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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re K.B. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: D086951

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/2/26 In re K.B. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re K.B., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND D086951
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. J521616)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

H.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Lilys D. McCoy, Judge. Affirmed.

Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel and Evangelina Woo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Appellant H.B. (Mother) appeals1 from an order maintaining the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction over K.B. (Child), entered at the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing. Mother contends only that the juvenile court erred when
it maintained jurisdiction in contravention of the San Diego County Health
and Human Services Agency’s (the Agency) recommendation. We conclude
the court did not abuse its discretion in maintaining jurisdiction over Child

under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)2 and
therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Child lived with Mother, Father, and half-sibling in Virginia until
January 2025. While the family was in Virginia, Mother’s use of alcohol
prompted at least eight calls for service between December 2020 and January
2025, including an arrest for driving under the influence.
The record is not clear whether Mother and Father separated when
Mother moved with the children to San Diego in 2025. Although Father
stated he and Mother were separated, neither has filed for legal separation or
divorce. Both parents expressed that they wanted to be together as a family
in San Diego. Either way, after Mother moved with Child and his half-
sibling, Mother’s relationship with alcohol continued to cause problems.
Child reported the need to hide from Mother when she had been drinking.
On April 10, shortly after beginning school, Child explained that he
was having a hard time sleeping due to Mother’s behavior; staff also
confirmed that Child did not have lunch most days. The Agency closed out

1 E.B. (Father) is Child’s stepfather and is not a party to this appeal.

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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the ensuing report because Mother reportedly returned to rehab in April
2025. When the Agency received an additional referral just days later, it was
again evaluated out, this time because the children were expected to live in
Virginia with Father.
On May 6, 2025, Child video called Father about Mother’s behavior.
Father observed Mother berating and chasing the children. She also stated
the children should not be alive because she believed life was “pointless.”
Nevertheless, Father told police that the children were “antagonizing”
Mother. Father instructed the 10-year-old Child to walk to a maternal aunt’s
house for safety. Child later explained to school staff that Mother was so
drunk, she did not recognize him. Child understood that Father was
traveling from Virginia to retrieve both himself and his half-sibling; however,
Father left Child with Mother in San Diego. Child said that Father usually
took his half-sibling when Mother was “going crazy,” leaving Child to handle
her moods alone. Father reported seeking family law orders in Virginia to
“be protective of the half-sibling” but did not similarly move to protect Child.
On May 11, Mother made an evidently false report to Virginia police
that Father sexually assaulted Child’s half-sibling. The officer that spoke
with Mother believed her to be heavily intoxicated based on her delayed and
slurred responses, and he was unable to corroborate Mother’s claims. When
he reported his findings to Mother, she “stated that everything was fine and
that [the half-sibling] was fine.” Also on that day, Child returned from
walking the dog and encountered Mother, who was drunk, yelling on the
phone. When he began to feel unsafe, Child left the home for the aunt’s
house. Mother had confiscated Child’s phone so he was unable to call Father.
Unbeknownst to Child, the aunt traveled outside of San Diego and was not

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available to support him. Child waited for the aunt between two and five
hours outside the aunt’s home before setting out for home.
As best we can discern, Mother called for police assistance

approximately two hours after Child left the home.3 When they arrived, they
determined she was intoxicated, although Mother asserted she had not
consumed alcohol that day. Despite her own reported sobriety, Mother was
unable to describe Child to the officers and began using racial slurs and
throwing things at the officers. The officers left the residence, endeavoring to
search for Child. They eventually encountered Child, who disclosed that he
had not eaten. He accepted dinner from the officers before they transported
him to Polinsky Children’s Center (Polinsky). When asked how Child would
rate his feeling of safety at home on a scale of zero to ten, he gave it a “ ‘0’ or ‘-
100.’ ” He disclosed that Mother called him explicit names, “like cunt, bitch
and whore, while drunk,” and he did not believe rehab helped Mother.
Mother attempted to collect Child from Polinsky. Child did not wish to
see her or leave Polinsky and Mother returned home without him. When she
spoke with a social worker later, the social worker believed her to be
intoxicated and belligerent. Child was later released to Father.
Father’s safety plan for Child consisted of contacting Mother’s rehab
and removing Child from the home, believing living separately to be
sufficient. He equivocated as to whether or not he and the children would
continue to live separately from Mother. Indeed, Father expressed that his
move with the children to San Diego “depends on the judge” and observed
that if the dependency case closed, moving “would depend on family court,”
and that generally “everything is contingent on the case closing and being

3 Mother contends she waited only 20 minutes.

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able to proceed to the next step.” He later again explained that “[e]verything
is contingent on the Court” highlighting the challenge of having “two houses
in [California].” However, Father did not believe anything beyond living
separately was necessary to create safety for Child, and both parents looked
forward to the court removing supervision restrictions for Mother. Similarly,
Mother’s relapse plan consisted of calling her sponsor and returning to rehab.
After Child’s evaluation, it was recommended Child receive
“high/medium level behavior support services similar to . . . individual
therapy.” Initially, Father agreed that Child should access mental health
support services. However, he changed his mind and said he would look into
it only if Child started doing poorly in school.
Given that Father resided in Virginia, the court took temporary
jurisdiction, ordered continued detention, and mandated Mother’s visitation
with Child be supervised. However, the family did not often spend time
together, challenged by the supervision requirement, travel difficulties, and
Mother’s relapses. Even virtual communication remained sporadic. While
Child was in Father’s care in Virginia, there were no additional safety
concerns. Given that stability, the Agency recommended closing the case,
with orders for Father to obtain custody of Child.
Child’s counsel sought to keep the case open and maintain court
oversight. The court sustained the petition and asserted jurisdiction over
Child under section 300, subdivision (b). Consistent with Child’s counsel’s
request, the court declined to make custody exit orders and kept the case
open, highlighting Mother’s increasingly frequent intoxication and erratic
behavior toward Child. The court was also concerned about Mother’s lack of
insight and failure to address her problematic use of alcohol, observing that
Mother believed exposure to her faults “builds . . . character” in her children.

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As to Father, the court observed he was aware of Mother’s problem with
alcohol and witnessed her behavior toward the children but nevertheless
described them as “antagonizing” Mother. Father left Child with Mother,
taking only the half-sibling back to Virginia, and avowed he had no safety
concerns despite hearing Mother wished the children harm and witnessing
her chase them around. Further, the court was concerned about Child’s
exposure to adult topics such as Mother’s bipolar diagnosis, parentification,
and Father’s decision not to follow through with mental health services for
Child or participate in greater safety planning. In line with those concerns,
the court elected to move forward “in a way that’s protective to [Child]” and
continued its jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
Section 361.2 governs the placement of a child following removal from
parental custody. Under section 361.2, subdivision (b), if the court
determines placement with the previously noncustodial parent is not
detrimental, the court then decides whether there is a need for ongoing
supervision. If the court determines there is no need for ongoing supervision,
the court grants custody to the noncustodial parent, provides reasonable
visitation to the previously custodial parent, and terminates jurisdiction.
(§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1).) If the court terminates jurisdiction, it is contemplated
that any further proceedings will take place in the family court. (In re J.S.
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1077.) Alternatively, the court may order that
the noncustodial parent assume custody subject to juvenile court jurisdiction.
(§ 361.2, subd. (b)(2); In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1130.)
The reviewing court applies the substantial evidence test when
reviewing whether it was detrimental to place a child with the previously
noncustodial parent. (In re Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1507.)

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Here, the parties agree that placement with Father was appropriate.
However, they disagree over whether the court abused its discretion in
maintaining jurisdiction over the noncustodial placement with Father for a
period of supervision pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (b)(2). We review
the challenged order for an abuse of discretion. (In re A.J. (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 525, 535, fn. 7.) We do not disturb a discretionary decision
unless the juvenile court’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
The juvenile court provided a reasoned explanation for maintaining
jurisdiction, highlighting the repeated incidents that led to the case and
Mother’s failure to address them or create a proactive relapse plan. Mother
did not believe she needed to change her behavior and believed exposure to it
built character in her children. She did not believe she needed to “fix”
anything, despite her numerous trips to rehab and multiple contact with law
enforcement related to her use of alcohol.
Mother argues that Father was taking appropriate care of Child and
that the court should have, therefore, terminated jurisdiction. However, the
record belies this argument. Of note, some referrals regarding Mother’s
behavior were evaluated out because it was unclear who had the children and
who would be caring for them in the long term. While Father was in
Virginia, he was unsuccessful in keeping Child and, at least once, blamed the
Child and his half-sibling for Mother’s actions. In Father’s absence, the
children barricaded themselves in rooms to escape Mother. The safety plan
he created for Child failed on May 11, prompting Child to be unsupervised for
up to five hours with no means to contact a trusted adult. Even after Father
was able to take Child to Virginia following his detention, he chose to not
enroll him in mental health services as recommended.

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Significantly, both parents have indicated they might live together in
San Diego in the future. While Mother now argues there are no definitive
plans for their reconciliation, Father twice implied their reunification is
dependent on whether or when the court terminates jurisdiction. Beyond
that implication, both parents have stated their intention is to live together
as a family. On this record, we conclude the juvenile court’s decision to
maintain jurisdiction under section 361.2 was not arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile order maintaining jurisdiction is affirmed.

IRION, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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