Minnesota Court of Appeals opinion filed March 2, 2026

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-0522 Accredited Electrical S olutions, LLC, et al., Appellants, vs. Gold Path Real Estate, LLC, et al., Respondents, KPG Real Estate Holdi ngs, LLC, et al., Defendants, Ankit Bhakta, Respondent. Filed March 2, 2026 Affirmed in part, reve rsed in part, and rem anded Schmidt, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 27 -CV- 20 -15753 Ryan R. Dreyer, Fafins ki Mark & Johnson, P. A., Eden Prairie, Minn esota (for appellants) Paul E. Darsow, P eter E. Lind, Tewk sbury & Kerfeld, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents Gold Path Real Estate, LLC, et al.) David J. McGee, Nat alie R. Walz, Mc Gee Walz PA, Minneapo lis, Minnesota (for respondent Ankit Bhakta) Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Brat vold, Judge; and Schmidt, Judge.

2 NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION SCHMIDT, Judge Appellant s argue that the district court erred by dismis sing its mecha nic s’ lien and challenges the distr ict court’s rulings on its defamation claim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. FACTS A. The Parties Appellant Accredited Electrical Solutions, LLC, an electri cal contractor, pr ovid es residential and commercial electrical servic es. A ppellant Matthew M cGill is Accredited’s co -owner and vice pres ident. Respondent Hena Govi ndji- Bhakta is the sole owner of respondent Gold Path R eal Estate, LLC, which purchases, repairs, and sells houses. Respondent Ankit Bhakta initially co -owned Gold P ath b ut ended his ownership after getting his real es tate license. 1 B. Electrical S ervices, Bi lling, and Billing Dis putes Gold Path contacted McGill about perform ing electrical work on a property in Edina. After McGill and the Bhaktas walked through t he property, t hey discussed pricing. The Bhaktas believed the total price of the proj ect would not exceed $10,000 if it was billed on a time- and -material s basis. McGill believe d that he never commit ted to a firm price. 1 Given the ir same last n ames, we refer to Hena Govindji - Bhakta and Ankit Bhakta b y their first name for clarity. Collectively we refer to them as the Bhak tas.

3 Accredited performed work at the propert y. A few weeks later, Accredited sent a $10,342.07 invoice to “Ankit Bhakta” at a P. O. Box in Apple Vall ey. Accredited n oted that a separate invoice would be sent for addit ional work that was bei ng performed. Ankit contacted Accre dited because the invoice exceeded $10,000. Gold Path issued Accredited a $ 2,200 check labeled “ paid in full,” w hich Accredited cashed a nd credited to the work on the propert y. Ankit also sent McGill an el ectronic payment for $2,200 labeled “Final Lien Waiver.” Accredited later perfor med the trim - out work at the property and sent an invoi ce for an additional $8,255.1 5 to “Ankit B hakta” at the same Apple Valley P.O. Box. At He na’s request, Accredited pr ovided material receipt s and itemized breakd owns for th e invoice. Gold Path then issued two checks to Accredited for $2,500 an d $5,000, both includi ng “paid in full” language. Accredited did not cash the check s. C. Mechanic s’ Lien On August 12, 2020, Accredited filed a mechanics’ lien statement on the property with the county r ecorder. T hat same day, Accredited ’s attorne y att empted to ser ve Gold Path with Accredited’s mechanics’ lien by sending it by certified mail to the property. The Bhaktas did not liv e at the propert y, so they did not receive the lien statement. Instead, Hena learned a bout the mechanic s’ lien while researchin g Accredited. Hena then emailed Accredited’s a ttorney and dispute d the mechanics’ lien. In November 2020, Accredited sued Gold Path. Accredited alleged claims for breach of contract, fore closure of the mecha nics’ lien, and unjust enri chment.

4 D. Online Reviews On December 2, 2020, Hena posted a revi ew of Accredited to Porch.com — a website that allows use rs to review and rate bu sinesses and contractor s—that read: WARNING: DO NOT WORK WITH THIS C OMPANY Used this company for 2 remodels. On both projects they sen t a final invoice dou ble the amount initially quoted without communication along the way that the proje ct is drastically going over. When aske d for detailed accountin g to make sense of it, they state that they do not have time to do so. At the same time, threatening to file a lien on the pro perty, which if not paid they will proceed to fil e suit to foreclose. Here is how they CON you: They say that p roviding a written bid will cost 25% more than if the y simply bi lled for “time & materials” because the y have to account for p ossible overages so have to build that buffer into their es timate, BUT if it wa s billed for time & materi als, it will definitely co me in under “X” amount. So obv iously you are going to choose t he more economical option. Who wouldn’t?! I ended up paying on one projects as it was an extra $ 3,000 as the property was due to close and it would have cost more to fight their frivolous lien. The 2nd project, I di d not pay, as they billed an extra $12,000 which has been a headache to deal with because I was unable to sell or refinanc e it due to them actually filing a frivolous mech anics’ lien and filing su it to foreclose. This company has ma de a business o ut of using the lie n rights given to them by the la w to legally extort cons umers. Hena posted this same review, using pse udonyms, to Buildzoom.c om, Houzz.com, and Google. Hena later posted an additional re view of Accredited that read: Steer Clear Delayed the project resulting in losses for us, [McGill] has no sense of accountability when it came to getting the project do ne within budget and within timef rame given. Excuses galore as

5 if he had a pre - written list for all sorts of scenarios. Never again. I don’t understa nd how companie s like this even stay in business. You should be ashamed of yoursel ves! Within a day of her posts, Hena removed th e negative reviews. Hena, instead, posted positive reviews of Accredited. Accredited amended t heir complaint, ad ding a defamation claim based on the published internet reviews. Gold Path answer ed the complai nt, an d all eged counterclaims, including removal of cl oud of title, and sla nder of title. E. Summ ary Judgment Ankit moved for su mmary judgment o n Accredited and McGill’s defa mation claim, arguing that the state ments were not actionable because they were either true or were opinions. The distri ct court granted A nkit’s summary j udgment mot ion in part as to some portions of the firs t online- review statement concerning Accredited. The district cou rt also granted Ankit’s motion as to all of the second online-revie w statements concerning McGill. F. Pretrial and Trial At a pretrial hearing, the district court informe d the parties that it intended to change its summary judgment decision because, upon further research, the di strict court believe d that certain statements were opinion s. Neith er party had requested that the district court reconsider its summa ry judg ment order or moved to exclude add itional online-review statements that the dist rict court ruled would b e considered by a jury. The dispute proceede d to trial. At trial, Accredited’s defamati on claim was submitted to the jury. Accredited’s mechanic s’- lien claim was tried to the district court during the same trial.

6 For the defamation claim, the district court submitted the alleged ly defamatory reviews to the jury in four separate stateme nts: 2 • Statement 1: Used thi s company for 2 remodels. On both projects they sent a final invoice do uble the amount initially quoted without com munication along the way that t he project is drastically going ove r. • Statement 2: When asked for detailed accounting to make sense of it, they s tate they do not have time to do s o. At the same time, threatening to file a lien on the property, which if not paid they will proc eed to file suit to forecl ose. • Statement 3: Here’s how they CON you: They say that providing a written bill will co st 25% more than if they simply billed for ‘time & materials’ because they have to account for possible overages so have to buil d that buffer into their estimate, BUT if it w as billed for time & materials, it will definitely come in und er ‘X’ amount. • Statement 5: I ended up paying on one project as it was an extra $3,000 as the property was due to close and it would have cost more to fight their frivolous lien. The 2nd p roject, I did not pay, as they billed an extra $12,000 which has been a headache to deal with because I was unable to sell or refinance it du e to them actually filing a f rivolous mechanics’ lien and filing sui t to foreclose. 3 While finalizing the special verdict f orm and jury instructions, the district court ruled, over Accredite d’s objection, that Accred ited was a limite d - purpose public f igure and that the reviews were a matter of public conce rn. As such, the jury was required to find 2 In it s summary judg ment order, the dis trict court analyze d the reviews p osted as six separate statements. The jury review ed the posts as four statements. The whole su bstance of each statement, how ever, were the same. 3 The strikethro ugh font indicates words that the district court ruled constituted a non - actionable opinion and were, thus, redacted a nd removed from the jury’s consideration.

7 that Hena acted with ac tual malice before Accr edited could recover presumed damages. G. Special V erdict and P osttrial P roceedings The jury returned a unanimous special verdict, findin g that He na, not Ankit, made the online statements a nd that she did not act with malice. The jury found Hena made two statements that were defamatory and false (Statement 1 and Statement 5), but the other t wo statements were not defamatory or false (Statement 2 and Statement 3). The jury awarded no actual damages on t he defamation claims, but did award Accred ited $875 in presume d damages for Statement 1 and $875 in presume d damages for Stateme nt 5. The jury also found tha t the parties had a contr act, which Gold Path b reached. The jury awarded $18,530. 05 in damages on Accredited’s breach-of-co ntract claim. After the jury verdict, the parties submitted proposed findings, and the district court heard closing arguments on the mechanics’- lien claim. The district court issued its order for judgment, dismissing Accredited’s me chanics’-lien claim because, among other reasons, Accredited did not properly serve the lien on Gold Path or its agents. The distr ict court also dismissed Accredited’s defa mation claim because Gold Path’s statements wer e on a matte r of public concern, Accre dited was a limited - p urpose public figure, and the j ury found that Hena had no t acted with actual mali ce. Accredited appeals.

8 DECISION I. The district court pro perly dismissed Accredited’s m echanics’-lien claim. Accredited’s challenge to the district court ’s mechanics’- lien ruli ng presents mixed questions of law and fact. Langford Tool & Drill Co. v. Phenix B iocomposites, LLC, 668 N.W.2d 438, 4 42 (Minn. App. 2003). “W e will correct erro neous applications of law, but accord the [distric t] court discretion in its ultimate conclusio ns and review such conclusions under an a buse of discretion stan dard.” Id. (quotation o mitted). Accredited argues that the district court erred i n determining that Accredited failed to serve the mechanics’ lien statement proper ly. In Minnesota, a lienor must file a lien statement with the county befor e the mechan ics’ lien time-period expires. Minn. St at. § 514.08, subd. 1 (2024). The lienor must th en serve— either personally or by certified mail—the lien stat ement on the owner or an authorized agent. Id. Service by certified mail is complete upon maili ng so long as it is “pro perly directed to the int ended recipient, even though not actually r eceived by them.” Har- Ned Lumbe r Co. v. Amagineers, Inc., 436 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Minn. App. 1989). The district court dismissed Accredite d’s mechanics’- lien cla im because the lien statement was not properly served u pon Gold Path or its auth orized agents w hen it was se nt to the property by c ertified mail. We disrec en no error. The district court’s dete rmination was premised upon six factual findi ngs. First, the Edina property was neither Gold Path ’s registered business address, no r the Bhakta’s home address. Second, Acc redited knew that the Bhaktas did n ot live at the E dina property because it had perfor med work at t he Bhaktas ’ actual residence in the past. Thir d, Gold

9 Path and t he Bhaktas never represented that mail could be received at the Edina property. Fourth, Accredited mailed invoices to Gol d Path at an Apple Valley P.O. Box. Fifth, Gold Path’s checks list the Apple Valley P.O. Box. Finally, emails between Hena and Accredited show Gold Path’s address in Ap ple Valley. These findings are supported by the record and, there fore, are not c learly erroneous. Langford Tool & Drill, 668 N.W.2d at 446 (“Factual determinations ar e reversible only if they ar e clearly erroneous. ”). Based on these findings, the d istrict court correctly d etermined that sending the lien statement to the Edina property did not effectuate service u pon Gold Path or its a uthorized agents. See Minn. Stat. § 514.08, s ubd. 1. Accredited contends t hat our decision in Carolina Holdings Mid west, LLC v. Copouls, 658 N.W.2 d 236 (Minn. Ap p. 2003) requires re versal. We disagree. In Carolina Holdings, we held that, because the propert y owners had contracted to build a house on a work site and had listed that address on their mortgage docume nts, the lienor properly served a stat ement of claim via certified mai l to the work site eve n though no one live d there. Id. at 237 -40. But unlike the two individual property ow ners in Carolina Ho ldings, Gold Path — as a b usiness that buy s, renovates, and re - sells prope rty — never listed the Edina address on a mortgage as a place tha t the business could receive mail. Instead, Gold Path only had a busines s address in Apple Vall ey. Carolina Holdings does not apply. The district court did not abuse its discre tion in determini ng that Accredited’s mechanics’-lien claim f ail ed. 4 4 Because we affirm on this basis, we need not consider Accredited’s a rguments related to the district court’s dete rmination that service of the lien statement w as untimely.

10 II. The district court’ s erroneous defam ation rulings require a new trial. Accredited and McGill argue that the district court erred by (1) dismis sing McGill’s defamation claim, (2) excluding certain statements as non- actionable opinio ns, and (3) determining— after the close of evide nce — that t he statements were matters of public concern and that Accredited was a limited - purpose public figur e. We address each argument in turn. But we must first clarify ou r scope of review. A. Our scope of revie w is not limited by t he lack of a posttrial m otion. Respondents contend that our scope of revie w is narrow because Accredited and McGill failed to move for a new trial. We dis agree. We will only review issues involvi ng trial procedure, evidentiary ruli ngs, and jury instructions “if there has been a motion for a new trial in which such matters have been assigned as error.” Sauter v. Wasemiller, 38 9 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Minn. 1986) (citation omitted). But we may review a district court’s denial of summary judgment after a jury verdict if the ruling is based on a legal conclusion. Bah r v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 918 n.9 (Minn. 2009); see also Schmitz v. Rinke, Noonan, Smoley, Deter, Colombo, Wiant, Von Korff & Hobbs, Ltd., 783 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010). On appeal, Accredite d and McGill challenge t he district court’s p urely legal rulings at summary judgment a nd at the close of evidence during trial. Since t hese challenges are purely legal issues, o ur scope of re view is not limited. 5 5 Respondents al so assert that McGill is precluded from challe nging the district court’ s summary- judgment ru ling on appeal because he withdre w his claims before trial.

11 B. The district court err ed in dismissing McG ill’s defamation claim. McGill argue s t hat the district court erred by dismissing hi s defamation claim on summary judgment be cause the challenged st atements were capable of being proven tru e or false. 6 “ We review a district court’s sum mary judgment dec ision de novo.” Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JA DT Dev. Grp., LLC, 79 0 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Mi nn. 2010). To establish defamatio n, McGill needed to prove: “ (1) the defamat ory statement was communicated to someone other than [McGill]; (2) the state ment is false; (3) the statement tends to ha rm [McGill] ’s reputat ion and to lower [McGi ll ] in the estimation of the community; and (4) the recipient of the false statement reas onably understands it to refer to a specific individual.” McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 72 5, 729 - 30 (Minn. 2013) (quotations omitted). “[S]tatement s of o pinion . . . are not actio nable.” Lund v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 467 N.W.2d 366, 3 70 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied (Minn. J une 19, 1991). A statement is an opini on when it cannot reas onably be interpreted a s stating actual facts about an individual or relates to a matte r of public concern and is in cap able of being proven true or false. Id. at 368 -69. The contested state ment provides: Steer Clear Delayed the project resulting in los ses for us. [McGill] has no Respondents rely upo n a pretrial state ment in which McGill ’s counsel agreed that the summary-judgment ruling precluded McGill from presenti ng his defamation clai m to the jury. Acknowledging the effect of a district court’s or der is not the same as withdra wing the claims. McGill’s a rgument is properly bef ore this court. 6 At oral argument, appellants’ counsel clarified that appellants do not challenge the jur y’s finding that Ankit did n ot make any of the alle gedly defamatory state ments.

12 sense of accountability when it came to getting the project do ne within budget and within timef rame given. Excuses galore as if he had a pre - written list for all sorts of scenarios. Never again. I don’t understa nd how companie s like this even stay in business. You should be ashamed of yoursel ves! 7 The district court determined that this statement could not be reasona bly interpreted as one of fact and that it was i ncapable of being prov en true or false. We di sagree. To determine if a d efamatory statement is f act or opinion, we consider “1) the statement’s precision and specificit y; 2) the statement’s ve rifiability; 3) the social and literary context in which the statement was made; and 4) the stateme nt’s public contex t.” Lund, 467 N.W.2d at 3 68. Whether a stateme nt’s language reasonabl y conveys an opinion or a fact is a question o f law that we review de novo. Id. at 369. First, describing McG ill as having “no sense of accountability” is sufficiently precise because it qua ntifies his accountability. “ [E] xcuses galore” specifies how McGill handles budget and time constraints. The state ment is sufficiently precise and quantifiab le. Second, whether McG ill was responsive t o budget needs and time constraints is verifiable by the parties ’ communications, which could disprove the st atement that McGill lacked accountability o r made excuses. The st atement is verifiable. Third, the social and literary context of the statement demonstrates that it was fact - based. The statement was posted online day s after Accredited and McGill filed th e lawsuit. T he statement s were also posted to f our websites where consum ers specifically seek insights, recomme ndations, and assess the pub lic reputation of contra ctors. 7 The district court’s an alysis split this stateme nt into two separate par ts.

13 Finally, the “public context” also weighs against a determination that it is an opinion. The statemen ts concerned McGill, a private citizen, and Accredited, a privately owned company. As such, there is no public context about McGill that tie s him to the online reviews such tha t the statements could b e characterized as opini on. The district court erre d by determining that the statement was a nonactionable opinion and by dismiss ing McGill’s defamatio n claim on summary ju dgment. C. The district court erre d in excluding certain statements as nonacti onable opinions imm ediately before trial. Accredited argues that the district court erre d by determining that p ortions of the statements were non-ac tionable opinions right before the start of the tr ial. We agree. In its summary - judgme nt order, the district court ruled that the fol lowing statements were not opinion and t hat a jury must determi ne whether the stateme nts were defamatory: • Statement 3: Here’s how they CON you: They say that providing a written bill will cost 25% more than if they simply billed for ‘ti me and materials’ be cause they have to account for possible overages so have to build that buffer into their estimate, BUT if it was billed for time & materials, it will definit ely come in under ‘X’ amount. • Statement 5: I ended up paying on one project as it was an extra $3,000 as the property was due to close and it would have cost more to fight their frivo lous lien. The 2nd project, I did not pay, as they billed an extra $12,000 w hich has been a headache t o deal with because I w as unable to sell or refinance it due to them actually filin g a frivolous mechanics’ lien and fili ng suit to foreclose. • Statement 6: This company has made a business out of using the lien righ ts given to them by the la w to legally extort consumers.

14 But at a hearing on the eve of trial—and with no motion pending—the district court announced that it intended to change its sum mary - judgment decisio n, rule that the above statements were opinio n, and exclude part of e ach statement from the jury’s consideration. In doing so, the distri ct court struck the ph rase “Here is how they CON yo u” from Statement 3. But eithe r Accredited did or did not “CON” it s customers with its billing practices. Thus, this is a factual stateme nt that can be prove n true or f alse. Therefore, th e district court erred, a nd the statement shou ld have been submitted to the jury. From Statemen t 5, the district court omitted the use of the word “frivolous” both times it appears as well as the phrase “which has been a heada che to deal with because[.] ” But whether a mechanics’ lien is fri volous is a question that is capable of being proven t rue or false. Therefore, it is not an opinion a nd could convey a defamatory meaning. As such, the entirety of Stateme nt 5 should have been presented to the jury. For S tatement 6, the di strict court ruled that the entire stateme nt “really seem[ed] to be opinion.” But whe ther Accredited has “made a busin ess” of using its lien rights to “legally extort consum ers” is a factual assertion because it can be proven true or false. Statement 6 should hav e been submitted in its entirety to the jury. D. The district court erred in determining that the statements were of public concern and that Accredited was a li mited - purpose public figure. Accredited argues that t he district court erred when it de termined that the statements involved a matter of public concern and that Accredited was a lim ited - purpose public figure. Accredite d also raises issues with the timing of the district cou rt’s rulings on these issues. We begin by ad dressing the procedural irregularities.

15 1. The procedural irregularit ies require a new trial. T wo weeks before trial was set to begin, the district court deni ed respondents’ motion to amend their answer, noti ng that granting the motion wou ld require Accredited to show that Hena acte d with actual malice 8 and “[r]equiring Accredit ed to be prepared to make this additional higher showin g of actual malice less than two weeks before trial is highly prejudicial and should not be allowed.” (emphasis ad ded). But after the close of evidence, the district c ourt determined tha t the statements were a matter of public opini on and that Accredited was a limited - pur pose public figure. Based upon those rulin gs, Accredited needed to p rove actual malice to re cover damages. Accredited learned it n eeded to prove actual malice after it closed its case -in-chi ef. When the district cour t made this ruling, Ac credited had no opport unity to present any evidence to meet this higher standard, much less do discovery to pr ove “actual malice.” This procedural irregul arity, alone, requires re versal. 2. The court erred in requir ing Accredited to prove actual malice. We must next decide the scope of the remand. If Accredited does not need to prove actual malice, then our remand will be limite d to a new trial. If Accredited does need to prove actual malice, our remand will be to re - open discovery and then proceed to a new trial—if discovery reve als facts that could support a finding of act ual malice. 8 “ Actual malice ” is a term of art that focuses o n a party’s subjective st ate of mind regarding the truth or falsity of a statement. Chafo ulias v. Peterson, 66 8 N.W.2d 642, 654 (Minn. 2003). By con trast, common - law mal ice focuses on “ ill will or improper motive. ” Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, n.5 (Minn. 1985).

16 a. The challenged state ments were not of pu blic concern. Accredited challenges t he district court’s rulin g that the statements were on a matter of public concern. T he district court reasoned that the statements were on a matter of public concern because they were made on public websites designed to share business reviews and warned potential c ustomers of “fraudulent business practi ces, a lack of communication and transparency, over billing and improper us e of mechanics’ liens b y Accredited.” Whether defamatory speech involves a mat ter of public or private con cern is based on a totality of the circumstances, taking into consideratio n the content, form, and context of the speech, “including what was said, wh ere it was said, and how it was said.” J&D Dental v. Hou, 26 N.W.3d 491, 499 (Minn. App. 2025) (quotation omitted). To do this, we “make an independent examinat ion of the whole record.” Id. (qu otation omitted). We review the ruling de novo. Johnson v. Fre borg, 995 N.W.2d 37 4, 384 (Minn. 2023). Our recent opi nion in J&D Den tal is instructiv e. 9 In J& D Dental, resp ondent wrote a Google review about a dental practice: “[a]nyone who cares about their dental health should avoid this practi ce!” 26 N.W.3d at 495. We reje cted the argument that the content of the speech was on a matter of pub lic concern because “the ‘overall thrust and dominant theme’ of [the] speec h was to discuss [the spe aker’s] personal grieva nce with J&D Dent al and not to spea k ‘to broader p ublic issues’ or discuss ‘a matter of public import.’” Id. at 501 (quoting Freborg, 995 N.W.2d at 387). We agreed tha t the form of the speech —using 9 J&D De ntal w as analyzed in the conte xt of the Uniform Pu blic Expression Protectio n Act, but our analysis — regarding whether s peech was a matter of public concern —was consistent with the anal ysis performed when analyzing the statemen ts in the common -law defamation context. J&D Dental, 26 N.W.3d at 494. Th us, J&D Dental applie s.

17 a digital public forum — supporte d a determin ation that the s peech was on a matter of public concern. Id. at 50 1 - 02. But we rejected th e argument that the context of the sp eech constituted a matter of public concern becaus e the speech did not c onnect the speaker ’s experience to broader public issues or reflect any “discourse, conver sation, or connection betw een [the speaker’s] reviews and other bu siness reviews.” Id. at 502. Based upon the totality of the circumst ances and balancing th e content, form, and context of the speec h, we concluded that the dominant them e of the speech was a person al experience and a complaint stemming f rom the speaker ’s treat ment at J&D Dental. I d. at 503. As such, we held that the challenge d speech was not “o n a matter of public concer n[.]” Id. Like the respondent in J&D Dental, Hena p osted review s warning consumers to “Steer Clear” of Accre dited’s business. Like the review in J&D Dental, Hena’s post did not impact a broader issue in the community at large because “th e overall thrust and dominant theme” of h er speech recoun te d an “ individual grievance” with Accr edited and McGill and it did not “speak to broader public issues” or “discus s a matter of public import.” Id. at 499-50 3 (quotation marks omitted). In addition, the content, for m, and context of Hena ’s s peech weighs aga inst a determination that the stateme nts were on a matter of p ublic concern. T he co ntent of Hena’s statements reflects an individual gri evance and her personal experience with Accredited ’s communi cation, transparency, a nd alleged overbilling. Hena did not connect her personal experiences to a co mmunity or broader movement, sh e does not speak to broader public issues, a nd she is not discussin g matters of public imp ort. Id. at 500. This factor weighs against d etermining that the speech was a matter of p ublic concern.

18 T he form weighs in favor of determini ng that Hena’s reviews were a matter of public concern. As in J&D D ental, Hena’s statements were posted digitally in a “modern public square . . . to reach as b road a public audience as possible. ” Id. at 502 (quotation omitted). The context wei ghs against determining that the reviews were a matter of publi c concern. The reviews did not connect Hena ’s experience to any broader public issues or reflect any “discourse, conversatio n, or connection between [her] reviews and other business reviews.” Id. at 502. Considering the totalit y of these circumstanc es, we conclude that th e district court erred by determining that Hena’s reviews were on a matter of public concern. We recognize that the distri ct court did not have th e benefit of the J&D D ental decis ion when ruling on Accredited’s claims. But, in light of J&D Dental, we must reverse bec ause the challenged statements s hould have been submi tted, in their entirety, to the jury. b. Accredited is not a li mited-purpose public figure. Accredited also challe nges the district court’s determinati on that it is a limited - purpose public figure. A corporation is a limit ed-purpose public figur e if the statement: concerns matters of leg itimate public interest i n the geographic area in which the def amatory material is published, either because of the nature of the bu siness conducte d or because the public has an es pecially strong in terest in the investigation or disclosure of the comm ercial information at is sue. Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 487-88. We re view the determination o f a plaintiff’s status a s a public figure de novo. Id. at 483. In ruling that Accredit ed was a limited - purpose public figure, the district court relied on Jadwin to reaso n that electrical work was “highly regulat ed” and that “fraudulent

19 business practices” were a matter of public c oncern. Id. at 487 (noting that c orporations engag ed in highly regulated businesses with “public de pendence and i nvolvement. . . have been found to be public figures”). But Jad win is distinguishable. In Jadwin, the su preme court anal yze d cases involving insurance, finance, and trade; all indisputably “highly regulated” industries that reflect the importance of “disclosure and ac cess to commercial inf ormation.” Although the w ork is subject to some regulation, the electrica l work that Accredi ted perform ed cannot be compared to the highly regulated industries s uch as insurance, fina nce, or companies tha t provide energy to consumers. T here is also nothing to sugge st that the publi c “has an especial ly stro ng interest in the investigat ion or disclosure of co mmercial information ” related to Accredite d. Id. at 487 - 88. And Hena’s reviews reflect her individual grievan ce with Accredited. Thus, the district court erred i n ruling that Accredite d is a limited-purpose p ublic figure. Because Hena’s statements were not on a matt er of public concern and Accredited was not a limited-p urpose public fig ure, Accredited di d not need to prove actual mali ce to be entitled to recover damages. Thus, we remand for a new trial. Consiste nt with our decision in J&D Dental, the stateme nts should be submitted to the jury in t heir entirety and not in isolation as occu rred in the first trial. Affirmed in part, reve rsed in part, and rem anded.