Joshua John O'Dell v. State of Wyoming - Criminal Appeal

IN THE SUP REME COURT, ST ATE OF W YOMI NG 20 26 WY 26 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 20 25 February 24, 2026 JOSHUA JOHN O ’DELL, Appellant (Defendant), v. THE STATE OF WY OMING, Appellee (Plaintiff). S-25-0098 Appeal from the Distri ct Court of Campbell County The Honorable Matthe w F.G. Castano, Judge Representing Appellan t: Office of the State Public Defe nder: Brandon T. Booth, Wyoming State Public Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Sean H. Barrett, Senior Assistant Appellate Co unsel. Argument by M r. Barrett. Representing Appell ee: Keith G. Kautz, Wyoming Attorn ey General; Jenny L. Craig, De puty Attorney General; Kristen R. Jones, Senior As sistant Attorney General; John J. Woykovsky, Senior Assistant Attorn ey General. Argume nt by Mr. Woykovsk y. Before BOOMGAAR DEN, C.J., GRAY, FE NN, JAROSH, JJ., an d EAMES, D.J. NOTI CE: This op inion i s subject to forma l revisi on before p ublicat ion in Pacific R eporter T hird. Readers ar e requested to notify the C lerk of the S upreme Cou rt, Supreme C ourt Build ing, Cheyen ne, Wyoming 82002, of typo graphical or oth er formal e rrors so corr e ction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.

1 JAROSH, Justice. [¶1] A jury convicted Joshu a John O’Dell of two c ounts of first - degree sexual assault of a minor. On appeal, Mr. O’Dell c hallenges several of the d istrict court’s rulings at trial. First, he asserts the district court ab used its discretion and violate d the Co nfrontation Clauses of the United States and Wyomin g Constitutions when i t limited his cross - examination of the vict ims related to their viol ations of a sequestratio n order. In addition, Mr. O’Dell contends the district court abu sed its discretion when it denied two motions for mistrial after Mr. O’D ell objected to purport edly inadmissible evid ence under Wyoming Rule of Evidence (W.R.E.) 404(b). Findi ng no error, we affirm. ISSUES [¶2] Mr. O’Dell asserts five issues on appeal, whic h we rephrase as follo ws: 1. Did the district court ab use its discretion when it limited the scope of Mr. O’Dell’s cross - examin ation of JB and FO related to their violations of the sequestration order? 2. Did the district court violate the Confr ontation Clauses of t he United States and Wyoming Constitutions when it limited the sco pe of Mr. O’Dell’s cross - examin ation of JB and FO related to their violations of the sequestration order? 3. Did the district court abuse its discretion whe n, during JB’s testimony, it sustained an objection under W.R.E. 404(b) but did not order a mistrial? 4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when, later during JB’s testimony, it overrule d an objection under W.R.E. 404(b) and di d not order a mistrial? 5. Does cumulative error warrant reversal? FACTS Background [¶3] Joshua O’Dell moved in with Brandie Ave and her daughter JB in October 2 005 when JB was six mont hs old. In April 2007, Mr. O’Dell a nd Ms. Ave had a daughter together, FO. Mr. O’D ell and Ms. Ave marrie d in September 2010. [¶4] Years later, in March 2022, Ms. A ve, JB, and FO moved out of t he family home. One month later, just a fter her fifteenth birthd ay, FO moved back ho me with Mr. O’Dell.

2 [¶5] In September 2022, JB disclosed to her probation officer and th en to a police detective, Nicole Hahn, that Mr. O’Dell sexual ly abused her when she was nine years o ld. JB reported that Mr. O’ Dell “trained” her to un dress every time he sna pped his fingers. JB also reported Mr. O’D ell would write notes/l etters 1 to her that were sexual in nature an d that her sister, FO, foun d some of the notes and “knew what [Mr. O’D ell] was doing.” She also reported Mr. O’Dell would mak e her sleep naked with no blanke ts so he could l ook at her anytime he wanted. [¶6] JB reported an incident in which Mr. O’Dell c alled her down to the basement and made her perform fella tio on him. JB began crying and told him “no,” but he said he did not care what she said, and she better do it or he would “beat her ass.” She did as she was told and performed fellatio on Mr. O’Dell f or approximately one or two minutes but stopped when they hea rd the front door open and Ms. Ave and FO e ntered the house. [¶7] In April 2023, Detective Hahn also spoke w ith FO, who co nfirmed Mr. O’Del l would ask FO to pa ss notes to JB. FO also r eported that in 2022, when she was fifteen, Mr. O’Dell forced her onto his bed and bega n to kiss her all over her body, from her brea sts to her thighs. He then inserted two fingers int o her vagina. FO state d she was screaming and kicking, but Mr. O ’Dell would not stop. Charges [¶8] The State charged Mr. O’Dell with two cou nts of first - degree sexual abuse of a minor and alleged Mr. O’Dell inflicted sexual intrusion on JB b y having her perform fellatio on him, and inf licted sexual intrusion on FO by digitally pen etrating her vagina. Trial – Sequestration of Witnesses [¶9] Prior to trial, the district court granted Mr. O’Dell’s motion to sequester wit nesses. On the second day of trial, Ms. Ave test ified. At the conclusion of he r testimony, the State asked the court to investigate a report that one or both victims were in the hallway and ma y have overheard someone livestreami ng the trial on a phone. The c ourt stated it would question both victims about what happened and allow each party to make “narrow” inquiries of each witne ss as well. [¶10] Outside the presence o f the jury, the court questioned eac h witness about what they heard. JB admitted she heard the livestream of the trial being broadca st from her cousi n’s phone in the hallway when the court w as “getting mad” for “ma ybe 30 seconds, 45 seconds.” She testifie d she “couldn’t reme mber” anything else, and that she “wasn’t 1 The par ties and th e record u se both “no tes” and “l etters” to d escribe t he writ ten co mmunication s from Mr. O’Dell to JB. For con tinuity, we w ill use the phrase “n otes” in this opin ion.

3 paying attention to [the livestream]” beca use she was on her own phone. She testified she did not hear any witness testimony. JB further testified that she was not told she “wasn’t allowed to listen to [the trial],” just that she “c ouldn’t be in the courtr oom.” [¶11] FO also admitted she heard the livestream on her cousin’s phone, and that it played for less than five minutes. She testified she did not realize the pho ne was streaming the trial, and that she was looking at her own pho ne and not paying attenti on. She testified she “heard people talking” and “yelling,” bu t she did not hear “what exactly was said” nor di d she recognize any of the voices she heard. She did know her mother was in the courtroom at the time. FO testified that at no point did she hear her mother’s v oice. When asked if she was told she could not listen to the trial, she answered, “th e attorney and [the prosecutor] told us that we weren’t allowed to listen to anything about it.” [¶12] Another witness, Raec hell O’Dell, was also s ubject to the sequestrat ion order and instructed not to list en to the trial. She testified that she listened to approximately eight minutes of the live stream around 9:37 a. m. on the first morning of t rial. The court took notice that what she heard was during the early portion of voir dire, and not during any witness testimony. [¶13] The district court did not find “any co ordination, cooperation, [or] c onnivance” in relation to JB, FO, and Raechell O’Dell overhearing the livestrea m. The court further concluded JB overhear d only a portion of the t rial during which the ju ry was excluded from the courtroom, which was “nontestim onial in nature,” and neither JB nor FO were intentionally listening or paying attention, according to their testimony. As for Raechell O’Dell, the court con cluded she only liste ned to a portion of voir dire which was nontestimonial. Id. [¶14] The court also conclud ed JB, FO, and Raechell O’Dell did not hear any testimony. The Court then denied Mr. O’Dell’s request to exclude JB’s and FO’s testimony as a sanction for their alleged violations of th e sequestration order. Instead, the court ruled Mr. O’Dell could cross - exa mine JB and FO about what they hear d in the hallway. The district court limited cross - exa mination to three questions about whether JB a nd FO heard anything that would taint their own testimon y. The court stated, “That cross examination will be limited as such: 1) Did you listen? 2) How m uch did you listen to? 3) What, if anything, did you learn in the c ourse of listening to t hat?” The court f ound “that strikes the balance … between any potential taint that may be something that the ju ry needs to know in determining whether or not the State has prov ed its case against Mr. O’Dell a nd allowing Mr. O’Dell, a s well, the freedo m of a defense in this matter with regard to that there has been testimony that has been fabricate d, ha rmonized, et cetera, with regard to having he ard other testimony.” Reg arding Mr. O’Dell’s re quest to examine the w itnesses regarding the fact that they violate d a court order, the cour t concluded by statin g,

4 … when the purpose of the rule -- or the p urpose of exclusion of witnesses is to avoid bleedover between the two, the Court’s order really is irrelevant to that iss ue to the Court. I mean, to do othe rwise would just be generally to p ut forward some notion of disobedience of these witnesse s, and the Court finds that probably more prejudicial t han probative when the probative portion of it i s what was heard. Trial Testimony – Seq uestration [¶15] Later in the trial, bot h JB and FO tes tified and were cross - examined about liste ning to the livestream of the trial. First, Mr. O’Dell questioned JB about what she heard i n the hallway. He asked her if she listened to a livestream of the trial. She replied, “just of the judge,” for “maybe 30 seconds.” She testifie d she had found livestreams for other cases before on Google, and she showed her co usin how to do that. She also stated she “did n’t know [her cousin] was going to sit there and listen to it.” She also testified she heard the livestream from her own phone, w hich contradicted her statements from the day b efore about hearing the livestream from her cousin ’s phone. As a result, Mr. O’Dell’s counsel questioned JB about he r prior statement. [¶16] FO also testified on cr oss - examination th at she heard the trial being livestreamed in the hallway on her cousin’s phone. When asked how long she listene d to it, she answered, “[n]ot long at all.” She testified her cousin was only sitting by her for “ three, four minutes” but that she was lo oking at her own phone and “wasn’t necessarily listening to [her cousin’s phone].” FO denied tal king about the trial wit h JB while they were i n the hallway. Motions for Mistrial – Alleged Rule 404(b) Violations [¶17] During trial, JB tes tified that when she was ab out nine or ten years ol d Mr. O’Dell called her downstairs to the basement living room. She said Mr. O’ Dell was sitting on the couch near the fireplace when he unzippe d his pants, exposed his p enis, and told JB to “suck his d*ck.” JB “tr ied to refuse i t” by saying “no,” and she started to cry. Mr. O’Dell told her, “[n]ow,” and that if she di dn’t do “what [she] was supposed to,” she would “ge t [her] ass whooped.” JB was on he r knees and placed Mr. O’Dell’s penis in her mouth for about two minutes whe n she heard her mother and sister come in the front door. Mr. O’Dell then told JB to get ups tairs, and “[n]ot to tell my mom or sister or anyone,” or else she would “get [her] ass w hooped.” [¶18] When asked if she eve r told her siste r, JB replied she did. The State then a sked, “And when you tell her, do you make it clear to her or advise her not to tell anybody?” JB responded, “I never to ld her about t hat incident, just about other tim es.” M r. O’Dell then objected and moved for a mistrial on the basis of Rule 404(b). Mr. O’Dell argued becaus e there was only one charged incident r elated to JB at issue, JB’s c omment about “other

5 times” was in reference to other sexual acts and the State had not filed a notice to use 404(b) evidence. The district court sustain ed the objection, struck JB’s res ponse, and instructed the jury to disregard it. The court denied the motion for a mistrial. [¶19] During cross - examination, Mr. O’Dell questi oned JB about the differences between what she told p olice during i nterviews and w hat she wrote in her written st atement. JB agreed that she did not say anything during the interviews a bout Mr. O’Dell sending her notes. On re-direct, JB testified that Mr. O’ Dell had “passed her [note s]” that were sexual in nature. When asked what the notes specifically sai d, JB responde d they said, “if I got my best friend … or babysitter at the t ime … to basicall y take my spot, then he wou ld stop with me.” [¶20] Mr. O’Dell objected and moved for a mistrial on t he ground that J B’s testimony referenced “other sexual acts again,” a nd “insinuating there’ s a bunch o f character evidence out here that is c ompletely uncharged[.]” The district court denied Mr. O’D ell’s motion stating JB’s testimony did not implicate “a nything other than what is potentially the charged conduct here.” Remainder of Trial, V erdict, and Sente nce [¶21] Finally, FO testified re garding Mr. O’Dell’s a buse of her. She testified Mr. O’Del l came into her bedroom in June 2022 and pull ed down his pants and pushed her onto her bed. They argued about what Mr. O’Dell had done to JB, and he s aid he would “show [FO ] what he d id to [JB] because [FO] wanted to beli eve it.” Mr. O’Dell then leaned over FO, pulled down her boxer shorts, kis sed “all the way up [her] front” including her brea sts and then forcefully inse rted two fingers “in and out” of FO’ s vagina. FO repeatedly asked him to stop, but he did not. Mr. O’Dell told FO there would be consequences if anyon e ever found out what happened. FO testified she was scared to leave but eventually moved out in March 2023. [¶22] Mr. O’Dell testified in his own defense and denied the allegation s against him. The jury found Mr. O’Dell guilty of both counts of first - degree sexual abuse of a minor and the district court sentenced him to consecutive ter ms of twenty - five to fo rty years in prison for each count. [¶23] This appeal followed. STANDARD OF RE VIEW [¶24] The sanctions imposed for violation of sequ estration orders are revi ewed for an abuse of discretion. K.C. v. State, 20 04 WY 74, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 805, 80 7 (Wyo. 2004). We also review rulings on the admissib ility of evidence for an abus e of discretion. Testerman v. State, 2025 WY 58, ¶ 27, 568 P.3d 1206, 1215 (Wyo. 2025) (c itation modified). In

6 considering whether there was an abuse of disc retion, we consider whe ther the district court could reasonably conc lude as it did. Id. (quotation omitted). “A trial court’s rulin gs on the admissibility of evidence are entitled to cons iderable deference, and as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court’s ruling, that rulin g will not be disturbed on appeal. The appellant bears the burden of show ing an a buse of discretion.” I d. (quotatio n omitted). Only if we find the evidence was admitted in error do we then consider whether the evidence was prejudicial. Nania v. St ate, 2025 WY 16, ¶ 15, 562 P. 3d 1306, 1310 (Wyo. 2025). We also review the denial of a motion for mis trial for an abuse of discretion. Langley v. State, 2020 WY 135, ¶ 18, 474 P.3d 1130, 1135 (Wyo. 2020) (citation modified). [¶25] Mr. O’Dell’s Confront ation Clause argument is a question of law this court reviews de novo. Tamblyn v. State, 2020 WY 7 6, ¶ 13, 465 P.3d 440, 445 (Wyo. 2020) (citing Schmidt v. State, 2017 WY 101, ¶ 22, 40 1 P.3d 868, 878 (Wyo. 2017)) (citation modified). DISCUSSION I. The district court did not abuse its discretion or vio late the Confrontation Claus es when it limited cross - exam ination of the witnesses who violated the sequestr ation order. a. The district court did not abuse its discret ion in determining the rem edy for violating the sequestra tion order. [¶26] Mr. O’Dell contends th e district court abused its discretion by not allowing him to conduct a mor e robust cross - examination of JB and FO regarding listen ing to the livestrea m of the trial while they were in the hallway. S pecifically, Mr. O’Dell contends he should have been permitted to question both witnesses about the fact that in do ing so, the witnesses violated a court orde r. [¶27] W.R.E. 615 provides that, at the re quest of either party, the cour t shall order witnesses excluded s o they cannot h ear the testimony of other witne sses. K.C., ¶ 11, 92 P.3d at 807 (quoting Towner v. State, 6 85 P.2d 45, 47 -49 (Wyo. 1984)). The purpose of sequestration is to prevent witnesses from tailoring their testimony to t hat of prior witnes ses and to aid in the detection of falseho ods and testimony that i s less than candid. Id. (cita tions omitted). Whether a s equestration order has been violated, and wh at remedy, if any, is appropriate, lies withi n the sound discretion of the trial court. Id., ¶ 9, 9 2 P.3d at 807 (quoting Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 58 - 5 9 (Wyo. 2000)). When a violation is alleged, a court must consider the circumstances of t he violation and whether it result ed in prejudice to the opposing party. K.C., ¶ 11, 92 P.3d at 807-08. [¶28] Although Rule 615 does not prescri be specific sanct ions for vio lations, courts generally recognize thr ee potential remedies: hold the witness in contempt; per mit cross -

7 examination and comm ent on the violation; or exclude testimony alto gether. Id. (citations omitted). Exclusion of testimony is an extre me remedy, generally reserved for situati ons involving bad faith or d emonstrable prejudice. See id., ¶ 11, 92 P.3d at 807 (“Exclusion of the witness ’ testimony is too grave a sanctio n where the violati on was not intentiona l and was not procured by the connivance of the party or his counsel.”) Generally, excluding testimony is strongly d isfavored where the pa rty offering the witness neither knew of nor procured the violation. Id., ¶ 11, 92 P.3d at 808 (citation modified). [¶29] Here, the witnesses o verheard a livestr eam of a brief portion of the trial while waiting to testify. Upon learning abo ut the conduct, th e State brough t it to the attentio n of the district court. Ther eafter, the district court and counse l conducted an examination of JB and FO outside the presence of the jury to determine the extent to which they listened to the trial in vi olation of the sequestration ord er. Once it concl uded that the violation was minimal, and that neith er witness heard any ac tual testimony, the distr ict court determined the appropriate remed y was to permit defe nse counsel to condu ct a limited cross - examination on the n ature and extent of each witness’s exposure to t he trial proceedings. The court authorized three specific questions: “1) Did y ou listen; 2) How much di d you listen to; and 3) W hat, if anything, did you lear n in the course of listen ing to that”? [¶30] Thereafter, JB and FO testified in fro nt of the jury about what they hea rd. 2 On cross - examination, JB testifi ed she heard the liv estream of the tri al for “[m]aybe 3 0 seconds,” and “[j]ust of the judg e.” FO testified she heard the livestream for three or four min utes but was scrolling on her own phone and “wasn’t necessarily list ening to it.” Critically, JB’s and FO’s testimon y revealed that neither heard any testimony fr om another witness. [¶31] In considering whether the district court abuse d its discretion, we must keep in mind that “[j]udicial discreti on is a composite of many th ings, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercise d with re gard to what is right under the c ircumstances and w ithout doing so arbitrarily and capriciously.” Miller v. Beyer, 2014 WY 84, ¶ 14, 329 P.3d 95 6, 961 (Wyo. 2014) (quot ations and citations omitted). Again, in as sessing whether there has been an abuse of d iscretion, our focus is on the reasonableness of the district court’s d ecision. Id. [¶32] Based on the record, we cannot find that the d istrict court abused its di scretion. The violation of the sequestration orde r was minimal, as neither witn ess heard any actua l testimony. As a result, there was no risk that JB or FO conformed their testimony to th at of a prior witness o r that a prior wit ness’s testimony impacted their testim ony in any manner. In addition, Mr. O’Dell did not su ffer any prejudice rela ted to JB’s or FO’s violation. While Mr. O ’Dell asserts he should have been per mitted to inquire into the fact that by listening JB and FO violate d a court order, any such testim ony would have been irrelevant. The issue w as whether they heard t estimony and conform ed their testimony to 2 Raechell O’Dell was not questione d in front of the jury about listening to the livestream.

8 what they heard. They did not. Even if there was some marginal relevance to the fact that JB and FO violated a court order, it was substantially outweighed b y the danger of unfair prejudice under W.R. E. 403— specifically, t he danger associated wit h the jury learning that JB and FO had been di sobedient to the court. [¶33] The district court’s response to the se questration violation was reas onable. The court did not abuse its discretion when it limit ed cross - examination o f JB and FO related to what they overheard on the livestrea m by precluding Mr. O’Dell from quest ioning t hem about violating a court order. b. The district court’ s rulings did not violate the Confrontation Clauses. [¶34] Mr. O’Dell also argues limiting his ability to cross examine JB and FO regarding violation of the distri ct court’s se questration order violate d his right to confront those two witnesses under the Confrontation Clau ses of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions. [¶35] The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitutio n and Article 1, Section 1 0 of the Wyoming Cons titution provide that a person accus ed of a crime has the right to confront a witness against hi m in a criminal a ction. Detimore v. State, 2024 WY 109, ¶ 17, 557 P.3d 1172, 1177 (Wyo. 202 4) (citation omitted). The primary right of the Confrontation Clauses is the right of cross - examination. I d. (quoting Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, ¶ 8, 127 P.3d 7 93, 796 (Wyo. 2 006)). The pur pose of cross - e xamination is to test “the believability of a witness and the truth of [their] testi mony.” Ta mblyn, ¶ 47, 465 P.3d at 452 (citations omitt ed). Altho ugh a defendant’s rig ht to confrontation m ay not be denied, it can be limite d. Miller, ¶ 8, 127 P.3d at 796. [¶36] To establish a Confrontation Clause viola tion, a defendant must show more than just a denial of the ability to ask spec ific questions of a particular witn ess. Detimore, ¶ 17, 557 P.3d at 1177. Rather, a defendant must show they were prohibit ed from engaging in otherwise appropriat e cross -examinatio n de signed to sh ow a protot ypical form of bi as and to provide the j ury with facts fr om which it co uld reasonably assess the witness’s reliability. Id. (quoting Miller, ¶ 8, 127 P. 3d at 796) (emphasis adde d). The Confrontation Clause guarantees “an opportunity for effective cross - examinati on, not cross -examinat ion that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defens e might wish.” Id. The right is “not unfettered.” Id. Where the jury is made aware of facts bearing on a witness’s credibility, the Constitution is satisfied even if t he defense is not permitted to explore every conceivable line of impeachment. Id. (recognizing questioning th at is “repetitive or of marginal relevance” is subject to the trial cour t’s discretion). [¶37] Here, both JB and FO testified live a nd under oath about the c harges against Mr. O’Dell. Additionally, the district court also allowed Mr. O’Dell to ask them the three

9 specific questions about the sequestratio n violation: 1) Did you listen? 2) How much did you listen to? 3) What, if anything, did you le arn in the course of listening to that? These questions directly addr essed the core purpose of sequestrati on, which was to preve nt the witnesses from tailorin g their testimony. Further, the jury w as able to evaluate whether the witnesses’ testimony was influenced by ex posure to other evide nce, thereby allowin g “enough information t o make a dis criminating appraisal of the witnesses’ credibility.” See 23 C.J.S. Criminal Pro cedure and Rights of A ccused, § 906. [¶38] Importantly, defense counsel was not prohibi ted from arguing credibil ity generally, and did so. Both witnesses w ere also subjec t to full cross - exa mination by Mr. O’Dell. Although Mr. O’Dell s ought to further question the witnes ses about the violation of the sequestration order, th e district court properl y limited that inquiry, as explained a bove. Simply put, whether t he witnesses violated a court order w as irrelevant. Because Mr. O’Dell was not prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropr iate cro ss-examination, there was no violation of the Confrontation Cl auses. II. The district court did not abu se its discre tion in ruling o n Mr. O’Dell’s objections to JB’s testim ony or by not granting Mr. O’Dell’s m otions for mistrial. [¶39] Mr. O’Dell argues the district court erre d when it did not declare a mistrial after JB testified, “I never told her about that incident, just about the other ti mes.” [¶40] W.R.E. Rule 404(b) sta tes, Evidence of other crimes, wron gs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in confo rmity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, suc h as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, k nowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or a ccident. [¶41] We have consistentl y held when a district co urt is presented with a motio n for a mistrial, justice req uires the motion be gra nted only if the appellant has been prejudiced because his or her substantial ri ghts were abri dged. Salinas v. State, 2016 WY 97, ¶ 15, 380 P.3d 647, 650 (Wyo. 2016) (quot ations omitted). Granting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy tha t should only be invok ed in the face of an err or so prejudicial that justice could not be served by proceedin g with trial. McGill v. S tate, 2015 WY 132, ¶ 11, 357 P.3d 1140, 1145 (Wyo. 2015) (quotation omitted). The district court must determine whether the conduct wa s “so prejudicial that ju stice could not be serve d by proceeding with trial.” Id., ¶ 8, 257 P.3d at 1144 (q uoting Warner v. S tate, 897 P.2d 47 2, 474 (Wyo.1995)). The district court is in the best po sition to assess the prejudici al impact of such error. McGill, ¶ 11, 357 P.3d at 1145 (qu otation omitted).

10 [¶42] On review, we must resolve whether the district court a bused its discretion i n denying the mistrial, and if so, whether that denial prejudiced Mr. O’Dell. Id. (citing Drury v. Sta te, 2008 WY 130, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 1017, 1019 (W yo. 2008) (“Ap pellant has the burden of sho wing that she was prej udiced by the district court’s denial of the motion for mistrial.”)). Evaluating Mr. O’Dell’s claim requires consideratio n of the challenged testimony i n context. On direct examination, t he State asked JB, “Did you ever have any fears of being believed?” She r eplied, “Sometimes.” The Sta te then asked, “N ow, at some point do you tell your sister?” JB re plied, “Yes.” The State then asked, “And when you tell her, do you ma ke it clear to her or advise her not to tell anybody?” JB responded, “I never tol d her about that inciden t, just about the other ti mes.” [¶43] Mr. O’Dell immediate ly objected and moved for a m istrial “on the b asis of a 404(b) violation.” He argu ed that the testim ony improperly refer red to unchar ged misconduct and that the State had not p rovided the required pr etrial notice to introduc e such evidence. [¶44] The State responde d that a mistrial was not w arranted. The distr ict court sustained the objection and struck the testimony, noting that the question “was not tailored to elicit [the stated] informatio n,” and was “produced organically from the witness.” The court found no intentional violation an d denied the motion for mistrial. The court further instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. The court rec ognized the precarious nature of the testimony but co ncluded that a mistrial was unnecessary. [¶45] Implicit in the distr ict court’s sustained objection and its instruct ion to the jury to disregard the testimony was that the testimon y was inadmissible u nder WRE 404(b). See Reay v. State, 2008 WY 13, ¶ 16, 176 P.3d 647, 652 (Wy o. 2008) (finding the victim’s testimony in that instance was evidence of uncharged misconduct). However, i n Reay, w e held that there was no reasonable possibilit y that the verdict mig ht have been more favorable to the defe ndant without the test imony. Id. at ¶ 17, 176 P.3d at 652. [¶46] We conclude similarly here. T he district court struck the te stimony a nd instructed the jury to disregard it. A trial error m ay be corrected by an appropriate cur ative instruction. In a ddition, we presume jurors follow the court’s inst ructions. Carrier v. State, 2017 WY 88, ¶ 40, 400 P.3d 358, 367 (Wyo. 20 17) (quoting Bruce v. State, 2015 WY 46, ¶ 75, 346 P.3d 909, 931 (Wy o. 2015)) (other quotati ons omitted). Generally, when improper testimony is stricken and the jury is instructed to dis regard it, the in struction is deemed sufficient to pr event prejudice. Carrier, ¶ 40, 400 P.3d at 267 (citing McGill, ¶ 12, 357 P.3d at 1145). We have repeatedly re affirmed this presumption and do so again here. See Willoughby v. State, 2011 WY 92, ¶ 11, 253 P.3d 157, 16 1 (Wyo. 2011) (“We have said many tim es that a trial error may be c orrected by an appropriate curative instruction, and that we presume that jurors fol low the court’s instruct ions.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it den ied Mr. O’Dell’s reques t to declare a mi strial.

11 [¶47] Mr. O’Dell a lso contends the district court erre d when it overrul ed his objection and denied a mistrial afte r JB testifie d on redirect t hat Mr. O’Dell sent her a note that said, “if I got my best friend … or my babysi tter … to basically take my spot, then he would sto p with me.” Mr. O’Dell objected, and the court held a sidebar co nference out of the presence of the jury, during whic h Mr. O’Dell again moved for a mistri al based on alleged uncharge d character evidence. [¶48] Having previously rule d the State could inqui re about the notes, the district cour t concluded the testi mony did not imply conduc t beyond the char ged offense an d denied the motion for mistrial. We agree. The note could reasonably be understood to reference the conduct for which Mr. O’Dell was charged, an d nothing more. [¶49] In addition, and even i f the testimony implied conduct be yond the charged offen se, JB provided no details regarding when or where any conduct oc curred, nor did she de scribe any distinct act separate from the charged offense. The testimon y was therefore t oo ambiguous to constitute evidence of uncharge d misconduct under Rule 404(b). See Reay, ¶ 12, 176 P.3d at 651. Additional ly, Mr. O’Dell first elicite d the testimony about the notes while cross - examining JB, which was his prerogative to do. S ee Ca zier v. State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 33, 148 P.3d 23, 24 (Wyo. 200 6). However, “[w]hen the defe ndant initiates a line of questioning, the prosecutor is enti tled to make a permissible inqu iry without crossing into prosecutorial over kill.” Id. (citation omitted). T he district court did n ot abuse its discretion when it over ruled the objection and denied Mr. O’Dell’ s motion for a mistrial. III. In the absence of m ultiple error s, cumulativ e error cannot exist. [¶50] “The purpose of eva luating for cumulativ e error is to address whether the cumulative effect of tw o or more indiv idually harmless e rrors ha s the potential to preju dice the defendant to the sa me extent as a single r eversible error.” King v. State, 2023 WY 36, ¶ 51, 527 P.3d 1229, 1 246 - 47 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Hicks v. State, 2 021 WY 2, ¶ 40, 478 P.3d 652, 663 (Wyo. 2021)) (o ther citation o mitted). Be cause there are not two or more instances of error here, we do not consider Mr. O’Dell’s cumulati ve error argument. CONCLUSION [¶51] The district court did not abuse its discreti on or violate the Confront ation Clauses of the Unite d States or Wyoming Constituti on when it limited his cross - examinati on of the victims related to their violations of a sequestr ation order. The distri ct court also did not abuse its discretion i n two instances when it denied M r. O’Dell’s motions for mistrial. Finding no error, we af firm.