Custody case motion denied, opinion affirmed

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-0585 In Re the Custody of MIVB; Dustin Allen Basting, p etitioner, Appellant, vs. Heather Mae Grehn, Respondent. Filed March 2, 2026 Affirmed; motion den ied Bond, Judge Anoka County District Court File No. 02- FA - 21 -1639 Dustin Allen Basting, St. Paul, Minnesota (pr o se appellant) Sonja M. Nyberg, Collins, Buckley, Sa untry & Haugh, PLLP, St. Paul, Minnes ota (for respondent) Considered and decide d by Bond, Presidi ng Judge; Connolly, Judge; and L arson, Judge. NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION BOND, Judge Appellant father challe nges a district co urt order grant ing respondent mother sol e legal and sole physical custody of their minor child an d suspending fat her’s parenting time. We affirm.

2 FACTS A ppellant Dustin Allen Basting (father) and respondent Heat her Mae Grehn (mother) are the parents of a child (child) born in 2015. The parties never married, and they executed a recognition of paren tage shortly after child was b orn. In 2021, f ath er petitioned to establish c ustody and parenting ti me for child. Father filed several temporary motions while the matter was pending, requesting, among othe r things, t emporary joint legal and temporary joint physical custody of child, temporary unsupervised parentin g time with child, and unlimited telep hone contact w ith child. The distr ict court denied father’ s temporary motions, ma intaining mother’s so le physical and sole legal custody of child and awarding father limite d supervised parenting time wit h child for two hours, t wice per month. In November 2023, th e parties stipulated to the appoint ment of a neutral custo dy and parenting - time eva luator (the e valuator). 1 The evaluator intervie wed mother, father, and child, and observ ed the parties interact with child. The evaluato r also review ed c ourt records, the parties’ medical rec ords and psychological evalua tions, and child’s med ical, mental health, and educational re cords. T he evaluator submitted a report recommending that the district court award mother sole physi cal and sole legal c ustody and limit father’s parenting time to a sup ervised, therapeutic setting. In June 2024, a court t rial was held at which father appeared pro se. At trial, the district court receive d testimony from mother, father, the evaluator, father’s sister, child’s 1 Father was represente d by counsel at the tim e of the stipulation.

3 maternal grandmother, and chil d’s paternal grandmother. At the clos e of trial, the district court issued a verba l order suspending fa ther’s parenting time f or 60 days based on concerns that child’s mental health and behavioral outbursts may be linked to child’s visits with father. T he district court su bsequently issued ame nded finding s of fact, conclusions of law, and an order for custo dy, parenting t ime, and child s upport. 2 The district court found the testimon y of mother, child’s mate rnal grandmother, and t he evaluator credible. After conducting a detailed analysis of the statutory best - interests fac tors, the district court determined it was in child’s be st interests for mother to re tain sole physi cal and sole legal custody. As to par enting time, the di strict court found that, based on af fidavits from child’s daily caregivers and a n ote from child’s therapi st, child’s “behavior an d mental health ha [d] improved since visits with [father] were sus pended” and therefore it was in child’s best interests for father’s pa renting time to rema in suspended. Father appeals. DECISION Father, a pro se l itigant, assigns nu merous errors to the district court’s order granting mother sole legal and sole physical c ustody of their minor child an d suspending father’s parenting time. We be gin by setting out certai n principles that gover n our review. On appeal, a reviewing court does not pre sume error; instead, the party seeking relief must identify err or and show that it was prejudicial. Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975); Braith v. Fischer, 632 N. W.2d 716, 724 (Minn. 2 The order was amended to inclu de the previously reserved issue of c hild suppor t, which father does not dispute on appeal.

4 App. 2001) (applying this aspect of Midway in a family - law appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001). While “some accommodation s may be made for pro se litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with c ourt rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgera ld, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). An assignment of err or based on mere ass ertion, unsupported b y argument or authority, is forfeited and need not be consi dered unless prejudicia l error is obvious on mere inspection. Schoepke v. Alexa nder Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2 d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971); see also State, Dep’ t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (M inn. 1997) (decli ning to address an in adequately briefed quest ion); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 73 3 N.W.2d 471, 479 (M inn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family - law appeal). Furthermore, we generally only consider issues prese nted to, and c onsidered by, the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 19 88); see also Le wis- Miller v. Ross, 710 N.W.2d 5 65, 570 (Minn. 2006) (applying this aspect o f Thiele in a family-law appeal). Finally, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.02, subd. 1(c), requires that in a formal brief, “[e]ach statement of a material fact shall be accompanied by a reference to the record. ” Citations to the record “are particularly imp ortant where. . . the record is extensive.” Hecker v. Hecker, 543 N.W.2d 678, 681 n.2 (Minn. App. 1996), aff ’d, 568 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1997). A failure to cite to the record vi olates Minn. R. Civ. A pp. P. 128.03 and “[a] flagrant violation of the rules to fail to p rovide citations to the reco rd may lead to non - consideration of an issue or dismi ssal of an a ppeal.” Brett v. Watts, 601 N.W.2d 199, 202

5 (Minn. App. 1999) (quotation omitted), rev. d enied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1999). Father’s brief provides no citations to the record, even though the record consist s of te n volumes of documents totaling m ore than 1,440 pages and 3 vo lumes of transcri pts totaling over 40 0 pages. Although we do not conclude t hat father’s failures to cite to the record are flagrant, we note that the failure to comply with the rule s diminishes the persua siveness of his brief. See id. (noting that a pa rty’s failure to co mply with procedural rul es can “diminish a br ief’s persuasiveness”). With those principles i n mind, we turn to fath er’s claims of error. I. The district court did not abuse its discretio n by suspending fat her’s parenting time. We understand father’s first challenge t o be to the dist rict court’s det ermination to suspend his parenting time. “District courts have broad discretion o n matters of custody and parenting time.” Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). We will not reverse a district court’s parenting-ti me decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Olso n v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1995). “A district cour t abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsuppor ted by the evidence, misapplying the la w, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on rec ord.” Bender v. Ber nhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). Further, we will uphold a district court’ s findings of fact underlying a paren ting - time decision unless they are clearly erroneous. Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118, 1 23 (Minn. App. 2 009). “ A finding is clearly erroneous if the r eviewing court is left with th e definite and fir m conviction that a mistake has been made. ” Van gsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 4 68, 472 (Minn. App. 2000)

6 (quotations omitted). I n determining whether findings are clearly err oneous, we defer to the district court’s credibility determinat ions and view the record in t he light most fa vorable to the district court’s fi ndings. Id. “[U]pon the request of either parent,” a distri ct court shall “grant s uch parenting time. . . as will enable the child and the parent to maintai n a child to parent relationship that will be in the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(a) (2024). “In the absence of other evidence, there i s a rebuttable presumption tha t a child must receive a minimum of at leas t 25 percent of the parenting tim e with each p arent. ” Min n. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g) (2024). But this presumption doe s not guarantee equal parenting time. See Manthei v. Manthei, 268 N.W.2d 45, 45 (Minn. 1978) (“[Parenting - t ime] rights are not absolute and are to be exercised onl y when in the best interest of the child.”). The parenting- time statute allows restricti ons on parenting time if the district court finds that “ parenting time is like ly to endanger t he child ’ s physica l or emotiona l health or impair the child’s emotional devel opment.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(c)(1) (2024). Here, t he district co urt suspended fa the r’s parenting t ime with chi ld because it concluded that father’s “parenting time endangers [child’s ] mental and emotional healt h and well - being and is not in [child’s ] best interest.” The district found that child’s ongoin g psychological distress and behavioral outb ursts were “directly r elated to visits with [father]” and that, “[a]fter a break from supervised visit s with [father, ] [child’s ] behaviors have started to improv e.” The district court a lso made ext ensive fa ctual findings relevant to child’ s best inte rests, including t hose pertaining t o: mother’s role as ch ild’s primary caregiver since chil d’s birth; the history of d omestic abuse perpetrated by father against

7 mother; father’s reluctance to facilitate child’s relationship with moth er; child’s expressed fear of father; father’s mental -health struggles and appare nt unwillingness to remain medication compliant; father’s r epeated violation of an order for pro tection and criminal domestic- abuse no - contact order; and child’s expressed preference n ot to have supervis ed parenting time with father. The distri ct court’s findings are supported by the rec ord. The refore, the district c ourt did not abuse its discretion by deter mining that parenting time would endanger child’s “ physical or emotional health or impair [child’s] emotional development ” and by restricting father’s parenting time. Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(c)(1). II. The district court did not abuse its discretio n in excluding father’ s exhibits. Father argues that the d istrict court improperly excluded most of his ex hibits at trial. “We afford the district court broad di scretion when ruling on eviden tiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absen t an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015). A district c ourt may exclude evidence when a party fails to comply with a scheduling order. Rule 16.06 provides in part: “If a party or party’ s a ttorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order,. .. the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as are j ust, including any of the orders provid ed in Rule 37.02(b)(2), (3), (4).” Minn. R. Civ. P. 16.06. Rule 37.02 allows the court to file an order “prohibiting [th e disobedient] party from introd ucing designated matt ers in evidence.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.02(b)(2).

8 Before trial, the distri ct court issued a scheduling orde r requiring the parties t o upload their proposed exhibits to the Minnesota Digital Exhibit Sys tem (MNDES) wit hin three days of trial and provide copies of their exhibits to the opposing counsel or pro se party within 14 days of trial. The schedul ing order provided that “[f]ailure to do so may result in exclusion of a n exhibit from evidenc e.” While father uploaded multipl e exhibits to MNDES, he failed t o provide physical cop ies of his exhibits to mother’s attorney as required by the sched uling order. T he district court pro vided father w ith additional time t o print and provide his exhibits to opp osing counsel by the first day o f trial, but father did not do so. Mother s tipulated to the admission of four of father’s exhibits but objected to the remaining exhibit s. The distri ct court excl uded father’s remainin g exhibits for failu re to comply with the s cheduling order. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretio n in the district court decisi on to exclude father’s e xhibits. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 16.06, 37. 02. III. The district court did not make clearly erro neous credibility dete rminations. Father appears to ar gue that the district court made erroneo us credibility determinations. We will “ set aside a district court ’ s findings of fact only if clearly erroneous, giving def erence to the district court ’ s opportunity to evaluate wit ness credibility. ” Goldman v. Greenwood, 74 8 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008). Under the clear - error standard, we will not reweigh e vidence, engage in fact - finding, or reconcile conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 - 22 (Minn. 2021); see also Ewal d v. Nedrebo, 999 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing Kenney in a family - law appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024). Accordingly, we “need not go

9 into an extended discus sion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate th e correctness” of the district court’s findings. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation omitt ed). Father first a rgu es that the district court clear ly erred in accepting the evaluator’s “biased” recommendati on “without review or scrutiny.” The record re flects that the district court found the evalua tor credible and assigned “substantial we ight” to the evaluator’s recommendation only after the court extensively review ed the evaluator’s fi ndings, education, an d profess ional experie nce, whic h included 20 years working as a neutral custody and parenting - time evaluat or. We defer to the district court ’s credibility determination. See Se fkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 2 10 (Minn. 1988) (“D efe rence must be given to the opportunity of the [dis trict] court to assess the credibility of th e witnesses. ”); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating that “due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the [dist rict] court to judge the credibility of the witne sses”). Second, father argues that the district court erred in disregarding pater nal grandmother’s testimo ny. Paternal grandmo ther testified that she had never seen child afraid of father, father was an excellent parent, and moth er was vindictive and “ an actress. ” The district court hea rd the testimony of p aternal grandmother a nd found it was not credible, a determinati on to which we must d efer. See id. Third, father argues tha t the district court erred finding credible mother’s attorney’ s statement that father never provided her physical copies of his exhib its as required by the scheduling order. The district court credited mother’s attorney’s s tatement “as an o ffice r of the [c]ourt” that she never received father’s trial exhibits. Again, we must defer to the district court’s credibili ty determination. See i d.

10 Accordingly, w e conclude that the district c ourt did not make clear ly erroneous credibility determinations. IV. The district court did not violate the Minne sota Code of Judicial Conduct. Father alleges that the district court violated various rules under the Mi nnesota Code of Judicial Conduct. “ Whether a judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct is a question of law, which we revie w de novo. ” St ate v. Dorsey, 70 1 N.W.2d 238, 246 (Minn. 2005). Father first contends t hat the district court violated rule 2.9(A) by engaging in prohibited ex parte communications by “conf erring with another jud ge.” See Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.9 (A) (stating that generally, “[a] judge shall not initiate, per mit, or consider ex parte communication s, or consider other communicatio ns made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or the ir lawyers, concer ning a pending or impending matter ”). Father fails to provide a citation to this alleged ex parte co mmunication, and our review of the record uncovered none. Thus, w e do not address this ar gument. See Wintz, 558 N.W.2d at 480 (de clining to reach an issue “ in the abs ence of adequate briefi ng”). Father next c ontends t hat the district court v iolated rules 2.2 and 2.3(A), which provide that “[a] judge shall uphold and a pply the law, and shall perform all dutie s of judicial office fairly and impartially” and “without bi as or prejudice.” Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule s 2.2, 2.3(A). Fathe r argues that the distric t court exhib ited bias against him by: (1) excluding his exhibits on “technicaliti es”; (2) relying on “biased” expert testimony from the evaluator; (3) referr ing to him as “the defenda nt,” suggesting “systemic bias and a presumption of guilt”; and (4) disregarding his “ reasonable argu ments. ” We have already

11 determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding father’s exh ibits for failure to comply with the scheduling order and did not clearly err i n its factual findings, including its determination that the evaluator’s testimony and recommendations were credible. Further, fathe r does not cite to the re cord to support his asse rtion that the district court referred to him as “the defendan t,” and our review of the r ecord fail s to show any such instance. As a res ult, we do not reach thi s issue. See Wintz, 558 N.W.2d at 480. Finally, while father alleges that the district court erred in disr egarding his “reasonable arguments,” a mere adverse ru ling is not proof of bias, Olson v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986), and we presume that a dis trict court judge “has discharged her duties properly, ” Han non v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008). Thus, father is not entit led to relief on his clai ms of judicial bias. V. Father’s remaining ar guments are forfeited. Father raise s multiple constitutional argu ments for the first tim e on appeal. Specifically, father ar gues: (1) the district court failed to appl y a “constitutional presumption of equal parenting time” in sus pending his parenting time; (2) Minn. Stat. § 257.541 (2024) is unconstitutional be cause it deprive s biological, u nwed fathers of equ al protection under the law; (3) the distric t court violated his First Ame ndment right to free speech in admitting his social- media posts a nd videos at trial; (4) the district court violated his procedural due- process right to be h eard and present evidence by e xcluding his exhibits; and (5) the district court denied him his constitutional right to con front his accusers by relying on hearsay evidence. Father further ar gues that the district court made evidenti ary errors at trial, including by admitti ng a note that father contends wa s unauthenticated and

12 contained hearsay and by admitting hearsay testimony from mother and a therapist. And he asserts vario us claims related to the eva luator’s alleged bi as and “history of dishonesty and serious professiona l misconduct.” We have carefully reviewed father’s remaining claims of error and conclude that they are forfeited because they are unsu pported by legal arguments or citation to legal authority, were not rais ed in the district court or properly preserved for appellate review, are not supported by the record, or because prejudicial er ror is not obvious on mer e inspection. See Wintz, 558 N.W.2d at 480 (c oncluding that inadequ ately briefed issue s need not be addressed when no pr ejudicial error was obv ious on mere inspectio n); Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582 (stating that a revie wing court generally may not consider issues that were not presented to, and considered by, the district c ourt); In re W elfare of C.L.L., 3 10 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981) (providi ng that an appellant cannot raise a constitutio nal issue for the first time on appeal); In re Welfare of D.N., 523 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Minn. App. 1994) (“E videntiary rul ings are subject to a ppellate review only if t here has been a motion for a new trial in which such matters have been assigned as error.” (quotation omi tted)), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 29, 1994). We the refore do not address t hem. VI. Mother’s motion to st rike is denied as m oot. Mother moved to strike portions of father’ s addendum because it cont ains materials that were not presented to the district court an d are not part of the record on appeal. The record on appeal is limited to “docu ments filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proce edings, if any.” Min n. R. Civ. App. P. 1 10.01. Generally, an appellate court may not base its decisi on on materials outside the recor d on appeal and may

13 not consider matters no t produced and receive d into evidence in the d istrict court. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. B ecause we have n ot relied on the portions of husband’s addendu m that mother is requesting we strike, we deny the motion to strike as moot. See Drewitz v. Motorwerks, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 231, 233 n.2 (Minn. 2007) (denyin g motion to str ike as moot when court did n ot rely on challenged m aterials). Affirmed; motion den ied.