Minnesota court opinion filed March 2, 2026

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-0438 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. William Louis Miller, Appellant. Filed March 2, 2026 Affirmed Bond, Judge Dakota County District Court File No. 19HA- CR -22-1541 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Min nesota; and Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attor ney, Cory B. Monne ns, Assistant County Attorney, Hastings, Mi nnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andr ea Barts, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Mi nnesota (for appellant) Considered and decide d by Bond, Presidi ng Judge; Connolly, Judge; and L arson, Judge. NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION BOND, Judge In this direct appeal from the judgment of conv iction for fifth - degree criminal sexual conduct, a ppellant argues he is entitled to a ne w trial because the district court abused it s

2 discretion by admitting evidence that the victim’s mother sought a restraining order against appellant after the offe nse. We affirm. FACTS In March 2022, 12-ye ar-old A.D. lived with her mother in a tw o - story duplex. A.D.’s grandmother and her grandmother’s boyfriend, appellant William Louis Miller, lived in the upstairs un it. Miller had lived the re for years, and the fa mily generally had a good relationship with him. Thou gh the upsta irs unit could o nly be accessed by a separate entry, it was common f or the parties to ente r one another’s living space. One day in late March, A.D.’s mother as ked A.D.’s grandmot her and Miller to check in on A.D. while A.D. was h ome alone. Miller entered the downstairs unit, where A.D. was doing her h omework on the couc h. After helping A.D. with her homework, Miller sat at the opposite end of the couch and watched television. A.D. saw that Miller had his hand in his pan ts and was making up and down moti ons “like boys do” for around ten minutes. Durin g this time, Miller asked A.D. if she had hair on her “private part” and if she was wet. A.D. a sked Miller to go back upstairs, which h e did. A short time later, A.D. told a friend abo ut the incident. The friend re ported it to an adult, who in turn con tacted A.D.’s mother. After speaking with A.D., A.D. ’s mother confronted Miller. Miller denied the incident took place. A.D.’s mother filed a petition

3 for a restraining order 1 and contacted the police. A police officer later delivered paperwork related to the restrainin g order to Miller. During a recorded inter view with a child- protection investig ator, A.D. described the incident a nd stated she recognized that Miller was masturbating and that he eventually took his penis out of his pan ts. A.D. reported that s he “felt weird” around Miller, preferred not to be around him, and her mother filed for a r estraining order. In a recorded pho ne interview with the police, Mill er denied A.D.’s versi on of events and stated t hat A.D. walked into the li ving room of the down stairs unit as he was masturbating. Around the same time as the phone inter view, Miller admitted t o A.D.’s mother that the inciden t took place and apolog ized. R espondent State of Minnesota c harged Miller with fift h- degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1a(2) (2020), and the case pr oceeded to a jury trial. At trial, the jury heard tes timony from A.D., her friend, A.D.’s mother, the child- protection investigator, and two police o fficers, and recordings of A.D.’s interview with the child - protec tion inve stigator and Miller’s sta tement to poli ce were receive d as exhibits. The jury found Miller guilt y, and the district court sen tenced him to 364 days in jail. Miller appeals. 1 As we explain below, A.D.’s mot her sought a harassment r estraining order. We use “restraining order” wh en describing the evidence received at t rial because th at is the terminology used by th e witnesses in their test imony.

4 DECISION Miller argues that th e district court com mitted reversible erro r by admitting irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial eviden ce that A.D.’s mot her sough t a restraining order. “Evidentiary rulings r est within the sound dis cretion of the district court,” an d appellate courts “will not reverse an evidentiary ruling a bsent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). A district court abuses it s discretion when its decision is based on an “erroneo us view of th e law or is agai nst logic and the facts in the record.” State v. G uzman, 892 N. W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). Even if evidenc e was erroneously admitted, an appellate court will not reverse un less the appellant shows there is a “reasonable possibi lity that the wrongfully admitted evidence signi ficantly affected the verdict.” State v. Bigb ear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024) (quotatio n omitted). Generally, relevant evidence is admiss ible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to m ake the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of th e action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 40 1; see State v. Swinger, 800 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Minn. App. 2011) (“ A fact is relevant if, when taken al one or in connection of other facts, it warrant s a jury in drawing a logical inference as sisting, even though remotely, the determination of the issue in question.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. S ept. 28, 2011). “ Rule 401 reflects a minimal relevancy approac h.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 298 (Min n. 2019). Even relevant evidence, ho wever, may be excluded, if “its probative value is substantially outweigh ed by the danger of u nfair prejudice, confus ion of the issues, or

5 misleading the jury, or by considerat ions of undue delay, waste o f time, or needless presentation of cumulat ive evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. In this case, the state sought to introdu ce evidence that A.D.’s mother had obtained a harassment re straining order against Miller, arguing that it provide d context for Miller’s statements to police and to demons trate A.D.’s mother’s rea ction to the offense. Miller objected on the groun ds that evidence of the restraining order wa s irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial because it “ endorses that [the offense] happened.” T he district court ruled that the state could elicit testimony that A.D.’s m other filed for a restraining order and that paperwork related to the filing was delivered to Miller to “provide co ntext for what [Miller] was talking about in his statement [with polic e].” 2 But the district court determined that evidence that a restra ining order wa s actuall y issued was not admissible, reasonin g that allowing the jury to hear that a court had is sued a restraining order would be unfairl y prejudicial because Mi ller “did not have a c hance at that time to defend himself or to challenge the [ex parte] order,” and because the “ jury could leap to a different space that we don’t want them to go.” At trial, the jury heard testimony from A.D.’s mother that, after Miller admitted that something had happe ned and apolo gized, she “filed for a restr aining order” becau se she did not want Miller to be around A.D. In addition, a police officer tes tified that he went to Miller’s residence and g ave Miller “paperwork related to a restraining order that [A.D.’s mother] had filed.” 2 Miller agreed tha t, if the district court overru led his objection to admitting evid ence of the restraining order, th is was the “correct sa nitization” of the evide nce.

6 Miller argues that evi dence that A.D.’s mother sought a restr aining order is irrelevant because it has “nothing to do with whether the alleged offense occ urred.” We disagree. In his statem ent to police, M iller disputed that anythin g serious happened with A.D., stating that “if it was a big deal, [A.D.] would have said something to her mom.” When police told Mille r that A.D.’s version of events was dif ferent than Miller’ s, he stated, “I read what you got,” and that “as far as. . . touching h er and the sh - t that I read,. . . I just didn’t do that sh - t.” The parties agreed that Miller was “referencin g something written” when he gave this statement to polic e. As the district court deter mined, evidence that A.D.’s mother filed a petition for a restraining order and Miller received paperwork relat ed to the restraining order was relevant to “provide context for what [Mill er] was talking about in his statement [with police] ” and, by extension, his cre dibility. Given the “minimal relevancy” requirements of Minn. R. Evid. 401, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding the restraining - order evidence relevant. See Minn. R. Evid. 401 (stating that relevant ev idence must only have “any tendency” to mak e a fact more or less probable). Miller argues that evid ence that A.D.’s mother sought a restraining order, even if relevant, should have b een excluded under Minn. R. Evid. 403 beca use its probati ve value was substantially outw eighed by the danger of unfair prejud ice. Unfair prejudice “ refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means. ” Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 29 9 (qu otation omitted). Persuas ion by illegitimate means incl udes “leading th e jury to impro perly conclude that [th e defendant] has a propensity to behave criminally and should now be convicted, and punished, for t he

7 charged offenses.” State v. Horm ann, 805 N.W.2d 88 3, 891 (Minn. App. 2 011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012). But unfair prejudice do es not mean “damage to the opponent’ s case that results from the l egitimate probative forc e of the evidence.” State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 7 89, 797 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). Miller contends that t he restraining - order evidence was unfairl y prejudicial because it allowed the jury to s peculate that Miller had harassed A. D. or engaged in other bad acts warranting a restraining order. On thi s record, Miller’s argument i s unavailing. A.D.’s mother testified that she sought a restrainin g order in direct response to the offense. A.D. did not testify that Mi ller committed oth er bad acts or harassed her, and the jury heard no such evidence from an y other witness. A nd, significantly, the district court recognized th e prejudicial nature of th e restraining - order evid ence and only allowed the state to introduce evidence that A.D.’s mother had filed for a restraining order — not that one had been issued by a court — and that Miller received pape rwork related to A. D.’s mother’s filing. I n so doing, the district court appropriate ly mitigated any risk of unfair prejudice. The restraining- order evide nce, while prejudicial, was not unfai rly prejudicial bec ause it did not persuade through il legitimate means. See Hallmark, 927 N. W.2d at 299. B ecause the limited restraining-ord er evidence was relevant and its probative value was not substantiall y outweighed by unfair prejudice, t he district co urt did not abuse its discretion. Affirmed.