Court opinion: This Little Piggy Catering vs Historic John P. Furber Farm

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-0255 A This Little Piggy Cat ering, Inc., Respondent, vs Historic John P. Furber Farm L.L.C., et al., Appellants, Loupat Corp., d/b/a Ti nucci’s Restaurant, et a l., Defendants. Filed March 2, 2026 Affirmed in part, reve rsed in part, appeal di smissed in part, and r emanded Schmidt, Judge Dakota County District Court File No. 19HA- CV -22-195 Stephen A. Ling, Arie l K. Lierz, Haley A. Ekhaml, Spencer Fane LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respond ent) James Carson Whedbe e Bock, JCWB ESQ., LLC, Minneapolis, Mi nnesota; and Ryan L. Kaess, Kae ss Law, LLC, St. Pa ul, Minnesota (for appella nts) Considered and deci ded by Schmidt, Presidin g Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bentle y, Judge.

2 NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION SCHMIDT, Judge Appellant Historic Joh n P. Furber Farm, LLC (Furber Far m), and appellant Ryan Kaess— Furber Farm’s attorney — challenge the district court’s orde rs awarding attorney fees and costs to respondent A This L ittle Piggy Catering, Inc. (Little Piggy), due to discovery violations. D wayne and Angela Butt s, the individuals that own Furber Farm and GFY, LLC —the company that owns the real property on w hich Furber Farm operates— also attempt to appeal t he district court’s order piercing the corporate veil and holding the Butts es individually lia ble for an attorney-fees -and-costs award. Because the Buttses are not proper appellants, we decline to consider the ir arguments. We also dismiss the appeal wit h respect to Furber Far m for a lack of standing. We reverse the district court’s sancti on award of $ 11,580.25 in attorney fees and costs against Kaess beca use he did not receive notice that the award may be entered against him personally. Finally, we affirm th e district court’s order awarding $ 63,093.15 in attorney fees and costs associate d with Little Piggy’s m otion for contempt. FACTS Little P iggy, a catering company, entered into a 15-year contract to be the exclusive caterer for Furber Farm, a wedding-and-event venue company. Pursuant to a contract term that allowed for ear ly termination by writte n agre ement of bot h parties, Furber Farm attempted to terminate the contract thre e years into the 15 - year term. Little Piggy refused. The Buttses cre ated a corporation — G FY — and Furber Far m then sold Furbe r Farm’s real property to G FY. After discovering that Furbe r Farm had been using caterin g

3 services other than Litt le Piggy, Little Piggy sued Furber Farm and GFY. Furber Farm denied liability and ass erted counterclaims ag ainst Little Piggy. Little Piggy served Furber Farm and GFY with interrogatorie s, requests for production of docume nts, and requests for admissions. Neit her Furber Farm nor GFY responded. Three mont hs after Little Piggy’s o riginal discovery requests, Little Piggy sent a letter to Kaess noti fying him that if Furb er Farm and GFY did not respond to the discovery requests, Lit tle Piggy would move to compel discove ry. Furber Farm serve d Little Piggy with answ ers to its interrogatorie s and requests for adm ission s. Little Piggy sent Kaess another letter, alleging that Furber Farm’s answers were evasive, nonresponsive, and not in good faith. Little Pig gy stated that if F urber Farm did not amend or supplement its answ ers by a given date, Little Piggy woul d move to compel disco very and include a request f or attorney fees and c osts. Furber Farm did n ot respond. Thirteen months after the original discov ery request s were served, Little Piggy sent a third letter to Kae ss, which detailed Little P iggy’s discovery effort s and requested tha t Furber Farm provide s upplemental discovery responses. Little Piggy noted that it w ould move to compel disco very and request attor ney fees and costs if Furber Far m did not respond or supplement its answers. Kaess wro te back: Thank you for your letter. . ., it was nice to hear from you, I assumed that your client had forgot ten about this frivolous litigation. As to your question about discovery, now that I know your client is still pursuing this matter, I will of c ourse update the initial discovery tha t was served on you.

4 After receiving no supp lemental responses, Little Piggy moved to compel discovery from Furber Farm and GFY and sought fees and costs associated wit h bringing the motion. Furber Farm eventually provided amend ed answers to the first set of interrogatori es and responses to the requests for the production of documents. I n support of its motion, Little Piggy argued that Furber Farm’s suppl emental answers “remain [ed ] universally evasive or incomplete” and that both Furber Far m and GFY “provide[d] no basi s in law or in fact to justify the substantial delay in answeri ng basic discovery questions.” Furber Farm opposed the mot ion, arguing that “Little Pi ggy failed t o prosecute this c ase and now after months of delay [is] demanding answer s to questions that have already been asked and answ ered.” After a hearing, the di strict court found that F urber Farm’s supplemental discovery responses were “inadequate. ” The district court granted Little Piggy’ s motion and ordered Furber Farm to provide supplement al answers by specific dates. 1 The district court also ordered Furber Farm and GFY to p ay Little Piggy’s reasonable at torney fees and costs associated with bringin g the motion. Little Pi ggy filed an affidavit in support of the fees and costs it sought from Furber Farm and GFY. The affidavit als o noted — for the first time—that Little Piggy also sought fees and c osts from Kaess. Kaess was not served with the affidavit for the f ees sought against h im in his personal capacit y. The district court enter ed judgment for Little Piggy’s attorney fees a nd costs and ordered that Furber F arm, GFY, and Kaess be jointly and severally liable for the total amount if it was not paid within 90 days. A fter the 90 - day deadline had expired, Kaes s 1 Furber Farm never pro vided the supplemental answers as ordered by the district court.

5 moved to “[d]ism iss and strike” the award of attorney fees and costs. But before the district court ruled on Kaess’ motion, Littl e Piggy informed the district cou rt that it had received notice that Furber Farm and GF Y declared Chapter 11 bankrup tcy. The b ankruptcy proceedings resulted in an a utomatic stay th at applied to Furber Farm and GFY. The district court denied K aess’ motion and — given Furber Farm and GFY’s insolvency a nd Kaess’ joint-and-sever al liability—entered judgment against Kae ss for $11,580.25. Based on Furber Farm and GFY’s co ntinued failure to provide dis covery, Little Piggy moved to hold Furber Farm, GFY, and Kaess in contempt. In its motion, Little Piggy asked the district co urt to dismiss Furber Farm and GFY’ s counterclaims wi th prejudice, enter judgment on Litt le Piggy’s claims, pier ce the corporate veil s uch that the Buttses could be held pers onally liable for Furber Fa rm and GFY’s ac tions, and order sanctio ns against Furber Farm, G FY, and Kaess in the fo rm of attorney fees and costs. At the contempt hearing, Furber Farm and GFY agreed to a de fault judgment but opposed the request to pierce th e corporate vei l and the request for att orney fees and costs. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the district court dismissed Fur ber Farm and GFY’s counterclaims against Little Pig gy with prejudice and en tered default judgmen t in favor of Little Piggy. The distr ict court also granted L ittle Piggy’s motion to pierce the corpora te veil and a ward ed attor ney fees and costs as a sanction. In a ssessing attorney fee s, the district court ordered K aess and th e Buttses to pay Little Piggy $63,09 3.15 and found them jointly and severally lia ble for the entire awa rd. Furber Farm and Kaess now appeal.

6 DECISION I. The Buttses are not p roper appellants as th ey failed to file a notic e of appeal. The brief submitted by Kaess and F urber Farm include s arguments on behalf of the Buttses a s individuals. The Buttses did not, however, file a separ ate notice of a ppeal. Although “notices of appeal are to be liberall y construed in favor of their sufficiency,” Kelly v. Kelly, 371 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Minn. 1985), we will not construe a notic e of appeal so liberally as to in clude additional app ellants not identified in it. See, e.g., Nash v. Allen, 392 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Minn. App. 19 86), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 22, 1986). The notice of appeal filed by Furber Farm does no t name or reference the Buttses. In additio n, although the Buttses are owners of GFY, which owns Furber Far m, the Buttses ’ interests as individuals — separat e and apart from the legal entities— are not represented by Furber Farm. Because the Buttses did not file a notice of appeal, they are not proper appellan ts. We, therefore, do not c onsider their arguments. See id. II. Furber Farm lacks standing because it is not an aggr ieved party. We next address wh ether Furber Farm has standing to challenge t he awards of attorney fees and co sts on appeal, which is an issue that we review de nov o. Richards v. Reiter, 796 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Mi nn. 2011). “To have standing to ap peal, a party must be aggriev ed by the decision of a court from which the p arty appeals.” Webster v. Hennepin C ounty, 910 N.W.2d 4 20, 434 (Minn. 2018). A party is “aggrieved” when its interests have been “ injuriously affected by the under lying adjudication. ” Glaze v. State, 909 N. W.2d 322, 325-26 (Mi nn. 2018) (quotations o mitted).

7 The district court never entered judgm ent against Furber Fa rm because the federal bankruptcy court proceedings automatic ally stayed the state court proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (20 18) (providing that the filing of a ban kruptcy petition automatically stays all other proceedings against the debtor). As such, F urber Farm appropriately concedes t hat it is no t an aggrieved part y. We ag ree. Because Furber Farm i s not aggrieved, it lacks sta nding to appeal. Webster, 910 N.W.2d at 4 34. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal with respect to Furber Farm. III. The district court abused its discr etion when it entered the $11,580.25 judgment against Kae ss for attorney fees an d costs. Kaess argues that the district court abuse d its discretion by ordering him to pay Little Piggy $11,580.25 in a ttorney fees and costs associated with Little Piggy’s motion to compel discovery. Kae ss first asserts that the district court abus ed its discretion because it did not expressly find t hat he advised Furber Farm not to cooperate with discov ery before imposing sanctions. Kaess also a sserts that the district c ourt abused its discretio n because he received no no tice that Little Piggy intended to seek f ees and costs from him per sonally. We review a district court’s disco very rulings, including sanctions orders, for an abuse of discretion. Fr ontier Ins. Co. v. Front line Processing C orp., 788 N.W.2d 917, 922 (Minn. App. 2010), re v. denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2010). Kaess rais es challenges to the district court’s constru ction of a court rule, which is a legal quest ion that we review de novo. See In re Rol lins, 738 N.W.2d 798, 803 (Minn. App. 2007). An error of law by a district court constitu tes an abuse of discreti on. Id.

8 A. Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01(d)(1) does not require an express finding that an attorney advi sed the conduct that led to a motion to compel disclosure o r discovery. Kaess argues that the di strict court abused its d iscretion by sanctionin g him without making an express finding that Kaess advised Furber Farm not to cooperate with discovery. Rule 37 authorizes a c ourt to issue orders compelling discovery and to impose sanctions. When a party moves to compel discovery and the district court grants the motion, the court shall, after affording an o pportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advi sing such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney fees [.] Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.01(d)(1) (emphasis added). We reject Kaess’ read ing of the rule that the district court m ust —before imposin g sanctions against an attorney — m ake an express finding tha t the attorney advise d the conduct which necessit at ed the fil ing of a motion to co mpel. The plain language of t he rule requires no suc h finding, and Kaess cites no caselaw that im poses such a requirement. W e also note that there is ample support in the record that Kaess advised Furber Farm about the conduct that led to Little Pi ggy’s motion to compel. Kaess represented Furber Farm througho ut these proceedings. Little Piggy served F urber Farm, through Kaess, with interrogatories, requests for pr oduction of documents, and requests for admissions. Furber Farm did not respond. Litt le Piggy sent Kaess three letters requesting that Furber Farm pr ovide good - faith responses to L ittle Piggy’s disc overy requests. Even though Kaess responde d to Little Piggy’s thi rd letter, Furber Fa rm failed to supplement its discovery responses, which forced Little Piggy to seek redress fr om the district court.

9 Thus, the record fully supports the district court’s decision to sanction Kaess as the “attorney advising [the] conduct” that necessitated Little Piggy fil ing a motion to compel against Furber Farm. Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.01(d)(1). B. Because Kaess did not receive notice that Little Piggy sought at torney fees from him perso nally, we reverse the district court’s o rder and remand with instructi ons to vacate the $11, 580.25 judgment. Kaess also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it h eld him liable for the $11,580.25 aw ard because he did n ot receive notice that Little Pig gy sought sanctions against him p ersonally. Little Piggy’s notice of motion and m otion to compel sought fees and costs against Furber Farm and GFY. Th os e plead ings did not mention Kaess. In g ranting Little Piggy ’s motion to compel, th e district court ordered that Fur ber Farm and GFY “ shall be responsible to pay [Little Piggy’s] reaso nable attorney fees and costs associated with the bringing of its present motion to comply. ” Th e order did not mention Kaess. Little Piggy then filed an affidavit detailing the amounts and, for the fir st time, noted its inte nt to seek fees from Kaess. Kaess did not receive service of the affidavit seeking awards against him. T he district court later entered judgment for Little Piggy a nd ordered that Furber Farm, GFY, and Kaess be joi ntly and severally liabl e for the total amount. But before a district court can render san ctions under rule 37, the rul e requires the person from whom san ctions are sought to be afforded “an opportunit y to be heard.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.01(d)(1). Kaess was never provid ed with notice — through, for example, Little Piggy’s notice of moti on or motion — or give n an opportunity to be heard about Little Piggy’s intent to seek s anctions against Kaess.

10 Little Piggy argues tha t rule 37, itself, provi ded sufficient noti ce to Kaess because the rule expressly authoriz es sanct ions against attorneys who advise parties to engage in conduct prom pting the filing of a motion to compel discovery. Bu t the rule’s language authorizing sanctions a gainst attorneys d oes n ot alleviate Little Piggy of its duty to provide notice to everyone fro m whom Little Piggy sought sanctions, so that they may have “an opportunity to be heard.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 37. 01(d)(1). W e conclude that Kaes s was not provided an o pportunity to be heard on whether he should personally be sanctioned unde r rule 37.01(d)(1). Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructio ns to vacate the $11,58 0.25 judgment against him. IV. The district court did not abuse its discret ion when it entered th e $63, 093.15 judgment against Kae ss for attorney fees an d costs. Kaess contends that t he district court abused its discretion when it o rdered him to pay $ 63,093.15 in attorney fees and costs associated with Little Piggy’s motion for contempt, 2 which— unlike the motion to compe l — specifically named Kaess and, therefore, put him on n otice. We review sanction s orders for an abus e of discretion and the underlying interpretation of a cour t rule de novo. Rollin s, 738 N.W.2d at 803. Kaess argues that the sanction order must be reversed based upon the five factors for determining whethe r a court has abused its discretion i n imposing discovery sanctions: (1) [whethe r] the court set a date certain by which comp liance was required, (2) [w hether] the cou rt gave a w arning of potential sanctions for non - compl iance, (3) [whether] the failure to cooperate with discovery was an isolated event or part of a pattern, (4) [whether] the fail ure to comply was willful 2 Kaess also argues that the dist rict court needed to fi nd that he advised Fur ber Farm’s sanctionable conduc t before imposing the se sanctions. We rejected this argument above.

11 or without justification, and (5) [whether] the moving party has demonstrated prejudice. Frontier, 788 N.W.2d at 923. Our analysis of each factor lead s us to the conclusion that the district court did no t abuse its discretion by sanctioning Kaess. Factor 1: the district c ourt set a date certain by which compliance w as required. Kaess argues that the first factor weighs against sanct ions because the court did not order Furber Farm to c omply with discovery by any particular date. Kaess’ argument ha s no merit because the di strict court gave Furber Farm 30 days to sup plement certain answers to interrogatories and r equests for admissi on and 45 days to prod uce certain documents. 3 Factor 2: the dist rict court warn ed Kaess of p otential sanctions fo r noncompliance. Kaess argues that the second factor weighs a gainst sanctions because the district court gav e no explicit warning. But we have afforded weight to im plicit warnings. See, e.g., id. at 923 - 25 (concluding “the lack of a prior explicit war ning [was] not dispositive ” because the sanctioned party “ had previously been given clear noti ce that its discovery responses were insuffic ient and of the importa nce of completing adeq uate supplementation in compliance with the discovery ru les by [given] deadline[s]”). The district court did not provide Kaes s with exp licit warnings of potent ial sanctions. But, as an officer of the co urt, Kaess knew of the implicit consequences of being held in contempt f or failing to comply with the court’s ruling requiring compliance with discovery by certa in dates. 3 Kaess argues that we s hould disregard these deadlines because Furber Farm notified Little Piggy that it intended to agree to a default judgment. But Furber Farm stipulated to default judgment 29 days after the court’ s deadline expired. Furber Farm’s intent t o agree to default judgment at a later date did not relieve it of its obligation to comply with the order.

12 Factor 3: the failure to cooperate with discov ery was part of a patter n. Kaess contends that th e district court “made no findings that there was any pattern regarding a failure to provide discovery.. . [or] why Kaess is responsi ble for not providin g adequate discovery. ” But the record shows that Furber Farm a nd GFY’s failure to participate in discovery was the rule, not the e xception. T he district court also made several findings that reflect a pattern of Furber Farm and GFY — through Ka ess — failing to partici pate in discover y. The c ourt found that Kae ss “largely ignored” communication s from Little Piggy to Kaess requesting that his clients provide complete disco very responses. The district court fur ther found that “Furber Farm and GFY made modes t attempts to respond t o [Little Piggy’s] disc overy requests” only after being threatened with a motio n to compel, but the court noted th at those attem pts were “by-and- large inadequ ate.” The court also n oted that Little Pigg y’s discovery req uests “were generally mater ial to the case, proportional, and n ot overly burdensome.” The district court further fo und that Furber Farm a nd GFY: • o ffered discovery resp onses that demonstrate d an attempt “to shield themselves from reaso nable discovery”; • provided discovery responses that were “ n ot responsive”; • “claimed not to underst and questions not diffic ult to understand”; • “claimed to lack knowl edge of facts which any reasonable [d]efendant in their position would have been aware”; • “answered questions of their own making rath er than the question put to them”; • failed to provide “[s]atisfactor y explanations for ” their noncompliance;

13 • failed to provide the ba ses for denials to re quests for admissions; and • “deficient[ly]” produc ed documents because “[n]ot a single e -mail between Furber Farm a nd any other admitted vendor was provided.” These findings support the district court’s im plicit determination that t he pattern of failing to cooperate with disco very occurred through Kaess. Factor 4: the failure to comply was without ju stification. Kaess argues that the district court ma de no finding as to w hy he, as oppose d to Furber Farm, is respo nsible for not providing adequate disc overy. But this factor asks whether the failures to comply were in good or bad faith, not who is most respo nsible. See, e.g., Brez a v. Sc hmitz, 248 N.W.2d 921, 922 (Minn. 1976). The distri ct court’s finding that the noncompliance was without ju stification is supported by the record. Factor 5: Little Piggy demonstrated prejudic e. Kaess argues that Litt le Piggy was not prejudiced by the fai lure to respond to discovery requests. Ka ess asserts that Lit tle Piggy “star ted a lawsuit t o win a case” an d it “won the case,” which is the “exact op posite of prejudice.” But Furber Farm and GFY’s uncooperativeness was not harmless. Little Piggy in curred significant expen ses due to Furber Farm and GFY’ s failure to meaningfull y participate in discove ry. In sum, all of the Frontier factors support the district court’s d ecision to hold Kaess in contempt. The court did not abuse its disc retion in awarding $63,093.15 in fees and costs associated with th e motion for contempt and in entering jud gment against Kaess. Affirm ed in part, reve rsed in part, appeal di smissed in part, and r emand ed.