Minnesota court opinion filed March 2, 2026

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A24-1150 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Jose Miguel Reyes-Jov el, Appellant. Filed March 2, 2026 Affirmed Schmidt, Judge Carver County District Court File No. 10 -CR- 22 -524 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Min nesota; and Mark Metz, Carver Co unty Attorney, Kevi n A. Hill, Se nior Assistant Cou nty Attorney, Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appella te Public Defender, Joseph McIn nis, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Mi nnesota (for appellant) Considered and deci ded by Johnson, Presidin g Judge; Larson, Judge; and Schmi dt, Judge. NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION SCHMIDT, Judge Appellant Jose Reyes -Jovel challenges the postconviction court’s or der denying his petition for postconvict ion relief seeking to wi thdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.

2 FACTS The procedural path l eading to this appeal is a winding journey. A summary of each step is necessary to understand the legal iss ues presented. Defense Counsel’s Ad vice and the S ub sequent Guilty Plea In their representation of Reyes - Jovel i n defense of charges in volving two counts o f first- degree drug pos session and o ne count of fleein g a peace officer, defense co unsel advised Reyes - Jovel about a possible dure ss defense and the potential immigra tion consequences of plea ding guilty. Couns el explained this advice in a letter: We understand that you would like to argue that you were coerced into doing this under legal d uress. As we have explained, the argume nt for that defense requires a showin g that you were “liable to instant death. ” Althou gh there is some evidence that you were gravely concerned for your life, and therefore participated i n the alleged crimin al activity it wo uld be difficult to prove the instant aspect of the de fense. Thus our advice is that it would likely be in your best interest to acce pt the State’s offer and allow us to arg ue for a minimum prison sentence. Also, it is important that you understa nd that entering if you plead guilty and/or are found guilt y of controlled su bstance crime in the first degree you may face additional immigration consequences. If you a re not a United States citizen, a plea of guilty or being found guilty for the offense with which [you] have been charged ma y result in de portation, exclusio n from admission to this country, or deni al of naturalization. Additionally, even if y ou are found not guilt y you could still be subject to immigrati on consequences given the nature of the charges. After reviewing the letter with Reye s - Jovel, defense counse l negotiated a plea deal w ith respondent State of Minnesota. The parties presented the signed plea petition to the district

3 court, in which Reyes- Jovel pleade d guilty to a iding and abetting first - degree sale of more than 17 grams of metha mphetamine and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. At the plea hearing, d efense counsel confir med that Reyes - Jovel reviewed and signed the petition. Th e district court reviewe d Reyes - Jovel’s rights and inquired about his awareness of potential immigration consequen ces: THE COURT: And I know y our attorney t alked to you about potential immigration consequences, but I’m going to go through them with you as well. Because of this c onviction, you could be deported from the Unit ed States, and I want to make sure that yo u understand that this C ourt and myself either now or at sentencing have no authority or jurisdiction t o change that. . . . I will not be making any immigrati on decisions. And ev en if I wanted to, I don’t have the authorit y to do so. Do you und erstand that? DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And do you still w ant to proceed ahead even knowing the immigrati on consequences? [Off the record.] THE COURT: Do you still want to procee d ahead know ing those immigration cons equences? DEFENDANT: Yes, t hat’s fine. THE COURT: Your attorney t ells me that you went throu gh a plea petition line by lin e, item by item. Is that correct? DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And then you signe d it on the last page. Is t hat correct? DEFENDANT: Yes.

4 THE COURT: A nd when you signed it, are you indicating to the Court that you do understand all of y our rights, the charges, and the potential conse quences? DEFENDANT: Yes. In the plea colloquy Re yes-Jovel testified: DEFENSE COUNSEL: Mr. Reyes - Jovel, do you understand that not only is it possible that you c ould be deported in this case, but that by entering a plea o f guilty to a controlled substance case of this nature that it w ould be presumptively mandatory? DEFENDANT: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: And do you feel tha t you have had enough time to speak with your att orneys about both the implications in term s of your poten tial sentence as well as any collateral consequence s such as immigration? DEFENDANT: Yes.. . . . DEFENSE COUNSE L: We also dis cussed possible d efenses, specifically your self-d efense and duress; righ t? DEFENDANT: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: And we’ve explained those to you in great detail; right? DEFENDANT: Yes, c orrect. DEFENSE COUNSE L: And you’ve been able to ask q uestions about how those apply in your case; right? DEFENDANT: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you feel that y ou’ve had enough time to discuss possibl e defenses with [D.W.] and myself?

5 DEFENDANT: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSE L: Are yo u asking for a ny more time to discuss possible defens es with [D.W.] and my self? DEFENDANT: No, th at’s fine. After the colloquy, the district court found that Reyes -Jovel “ha[d] knowledge of [his] rights, that [he] voluntarily and intellige ntly entered into [the] plea by [his] own free will, and that by answering everybod y’s questions. . . [on the re cord, he had ] taken responsibility and estab lished a factual basis fo r [his] plea.” The court accepted the plea. Denial of Motion to W ithdraw the Guilty Ple a Before sentencing, Reyes- Jovel m oved to withdraw his plea. Reye s - Jovel argued that he pleaded guilty under duress and that h e believed that the evid ence may be viewed “favorably towards hi m.” The district court held an evidentiary hea ring on the motion. At the hearing, Reyes- Jovel testified he felt pressured by his attor neys to plead guilty. But he clarified that the “pressure” he f elt was from his attorne ys advising him that he did not have a strong case. He also admit ted that his counsel advi sed him that pleadi ng guilty meant “I would probably go spen d time in prison and t hen I would be deported.” Reyes-Jovel also conce ded that his attorneys m ade no threats to make him plead guilty and that he signed the plea petition which indicated that no one had c oerc ed him to plead guilty. The prosecu tor called two of Re yes-Jovel’s defense atto rneys. The first testif ied that s he pr ovided legal advice to Reyes - Jovel about the l ikelihood of success in his case, she never threatened or coerced him to plead guilty, and that “[t]he decision to not go to trial was Mr. Reyes - Jovel’s decision.” The second defense attorney te stified that he “never

6 told [Reyes-Jovel] th at I would not represent h im if the case proceeded to trial” and a dded that it was Reyes-Jovel ’s decision to plead gui lty. Following the hearing, t he district court denied Reyes - Jovel’ s motion. The district court entered a final ju dgment of conviction a nd imposed its sentenc e. Postconviction Procee dings and Appeal Reyes- Jovel appe aled. We gra nted Reyes - Jovel’s mo tion to stay hi s appeal and remand the case for postconvictio n proceedings. On remand, Reyes -Jovel file d a petition for postconviction relief, requesting that his conviction be vacate d due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Reyes - Jove l alleged that his trial counsel “ fail[ed ] to investigate the defense of duress,” gave him “ affirmative misadvice on the burden of proof fo r this defense, ” and failed to properly advise him of the immigration co nsequences of h is guilty plea. The postconvicti on court granted an evi dentiary hearing on the petition. At the hearing, Reyes - Jovel’s trial counsel te stified th at he sent Re yes - Jovel the letter to give him advice on immigrati on and about a duress defens e, which he testified included discussion on the requirement of th e threat of instant death. The trial counsel further testified that he provided Reyes - Jov el with a standard Padil la advisory in the letter and that he and another attorney provided stro ng advice during in - per son meetings on th e possible collateral immigration consequenc es to pleading guilty. A different defense counsel testified that s he “told Reyes -Jovel th at if he plead guilty or were found guilty of the offense charged in t his case, he will be dep orted.” Following the hearing, t he postconviction co urt denied Reyes -Jovel ’s petition for relief. The postc onviction court rejected the ar guments related t o Reyes - Jovel’s allegations

7 of inadequate investig ation and misadvice r egarding a possi ble duress defense. The postconviction court also rebuffed Reyes- Jovel’s argument that his cou nsel did not effectively advise him of the potential immigr ation consequences of his guilty plea. We granted Reyes-J ovel ’s motion to lift th e stay of this appeal. Thi s appeal follows. DECISION Reyes-Jovel argues that the postconviction court abused its discretio n in denying his petition because his defens e counsel was ineffective when advising hi m prior to hi s guilty plea. When reviewing a postconviction court’ s denial of relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we consi der whether the postco nviction court’s factual findings are sufficiently supported in the record. State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013). We then “ conduc t a de novo r eview of the legal impl ication of those facts on the ineffective a ssistance claim, a nd either affirm th e court’s decis ion or conclude t hat the court abused its dis cretion because postco nviction relief is warra nted.” Id. at 503- 04. We examine an ineffective -assistan ce-of- counsel claim under the two - prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washingto n, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (198 4). To establish a clai m of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defen dant must prove “(1) that his counse l’s representation ‘ fell below an objective stand ard of reasonableness ’; and (2) ‘ there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel ’s unprofessional erro rs, the result of the proceeding would ha ve been different. ’ ” Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2 d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694). “ We revie w a district court’s application of the Stric kland test de novo because it in volves a mixed question of law and fact. ” State v. Mosle y, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017).

8 Reyes- Jovel argues tha t he received ine ffective assistance of counsel because his defense attorneys (1) inadequately advise d him about the p otential immigrati on consequences of his guilty plea, and (2) improperly advised him on a possible duress defense. We address e ach argument in tur n. A. The postconviction court did not abu se its discretion in determining that Reyes- Jovel received effective assistance of counsel as to the im migration c onseque nces of his gui lty plea. Reyes-Jovel immigration- conseq uences argument relies upon t he Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). In Padilla, the United States S upreme Court held that an attorney must accurate ly inform a client th at has been charged with a crime and is not a United States citizen of the immigration conse quences of pleading gui lty. 559 U.S. at 369. Failing to do so satisfie s the first Strickland pr ong. Id. at 371 (quotati on omitted). T o satisfy the firs t prong of t he Strickland analysis, Reyes - Jo vel needed to establish that his counsel failed to advise him of the immigration cons equences for pleading guilty to aiding and abetting first - degree sale o f more than 17 grams of met hamphetamine. See Nissalke, 8 61 N.W.2d at 94. He nex t needed to establish that th ere was a reaso nable probability that if he ha d been adequately advi sed, he would not have pleaded guilty. Id. T he postconviction co urt concluded th at Reyes -Jovel ’s petitio n failed on the firs t Strickland prong. The postconviction court rejected Reye s - Jovel’s argument on this issue, finding that Reyes- Jov el “was not credible” in claiming that he was not advised of the possible immigration c onsequences if he pleaded guilty. The postconviction cour t also found that “the record and counsel’s credible testimony sh ows” that defense cou nsel adequately advised Reyes-Jovel of likely immigration conseque nces.

9 “The postconviction c ourt is in the be st position to evaluate w itness credibility. ” Miles v. State, 840 N.W.2d 195, 2 01 (Minn. 2013). As such, w e must defer to the postconviction court’s credibility determina tions. Id. And the record s upports the postconviction court’s determination that Rey es-Jovel was not credib le. Reyes- Jovel’s attorney s first inc luded t he Pa dilla warning in their standard letter. They then provided str onger warnings when discussing the case with him. One attorney testified that she told Reyes-Jove l that “if he plead [ed] guilty or w ere found guilty of the offense charged in this case, he will be deported” and that “the natur e of his charges were extremely likely to ma ke him deported in this case.” A t the plea hearing, the plea petition presente d to the district court cle arly explained the poss ible i mmigration conseq uences. Reyes - Jovel agreed at the hearing that his defense counsel went through the petition line -by-line with him and specifically covere d the immigration conseque nces portion of the petition. Reyes- Jovel agreed that, if convicted, he would be subject to a presumptive deportati on proceeding. The record supports the postconviction cou rt’s finding that Reyes - Jovel lacked credibility in asserting that he was not adeq uately advised of the possible immigration consequences of his guilty ple a. The postc onviction court, there fore, acted wit hin its discretion in denying R eyes -Jovel’s postconvi ction petition on this gr ound. 1 1 Since the ineffective a ssistance of counsel argument fails on the fir st Strickland pro ng, we need not address th e second. See Mosley, 895 N.W.2d at 591.

10 B. The postconviction c ourt did not abuse i ts discretion when it determined that Reyes- Jovel received e ffective assistance of counsel as to the meri ts of a potential dures s defense. Reyes- Jovel argues tha t his counsel was i neffective whe n his attorneys advised him that a duress defense would not likely succeed at trial. His argument fails because th e record supports the postconvictio n court’s finding that defense counsel made strategi c choices after investigating the law an d facts. See Swaney v. State, 8 82 N.W.2d 207, 217- 218 (Minn. 2016) (stating that “a failure to in vestigate a potential defense may cons titute ineffective assistance i f it results not from c ounsel’s considered ch oice but rather fr om inattention or neglect,” but that “ [s] trategic ch oices made by an at torney after a th orough investigation of the fac ts and law are virtua lly unchallengeable” (qu otation omitted)). Here, the record shows that defense counsel consulted with Re yes - Jovel about the available evidence and discussed the merits of a possible duress d efense with him. Then, w ith Reyes - Jovel’s permission, coun sel negotiated a plea deal with the state. The record further shows that Re yes - Jovel agreed that he discussed the dure ss defense with his attorneys and that he di d not need more time t o discuss his case before pleading guilty. The record reveals that counsel made a reaso nable investigation int o the law and facts and made strategic choices. We “ genera lly will not review strategic choices counsel made following a reasonable inves tigation of law and facts, a nd [Reyes-Jovel] ha s given us no compelling rea son to depart from t hat general rule. ” Id. at 220 n.9. The

11 postconviction court a cted within its discreti on in denying Reyes - J ovel’s postconviction petition on the first Stri ckland prong. 2 Affirmed. 2 Because Reyes - Jovel’s argumen t fails to satisfy the fir st Strickland prong, we need not address the second pro ng. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d at 591.