Court opinion denies motion in marriage case

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-0356 In re the Marriage of: Joseph Ming Klimmek, petitioner, Respondent, vs. Elizabeth Lynn Klimm ek, Appellant. Filed March 2, 2026 Affirmed; motion den ied Frisch, Chief Judge Anoka County District Court File No. 02- FA - 20 -865 Richard D. Crabb, Hill Crabb, LLC, Edina, Mi nnesota (for respondent) Elizabeth Sibet, Brookl yn Park, Minnesota (pr o se appellant) Considered and decide d by Frisch, Chief Judge; Ede, Judge; and Bentley, Judge. NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION FRISCH, Chief Judge Appellant challenge s the district court’s judg ment and decree award ing joint legal custody, joint physical custody, and equal parenting time of the parties’ childr en. Appellant argues that the district court er red in determining that the parties were legally married and abused its discretion in it s custody and parenting - time award by failing to

2 consider or improperl y weighing cert ain evid ence. Because we discern no error or abuse of discretion by the dist rict court, we affirm. FACTS Appellant-mother Elizabeth Lynn Klimmek and respondent- father Joseph Ming Klimmek ma rried in 2016 and share two min or children. In June 2020, father peti tioned for dissolution of the marriage, reque sting that the parties be awarded joint legal cust ody and joint physical custody. In July, mother f iled a counterpetition requesting sole legal custody and sole physi cal custody of the c hildren. In December 2022, mother filed a motion to dis miss father’s petition for dissolution, asserting that the partie s were never legally married. In April 2023, th e district court denied mother’s motion to dismiss, reasoni ng that the issue was not timely raised and even if timely, failed on the m erits. In June, and wit hout filing a motion se eking leave of court pursuant to Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 115.11, mot her filed a letter reque sting that the district court reconsider its April order den ying her motion to dismiss. The distric t court denied mother’s request for reconsideration. The district court held a six - day trial, at whic h several witnesse s testified, including friends, relatives, careg ivers, and teachers. After trial, t he district court entered an order for judgment and decr ee (J&D). Relevant t o this appeal, the J& D awards joint legal custody, joint physic al custody, and equal parenting ti me to mother and father. Mot her appeals, asserting that the district cour t (1) erre d in determining tha t the parties were legally married and (2) abuse d its discretion by failin g to consider or impr operly weighing certain evidence.

3 DECISION I. The district court di d not err in determining that the parties were leg ally married. Mother seeks to inv alidate the J&D on the basis that the parties were never legally married. “In reviewing the [district ] court’s determination that th e parties were legally married, this court must decide whether the [di strict] court correctly applied the law.” Ma v. Ma, 483 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Minn. App. 1992). A civil marriage is lawful when “a licens e has been obtained as provided by la w and when the civil marriag e is contracted in the presence of two witnesses and solemni zed by one authorized, or who m one or both of the parties in good faith believe to be authoriz ed, so to do.” Minn. Stat. § 517.01 (2024). “When the fact of marriage is required or of fered to be proved before any court, evidence of . . . general r epute, or of cohabitati on as married pers ons, or any ot her circumstantial or presumptive evidence from which the fact m ay be inferred, shall be competent.” Minn. Stat. § 602.02 (2024). “When evidence of a marriage is sh own, a strong presumption of its legality arises.” Ma, 483 N.W.2d at 735. The objecting party bea rs the burden of proof to overcome this pr esumption. Id. The district court denie d mother’s motion to dismiss the diss olution proceedings on this basis for tw o reasons: first, mother’s m otion was untimely, and seco nd, mother’s motion failed on th e merits. As to the first basis for denial, t he distri ct court determined that mother’s motion to dismiss was untimely because the dis solution petition was fil ed in 2020, mother answered the petition less tha n a month later without raising invalidit y of the marriage as a defense, and mother waited mor e than two years to m ove to dismiss on this

4 basis. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02, “[e]very defense, in law o r fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading.. . shall be asserted in the responsive p leading.” A party “waives an affirmative defense if it is not inc luded in a responsive pleadin g.” Sletten v. Ramsey County, 675 N.W.2d 291, 299 (Mi nn. 2004). Beca use mother did not timely as sert the invalidity of the marri age as a defense, thereb y waiving the same, the district cou rt correctly applied the law in den ying her motion to dismiss. See also Sorenson v. St. Paul R amsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2 d 188, 190 (Minn. 1 990) (stating that an appellate court will not di sturb a district court’s decision to deny an u ntimely motion to dismiss unless there ha s been an abuse of discretion). We therefore affirm the district court’ s decision on this basis. 1 We also address the district court’s second basis for denial of mot her’s motion, that the motion, even if timely, failed on the merits. The district court determined that th e submissions accompan ying the motion — inclu ding the sworn statement from the officia nt and the properly executed marriage certif icate —conclusi vely establis hed the validity of the marriage under Minnesota law. Seven months after the district cour t’s denial of mother’s motion to dismiss, mother sought reconsi deration of the district cou rt’s decision at trial. She alleges that the dis trict court erred in not reconsidering its prior decision because she was prepared to intr oduce new evid ence to contest the marriage, including testimony regarding alleged irregularities in the cerem ony and paperwork. But pursuant to Min n. Gen. R. Prac. 115. 11, motions to rec onsider are prohi bited without express permission of the district court, and mother neither re quested permission nor received such permission 1 We note that mother also did not move to amend the plea dings pursuant to Min n. R. Civ. P. 15.01.

5 from the district court. 2 T he district court ’s initial dismissal of moth er’s motion is well - grounded in Minneso ta law, and the district c ourt was not require d to later reconsid er the validity of the parties’ marriage at trial. 3 Because the district co urt correctly applied the law, we discern no erro r and affirm on this bas is as well. II. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by awardi ng the parties joint legal custody, joint ph ysical custody, and eq ual parenting time. Mother appears to ar gue that the district court abused its discretion in failing t o consider certain eviden ce in orderin g custody and parenting ti me, and that if the district court properly consider ed this evidence, its award of custody a nd parenting time w ould not be supported. Father counters that the di strict court’s decision should be affirmed because the district court proper ly considered the entire record and appro priately analyzed the be st - interests factors. We a gree with father. The district court has broad discretion in maki ng child - custody and parenting -ti me determinations. Matson v. Matson, 638 N.W. 2d 462, 465 (Minn. App. 2002); see also In re Welfare of C.F.N., 923 N.W.2d 3 25, 334 (Minn. App. 2018) (“[T]here is scant if an y room for this court to question a district court’ s balancing of best - i nterests consideratio ns.” 2 Mother also argues that the district court later erred at trial be cause it did not allo w “a witness to testify regarding the validity of the marriage.” Again, mother did not request nor did she receive per mission to reconsider t he district court’s decis ion with respect to the validity of the marriage, and we discer n no error in the distri ct court’s determination in this regard. 3 Mother ’ s argument als o fails because she does not identify any legal error in the distri ct court’s decision to deny her motion to dismi ss. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464- 65 (Minn. 1944) (“[O]n appeal err or is never presu med. It mus t be made [t]o appe ar affirmatively before th ere can be reversal .. . [and] the burden of sho wing error rests upon the one who relies upo n it.”).

6 (quotation omitted)), r ev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2019). We revie w the district court’s factual findings for clear error, “givi ng deference to the district c ourt’s opportunity t o evaluate witness credi bility and reversing on ly if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 2019) (quotations omitted). A finding of fact is clearly errone ous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weig ht of the evidence or not reasonably supported b y the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). In re viewing factual findings for cle ar error, we (1) “view t he evidence in a light favorable to the finding s,” (2) do not find our o wn facts, (3) do not “re weigh the evidenc e,” and (4) do not “reconcile conflictin g evidence.” Id. at 221 - 22 (quotations omit ted). We defer to the district c ourt’s credibility deter minations. Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Min n. App. 2000). The district court’s “guiding principle” and “pa ramount commitment” when making child- custody and pare nting - time decisio ns is the best interests o f the child. Thornton, 933 N.W.2d at 789 (quotations omitted). “In con sidering the child’s best interests, a distr ict court must consider and evaluate all relevant factors, including 1 2 factors set forth by statute.” Id. (quotation omitted); see Minn. Sta t. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2024) (listing t he 12 factors). For each of the statut ory best - intere sts factors, the di strict court must provide “detailed findings. . . and explain how each factor led to [the district court’s] conclusions and to the determination of custody and parenting time. ” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(1) (2024).

7 Without assigning any error to the district c ourt’s analysis of the best -interests factors, mother argues that the distri ct court abused its discretion i n its award of custody and parenting time. Mother poi nts to certain evidence that she alleges the district court failed to consider. But the J&D demonstrates t hat the district court properly consid ered all the identified evidence and either discr edited that evidence or did not assign weight to that evidence. First, mother argues that the district court failed to c onsider “ev idence shown including [father] and [father’s brother] allowi ng [older child] to phys ically hurt [younger child] while in the sa me room with them a nd only paying attenti on to their screens the entire video.” Bu t in its J& D, the district c ourt explicitly addres sed mother’s c oncerns about father’s parenting and about father’ s brother. The district court concluded that th ere was “no evidence of maltreatmen t by [father], [father’s] mother, o r [father’s] brot her.” And the district court s tated that it did “not sh are [mother’s] concerns and find s no reason to limit [father ’s b rother’s] access t o the c hildren.” Because we do not re weigh the evidence on appeal, Kenney, 9 63 N.W.2d at 221 - 22, and mother fails to identify evidence in the record contrary to the district court’s findings, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making this finding. Next, mother asserts th at the district court abus ed its discretion by failing to conside r evidence of “[father] continuing t o leave guns in the house loaded despite the [parenting consultant’s] interve ntion and supervised visi ts previously” and “[father] continu ing to leave pills out right on the kitchen isla nd and in general not providing for the safety of t he

8 children.” Ag ain, the J&D extensively addressed mother’s concerns about fat her’s ability to care for the children, explaining: At trial, and throughout the procee dings, [mother] has re peatedly raised concerns and attem pted to establish a narrative that [father] is unable to effectively address the c hildren’s needs. No ne of [mother’s] concerns have b een validated by professi onals. No significant c oncerns have b een expressed regarding [father’s] care of the children by the children’s teachers, medical provid ers, or child protectio n services. . .. The C ourt has found and co ntinues to find [mother’s] co ncerns to be largely unfounded and, frankly, exaggerated. The district court ultim ately concluded that m other’s concerns “regarding [father’ s] mental health and his ability to adequately care for the children [were] not cre dible.” We will not reweigh evidence or di sturb the district court’ s credibility determinat ion. See Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472; Go ldman v. Greenwood, 7 48 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008). Finally, m other asserts that the distr ict court abused its di scretion in disregardin g testimony from variou s witnesses, inc luding testimony from the chil dren’s teachers. We are not persuaded. The district court specifically stated that it conside red “reports fro m the children’s teachers, me dical providers, child p rotection workers, pare nting consultant, and other professionals” in its conclusion that it had “no significant concerns that [father] is unable to meet the chil dren’s needs.” T o the extent that mother’s argument may be construed as a challenge to the district court’s analysis of the best -interests factors, the district court’s findings are sufficientl y detailed to support its custody and par enting - time determination s. Because the district

9 court demonstrably con sidered the evidence pr esented and its findings are grounded in the record, we discern no a buse of discretion. 4 Affirmed; motion den ied. 4 After the close of briefing in this appeal, fathe r moved to dismiss “the part of the appeal regarding the validity of the marriage” as not properly within the s cope of this appeal. Appellate courts “dismiss an issue or claim on a ppeal as moot when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary.” Snell v. Walz, 985 N.W.2d 277, 283 (Minn. 2023) (quo tation omitted). Because we agree with father and c onclude that the district court did not err in its determination that the parties were legally married, a decision on the merits of father’s motion to dismiss is no longer necessa ry. Thus, we deny father’s motion to dismiss as moot.