Court opinion: Raygor vs. Stewart & Associates, March 2

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-0953 Renee Raygor, Relator, vs. Stewart & Associates, I nc., Respondent, Department of Employ ment and Economic Development, Respondent. Filed March 2, 2026 Affirmed Ede, Judge Department of Employ ment and Economic Development File No. 51422583 Renee Raygor, Bloomi ngton, Minnesota (self- represented relator) Stewart & Associates, I nc., Burnsville, Minnes ota (respondent employ er) Melannie M. Markham, Keri A. Phillips, Katrina Gulstad, De partment of Employme nt and Economic Developmen t, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent departm ent) Considered and decide d by Ede, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judg e; and Johnson, J udge. NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION EDE, Judge In this certiorari appeal, relator challenges an order by an u nemployment-law judge (ULJ) affirming the U LJ’s earlier decision that relator quit her e mployment, that she was therefore ineligible for unemploy ment benefits, and that no ineligibi lity exceptions apply.

2 Because we conclude that substantial eviden ce supports the ULJ ’ s order, including its credibility determinations, we affir m. FACTS From October 21, 2024, to January 3, 2025, relator Renee Raygor worked as a full- time sales speciali st for respondent -emp loyer Stewart & As sociates, Inc. Stewart & Associates is an insurance agency ow ned by Calvin Stewart. After her employment with Stewart & Associates ended on Janua ry 3, 2025, Rayg or filed for une mployment bene fits. Respondent Departmen t of Employment and E conomic Development (DEED) determined that Stewart & Associates had dischar ged Raygor based on employm ent misconduct and that Raygor was theref ore ineligible for unem ployment benefits. 1 Raygor appealed tha t determination an d requested a hearing be fore the ULJ. Before the hearing, Stewart & Associates a nd Raygor submitted thirteen exh ibits, which included written statements by b oth parties about why Raygor’s employment had ended and several written communication s between Ste wart and Raygor. During the hearing, S tewart and Raygor testified. In a written decision filed after the hearing, the ULJ determined that Raygor had quit her employment with Stewart & A ssociates, that she is ineligible f or unemployment benefit s, and that no ineligibility exc eptions apply. Following Raygor ’s request for reconsidera tion of that decision, the ULJ filed an order of a ffirmation in which the ULJ determined tha t its earlier decision was factually and legally co rrect. The following factual summary stems from the findings of f act set forth in the UL J’s decision and, as 1 DEED “ is the pr imary responding party to any judicial action involvin g an unemployment law judge’s decision.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(e) (2024).

3 relevant to Raygor’s appellate c hallenge to a credibility determina tion by the ULJ, the hearing record. When Raygor began working for Stewart & Associat es on October 21, 202 4, Stewart and Raygor had a general agreement that, unless they spe cifically discussed a different schedule, Raygor would wor k from home on Mondays and work in the office on other days. Raygor’s employment with Stewa rt & Associates started with a probat ionary period scheduled to en d on January 19, 2025. Stewart eventually ass igned Raygor some non- sales tasks and eliminated her sale s goals as unrealistic based on the company’s book of business. In December 2024, Stewart inquired with another agency abou t hiring Raygor because he anticipated possibly discharging h er at the end of her pro bationary period, and t he other agency res ponded by cont acting Raygor. That same month, Stewart allowed Raygor to work from home during the week of Christmas, althoug h he expected her to work in the office o n Tuesday, December 31, 2024, and Friday, January 3, 2025. When Raygor instead work ed from home both days, Stewa rt sent Raygor an electronic communication asking where she wa s. Stewart and Raygor spoke b y tele phone at the en d of the day on January 3. He informed her that she was not permitted to unilaterally deci de to work from home and that “she c ould either commit to coming to the office or [January 3] could be her last day.” After Raygor responded by telling Stewart t hat January 3 “would be her last day,” he tol d her that “he would co me pick up her com pany equipment.” In its decision, the ULJ made a credib ility determination beca use “[t]he parties disputed what was said at the end of the phone call on January 3.” The ULJ explained that

4 “ Raygor claimed that Stewart said that he w as going to have to let her go for financial reasons ” and that, “ shortly after the [January 3] conversation, she te xted an acquaintance and wrote [that] ‘he ba sically just fired [her]. ’” At the hearing, Rayg or testified that she believed Ste wart would t ell her if she needed to be in the off ice during the we ek of the New Year’s holiday — Monday, December 31, 2024, through Fri day, January 3, 2 025 — because of the risk of exposure t o potential il lnesses in the office. When Stewar t did not inform her that she ne eded to work at the office throughout that week, Raygor assumed that she could continue working from home. Raygor also stated that Stewart told her th at he had to discharge her be cause “he had hoped that he would have enough money to pay [her ] through the end of [her] probationary period, but . . . he didn’ t have any mor e money.” As support for this a ssertion, Raygor said t hat Stewart “had gone to another agent t o ask if they had any job openi ngs, and that’s when he . . . started to tell [he r] about the proble ms.” Raygor maintaine d that she was pla nning to return to the office the foll owing Tuesday, January 7, until the January 3 conve rsation occurred, and she said that Stewart did not give her t he option of returnin g to the office. Sh e also describ ed a text message she sent to an acquaintance that read, “So he basic ally just fired me.” When the ULJ asked at the hearing why Raygor had used the w ord “basically,” Raygor respo nded that she “wasn’t really sure how to interpret exactly what [Stewart] said” because Ste wart “ tried to make it sound like he was doin g [her] a favor in a way.” During his testimony, Stewart denied telling Raygor that he was di scharging her because he did not have money to pay her, explaining that he “ne ver discussed office

5 finances with [her ], ” that his “office [ha d ] budgeted for her” an d “actually need[ed] her, ” and that “she never mi ssed a paycheck.” Ste wart admitted that he had contacted another agency about a potenti al job for Raygor “because she jus t wasn’t hitting sales g oals” and he did not think she would “be able to hit [th ose] goals” after the end of her probationa ry period. He described h is inquiry into a nother position for Raygor as “forward thinking.” Stewart elaborated that, although Raygor “still had some time” given that “her probation wasn’t even up until February,” he th ought that, “as a service spec ialist [for a different agency], . . . [she w ould] be good . . . beca use she knows her stuf f.” As to the January 3 ph one call, Stewart testifi ed that he told Raygor “[she] need[s] to start coming back i nto the office or [January 3 could] be [her] last day.” Ac cording to Stewart, Raygor told h im that January 3 woul d be her last day, that he could “co me pick up . . . her work lapt op and her work bag,” and that she would “j ust file for unemployment.” Stewart also described a communication wit h his “sales district le ader” in which he discussed “what happ ened when [Ra ygor] left [him] no choice.” He acknowledged that he told his “sales district leader” that he “just had to let [Raygor] go” an d that she “left [him] no choice. ” But Stewart also explained that “the option [he] gave her was that” —apparently referring to his instruction to Raygor that she re turn to the office or choose to make January 3 her last day — and “ when [he] gave he r that choice,. . . s he accepted it, [and he] accepted it back.” The ULJ ultimately based its findings on Stewart’s testim ony, which the ULJ determined “was credi ble because it was clear, consistent, and plausible.” As to Raygor’s testimony about the text message she claimed to have sent an a cquaintance stating that

6 Stewart “basically just fired” her, the ULJ r easoned that, “[i]f R aygor’s version of the events were accurate a nd Stewart had unequi vocally and unambiguo usly told her she was being let go, it is unc lear why she wou ld have said ‘basic ally.’” Considering thi s evidence, the ULJ decided that “[i]t is more likely that Stewart expresse d some frustration with Raygor about her work ing from home and exp ressed some uncertaint y about her prospects with the company, all of which made R aygor believe that her employme nt was in jeopardy.” Given its credibility de termination in favor of Stewart, the ULJ foun d that, “[o]n January 3, Stewart gave Raygor the option of continuing her emplo yment or having that day be her last day, and she chose the latter, ” and that “[i]t was Raygor’s decisio n for the employment to end when it ended, n ot the employer’s. ” The ULJ thus ruled that “[a] preponderance of the evidence shows that Raygor qu it her employ ment.” And the U LJ determined that “[a] pr eponderance of the evidence shows tha t Raygor did not quit because of a good reason caused by t he employer.” The ULJ rea soned that “notification of discharge in the future is not a go od reason caused by th e employer for quitting,” such that, “even if Stewart strongly sugge sted that Raygor’s e mployment was going t o end at the end of her probationary period, [that] would not be a good reason caused b y the employer for quitting.” Moreover, the ULJ exp lained that “Stewart req uiring Raygor to wor k from the office except for on Mondays was not adverse t o Raygor because it was consistent with the agreement they had fr om the beginning of the employment.” The ULJ decided that any disagreement or miscommunicati on about these work -from - home rules “would not compe l an average, reasonable worker to quit and be come unemployed.” Consequently, the ULJ

7 determined that Raygor quit her employm ent, that she was therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits, and that no ineligibilit y exceptions apply. Raygor requested reco nsideration of the ULJ’s decision, cl aiming that there were discrepancies and inac curacies in Stewar t’s testimony and that “[a]ll of the evidence that ha[d] been submitted support[ed] the argument that [she] was disch arged, not that [s he] quit.” The ULJ filed an order of affirmation stating that the ULJ had “full y considered the request [for reconsider ation] and determined that the [ULJ’s earlier ] decision. . . [was ] factually and legally correct.” While the ULJ acknowledge d that “Stewart [had] refer red to Raygor being ‘dischar ged’ in a questionn aire, and that S tewart [had] testified that he told someone that he ‘had to let Raygo r go,’” the ULJ ruled that Stew art had nonetheless “consistently asserted t hat on January 3, [2025,] he gave Ra ygor the option of committing to coming to the office or having January 3 b e her last day, a nd that she cho se the latter.” The ULJ explained tha t Stewart had offered t hat explanation “in the questionnaire that he [had] completed for unemploym ent on January 10,” “in [an] email [that he had sent] to Raygor on January 13, and in his testimony at the hearing o n March 4,” which led the ULJ to “credit[] Stewart’s testimony abo ut the January 3 conversation and therefore conclude[] that the course of events amounted to a quit, not a discharge, regardless of what words Stewart used to describe the separati on.” And the ULJ rejected Ra ygor’s argument “that there were ‘multiple discrepancies and inac curacies’ in Stewart’s testimony” because Raygor did “not provide any specific exa mples” and did not show “tha t Stewart likely gave false testimony or that any additional evidence would likely chang e the outcome of the

8 decision.” Because t he ULJ deter mined that “ Raygor ha[d] not provided any inf ormation or arguments that require[d] changin g the decision or ordering anoth er hearing,” the ULJ “affirmed [the decision ] as factually and legall y correct.” Raygor appeals by writ of certiorari. DECISION Raygor challenges the ULJ’s order affirming its earlier decision that she quit, that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits, and that no ineligibility excep tions apply. She asserts that the ULJ’s order, including its credibility deter minations, is not supported by substantial eviden ce. DEED resp onds that t he record supports the ULJ’s order. We agree with DEED. When reviewing a ULJ’s decision, we may: affirm; remand for furth er proceedings; or reverse or modify the decision, if the relator’s substantial r ights may ha ve been prejudiced because, as relevant here, the decision is unsup ported by substantial evidenc e in view of the entire re cord as submitted. M inn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2024); see also Icenhower v. Total Auto., Inc., 845 N.W.2 d 849, 855 (Minn. App. 201 4) (“ We may reverse or modify a ULJ’ s decision if the relator ’s substantial rights may have been prejudiced because the findings or decision are unsu pported by s ubstantial evidence. . .. ”), rev. denied (Minn. July 15, 2014). An appellate court determines whet her a decision has the support of substantial evidence by evaluating: if there is “ such rel evant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a con clusion ”; if there is “ more than a scintilla of evidence ”; if there is “ mor e than some evidence ”; if there is “ more than a ny

9 evidence”; or by evaluating “ the evide nce [,] considered in it s entirety.” Minn. Ctr. fo r Env ’t Advoc. v. Minn. Polluti on Control Agency, 644 N.W.2d 457, 46 4 (Minn. 2002). “When the credibility o f a witness testifying i n a hearing has a significant effect on the outcome of a decision, the [ULJ ] must set out the reason for crediting or discreditin g that testimony. ” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2024). “We view the ULJ ’ s factual findings in the light m ost favorable to the decision, givi ng deference to the credibi lity determinations made by the ULJ,. . . [an d] w e will not disturb the ULJ ’ s factual findings when the evidence substantially sustains the m. ” Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006) (cita tions omitted). “Credibility det erminations are the exclusive province of t he ULJ and will not b e disturbed on appeal. ” Bangtson v. Allina Med. Grp., 766 N.W.2 d 328, 332 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omit ted); see also Ywswf v. Teleplan Wireless Servs., Inc., 726 N.W.2 d 525, 53 0–3 3 (Minn. App. 2007) (addressing a relator’s argument that a “ ULJ failed to ma ke statutorily required credibility fin dings in a case that hinged on the credibility of the parties” and conclu ding that a “ULJ’s findings [were] supported by substantial e vidence and provide [d] the statutori ly required reason for [the ULJ’s] credibility determinati on ”). We conclude that subst antial evidence support s the ULJ’s order affir ming its earlier decision that Raygor q uit, that she was ineligi ble for unemployment benefits, and that no ineligibility exceptions apply. In particular, the ULJ provided adequat e reasons cred iting Stewart’s testimony, as required by subdivision 1a(a) of Minnesota Statutes section 26 8.105. The ULJ’s order of affirmation acknowled ges that “Stewart [had] referred to Raygor being ‘disc harged’ in a

10 questionnaire, and that Stewart [had] testif ied that he to ld someone that he ‘had to let Raygor go,’” which are the primary bases on which Raygor claim s error on appeal. But the ULJ relied on substanti al evidence in the reco rd in finding that Stew art had “consistently asserted that, on January 3, [2025,] he gave Ra ygor the option of committing to comi ng to the office or having Jan uary 3 be her last day, and that she chose the l atter.” More specifically, the ULJ pointed t o Stewart’s repeated articu lation of the foregoing “in the q uestionnaire that he [had] completed f or unemployment on January 10,” “in [an] email [that he had sent] to Raygor on January 13, and in his test imony at the hearing on March 4.” Substantial evidence in the record bears out this deter mination by the U LJ. The referenced Januar y 10 questionnaire states: [Raygor] was inform ed that working from home without prior approval was not acceptabl e, [Raygor] stated that she did not believe in - office attendance wa s necessary for her role. Additionally, she expressed concer ns about exposure to illness due to a lack of healthcare coverage. S he was told that this behavior would l ead to her termination, and given the options to change her behavior or she would be terminated. [Raygor] decided to quit and hung up the phone, as she believed it was no t in her best interest to wo rk in the office without currently havin g health insurance. In the referenced Ja nuary 13 email — which listed “Cla rifying the End of Your Employment” as its s ubject — Stewart wro te to Raygor that, on January 3, he “laid out [her] options: (1) either recommit to m eeting the in - office atten dance requirements[;] or conclude [her] employment.” A nd, as summarized above, Stewart testified that he told Raygor during their January 3 phone call that “[she] ne eds[s] to start coming back into the

11 office or [January 3 co uld] be [her] last day” and that, in response, Raygor told him that January 3 would be her last day. Based on this record, we conclude that subs tantial evidence suppo rts the ULJ’s determination that Ste wart’s account “was cr edible because it was clear, consistent, and plausible,” and the ULJ’s decision t o “credit[] Stewart’s te stimony about the January 3 conversation” in “conclud[ing] that t he course of events amount ed to a quit, not a discharge, regardless of what words Stewa rt used to describe the separation.” And we conclude that the ULJ provided statutorily required reasons for this credibility determi nation per subdi vision 1a(a) of Minnesota Statutes section 268.105. See Ywswf, 726 N.W.2d at 530–33. 2 We reach the same conclusion about the U LJ’s decision to discr edit Raygor’s testimony about her text messa ge to an acqua intance, af ter the January 3 ph one call, that Stewart had “basically just fired [her].” The ULJ “set out the reason for. . . disc rediting ” Raygor’s testim ony about the email: “If Rayg or’s version of the events were accurate and Stewart had unequivoc ally and unambiguousl y told her she was being let go, it is unc lear why she would have said ‘basically.’” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a). On this basis, 2 As much as Raygor contests on appeal the U LJ’s rejection of her assertion that ther e are “multiple discre pancies and inaccurac ies” in Stewart’s hearing testimo ny, we conclude t hat substantial evidence su pports the ULJ’s determination tha t “Raygor has not shown that Stewart likely gave fals e testimony or that an y additional evidence would likely change the outcome of the decision.” Despite Ray gor’s “claim[] that Stewart sai d that he was going to have to let her go for financial reasons,” Stew art’s testimony at the hearing, as summarized above, amounts to s ubstantial evidence in support of t he ULJ’s finding s that “Stewart gave Raygor the option of c ontinuing her employm ent or having . . . [Janu ary 3] be her last day and she chose the latter,” and that “[i]t was R aygor’s decision for th e employment to en d when it ended, not the employer’s.” See Skarh us, 721 N.W.2d at 344.

12 the ULJ determined that “[i]t is more likely t hat Stewart expressed some frustration with Raygor about her work ing from home and exp ressed some uncertaint y about her prospects with the company, all of which made R aygor believe that her employme nt was in jeopardy.” Given that the ULJ prov ided a statutorily required reas on for this credibility determination and t hat we must “ v iew the ULJ ’ s factua l findings in the light most fav orable to the decision, giving deference to the cr edibility determinations m ade by the ULJ,.. . we will not disturb the ULJ ’ s factual fi ndings. . . [here becaus e] the evidence substantially sustains them. ” Skarhu s, 721 N.W.2d at 344 (citations omitted). Against the backdrop of these valid credibili ty determinations, we conclude that substantial evidence s upports the UL J’s decision that Raygor quit, th at she was ineligibl e for unemployment benefits, and that n o ineligibility exceptions apply. As explained ab ove, there is substantial evid ence in the record unde rlying the ULJ’s determ inations that Stewart afforded Raygor the choice to either contin ue her employment or sel ect January 3 as her last day, as well as the ULJ’s finding that Ray gor “chose the latter.” Thus, the ULJ did not err in deciding that “[a] prepondera nce of the evidence shows t hat Raygor quit her employment ” because it was her “decisio n for the employment to en d when it ended, not the employer’s.” See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a) (2024) (“A quit from employment occurs when the decision to end the employ ment was, at the time the employment en ded, the employee’s.”). Similarly, there is substantial evid ence in the record supportin g the ULJ’s determinations t hat, “ e ven if Stewart str ongly suggested t hat Raygor ’ s empl oyment was going to end at the en d of her probationary pe riod,” that suggestion “would not be a go od

13 reason caused by t he employer for q uitting. ” See id., subd. 3(e) (2024) (“No tification of discharge in the future, including a layoff bec ause of lack of work, is not a good reason caused by the employer for quitting.”). And substantial evidence likewise supports the ULJ’s ruling that “Stew art requiring Raygor to work from the office ex cept for on Mondays was not adverse to Raygor because it was consistent with the agreement they ha d from the beginning of the employment” and that any “disagreement or miscommunicat ion [about the work -from- h ome rules] would not c ompel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed.” See id., subd. 3(a) (2024) (defining a “good reason ca used by the employer for quittin g” as a reason “(1) that is directly related to the employmen t and for which the employer is responsible, ” “(2) that is adverse to the worker,” and “(3) that would compel an average, reasonable wor ker to quit and become unemployed rathe r than remaining in the emplo yment”). We therefore discern n o error in the ULJ’s order affirming its decision that “Raygor is ineligible for unemploymen t benefits based on her separ ation from Stewart & Associates” because “[a] preponderance of the evidence shows that Raygor did not quit because of a good reason caused by the em ployer” and “[n]one of th e other exceptions to ineligibility apply.” Affirm ed.