Court opinion affirmed Richard L. Greenstreet case March 2

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-0748 Richard L. Greenstreet, Appellant, vs. Central Minnesota Edu cational Research & Development Counci l, Respondent, Lowell Haagenson, Respondent. Filed March 2, 2026 Affirmed Smith, Tracy M., Judge Benton County District Court File No. 05-CV- 24 -1244 Richard L. Greenstreet, Sauk Rapids, Minneso ta (self-represented app ellant) Central Minnesota E ducational Research & Development Cou ncil, Sauk Rapids, Minnesota (respondent) Lowell Haagenson, Sa uk Rapids, Minne sota (self-represented resp ondent) Considered and decide d by Harris, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and Florey, Judge. ∗ ∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appointment pu rsuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2 NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION SMITH, TRACY M., Judge Following a court trial and the district court ’s dismissal of appellant’s claims related to his gardening activit y on r espondents’ property, appellant argues that the district court erred by disregarding hi s investment in improv ements, which appellan t contends convert ed his revocable license to garden on the prope rty into an easement. W e affirm. FACTS The following factual summary is drawn from the district court’s f indings of fac t, conclusions of law, and order. Appellant Richard L. Greenstreet live s in a senior housing comple x next door to a property owned by respondent Central Minnes ota Educational Rese arch and Devel opment Council (CMERDC). Respondent Lowell Haagenson is the executive director of CMERDC. CMERDC bought the property in 2022. The property was pre viously owned by the Benton Count y Historical Society. Sometime around 201 2, based upon an informal agreement with the Histori cal Society, Greenstreet began maintaining a co mmunity garden on th e property. Greenstreet and other community members in vested significant labor in the gar den, producin g a variety of crops, including strawberries, tulips, rutabagas, eggplants, and many other vegetables. This arrangement continued for 11 years, u ntil the Histor ical Society s old the property t o CMERDC. Sometime in 2023, Haagenson met Greenstre et while Greenstreet was gardening on the property. Haagenson agreed to allow Greenstreet t o continue gard ening on the proper ty

3 through the 2023 growi ng season. But he explained to Green street many times that he had reservations about continued gardening there in the 2024 seaso n because of underground fixtures and constructio n activity occurring t hen. Haagenson a lso spoke with the apartment manager at the se nior housing complex, sha ring with her his concer ns about the garden’s location, safety, and liability, given the construction taking pla ce on the property. Haagenson learned that the senior housing co mplex had offered Greenstreet the ability to garden on its property but Greenstreet decline d. On April 15, 2024, Greenstreet and Haagenso n met with a CMERD C employee to discuss continued us e of the garden plot. Greenstreet re calls that the parties orally agreed that he could continue to use the garden for the 2024 growing season, but Haagenson reca lls this meeting as o ne where he reiterated his co ncerns a bout continued gardening there. On May 2, 2024, Greenstreet signed a release f orm prepared by the CMERD C employee, stating: “Richard Gree nstreet. . . do[es] attest that I am waiving any liability of injury or damages to my person due to items on [CMERDC] property.” Greenstreet testified tha t he understood the docume nt to mean that he had permission to plant and maintain the garden for the summer, but Haagenson te stified that he had Greenstr eet sign the waiver after discovering him on the property while constru ction activities were ta king place. Later in the day on May 2, Haagen son emailed the apartment man ager regardin g CMERDC’s concerns about their tenant, Greenstreet, gardening on the property. Haagenson reiterated his concerns that the pla nned excavation work would render the area “unsuitable for gardeni ng.” He also wrote:

4 [CMERDC employee] and I had told a tenant in your building it was okay to garden in that are a this year aft er excavation is completed and it is det ermined safe to garden there. [We] have been clear that no tillin g nor digging is to be do ne until after excavation —likely mid-to-late M ay. At trial, Greenstreet acknowledge d that he knew about the meeti ng and Haagenson’s communication tha t Greenstreet could not garden until excavation was completed. During the summer, Haagenson remo ved the perimeter posts from t he garden and offered to move the top soil, tulip bulbs, and str awberries to an alternat ive garden space that the apartment manager had offered to Greenstreet. This offer was n ot acknowledged or accepted by Greenstreet, so, after a s eries of constru ction delays, Haagenson authorized demolition of the garden on July 8, 2024. As a result, the site became unsuitable for gardening. Greenstreet sued resp ondents, asserting clai ms for damages and oth er relief based on promissory estoppe l and an equitable or implied ease ment. He also sought punitive damages and other relief. The district court ruled in favor of resp ondents, dismissing Greenstreet’s claims wi th prejudice. This appe al follows. 1 1 All parties were self -represented i n the distri ct court and on appeal. No response brief was filed by either respondent. Therefore, t his case will be decided on the merits as provided in Minn. R. C iv. App. P. 142.03.

5 DECISION On appeal, Gre enstreet challenges only the district court’s di smissal of his equitable easement claim, so we limit our review to that claim. 2 Following a court trial, a district court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless they a re clearly erroneous. Robe rts v. Moore, 603 N.W.2d 6 50, 656 (Minn. 1999). But the di strict court’s c onclusions of law are reviewed de novo. W. Insulation S ervs., Inc. v. Cent. Nat’l In s. Co., 460 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Minn. App. 1990). Greenstreet arg ues that he was given a license by the prior owner — the Historical Society— to use the property for gardenin g and that the license was converted into an easement by virtue of t he money he spent gar dening and the long du ration of his use. “[A] license is not an estate but a permission giving the licensee a personal legal privilege enjoyable on the land of another.” Mi nn. Valley Gun Club v. Northline Corp., 290 N.W. 222, 224 (Mi nn. 1940). Licenses are revo cable (1) at the will of the licensor or (2) due to the transfer of landownership unless the new property owner chooses to continue allowing the use. See Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co. v. City of Winthrop, 2 57 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Minn. 1977). “Becau se a license i s generally revocable, it is not a n encumbr ance upon land.” Id. An easement, on the other hand, is “an interest in land in the possessi on of another which entitles the owner of such interest to a li mited use or enjoyment of the land in whic h 2 In his brief, Greenstr eet appears to concede th at his claims all depe nd on the existen ce of an equitable easem ent, and he does not separ ately challenge the district court’s denial of his other claims for relief.

6 the interest exists.” Minneapolis A thletic Club v. Cohler, 17 7 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Minn. 1970). Equitable easem ents are easements in which “ the equitable p owers of the court are called into play. ” Highway 7 Embers, Inc. v. Nw. Nat ’l Ba nk, 256 N. W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 1977). In the context of easements, court s most often invoke their eq uitable powers when there is a dispute regarding owners hip or use of a portion of land or if there is a preexisting easement with a vague description. I d. T he co urts are not free to create an easement when the agreement between the parties does not permit su ch flexibility. Willenberg v. Frye, 3 N.W.3d 23, 28 (Minn. App. 2024). After hearing the trial testimony and revie wing the exhibits, th e district court rejected Greenstreet’s equitable - ease ment claim. It observed that Greenstreet did not clai m the existence of a vague or pr eexisting easeme nt that might warrant an equitab le easement. Instead, the district court determined, G reenstreet was granted two licenses to garden on the property. First, the Historical Society granted Greenstreet a license to gar den on the property while it own ed the property but that license “was effecti vely revoked” when CMERDC purchased the property. Second, following C MERDC’s purchase of t he property, resp ondents g ave Greenstreet a license to garden for just one season in 2023. The district court determined that, “witho ut a formal agreement e xplicitly stating other wise,” what happened with the garden after CMERDC purchased it wa s at the discretion of CMERDC. We see no error in the district court’s factual findings or legal conclusions. The executive director of the Historical Society, whose testimony the district court fou nd credible, testified that Greenstreet had an inf ormal agreement with t he Historical Society

7 that he could use a portion of their land to pla nt a garden. She also testified th at she told Greenstreet that permis sion to continue to use the land would have to be obtaine d from the new owner. Haagen son, whose test imony the district court also fo und credible, testified that he allowe d Greenstreet to garden for one season but the n informed Greens treet that he would need to wait to continue gardenin g until after construct ion was complete and that permission to garden would be conting ent upon determi ning that it w as still safe to garden in the area. Th ese witnesses’ testim onies support the district c ourt’s findings regarding the limited permission giv en to Greenstreet to u se the property. A nd t he findings supp ort the district court’s conclu sion that Greens treet had a revo cable license to use the property an d was not entitled to an e quitable easement. Greenstreet contends, however, that his lice nse was converted into an equitab le easement by his expend itures on the garden. B ut that argument misunderstands the law. “A licensee is conclusivel y presumed, as a matter of law, to kn ow that a license is revocable at the licensor’s pleasu re; and if the licensee e xpends money in conn ection with his entry upon the licensor’s lan d, he does so at his ow n peril.” L arson v. Amundson, 4 14 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Minn. App. 1987) (citing Mi nneapolis Mill Co. v. Minnea polis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 53 N.W. 639, 64 1 (Minn. 1892)). In Larson, we refused to c onclude that an oral agreement creating a license was irrevoca ble even when the licensee had contributed over $2,000 to pave the driveway and maintai n it and had continued to use if for ten more years after making those cont ributions. Id. at 418-19. Greenstreet supports h is argument by citin g City of Hutchinson v. Wegner, 195 N.W. 535 (Minn. 1923), which he claims d emonstrates that his revocable license wa s

8 converted into an easement due to hi s “costly improvements” in the garden. But this case supports the opposite conclusion. In H utchinson, the city made an agreement with a landowner that, if the landowner allowed t he city to conn ect its waterworks to the landowner’s well for its water supply, the city would provide w ater for use at the landowner’s flour mill. 195 N.W. at 536. In reliance on the agreement, the city spent $20,000 to connect its waterworks to t he well and build a pumping station oppo site the mill. Id. Eighteen years later, a subseque nt lan downer began charging the city for the w ater that it was taking an d gave notice that he would shut off the water i f the city did not p ay. Id. The c ity sought an i njunction restraining hi m from shutting of f the water, arguing that it had a perpetual r ight to use the well — in othe r words, an easeme nt — and the district co urt agreed. Id. The sup reme court, however, determined that the evidence showed only that the landowner gave the city “permission to use the well without specifying how l ong the privilege should continue ” and that all the city had was a revocable license. Id. Import antly, the supreme court determined that t he cit y’s $20,0 00 expenditu re did not support the establishment of an easement because the city had “saved mone y by not sinking a well on its own land. ” Id. at 53 7. Here, the Historical So ciety gave Greenstreet permission to use the property and di d not require any type of consideration in re turn. It is true that Greenstreet spent mone y to plant the garden and invested his time to nourish it. But his expendit ure did not support the establishment of an ea sement because Greens treet would have spent the same amoun t to plant the garden elsewhere. Furthermore, as a licensee, he was presumed to know that the license was revocable and was even told as much by the Historical S ociety. Greenstreet’s

9 expenditure of money i n connection with his u se of respondents’ land was done “ at his own peril” and did not cre ate an equitable easement. Larson, 414 N. W.2d at 41 9; see also Minneapolis Mill, 53 N.W. at 641. Affirmed.