Minnesota Court of Appeals Opinion filed March 2, 2026

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-0642 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Cody Lynn Duncan, Appellant. Filed March 2, 2026 Affirmed Wheelock, Judge Polk County District C ourt File No. 60 -CR- 24 -815 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Min nesota; and Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhle r, First Assist ant County Attorney, Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Reb ecca Ireland, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Mi nnesota (for appellant) Considered and decide d by Wheelock, Presi ding Judge; Larkin, Ju dge; and Reyes, Judge. NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION WHEELOCK, Judge In this appeal from a judgment of co nviction, appellant argu es that he should be granted a new trial bec ause the district court e rred in admitting impro per hearsay evidence

2 and because the state failed to dis close potentially exculpat ory evidence related to a search of one of his electronic devices. We affirm. FACTS R espondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Cody L ynn Dunca n with felony engaging in electronic communication with a child relating or de scribing sexual c onduct in violation of Minn esota Sta tutes se ction 609.352, subd ivision 2a(2) (202 2). The complaint alleged that Duncan e ngaged in sex ual ly explicit messaging and exchang ed nude photographs and video s with his 15- year -old s ibling, Child A, in Nov ember 2023. At the time of this offense, Duncan was on supervised release from prison following a 2014 conviction i n Minnesota for crimina l sexual conduct in the first degr ee involving penetration or contact with a perso n under 13 years of age. Duncan was first relea sed from prison for that convicti on in August 2020, and he was assigned a sup ervised- release agent in Minnesota (Minneso ta agent), but at so me point around 2021, he moved to Las V egas to live with his mother and the State of Nevad a took over supervision of his release. When the state filed the complaint charg ing Duncan with the offens e at issue in this appeal, it caused Duncan to be in violation of the co nditions of his release for his 2014 conviction. He was subsequently transported to Minnesota an d committed to the Minnesota Department of Cor rections. Pu rsuant to a detainer agreement, Duncan requested a speedy dis position of the charge. 1 He waived his right to a jury trial, a nd the 1 The Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDD A), Minn. Stat. § 629.2 92 (2024), requires all un tried complaints to be bro ught to trial within six months of the request unless good cause is shown. State v. Miller, 525 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Minn. App. 1994). The

3 case proceeded to a cou rt trial. The following f acts are derived from th e evidence presente d at trial. Investigator M.J. of th e Red Lake County Sheriff’s Office receiv ed a request from Child A’s father, who is also Duncan’s fathe r, to conduct a welfare check on Child A. Child A’s father was c ontacted by Child A ’s mother, J. H., who informed him t hat Child A had been receiving sexually ex plicit messages on C hild A ’s Facebook account. Investigator M.J. spoke with J.H., who said sh e had access to Child A ’s Facebook account and saw mess ages between Child A and Duncan. J.H. took screenshots of the messag es, wh ich totaled 78 p ages, and i nvestig ator M.J. took photo graph s of t he messages. All of the messages were admitted into ev idence as exhibit 1. J.H. also downloaded several videos and photo graph s and provided t hem to the investigator; these were also admitted into evidence as exhibi ts 2-4. Later, J.H. brought Child A to the Polk County Sheriff’s Office to provide a statement. Child A sat in the lobby while J.H. gave a statement to a different investigator, J.S. While speaking with i nvestigator J.S., J. H. logged into Child A’s Facebook acco unt and observed Faceboo k messages being sen t in real time be tween Child A and a person whose account was i dentified as “Brotha.” Child A sent a pict ure of the sheriff’s office logo, and Brotha responded, “if they ask u pls say it wasn’t me,” and told Child A severa l UMDDA was amende d in 2024. 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 8, § 26, at 2 321- 22. We cite the most recent ve rsion because the amendment and t he UMDDA are not relevant to the issues in this appeal.

4 times not to say an ything. Child A responded, “ I t’s h ard when they got ur face.” Brotha then said, “Well yea but they gotta prov[e i ]t was really me.” At trial, J.H. testified that she knew Child A was messaging Duncan while she and Child A were at the sheriff’s offic e because J.H. previously had messaged with Dunc an on Facebook, Duncan’s Facebook name was “T hor Randall,” and Child A had changed the name att ached to the Thor Randall account to “Brotha” in her Facebo ok account. During previous conversations with J.H., Duncan ha d confirmed to her that the Thor Randal l account belonge d to him. In t hose messa ges, they also discussed Duncan’s a nd Child A ’s father and J.H. inform ed Duncan that Child A was his younger sist er. These messages were also admitted into evidence. Duncan’s Mi nnesota agent, who had supervised him briefly in Ramsey County after he was released in August 2020, also testifie d. She stated that Du ncan had violated his release conditions by possessing an undisclose d device and had created a Facebook account under the name “Cyler Randall” using the ema il address Vegaskingz6 969@gmail.com. Duncan’s Nevada supervis ed -release agent (Nevada a gent) also te stified. The Nevada agent explaine d that Dunca n was subject to rando m searches as a conditio n of his supervised release and that, o n November 29, 2023, she visited Duncan at his m other’s home in Las Vegas equipped with a body - worn camera. Several s creenshots from the body- worn camera footage were received i n evidence. The Nevada agent testified that the screenshots depicted D uncan’s bedroom, bathroom, and kitchen, as well as Duncan inside his bedroom and a tattoo on Duncan’s righ t hand.

5 The Nevada agent was then shown several of the videos and photo graph s that Child A received. She testified that, based on her observations and th e body - worn camera screenshots from the November 2023 visi t, the nude videos and photo graph s sent to Child A were of Duncan and were taken i n various rooms in his mother’s ho use. Specifically, the Ne vada agent identified t hat, i n one of the videos sent to Child A from the Thor Randall Facebook account, the bathroom was the same room she observed dur ing her visit to Duncan based on the la yout of roo ms in the home, the flooring, and two shower curtains. She furthe r testified that, i n the vid eos sent to Child A fr om the Thor Randa ll Facebook account, a tat too that was visible on the nude man’s right ha nd matched a tatto o Duncan has on his right hand that extends down onto his right thum b. She also ide ntified Duncan’s bedroom from photo graph s sent to Child A from the Thor Randall Facebo ok account, explaining th at she could tell it wa s Duncan’s bedroom because the window covering, the picture o n the wall, the TV, the gaming syste m, an “orange ite m,” and the dresser were the same as those she had see n in the Las Vegas hom e. Additionally, she identified photo graph s sent to Child A from the Thor Randall Facebook account as depicting Duncan’s kitchen because she recognized t he stovetop an d a “green Christ mas tree spoon holder” fro m her visit to the Las V egas home. J.S. testified about his investigation, including the search warrants for which he applied and the trial e xhibits — exhibits 14, 15, and 16 —that result ed from the search warrants. In the se arch warrant J.S. sent to Meta (Facebook), he r equested informati on from the acc ounts depicted in J.H.’s scree nshots of the Facebook pages and their URLs.

6 In the search warrant J.S. sent to T -Mo bile, he requested information on the IP addresse s listed in the Facebook r ecords. During his testimony, J.S. stated that t he Nevada agent mentioned to him that Las Vegas authorities searched a cell phone in Du ncan ’s possession and found nothin g on it. This information previ ously had not be en disclosed to either t he prosecutor or Duncan’ s counsel. The district court asked if Duncan would like a continu ance to see if more information could be g athered about the phone that was searched. Duncan declined and argued tha t only a mistrial woul d be appropria te at that point due to t he failure to disclose that information. The district court denied D uncan’s motion for a m istrial. The district court foun d Duncan guilty, convicted him, and imposed a sentence of 39 months’ imprisonm ent. Duncan appeals. DECISION Duncan asserts that he must be gra nted a new trial for two reasons. First, he argu es that the district court er red by admitting Faceb ook and T - Mobile reco rds into evidence at trial over his hearsay objection withou t determining that a hearsay exception applied. Second, he argues that the district court erred when it denied his requ est for a mistrial after

7 testimony was elicite d at trial containing information that had not previously been disclosed to him. We a ddress each argument i n turn. I. Any error in the admission of the challe nged exhibits is harm less because Duncan was no t prejudiced. Duncan challenges th e district court’s adm ission of three exhibits: exhibit 1 4 containing Child A’s F acebook account recor ds; exhibit 15 containi ng the Thor Randall Facebook account reco rds; and exhibit 16 cont aining T - Mobile record s. He argu es that the exhibits contain inadmissible hearsay, no hear say exception applies, and the district court failed to address the he arsay objection. Facebook provided a ll t he documents in ex hibits 14 and 15 in response to a search warrant J.S. sent; T- Mobile provided a ll the do cuments in exhibit 16 in response to another search warrant from J.S. Facebook and T - Mobile each provided a certificate for the documents it produced stating that the certifi cate is intended to comply with the state equivalents of Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6), 902(11), 902(1 3), an d 902(14). Exhibit 14 confirms J. H.’s testimony that Ch ild A changed the name “ Thor Randall ” to “Brotha” in her Fac ebook account. Exhibit 15 provide s circumstantial evide nce that Duncan is “ Thor Randall ” because it sho ws that the Tho r Randall F acebook account wa s exchanging messages with an individual to w hom Duncan had referred as his wife, as well as messages and comments involvi ng another individual that tie Duncan’s wife an d a vehicle Duncan own ed to “ Thor Ra ndall.” Exhibit 16 conf irms that the T -Mobile custome r associated with the IP address listed for the Thor Randall Facebook account is Duncan’ s mother an d that the T-Mobile account was registered to Duncan’s mother’s stre et addre ss

8 in Las Vegas, which was Duncan’s home at t he time the Thor Randall Facebook acc ount sent sexually explicit messages, photographs, and videos to Child A. At trial, Duncan objected to the admission of each of these exhibits on the basis of hearsay, 2 asserting that the state failed to satisfy the business -rec ords exception because the documents were p repared for litigation a nd the certificates wer e insufficient to lay foundation with out a testifying witness fr om Facebook or T - Mobile. See Minn. R. Evid. 803(6) (se tting forth the bus iness- recor ds hearsay exception). The state responded that the certifications properly authe nticate d the document s and that the documents wer e “nontestimonial.” The district court did not address hearsay; instea d it agree d that the documents were nontes timonial and admitt ed t hem into evidence. Duncan argues that the district court erred by admitting all three exhibits because they contain hearsay a nd no hearsay exception applies. We need n ot decide whether any error occurred, howe ver, because any allege d error was harmless. An evidentiary error to which an appellan t objected is reviewe d under the harmless- error standard. State v. Matt hews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Minn. 2011). This standard requires that “ a defendant who alleges an error that does not implicate a constitutional right must prove there is a reasonable possibility that t he wrongfully admitted evidence sig nificantly affected the verdict. ” Id. (quotations omitted). “W e generally will n ot reverse a verdict even w hen improper [evidence ] is presented to the [fact- finder] unless the re is a reasonable possi bility that the wrongful ly admitted evidence 2 Although Du ncan objected to the admis sion of all three exhibits based on h is confrontation rights at t rial, he does not raise t his argument on appeal.

9 significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Jaros, 932 N. W.2d 466, 472 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). Factors that assist our determination of w hether this reasonable pos sibility exists include “ (1) the manner in which the p arty presented the evidence, (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive, (3) whether the party who offer ed the eviden ce used it in closi ng argument, and (4) whether the defense effectiv ely countered the evidence. ” State v. Smith, 940 N.W.2d 497, 50 5 (Minn. 2020). Stron g evidence of guilt undermines the persu asive value of wrongly admitted evidence. See Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634 (noting that the wrongfully admitted testimony was br ief a nd not persuasive on the question of the defendant’s guilt and t hat other strong eviden ce of guilt overshadow ed that testimony). “ This analysis is fact - s pecific, and not all the factors are relevant or persuasive in every case. ” State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 - 55 (Mi nn. 2024). The question is not whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Id. at 54. Instead, “to assess harmless error we must consider all the eviden ce introduced as well a s other illuminating factors (including the non - exclusive factors s et forth earlier) and ask whether t here is a reasonable possibility that the error signifi cantly affected the verdict. ” Id. at 55. In some cases, these factors may not lead to a clear co nclusion, but we may be aided in a court trial by the district court’s f indings. See State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 568 (Mi nn. 2008) (holding that any error in admitting te stimony under the hearsay rules was harmless when the district court indica ted in its findings that t he testimony did not af fect its verdict). Here, Duncan d id not analyze the se factors i n his brief, and we do not find them conclusive in determining whether any err or was harmless. However, Duncan’s argument

10 rests on the rationale th at exhibits 14, 15, and 16 were the most impa ctful and conclusive evidence that Duncan was the individual wh o messaged Child A fr om the Thor Randall Facebook account. We note, howeve r, that the photograph s and messages sent to C hild A from the Thor Randall Facebook account in e xhibits 14 and 15 were also admitted through (1) a different exhibit t hat contained screensh ots of those same com munications and many more sexually explicit communications —ex hibit 1 and (2) te stimony fro m Chi ld A ’s mother and i n vestigator M.J. And Duncan does not argue tha t exhibit 1 or the testimony were erroneously ad mitted. See Matthew s, 800 N.W.2d at 63 4; State v. Weaver, 733 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Minn. App. 2 007) (stating that evidence was highly persuasive when it was not merely cumulative o f other evidence presented at trial), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007). The strength of other eviden ce that Duncan d oes not challe nge greatly undermines the persua sive value of exhibits 14, 15, and 16. The diminished persuasive value of the challenged exhibits and the fact that much of their content was admitted via other unchallenged evidence compel a concl usion that the evidence in those exhibits di d not significantly affect the verdict. In addition, we have the benefit of the district court’s writte n findings. See Holliday, 745 N.W.2d at 568 (d etermining that any error was harml ess because the district court explained the evidence did not affect its verd ict but noting that the resolution might ha ve been different had the appellant been c onvicted by a jury). As to the district co urt’s determination that Dun can wa s the user of the Thor Randa ll Facebook account, th ere is no

11 reasonable possibility that exhibits 14, 1 5 and 16 affected it because t he district court s aid as much: There is no mistakin g the identity of the Defendant an d the Child; the messages, images, photo graphs, and videos fully support the Court ’ s findings and conc lusions in this regard. This is especially t rue in relation to the Defendant; al l of the backgrounds in the relevant images are of t he Defendant ’ s shower, bathroom, bed, bedroom a nd kitchen at his residence in Las Vegas, Nevada. There is no mist aking that the individual in the image s is the Defendant. Given this explicit finding, Duncan can not meet his burden of demo nstrating that a reasonable possibility e xists that the challenge d exhibits signific antly affected the verdict. See Smith, 940 N.W.2d at 505. We therefore conclude that any error in the admission of the challenged exhibits was harmless. II. Any discovery violati on was harmless. Duncan argues the dist rict court abused its dis cretion when it denied his motion f or a mistrial and asserts that, because the state co mmitted a discovery vi olation when it failed to disclose the res ults of a sea rch of his phone, he must be granted a new trial. In vestigator J.S. testified that he re called that the Nevada agent was going to search Duncan’s phone. He also stated that the Facebook records indicated that the Thor Randall Facebook accou nt was associated with a Samsung device and th at his recollection was that the device seized was a different electronic device. The Nevada agent then testified that she had seized Duncan’s phone as part of the investig ation and that a forensic inve stigator searc hed the phone, but as far as sh e knew, “ [t] here w asn’t anything useful” obtained and no evide nce of the Thor Randall Facebook account wa s found. She further testified that, in her

12 experience supervising sex offenders, they m ay have more than one cell phone and may not disclose to the a gent their possessi on of other cell ph ones. She also said the infor mation from the search of the phone was sen t to Minnesota. However, neit her the prosecutor’s office nor Duncan’s co unsel recalled receivin g that information. After J.S.’s testimony about Duncan’s pho ne, Duncan’s counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that th e information from the phone was exc ulpatory and n ever disclosed to Duncan. The dis trict court denied the motion but said it would co nsider the issue again in its overall con sideration of the case. In w ritten closing argume nt, Dunca n’s counsel argued that, under Brady v. Maryland, 3 73 U.S. 83 (196 3), an d Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(6), which a ddress es a prosecu tor’s duty to d isclose exculpat ory information, the state violated its duty to disclose material evidence favorable to Duncan and again requested a mistrial. I n its final order, t h e district court determined that there did not appear to be a discovery viola tion and that it could not identify a ny facts th at would support the request for a mistria l. Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.01 sets out the stat e’s discovery obligations. “Under B rady, the suppression by the State, whether i ntentional or not, of material evidence favorable to the defendant violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.” Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 20 10) (addressing Brady). Evidence is material under Brady “if there is a reasonable probability t hat, had the evidence been disclosed to t he defense, the re sult of the procee ding would have been different.” State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. 20 00).

13 Whether a discovery violation occ urred is an issue of law that appellate courts review de novo. State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 489 (Min n. 2005). “Generally, without a showing of prejudice to the defendant, the state’s violatio n of a discovery r ule will not result in a new trial.” Id. We review the district court’ s ultimate decision to deny a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Sta te v. Griffin, 8 87 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2016). “The tr ial judge is in the best position to determine whether an error is sufficiently prejudicial to require a mistrial or whether another remed y is appropriate.” I d. A district court’s determination of whether a prosecutor’ s discovery violatio n warrants a new trial will be re versed only when the disc overy violation, “view ed in the light of the whole record, appears to be inexc usable and so serio us and prejudicial tha t [the] defendant’s right to a f air trial was denied.” P alubicki, 700 N.W.2d a t 489. Duncan modifies his argument on appeal, and based on investigator J. S.’s failure to disclose the verbal statements that the Neva da agent made to him about searching the phone, he asserts that the discovery violatio n occurred under Min n. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(2), which add resses a prosec utor’s duty to disclo se statements. 3 Assuming, without deciding, that a discovery violation o ccurred, we conclude that, under either of subdivision 1’s disclos ure requirements, any violation was harmless because D uncan has 3 A party cannot “obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below but u nder a different theory.” State v. Ba iley, 732 N.W.2 d 612, 623 (Minn. 2007) (quoting T hiele v. Stitch, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 19 88)). However, a revie wing court “may affirm the district court on any ground, including one n ot relied on by the district court. ” State v. Martens, 996 N.W.2d 249, 26 1 n.5 (Minn. App. 2023), aff’d, 18 N.W.3d 752 (Minn. 2025).

14 not established prejudi ce. And because there was no prej udice, we conclude th at the district court did not ab use its discretion by de nying Duncan’s reques t for a mistrial. To establish prejudice under Minn. R. Cri m. P. 9.01, an a ppellant must show a reasonable probability that, had he been aff orded access to the evid ence in question, the outcome of the trial w ould have been d ifferent. State v. Rad ke, 821 N.W.2d 316, 326 (Minn. 2012). A discovery violation m ay be harmless whe n the evi dence is not “of great importance” and other evidence weighs strongly agains t the defendan t. State v. Green leaf, 591 N.W.2d 488, 506 (Minn. 19 99). When the testimo ny of the witness sought to b e impeached by u ndisc losed evidence “was not the only damning evide nce against defendant,” the likeliho od of prejudice decreas e s. State v. Jackson, 3 46 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Minn. 1984); see al so State v. Hatha way, 379 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Min n. 1985) (“[I]n light of the other available evidence with which the defendan ts were able to impeach, thi s error [of withholding disco verable evidence from t he defense] is harmless.”). “Nondiscl osure of evidence that is merely impeaching may not typic ally result in the kind of prejudice necessary to warrant a new trial. ” Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 300-01. Ap pellate courts may also consider whether, if a n ew trial were granted, t he new trial would be a ny different than the first one. State v. Hol mes, 325 N.W.2d 33, 3 5 (Minn. 1982). Duncan asserts prejudice in general ter ms, positing that his counsel could have mor e fully and completely pr epared, cross - examined differently, and tailore d a different strategy because the informatio n “was potentially hel pful.” But he does not explain how having this information in a timely manner wo uld have changed his defense strategy. Duncan’s strategy at trial w as to persuade the fact -finder that the state could not prove it was Dunca n

15 who used the Thor Ra ndall Facebook acc ount to engage in co mmunicati ons of a sex ual nature with and send nude photo graph s and videos to Child A, an d he elicited testimony at trial about the phone to support that strategy. The Nevada agent confirmed that the phone contained nothing incriminating and that the Thor Randall Facebook acco unt was not found on it. On recr oss -examination, she confirmed that, prior to obtaining the phone, sh e did not have reason to believe that Dunca n had two phones. A t the most, obtaini ng the phone data merely would have c orroborated what was already elicited — that not hing was found on the p hone. The district court also found that the issue was “sufficie ntly fleshed out and made clear, ” and therefore, the court was able to consider Duncan’s position that the phone provided n o evidentiary support against him. This is the most Duncan would h ave been able to eli cit if he had been pro vided the information prior to trial. Further, the district cou rt inquired about whether Duncan would like ti me to expand the record to see if mor e could be learned about the phone. Duncan r esponded that he did not want to sit around f or months while it was i nvestigated further and argued that a mistri al was the appr opriate remedy. This further ind icates that the data on the phon e was not of “great importance.” Duncan points to the value of the information to impeach the Nevada agent abou t the type of device searched, arguing t hat it “ might have caused t he court to conclu de that the evidence a s to Duncan had not been proven. ” We are not persuaded because the distric t court explicit ly concl uded that the phone pro vided no evidentiary support for, an d was therefore irrelevant as to, the charge s against Duncan. Moreover, evidence t hat is merely

16 impeaching does not “ t ypically result in the ki nd of prejudice necessa ry to warrant a new trial.” See Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 300 -01. Ac cordingly, the distri ct court did not abuse its discretion when it deni ed Duncan’s motions f or a mistrial. To support his argument that a new trial sh ould be granted on appeal, Duncan relies on opinion s in which the supreme court, in exercis ing its supervi sory powers over the district courts, granted new trials even tho ugh prejudice in the usua l sense could not be shown. State v. Kaiser, 486 N.W.2 d 384, 386 (Minn. 1992) (explai ning that this line of cases includes State v. Zeimet, 310 N. W.2d 552 (Minn. 1981), and State v. Schwantes, 314 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 1982)). But as an error - correcti ng court, it is not our role to exercise a “supervisory power” in the manner the supreme cour t does. See In re Welfare of M.K., 805 N.W.2d 856, 865 (Minn. App. 2011) (“[T] his court, as an intermediate- appellate court, does not exercise supervisory powe rs reserved to the supre me court.”). Because there is no reason to believe t hat a new trial would be any different than the first one, Duncan has not demon strated the prejudice nece ssary for this court to grant a new trial, s ee Holmes, 325 N.W.2d at 35, and we discern no error in the district court’s decision to deny Dunc an’s request for a mist rial as a sanction for the alleged di scovery violation. Affirm ed.