castaner’s for the crime of second - degree murder. Th erefore, we hold that Mr. Cast aner’s 42 -to- 75 - year sentence for sec ond - degree murder is not unusual under Article 1, Sectio n 14, of the Wyoming Constitution. CONCLUSION [¶34] We find that the district court’s sentence of 42-to-75 years of incar ceration for a juvenile convicted of one count of sec ond - degree murder wa s legal under Wyoming law. Further, Mr. Castaner failed to demons trate a clear consensus of state legislatures has abandoned the sentenc ing practice, o r that a clear con sensus of co urts has deem ed his sentence to be contrary to the law. Therefore, Mr. Castaner’s 42 -to-75- year senten ce for second- degree murder, that he committed as a juvenile, was not unu sual under Article 1, Section 14 of the Wyo ming Constitution. [¶35] Affirmed.