Court opinion affirms motion denial for civil commitment

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-1213 In the Matter of the Ci vil Commitment of: Ch ristopher Loyd Ivey. Filed March 2, 2026 Affirmed; m otion denied Johnson, Judg e Carlton County District Court File No. 09 - P2 -03-001548 Christopher Ivey, Moo se Lake, Minnesota (pr o se appellant) Keith Ellison, Attorne y General, Angela Hel seth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Jeffrey Boucher, Carlto n County Attorne y, Carlton, Minnesota (f or respondent) Considered and decide d by Ede, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Jo hnson, Judge. NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION JOHNSON, Judge In 2004, Christopher Loyd Ivey was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person and a sexual psychopathic p ersonality. In 2025, Ivey f iled a motion for relief from the 2004 commitment order pursuant to r ule 60.02 of the r ules of c ivil procedure. He argued that, during the commitment procee dings that resulted i n the commitment order, he was not allowed to waive his statutory right to counsel and represent himself. We conclude that the district court d id not err by de nying the motion on the groun ds that the commit ment order is not void and is not inequitable. Theref ore, we affirm.

2 FACTS Ivey was convicted of multiple crimes, including murder and criminal se xual conduct, in Minnesota and Germany in the 1990s. In re Ivey, 687 N.W. 2 d 666, 6 68 (Minn. App. 2004). In Nove mber 2003, as Ivey was being deported from G ermany to the United States, Carlton Co unty filed a petition to have him civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person and a sexual psychopathic personality. I d. In December 2003, the district court appointed an attorney to represen t him in the commitment proceeding. Id. at 669; s e e also In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn. App. 1995) (stating that patient has right to counsel under Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 9 (1994)), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 1995). The record of the commitme nt proceedings does not indicate th at Ivey ever objected to the appointment of counsel, sought to waiv e his right to cou nsel, or attempted to discharg e his court - app ointed attorney. In Ma y 2004, the district court granted the co unty ’ s petition and ordered Iv ey’s civil commitment. Ivey, 687 N.W.2d at 6 69. In March 2025, Ivey f iled a motion for relie f from the 2004 commitment or der pursuant to rule 60.02 of the r ules of civil p rocedure. His moti on is based on I n re Ci vil Commitment of B enson, 12 N.W.3d 711 (Mi nn. 2024), in which the supreme court held that a respondent in a civil- commitment pro ceeding may waive the right to counsel in Minnesota Statutes section 253D.20 an d represent himself. Id. at 720. Accordingly, t he supreme court c oncluded that Benson was entitled to a new hearing before the commit ment appeal panel on his petition for a red uction in custody. Id. at 721. Iv ey filed an affidavit with his motion in which he states that he “did not request the appoint ment of counsel” and “was never afforded a hearing to waive counsel.” He further states that he “was informed

1. .. that no one is allowed to represent hi mself at a civil commitment h earing.” Relying on the Benson opinio n, Ivey requested that his 2004 commitme nt order be vacated and that the district court condu ct a new hearing on the county’s civil-commit ment petition. In June 2025, the d istrict court filed an 18 - p age order in which i t denied Ivey ’s motion. Ivey appeals. DECISION Ivey argues that the dis trict court erred by denying his rul e 60.02 motion to vacate the 2004 commitment order. Rule 60.02 provides, in relevant part: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a par ty or the part y ’ s legal repres entatives from a final judgment (other than a marriage diss olution decree), order, or proceeding a nd may order a new tr ial or grant such other relief as may be j ust for the following re asons: (a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) Newly discovered e vidence which by due diligence could not have been discovere d in time to move for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.03; (c) Fraud (whether heretofore denominate d intrinsic or extrinsic), misre presentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) The judgment is void; (e) The judgment has be en satisfied, released, or discharged or a prior judgment upo n which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no long er equitable that the judgment should ha ve prospective applicat ion; or

4 (f) Any other reason ju stifying relief from t he operation of the judgm ent. Minn. R. Civ. P. 6 0.02. A party seeking relie f under rule 60.02 has the burden of pr oof. City of Barnum v. Sabri, 657 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Minn. App. 2003). This court applie s an abuse-of-discretion standard of revie w to a district court ’ s denial of a rule 60.02 motion. In re Civil Commitmen t of Johnson, 931 N.W. 2d 649, 655 (Minn. Ap p. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2019). Both in the district co urt and on appeal, Ive y has made two argu ments for relief based on two paragraphs of rule 60. 02: paragraph (d) and pa ragraph (e). We address each argument in turn. A. Rule 60.02(d) Ivey first argues that the district court erred by denying his rule 60.02 motion to t he extent that it is based on paragraph (d). H e contends that he is en titled to a new civil - commitment hearing o n the ground that the 2 004 commitment order is void. F or purposes of rule 60.02(d), a judgment or order may be deemed vo id for any one of three reasons: “ if the issuing court [1] lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, [2] lacked personal jurisdiction ov er the parties through a failure of service that has not been waived, or [3] acted in a manner inconsi stent with due process. ” Bode v. Minnesota Dep’ t of Nat. Res., 594 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. App. 1999), aff’d, 61 2 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2000). Ivey does not argue that the distric t court lac ked either subject- m atter jurisdiction or person al jurisdiction with respect to the 2003 -2004 c ommitment proceeding s. An y such

5 argument would be barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion because Ivey made both arguments on direct appeal from the 2004 co mmitment order and this court rejected the arguments. Ivey, 687 N.W.2d at 669-71. Ivey limits his argume nt concerning paragraph (d) to the thi rd type of void order: an order issued after a district court “ acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. ” See Bode, 594 N.W. 2d at 261. He conten ds that the district court denied him du e process by depriving him of an opportunity t o waive his statutory right to co unsel and represent himself during the 2003 -2004 civil- commitme nt proceedings. Ivey cites Benso n in making this argument. Ivey’s reliance on Bens on is problematic for two reasons. First, the supreme court made clear in Ben son that the right to waive counsel a nd represent on eself is a right arising from a sta tutory right t o counsel, not a right b ased on the constitutio nal guarantee of d ue process. 12 N.W.3d at 715-21; se e also In re Civ il Commitment of U rbanek, ___ N.W.3d __, __, 2025 WL 3623348, at *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 15, 2025), petition for rev. filed (Minn. Dec. 29, 2025). Indeed, the supreme court expressly state d that it was avoiding tha t con stitutional issue. B enson, 12 N.W.3d at 717 -18; see also Urbanek, 2025 WL 3623348, at *3. Second, the statute at i ssue in Benson is diffe rent from the statute th at applied to Ivey in 2003 and 2004. The Benson co urt held that Minnesota Statutes section 253D.20 (2022) “establishes a waivable right to counsel.” 12 N.W.3d at 72 0 (emphasis o mitted). But section 253D.20 applies only to a person who a lready has been committed and is a party to a pro ceeding under cha pter 253D. See Minn. Stat. § 253 D.20 (2024). Ivey’s

6 statutory right to counsel arose from a differ ent statute, which applies only to an initial commitment proceeding under c hapter 253B. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 2c (2002). This court has held that Benson does not app ly to commitment proc eedings in which the statutory right to couns el arose from section 253B.07, su bdivision 2c. Urbanek, 2 025 WL 3623348, at *3-4. Even if we were to ass ume that Benson applies to Ivey’s commitment proceed ings, his argu ment wound en counter other obstacle s. In applying ru le 60.02(d), the distric t court cited Unite d Student Aid Funds, I nc. v. Espinosa, 559 U. S. 260 (2010), in which the United States Supreme Court e xplain ed that a judgment or order may be void under the ana logous federal rule “ in the rare instance where a judg ment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that depriv es a party of notice or the opportunity to be hea rd.” Id. at 271 (emphasis added) (interpr eting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)). Ivey q uestions whether this part of Espinosa is consisten t with Minnesota law inasmuch as the Minnesota Supreme Court never has relied on Espinosa to inter pret Minnesota’ s rule 60.02(d). Ivey is correct that Espino sa is a ca se involving federal law, not Minnesota law. In any event, i t does not appear that the pri nciples discussed in Espinosa wo uld narrow or limit the scope of the third type of voi d judgment or order recognized by our case law: a judgment ente red or order filed after “ the issuing cour t .. . acted in a manner inco nsistent with due proce ss.” See Bode, 594 N.W.2d at 261. Assuming without deciding that Espinosa informs the interpretatio n of Minnesota rule 60.02(d), Ivey’ s argument fails. He does not contend th at he was deprive d of notice. He contends that he was deprived of a n opportunity to be heard onl y in the sense that he

7 was “ deprived of his r ight to present his own defense ” and “ to ma ke [his] own defense personally.” I n support of that co ntention, he cites Faretta v. Calif ornia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which recognized a constituti onal right of s elf -representation based on the Si xth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 807, 814, 818 -21, 832. This cour t recently concluded that a respondent in a civil-commi tment proceeding does n ot have a constitutional right of self- representation arising from either the Sixth Amendment right to counsel or the Fourteenth Amendmen t right to due p rocess. Urbanek, 2025 WL 3623348, at *4. In light of o ur Urbanek opinion, Ivey cannot prove that the distri ct court “ acted in a m anner inconsistent with due process ” during the 2003- 2004 commitment pr oceeding s. See Bode, 594 N.W.2d at 261. Furthermore, even if Ivey’ s theory w ere viable, his argument would f ail for lack of evidence. Ivey did not introduce a ny evidence that he obje cted to the appointment of counsel, sought to waive his right to counsel, or attempted to discharg e his court -appointed attorney. T he facts of this case are very si milar to those of Urbanek, in wh ich the civil - commitment re spondent “ did not object to the order appointing co unsel, ” did not “ seek to waive counsel and r epresent himself, ” and “ provided no evi dence to support his a ssertion that he wished to represent himself at his initial commitmen t proceeding, or that he was prevented from maki ng such reques t. ” 2025 WL 36 23348, at *6. Consequently, th is court concluded that there was no error in the denia l of Urbanek ’ s rule 60. 0 2 motion. Id. at *7. Because Ivey has no t submitted evidence that he assert ed a right of self-represen tation during his 2003- 200 4 commitment proc eedings, he cannot establish that the district court

8 violated his right to due proces s, even if his due -process rights wer e understood to inclu de a right of self-represe ntation. Thus, the district court did not err by denying I vey ’s rule 60.02 motion on the ground that the judgment enter ed on the 2004 commit ment order is not void. B. Rule 60.02(e) Ivey also argues that th e district court erred by denying his rule 60. 02 motion to the extent that it is based o n paragraph (e). “ Rule 60.02(e) consi sts of three c lauses, which provide three lega l bases for relief. ” In re Civil Commitm ent of Moen, 83 7 N.W.2d 40, 48 (Minn. App. 20 13). Ivey relies only on the third clause, w hich provides that a district court may grant a party relief from a judgment or o rder if “ i t is no longer equitable that the judgme nt should have prospective application.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(e). “ The third clause of r ule 60.02(e) reflect s ‘ the historic power of the court of equity to modify its decree in light of changed circum stances. ’” Moen, 837 N.W.2d at 48 (quoting Sabri, 657 N.W.2d at 2 05). As a general rule, the “changed circumsta nces” that may give rise to relief under rule 60.02(e) are “ (1) changes in ope rative facts, (2) changes in th e relevant decisional law, and (3) cha nges in any applic able statutory law. ” Id. at 4 8 -49 (quotation omitted). In ruling on a motion based on paragraph (e), a district court must “ determine whether c hanged circumstances exist and, if so, whether they render it inequitable for the judgment to have prospective appli cation. ” Sabri, 657 N.W.2d at 207. Whether the prospective effect of a judgment is no longer equitable “ must be determined on a case-by- case basis. ” Id.

9 Ivey contends th at the supreme court ’ s holding in Benson constitutes a chang e in circumstances. The district court agreed with Ivey on that point, stating that “ [t]here is little doubt that the decision in In re Benson constitutes a significant chan ge in circumstances.” The district court proceeded to consider whether “ it is no longer equitabl e that the judgment s hould have prospe ctive ap plication. ” See Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(e). The district court reaso ned as follows: The respondent has not identified any additional evidence that he would have offered if he was allowed to represent himself. The respondent has not identified any additional witnesses who would have testified in the commitment hearings i f he was allowed to represent him self. Nor has the respond ent explained how h e would have resp onded differently t o the petition if he had been allowed to represent himself. The respondent seeks relief based solely on a change in decisional law. Therefore, t he court does not find it inequitable to continue to hold the respondent under the indefinite commitment order. Ivey challenges the dist rict court’ s decision by asserting that, after fin ding changed circumstances, the district court should have granted h im relief without co nsidering equitable factors. He contends that the d etermination of changed ci rcumstances “should have ended the court ’ s inquiry. ” He further contends that the distric t court erred because it “erroneously conside red equitable factors, w hich [he asserts] do not apply when there is a change in the law, es pecially in a case such as this that is not a case in equity.” Ivey’ s argument is plainly inconsis tent with the applicable rule and Minnesota caselaw. The text of the rule allows f or relief from a judgment if “ it i s no longer equitable that the judgment sho uld have prospective application. ” Mi nn. R. Civ. P. 60. 02(e) (emphasis added). And, as stated above, “[t] he third clause of rule 60.02(e) reflects ‘the

10 historic power of th e court of equity to modify its decree i n light of changed circumstances.’” Moe n, 837 N.W.2d at 48 (quoting Sabri, 657 N.W.2d at 205). I n exercising that autho rity, a district court must “ strike a delicat e balance between the sanctity of final judgments and the in cessant command of a court’s c onscience that justic e be done in light of all t he facts.” Sabri, 657 N.W.2d at 207 (quotatio n omitted). In this case, the distr ict court appro priately engaged in a case - speci fic analysis of facts that are pertinent to Ivey’ s request f or relief. In short, the district court considered whether Ivey’ s evidenc e or arguments in the 2003- 2004 commitment proceedings would have been any different if he had been allowed to represent himse lf (assuming that he had expressed an interest in doing so). The district court was well withi n its discretion in the manner in which it ide ntified the relevant fa cts and weigh ed eq uitabl e factors. Thus, the district court did not err by den ying Ivey ’ s rule 60.02 motion b y concluding that it wo uld not be inequitabl e for the judgment t o have prospective application. C. Motion to Strike Before concluding, we must rule on a pending motion: Ivey’ s mo tion to s trike a letter that respondent Carlton County filed w ith this court pursuant to rule 128.05 of the rules of appellate proce dure. The applicable rule pro vides: If pertinent and si gnificant authorities come to a party ’ s attention after the party ’ s brief has been filed or after ora l argument but before decision, a party ma y promptly file a letter with the clerk of the appellate co urts setting fo rth the citations. The letter must state without argument the reasons for the

11 supplemental citations, referring either to the page of the brief or to the point argued o rally. . . . Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.05. “ The rule co ntemplates a very short submission, si mply providing the citation of the new authority and enough informat ion so the court c an determine what previo usly made argument it relates to.” Id., 2000 c omm. cmt. Ivey contends that respondent’ s Octo ber 7, 2025 lette r does not co mply with rule 128.05 because the letter does not refer to any page numbers of res pondent’s bri ef. Ivey cites no caselaw for the proposition tha t a letter filed pursuant to rule 128.05 always must include such page numbers. The rule in dicates that reference s to page numbers are not always r equired becaus e the rule expressly provides the o ption of “ referring either to the page of the brief or to t he point argued orally.” Minn. R. Ci v. App. P. 128.05 (emphasis added). The comment to the rule further indicates that a rule 128.05 l etter should be “very short,” with onl y a citation and “ enough information ” to allow the co urt to understand th e relevance of the supple mental authority. Id., 2 000 comm. cmt. In this case, responde nt submitted a letter with the caption and citation of a nonprecedential opinio n of this court, which re spondent described as “ a sexually dangero us person and se xual psychopathic personality rule 60.02 cas e involving sim ilar issues to those raised in this case. ” The letter also states that the non precedential opinion “pert ains to appellant’ s a nd respondent’ s arguments in this case related to his right to self - representation at his civil commitment trial and struct ural error argu ments. ” The letter ’s refer ence to two issues briefed by the parties allows this court to de termine the points to

12 which the supplementa l authority relates. Most impor tantly, respond ent ’ s letter does not violate the without-arg ument requirement of r ule 128.05. Thus, we deny Ivey ’ s motion to strike. Affirmed; m otion denied.