Cronquist v. State: Reversed and remanded March 2, 2026

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-0833 Tyler Allan Cronquist, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent. Filed March 2, 2026 Reversed and remanded Cochran, Judge Crow Wing County Di strict Court File No. 18 -CR- 15 -66 Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathr yn J. Lockwood, Assistan t Appellate Public Defen der, St. Paul, Minnesot a (for appellant) Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Min nesota; and Kelsey Hopps, Crow Wing County Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota; and Travis J. Smith, Specia l Assistant County Atto rney, Slayton, Minneso ta (for respondent) Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Brat vold, Judge; and Schmidt, Judge.

2 NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION COCHRAN, Judge On appeal from summ ary denial of a petitio n for postconviction re lief, appellant argues that the postcon viction court abused its discretion when it made adverse credibilit y determinations as part of its decision to deny the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Because we c onclude that the postconviction court abused i ts discretion when i t made improper credibility determinatio ns to support the summary denial of the petition, we reverse and remand for the postco nviction court to reconsider the petition applying the proper standard. FACTS The Underlying C harges and Plea Deal On January 6, 2015, re spondent State of Minnesota charged appella nt Tyler Allan Cronquist with several crimes following the shooting of two i ndividuals. The charges included: two counts of second - degree murder in violation of Minnesota Statutes s ection 609.19, subdivision 1(1) (2014); one count o f first - degree assault involving gre at bodily harm in violation of Minnesota Statute s section 609.221, su bdivision 1 (2014); and one count of second - degree assault with a dangerou s weapon in violation o f Minnesota Statutes section 609.222, subdi vision 1 (2014). The complaint allege d the followi ng facts in support of the charges. Two days before the complaint was filed, Cronquist and Nath an Becker were at C.C. ’s apartm ent with her. After their arrival, anot her individual J.K. ca me to the apartment. When J.K. walked into the apart ment, Cronquist and Bec ker began “staring [J. K.] down while all four

3 were in the living room.” C.C. then went to the kitchen. While in the kitchen, she heard a “loud noise” and sa w J.K. on the floor in the living roo m. The complaint further alleged that Cronquist then walked up to C.C. “and shot her in the head. ” At that point, both Cronquist and Becker l eft the apartment. C.C. then called 911 and report ed the s hooting. When law enforceme nt arrived, C.C. was sti ll conscious and b leeding from her head, but J.K. was unconscious and g asping for air. C.C. told the officers that Cronquist had shot her. Both C.C. and J.K. were tran sported by ambulance to a medical center before being airlifted to a hospital, where J.K. died from the gunshot injury. C.C. survived. Police arrested Becker, and Cr onquist later turned hi mself in to local law en forcement. After the state filed its criminal complaint aga inst Cronquist, a grand jury indicte d Cronquist on one count of premeditat ed first - degree murder in vio lation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.185, subdivision (a) (1) (2014); and on e count of atte mpted premeditated first - degr ee murder in violation of Minneso ta Statutes section 609.185, subdivision (a)(1), wit h reference to section 609.17, subdivision 1 (2014). Followin g the indictment, the previou sly filed complaint agai nst Cronquist was dism issed. Becker was also charged in relation to the shoo ting. The state charged Becker wi th aiding and abetting Cro nquist in the shootings of J.K. and C.C. Becker ’s trial occurred before the schedu led start of Cronquist’s trial. At Becker’s trial, C.C. testified that Cronquist sho t both her and J.K. Neither C ronquist nor Becker testified at Becker’s tri al. Becker ’s attorney argued that Cronquist alone was re sponsible. Becker was found not guilty on all charges.

4 In September 2016, f ollowing Becker’ s acq uittal, Cronquist enter ed into a plea agreement with the state. He pleaded guilty to one count of second -degree murder and one count of attempte d second - degree murder. In exchange for Cronquist’s guilty pleas, the state dismissed the premeditate d first -degree murder and at tempted premeditated first- degree murder charges. The distri ct court sentenced Cronquist to consecutive sentences of 306 months’ imprison ment for second - degree murde r and 153 months ’ imprisonment for attempted second - degree m urder, for a total consecu tive sentence of 459 months. Postconviction Procee dings On September 14, 202 3, approxi mately seven years after Cronquist pleaded guil ty, Becker informed a deputy at the Crow Wing County Jail that he “wi shed to confess to a murder he had committ ed.” Becker was in jail for unrelated reasons. Becker then gave a recorded statement. In his statement, B ecker told the sheriff ’s deputy that he shot C.C. and J.K. on Januar y 4, 2015, in C.C.’s home with a.45- caliber semi - automatic pistol. Becker stated that, before the shootings, he an d Cronquist w ent into the bathroom, where he produced the pistol from his pants. Becker further stated that Cronquist told hi m “not to do it, ” but Becker went back into the livi ng room and h e shot J.K. According to his statement, h e then went into th e kitchen and shot C.C. Becker did not divulge his motivations for the sh ootings, but claimed “ God compelled him to confess. ” Becker’s statement was forward ed to the public defender’s office, wh o informed Cro nquist of the statement.

5 O n February 5, 2025, Cronquist petitioned for postconviction reli ef pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 590.01 (2024), requesting leave to withdr aw his guilty pleas to second-degree murder and attempted second - degree murder. Cronquist also reques ted an evidentiary hearing to prove that Beck er’s confession exonerates Cr onquist and therefore Cronquist’s guilty plea s are invalid. In his petition, Cronqui st alleged the following facts in support of withdraw al of his guilty pleas. On the day of the shootings, Cr onquist was at C.C.’s apartment with Bec ker, C.C., and J.K. While he was there, a confl ict broke out bet ween Becker and J.K. — Cronquist was not inv olved. Becker then went into the bat hroom with Cronquist, and showed Cronquist that he had a gun. When Cronquist saw the gu n, he made Becker promise not to shoo t anyone. Cronqui st left the bathroo m, went int o the kitchen, and cal l ed his friend, D.D., for a ride home. While Cro nquist was on the p hone with D. D., Becker shot J.K. Cronqu ist heard the gunshot and looked up to see Becker coming towards him with the gun. Cronquist tried to run out of th e door of the apartment, but Becker stopp ed him and would not let him leave. Becker then shot C.C. in the f ac e, at which point Cronquist escaped. Cronquist explaine d that he ran a way because he was afraid that Becker would shoot him. Along with his petition, Cronquist file d the sheriff’s deputy’s report of Becker’s confession at the count y jail. Cronquist also filed an affidavit from D.D. and an affidavit from Cronquist hi mself. The affi davit of D.D. states that he and Cronquist lived together in January 2015. D.D.’s affidavit also sta tes that Cronquist called D.D. for a ride home on January 4, 2015 (the day of the shooting), and while he and Cronqu ist were talking, D.D.

6 heard w hat sounded like gunsh ots in the bac kground. According to D.D., Cronqui st was mid-sentence, when D.D. heard the noise. In Cronqui st’s affida vit, Cronquist attested t o the version of events outlined in his petition. Cronquist further explained that he did not kno w that Becker had a gun or intended to shoot an yone until Becker show ed him a gun while they were in the bathroom at C.C.’s home. Cronquist also stated that h e never talked to polic e or testified against Becker because he was afraid of Becke r, though he insisted that he t old his attorneys that Becker shot C.C. and J.K. He further explained that his atto rneys told him he was likely to go to prison regard less, and urged h im to testify agains t Becker, which he ref used out of fear. Cronquist al so stated that once Beck er was acquitted, Cronquist’s atto rneys told him he would likely spend the rest of his life in prison unless Cronquist pleaded guilty. Base d on these allegations, Cronquist r equested an evidentiary hearing to prove Becker’s confession exonerates him and his guilty plea s are not valid. In his petition, C ronquist acknowledged that the petiti on was being f iled more than two years after his co nviction and se ntencing but alleged that the petition meets tw o exceptions to the two - year time bar: the ne wly-discovered- evidence exception and the interests-of-justice ex ception. The state filed an answer to the petition, asking that the petition be dismissed without a hearing as ti me -barred and argu ing that neither exception applies. The postconviction cou rt summarily denied Cronquist’s pe tition without a hearing. The court concluded t hat the petition was time - barred under Minnesota Statutes s ection 590.01, su bdivision 4, because more than two years had elapsed sin ce the entry of final

7 judgment. The court f urther concluded that t he newly -discovered- e vidence exception to the time bar did not app ly because “Becker’s purported co nfession is not newly -discovered evidence.” (quotation marks omitted). The postconvicti on court also concluded that the interests-of- justice exception did not apply. I n denying Cron quist’s petition, the postconviction court ex pressly weighed the cr edibility of Becke r’s confession and D. D.’s affidavit. It reasoned that “Bec ker’s purported confes sion, even if coupled by the ne w Affidavit of witnes s [D.D. ], does not meet t he trustworthy requ irement that is needed in order to advance to fur ther proceedings in thi s matter.” It went on t o find that “ Becker ’ s purported confession is not corrobora ted by a single shred of trust worthy independent evidence.” And the postconviction cour t concluded that Cron quist was not e ntitled to a n evidentiary hearing on his petition for postconviction relief becau se the “files and records of the proceeding herein conclusi vely show that [Cronquist] is not entitled to postconviction relief.” Cronquist appeals. DECISION A person convicted of a crime may s eek po stconviction relief by fi ling a pe tition alleging that the convic tion “violated the person ’ s rights unde r the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1). A postconviction petition must be filed within two years after “the entry of judgm ent of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is file d” unless an exception applies. Id., subd. 4(a)(1). Relevant to this appeal, section 590.0 1 provides an exception to th e two-year time bar if: the petition alleges the existence of n ewly discovered evidence and certain conditio ns

8 are met, or “ the petitio n is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” Id., subd. 4 (b)(2), (5). “Any petiti on invoking an exception. .. must be file d within tw o years of the date the claim arises.” Id., subd. 4(c). An evidentiary hearing on the petition must b e promptly held “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceedi ng conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024). When determining whether the petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hear ing, the postconvictio n court is required to consider the facts alleged in the pe tition as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the peti tioner. Andersen v. State, 913 N.W. 2d 417, 422 - 23 (Minn. 2018). “[T]he burden is on a petitioner to show facts entitling the petitioner to relief.” Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 541 (Minn. 2023). We review a postconviction court’s deci sion on a petition for postcon viction relief for an abuse of discr etion. Andersen, 913 N.W.2d at 422. “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is ba sed on an erroneous view of the l aw or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Brown v. State, 895 N.W. 2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). A postconvi ction court’s legal det erminations are reviewed de nov o, and its factual findings for cle ar error. Id. Cronquist argues that t he postconviction cour t abused its discretion when it made credibility determinations to support its c onclusion that Cronquist’s petition was time- barred and n o exception applied, without first holding an evidentiary hearing. We agree.

9 As discus sed abo ve, th e postconviction court must “consider[] the fa cts alleged in the petition as true and construe[] them in t he light most favorable to the petitioner” in deciding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. Andersen, 913 N.W.2d at 422 - 23. A postconviction court may not assess an aff iant’s credibility in de termining whether a petitioner is entitled t o a hearing. Id. at 423. Credibility determinati on s may be made o nly after an evidentiary hea ring on a postconvictio n petition. Id. at 4 23- 24. In Andersen, the supreme court ad dressed an i ssue similar to the i ssue raised in this case. There, the postc onviction court summarily concluded that A ndersen’s petition for postconviction relief w as untimely because the petition was filed after the two - year time bar and the allegations in the petition and supp orting documents did not satisfy the newly- discovered- evidence exception. Id. at 422. In reaching this d ecision, the postconviction court determined that t wo supporting affidavi ts filed by the petitioner were “unreliable” and “dubious.” Id. The supreme court reverse d the postconviction co urt’s summary denial and remanded, emphasizing that t he supreme court ha s “ repeatedly instructed postconviction court s that they may not find a postconviction affiant unreliable wit hout first holding an evident iary hearing to assess t he affiant’s credibility. ” Id. at 423. Similar to Andersen, t he postconviction court here denied Cronquist ’s petition based on credibility determinations witho ut first conducting an evidentiary hearing. The postconviction court’s order includes express credibility determinations, like those which the supreme c ourt has “admoni [shed]. ” I d. Here, the postconv iction court fou nd th at “Becker’s purported co nfession, even if coupl ed by the new Affidavi t of witness [D. D.], does not meet the trustworthy requirement th at is needed in order to advanc e to further

10 proceedings in this matter.” It went on to find that the affidavit of D. D. “has no veracity,” and further found that it is troubling that Becker has made thi s confession at a time when he is protected by the prohibiti on of double jeopardy (and thus has nothing to lose by making the conf ession), and also at a time when a ll indications were that he was feeling ho peless in life (sitting in jail due to his longstanding meth addiction persisting). Because the postco nviction court made credi bility determination s and did not accept the allegations in Cronquis t’s petition and the supporting docume nts as true, we conclude the postconviction court ab used its discretion whe n it summarily denied Cronquist’s petition. To persuade us otherwise, the state argues that any credibility determinations made by the postconviction court do not require reversal because “the facts alleged in the petition . . . taken as tr ue. . . are not legally [sufficient] to show tha t [Cronquist] me ets either the newly - discovered- evidence or interests of justice exceptions” to the tw o - year time bar set forth in section 59 0.01. But the state does not explai n why the facts alleged in the petition, taken as tr ue, are insufficient to meet either of the statutory exception s. And, as discussed above, the postconvict ion court did not make a determination that Cronquist’s factual allegations and supporting e vidence, if true, did not entitle hi m to relief. Instead, the postconviction court’s denial of Cronquist’s petition relies on determinations about the credibility of Becker’s confession and D.D.’s statement in his affidavit. R elying on those credibility determinations, the postcon viction court concluded that neither exception applied and summa rily denied the petition.

11 Abuse of discretion is a deferential stan dard, but it i s not absolute. State v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Minn. 1999). And it does not permit a p ostconviction court to make credibility determinations in deciding wheth er to grant an evidentiary hearing on a petition for postconviction relie f. Instead, the postconviction court must consider the facts alleged in the postconviction p etition as true and construe them in th e light most favorable to the petitioner. Anderse n, 913 N.W.2d at 422- 23. We therefore conclude that t he postconvict ion court abused its discretion by impermissibly weighin g the credibility of the facts alleged in Cronquist’s petiti on and the supporting documents, without an e videntiary hearing, when it summarily denied Cronquist’s postconvi ction petition. Accordingly, we rever se and remand to the postconviction court with specific instructi ons to: assume that th e facts alleged in the petition and supporting documents are true; construe those facts in the light mo st favorable to Cronquist; and then assess whether, under s ection 590.04, subdivis ion 1, an evidentiary hearing is required. See id. R everse d and rem anded.