Minnesota Court of Appeals opinion affirmed March 2, 2026

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-1603 In the Matter of the We lfare of the Child of: C. J. W. and L. S. G., Par ents. Filed March 2, 2026 Affirmed Larson, Judge Koochiching County D istrict Court File No. 36-JV-23-788 Mary I. Johnson, Johnson Law Firm, P. A., Virginia, Minnesota (for appellant mot her C.J.W.) Joshua P. Nuckols, Joshua Nuckols Law, Pine City, Minnesota (f or respondent father L.S.G.) Jeffrey Naglosky, Koochiching Cou nty Attorney, Molly French, Assistant County Attorney, International Falls, Minnes ota (for respondent Koochic hing County Public Health and Human Services) Angela J. S. Sonsalla, Perham, Min nesota (for guardian ad litem Ashlee Larson) Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Schmid t, Judge; and Florey, Judge. ∗ NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION LARSON, Judge In this appeal a fter remand, appel lant -mother C.J.W. (mother) challe nges the district court’s decision to deny her private petition to terminate respon dent -father L.S.G.’s (fathe r) ∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appointment pu rsuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2 parental rights to their joint child. Specifically, mother argues the dist rict court abused its discretion when it determined that te rmination was not in the child’s be st interests. Beca use the district court’ s best - interests determinatio n addresse d the appropriate criteria and has support in the record, we affirm. FACTS M other and father have one joint c hild, a son (the child), who was born in 2017. The parties were never married but lived toge ther with the child and mother’s two other children for the first five years of the child’ s life. During that time, father was actively involved in caring for t he child. In mid -2022, fa ther was charged with two cou nts of second - degree criminal sexual conduct after mother’s daughter fro m a previous rela tionship (dau ghter) disclosed that father had sexually ab used her. Fat her continued to have contact wit h the child until t hat December, when moth er requested su pervised visits. Father refused, e xplaining that he di d not want supervised vi sitation to be th e child’s last memory of him if h e was sent to prison. In January 2023, fath er was convicted of both charges and received a probat ionary sentence, a downward dispositio nal departure. His probati on conditions require d him to participate in se x - offender treatment, a nd his treatment p rogram prohibits him from having any contact with minor females but not minor males. In November 2023, mother filed a pri vate petition to terminate fat her ’ s parental rights to the child. At the time she filed the petition, mother had sole legal custod y and sole physical custody o f the child. In the petition, mother assert ed multiple statutory bases

3 to terminate father’s p arental rights and ar gued that termin ation was in the chi ld ’s best interests. During a two - da y trial in July 2024, t he district court re ceived numerous exhi bits, including records from father’s probation a nd sex - offender treatme nt, and testimony fro m ten witnesses: mother, father, father’s probation agent, a social w orker, the guardian ad litem (GAL), the child’s maternal gran dmother, two of father’s older children from a previous relationship (the older childr en), father’s neig hbor, and mot her’s husband. Ba sed on this evidence, the district c ourt found th at mother presented c lear and convincing evidence to prove two statutory bases for ter minating father’s pare ntal rights: (1) f ather inflicted egregious harm on daug hter while da ughter was in fa ther’s care and (2) fa ther was convicted of an offense requiring him to regist er as a predatory offen der. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), (8) (2024). 1 Nonetheless, t he district co urt deter mined that, despite those bases, it was not in the chil d ’ s best interests to termin ate father ’ s parental rights and denied the p etition. Mother appealed. We determined that the district court ’ s findings on the child ’ s best interests we re insufficient for a ppellate review and remanded for further fin dings, providing that the district court ha d “ discreti on to reopen the record, and if necessary, require the partie s to submit expert m aterial or data on the issue. ” In re We lfare of Child of C.J.W., No. A24-15 91, 2025 WL 957962, at *3 (Minn. App. Mar. 31, 2025). 1 We generally apply the law in effect at the time we decide a case, u nless doing so wou ld alter vested rights or re sult in a manifest injustice. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cty. Bd. of Comm ’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000). Because there were no substantive amendments to the rele vant statutes, we apply the current version.

4 On remand, the distri ct court granted moth er’s request to reopen the record to receive additional expert evidence. Mother submitted a repo rt from the child’s psychologist, and fathe r submitted a repor t from a psychologist, both addressing the child’s cont act with father. Thereafter, the district court filed an amended order denying the petition. In doing so, the distri ct court retaine d its determination that mother prove d two bases for termination. But the district court a gain determined that terminatio n was not i n the child’s best interests, making m ore than six pages of findings and conclusions on that point. Mother appeals. DECISION A natural parent is gene rally presumed to be “ fi t and suitable ” to care f or their child, and a court may t erminate a parent’s rights to their child only for “ grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfar e of K.L.W., 924 N. W.2d 649, 653 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 8, 2019). To terminate parental r ights, a district court must find at least one of the eight statutory bas es for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence. 2 In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.3 01, subd. 1(b) (2024) (listing base s for termination). Bu t the best interests of the child are the “paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, sub d. 7 (2024). Even if a statutory basis for 2 Termination als o generally requires a finding that the responsible social services agenc y has made reasonable efforts to reunif y the fam ily, but the district cour t determined that no such efforts were requir ed here because of the termination groun ds proved. See Minn. Stat. §§ 260.012(a)(1), (6), 2 60C.301, subd. 8 (2024).

5 termination exists, “ the district court must still find that termination o f parental rights. . . is in the best interests of the child.” In re Welfare of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn. App. 2018); see also In re Tan ghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 - 26 (Minn. App. 2003) (recognizing that “a c hild ’ s best inte rests may preclude terminating parental rights” even when a statutory basis f or termination exists (q uotation omitted)). To evaluate a child’s b est interests, a district court must cons ider “(1) the child ’ s interests in preserving the parent - child r elationship; (2) the parent ’ s in terests in preserving the parent - child relatio nship; and (3) any com peting interests of the c hild.” In re Welfare of Child of R.V.M., 8 N.W.3d 680, 696 (Min n. App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2024); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (requiring a district t o court to consider these factors when addressin g a child’s bes t interests). A child’s “c ompeting interests” m ay include a “stable e nvironment, health considera tions, and the child’ s preferences.” In re Welfare of Ch ild. of J. R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. Ap p. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). We review a d istrict court ’s best-interests determination for an abuse of discretion. A.M.C., 920 N.W. 2d at 657. A district court abuses i ts discretion if it “ makes fin dings of fact that lack evide ntiary support, misa pplies the law, or resolv es discretionary matters in a manner contrary to logic and the fa cts on record. ” I n re Welfar e of Child of T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d 346, 355 (Minn. App. 2024). We will not disturb a district court’s factual findi ngs unless they are clearly erroneous because they are “manifestly contrary to the weig ht of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” A.M.C., 920 N. W.2d at 654.

6 Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it dete rmined it was not in the child’s best interests to termina te father’s parental righ ts. She advance s three arguments, which we a ddress in turn. First, mot her cites K.L.W., a case affi rming a district cour t decision to terminate parental rights after a parent was c onvicted o f a sexual offense. See 924 N.W.2 d at 656. Relying on this case, m other appears to assert that a district co urt abuses its discretion if it does not terminate the parental rights of an y i ndividual with such a c riminal background. T his argument misstat es the law. In K.L.W., like this ca se, the conviction for a sexual offense was used to establish a statu tory basis for terminati ng parental rights. Id. at 653 - 56; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (listing the statutory ba ses for termination). This determination wa s necessary, but not sufficient, to terminate parental rights because the child’s best interests are a separate and “paramount” con sideration. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. It is on the best- interests analysis that this case diverges from K.L.W. That case turned on a determination that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate parental rights because of factors that made ter mination beneficial to the child, like parental inattentiveness and no ncompliance with prob ation. K.L.W., 924 N.W.2d at 656- 57. But the district court did not find those f actors present here. Instead, the district court foun d other factors, like s hared health conce rns and a strong historical bond between fath er and the chil d, s upported preserving the parental relationship. In s hort, the district court reached a different decision because it faced dif ferent facts, which was an appropriate exercise of discretion.

7 Second, mother asserts repeatedly that father is an “untreated predatory offender” who continues to deny his criminal cond uct, appearing to argue f ather poses a risk of harm such that termination of father’s parent al rights must be in the child’s best interests. 3 This argument is unavailin g. The district court found, based on the t estimony of fathe r’s probation agent and the GAL, that father was r emoved from his first sex -offender treatment program because he re fused to admit the offense — whic h was permissible in light of his pending appeal. 4 Father was then placed in an appropriate treatment program for those maintaining their in nocence during an appeal, and he ha d been compliant with that program. The di strict court als o found, based on testimony and treatment rec ords, that the treatment program did not consid er father to pose a ris k of harm to minor mal es and did not prohibit father from having contact with th em. Because the f indings regarding fa ther’s treatment and lack of risk of harm to the child find ample supp ort in the record, the district court did no t abuse its discret ion when it d etermined that those consideratio ns do not indicate that terminatio n was in the child’s bes t interests. Third, mother argue s the district court placed too much weight on the testimony of the older children —spe cifically, that they wished they had a relationship with the ir father 3 Mother al so asserts that father has a “severe and persistent mental illness” but acknowledges that her basis for this assertion is a document that was not presented to the district court. As such, it is not properly before us. See Mi nn. R. Civ. App. P. 11 0.01 (“ The documents filed in the trial cour t, the exhibits, and the trans cript of the proceedings, if a ny, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. ”); In re Welfare of Child of K.O., 4 N.W.3d 359, 365 n. 1 (Minn. App. 2024) (“ An appellat e court is generally limited to the record that was before the district court when it made the decision being appeale d.”). 4 Father’s appeal was not fully resolved unti l after the district court issued the September 12, 2025 decision unde r review in this a ppeal. See State v. Glover, No. A23 - 1144, 2025 WL 1923684 (Minn. A pp. July 14, 2025), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2025).

8 while growing up — as evidence that it wou ld be detrimental to the child to only have one parent. In support of th is argument, mother asserts that father “phy sically and emotionall y abused” the older children. Mother provides no citation to the record to substantiate he r assertions, and our car eful review of the rec ord reveals that most of her assertions lack evidentiary support. Additionally, th e district court expressly con sidered evidence that father has had anger issues and actively w orked on managing them. The district court also explained that its ass essment of this factor was not based solely on the testimony of the older children but also on the GAL’s t estimony. In short, mo ther has not demonstrated that the district court made clearly erroneous factu al findings, reached an illogical decision, or otherwise abused its di scretion in determining that concerns about ha ving only one parent indicate that terminatio n of father’s parental ri ghts is not in the child’ s best interests. In sum, the district cour t made the findings ad dressing the appropriat e best-interests factors, and mother has not demonstrate d that the district court abused its discretion in determining that termin ation of father’s parent al rights is not in the ch ild’s best interests. Affirmed.