Missouri v. James Guthrie - Opinion Vacated and Remanded

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• Combined Opinion from the Court Add Note # STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. JAMES GUTHRIE, Appellant

Missouri Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: SD38707
• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Disposition: Vacated and Remanded with Instructions

• Opinion

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• Cited By

• Summaries

• Similar Cases

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Disposition

Vacated and Remanded with Instructions

Combined Opinion

Missouri Court of Appeals
Southern District

In Division

STATE OF MISSOURI, )
)
Respondent, )
) No. SD38707
v. )
) Filed: October 15, 2025
JAMES GUTHRIE, )
)
Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSISSIPPI COUNTY

Honorable R. Zachary Horack, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

A Mississippi County jury found Appellant James Guthrie guilty of two counts of

first-degree statutory rape and one count of fourth-degree child molestation against

Victim 1; and one count of first-degree statutory rape and one count of first-degree

sodomy against Victim 2. In his sole point on appeal, Guthrie contends the record

contains insufficient evidence to support his conviction of statutory rape against Victim 2

on Count IV. Specifically, he claims there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Victim 2 was under the age of fourteen at the time of the offense.

Because we find the judgment convicting Guthrie on Count IV was not supported by
sufficient evidence, we vacate Count IV of the judgment and remand with specific

instructions.

Factual Background 1

Guthrie was charged with sexually assaulting two victims. As relevant here, in

Count IV of its Second Amended Information, the State charged that, in violation of

§ 566.032, Guthrie

committed the felony of statutory rape in the first degree, punishable upon
conviction under Section 566.032, RSMo, and subject to lifetime
supervision under Sections 217.735 and 559.106, RSMo[,] in that between
January 1, 2017[,] and May 1, 2017, in the County of Mississippi, State of
Missouri, the defendant knowingly had sexual intercourse with [Victim 2],
a child less than fourteen years old.

At trial, a trained forensic interviewer testified that Victim 2 was fourteen at the

time of the charged conduct. Victim 2 testified that she was born on May 30, 2003. On

direct examination by the prosecutor, Victim 2 further testified as follows:

Q. Okay. Was there a time that something happened with James
Guthrie that you didn’t want to happen?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me about when that was?

A. It was in 2017.

Q. Okay. Would it have been when you were 14?

A. Yes.

1
We must accept as true all evidence favorable to the judgment, together with all
favorable inferences drawn therefrom. State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Mo. banc
2011). We also are required to ignore “all contrary evidence and inferences.” State v.
Tate, 708 S.W.3d 483, 488 (Mo. banc 2025). We recite the relevant facts accordingly.

2
Q. How do you know or how do you remember that is when it was?

A. Preteens.

Q. Okay?

A. Going through school, making friends, was getting to go to birthday
parties and swimming pool parties and slumber parties.

On cross examination by defense counsel, Victim 2 testified as follows:

Q. And do you remember what time of year it was?

A. The year? 2017.

Q. Do you remember which month of the year –

A. No.

Q. – this happened?

A. No.

Q. Do you know if it was cold outside or hot outside?

A. It wasn’t hot. But it wasn’t cold so couldn’t say kind of more like a
cool, breezy-type of weather.

In closing argument, the State explained as follows:

As to Count IV and Count V, Instruction No. 8 and 9, we are going
to talk about [Victim 2]. Again, Count IV is identical to the first two
counts. It is talking about statutory rape.

You have to believe that [Victim 2] was a child less than 14. It
happened sometime between January and May of 2017.

The jury found Guthrie guilty on all five counts of the amended complaint.

3
Legal Standards

Our review of sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims “is limited to whether the State

has introduced sufficient evidence for any reasonable juror to have been convinced of the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt[,]” accepting as true all evidence and

inferences favorable to the judgment and disregarding “[a]ll evidence and inferences to

the contrary[.]” Nash, 339 S.W.3d at 508-09. We are required to give great deference to

the trier of fact and refrain from weighing the evidence anew. Id. We review to

determine “whether there is sufficient evidence to support the charged crime, based on

the elements of the crime as set forth by statute and common law and the evidence

adduced at trial.” State v. Jackson-Bey, 690 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Mo. banc 2024) (quoting

State v. Brown, 558 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Mo.App. E.D. 2018)), as modified on denial of

reh’g (July 9, 2024).

This is not an assessment of whether the Court believes that the evidence at
trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a question of
whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational
fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.

State v. Gillum, 574 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Mo.App. S.D. 2019) (quoting State v. Stewart,

560 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Mo. banc 2018)).

To obtain a conviction, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each

element of the crime. 2 State v. McClain, 301 S.W.3d 97, 99 (Mo.App. W.D. 2010). “A

2
In his sole point relied on, Guthrie only challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to prove that Victim 2 was under the age of fourteen when the offense occurred.
Accordingly, we need not and do not analyze the other elements found by the jury.

4
person commits the offense of statutory rape in the first degree if he or she has sexual

intercourse with another person who is less than fourteen years of age.” Section

566.032.1. 3 It is well-settled law in Missouri that

in sex offense cases, time is not of the essence. 4 Because time is not an
essential element of the crime, the State is not confined in its evidence to
the precise date stated in the Amended Information, but may prove the
offense to have been committed on any day before the date of the
information and within the period of limitation.

State v. Cannafax, 344 S.W.3d 279, 287 (Mo.App. S.D. 2011) (citation modified)

(quoting State v. Bunch, 289 S.W.3d 701, 703 (Mo.App. S.D. 2009)). The victim’s age,

however, is an essential element of the crime of statutory rape. Consequently, the State

must “present sufficient evidence that Appellant had sexual intercourse with [the victim]

who was then less than fourteen years old.” State v. Sprofera, 427 S.W.3d 828, 832

(Mo.App. W.D. 2014).

Discussion

The State established that Victim 2 was born on May 30, 2003. Thus, she turned

fourteen on May 30, 2017. The State also established that the charged conduct occurred

in 2017. Victim 2 stated she was fourteen when the charged conduct occurred, but also

testified that she was a preteen at the time of the conduct, which could not have been true

at any time during 2017. From January 1, 2017, through May 29, 2017, Victim 2 was

3
Statutory citations are to RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2017).
4
“However, it is important to note that an instruction covering a broad period of
time may not be given when doing so would nullify an alibi defense that is supported by
substantial evidence.” Cannafax, 344 S.W.3d at 287 n.4 (citation modified).

5
thirteen years old, and from May 30, 2017, through the end of the year, Victim 2 was

fourteen years old. The State alleged that the acts occurred between January 1, 2017, and

May 1, 2017, when Victim 2 was younger than fourteen. Yet, the State did not provide

sufficient evidence that the abuse occurred between those dates. Victim 2 testified that it

was cool and breezy outside when the abuse occurred. While the jury could reasonably

infer she was describing spring-like weather, it is equally reasonable for the jury to infer

Victim 2 was describing fall-like weather. The State did not provide other evidence to

the jury of significant dates or events that would limit the alleged abuse to a time before

May 1, 2017, the date alleged in the Second Amended Information, or even a time before

May 30, 2017, when Victim 2 turned fourteen. See, e.g., State v. Sims, 700 S.W.3d 569,

577 (Mo.App. E.D. 2024) (“Victim attested to several corroborative events that

established the timeline for the abuse.”), rev’d on other grounds by State v. Winter,

SC100847, 2025 WL 2347004 (Mo. banc Aug. 12, 2025). Therefore, the evidence

presented by the State was insufficient for the jury to determine beyond a reasonable

doubt that Victim 2 was under the age of fourteen when the charged conduct occurred.

Having so found, we are required to vacate the judgment entered by the trial court

as to Count IV. See State v. Dixon, 70 S.W.3d 540, 545 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002), as

modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 5, 2002), rev’d on other grounds by State v. Claycomb,

470 S.W.3d 358 (Mo. banc 2015), as modified (Aug. 4, 2015). We do not, however,

discharge Guthrie.

6
Where, as here, a conviction of a greater offense has been overturned
for insufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court may enter a
conviction for a lesser offense if the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
find each of the elements and the jury was required to find those elements
to enter the ill-fated conviction on the greater offense.

State v. Whalen, 49 S.W.3d 181, 187-88 (Mo. banc 2001) (quoting State v. O’Brien, 857

S.W.2d 212, 220 (Mo. banc 1993)), holding modified by Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d 358.

“A person commits the offense of statutory rape in the second degree if being

twenty-one years of age or older, he or she has sexual intercourse with another person

who is less than seventeen years of age.” Section 566.034.1. Although they have

different age elements, second-degree statutory rape is specifically designated by statute

as a lesser offense of first-degree statutory rape. State v. Smith, 330 S.W.3d 548, 556

(Mo.App. S.D. 2010) (citing Dixon, 70 S.W.3d at 547); § 556.046.1(2). It is undisputed

that Guthrie was over the age of twenty-one, but the Count IV jury instruction on which

Guthrie was convicted did not include any finding regarding his age. By finding Guthrie

guilty on Count IV, the jury necessarily found that Victim 2 was under the age of

seventeen, and this finding was supported by substantial evidence, to wit: Victim 2

testified that she was born on May 30, 2003, and that the charged conduct occurred in

1. Thus, the elements for convicting Guthrie of second-degree statutory rape were

undisputed or found by the jury and supported by substantial evidence. See Whalen, 49

S.W.3d at 188 (trial court was directed to enter judgment reflecting conviction of

statutorily prescribed lesser offense when all the elements necessary for lesser offense

were found by the jury or were undisputed). As in Dixon, however, since the jury was

not instructed on the additional and distinct element regarding Guthrie’s age as required

7
to convict him of second-degree statutory rape, we remand for a new trial on the lesser

offense of statutory rape in the second degree on Count IV. Dixon, 70 S.W.3d at 548.

JACK A. L. GOODMAN, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C.J. – CONCURS

MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCURS

8