State v. Mason - Criminal Sentencing Appeal

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-1050 State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Paul Lewis Mason, Respondent. Filed February 23, 20 26 Reversed and remanded Cochran, Judge St. Louis County Distri ct Court File No. 69VI-CR-25-2 70 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Min nesota; and Kimberly J. Maki, S t. Louis County Attorney, Aaron Welch, Assista nt County Attorney, Virginia, Minnesota (f or appellant) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Evan Ottavi ani, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Mi nnesota (for respondent) Considered and decide d by Cochran, Presidi ng Judge; Frisch, Chi ef Judge; and Worke, Judge. NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION COCHRAN, Judge Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the distr ict court’s im position of a downward durational departure in sentencing respondent Paul Lewis Mason for his conviction of felony threats of violence. Bec ause we conclude that the district court ab used

2 its discretion when it sua sponte imposed a do wnward durational de parture, we rever se and remand for resentencin g consistent with this o pinion. FACTS In March 2025, p olice were dispatched to Mason’s apa rtment after receiving a report from Mason’s downs tairs neighbor, C.W., that Mason h ad threatened C.W. with a weapo n. At the apartment building, C.W. tol d police that Mason pointed a gun a t him and threatened to kill him. Following the discussion with C.W., police located Mason and placed him under arrest. During a Mirandized interview, Mason told police that he was upset with C.W. for banging on Mason’s walls and doors. Mason also told police that he went to C.W. ’s apartment to co nfront C.W. and said: “[i]f you knoc k on my d --- door agai n, I ’ m beatin’ your a --.” But Mason denied he had a gun and also denied th at he threatened to kill C.W. Up on being searched at the jail, police found 5.31 grams of m ethamphetamine on Mason’s person. The state charge d Mason with thre e offe nses: second - degree a ssault with a dangerous weapon in violation of Minn esota Statutes section 609.222, subdivisio n 1 (2024) (count I); felony threa ts of violence in violation of Minnesota Stat ut es section 609.713, subdivision 1 (2024) (count II); and fifth - degree felony drug p ossession in violation of Minn esota Statutes s ection 152.025, subd i vision 2(1) (2024) (count III). The sta te later amended count III to fifth-degree gross misde meanor drug possession pursuant to the plea agreement. Under th e n egotiated plea agreemen t, Mason agreed to pl ead guilty to c ount II a nd count III as amended and the state agreed to dismiss coun t I. The state also agreed t o abide

3 by the presentence i nvestigation (PSI) report and follow the reco mmendations therein. I n addition, the state agre ed that Mason would receive credit for time served and that Mason could argue for a down ward dispositio nal departure at sentenc ing if “for any reason he is a presumptive commit,” but the state would oppose any such request. Lastly, the state agreed to a “ bottom of t he box” sentence, meaning the state would a gree to the lowest end of the presumptive sentencin g range under the Minn esota Sentencing G uidelines. At the plea hearing, Mason pleaded guilty to count II and count III as amended. In support of his ple a, Mason provided the foll owing factual basis for the offenses whic h occurred on March 22, 2025. He testified that he and C.W. had been smoking methamphetamine that day and that they ha d “a disagreement. ” He further testified, consistent with his Mirandized statement to police, that he told C.W., “if you knock on my door again I’m going to. . . beat your a --. ” Mason claimed that his dis agreement with C.W. arose out of C. W. “knocking on [Mason’ s] door and run ning off” but he denied “threaten[ing] to take [C.W. ’s] life or anything like that.” He also agreed that the police found methamphetami ne on his person when he was arrested. The district court accepted Mason’s ple as, ordered a PSI, and set a sentencing date. The PSI indicated that the presumptiv e sentence for count II was a prison commit ment for 24 months, with a guid elines range of 21 to 28 months. Prior to the sentencin g hearing, Mason m oved for a downward dispositional departure on c ount II, seeking a probationa ry sentence. In his mem orandum in support, Mason argued for the dispos itional departu re on the basis that “he is amenable to probation. ” Mason did not seek a downward durational departure.

4 T he district court also received a victi m impact stateme nt from C.W. before the sentencing hearing. C.W. reiterat ed th at Mason threate ned to kill hi m while brandishing “ what appeared to be a firearm.” C.W. also n oted that the incident was very stress ful for him and that he has ha d trouble sleeping du e to anxiety, but he “did not have any issues ” with Mason before the incident, and “strongly [felt] this was a very is olated situation.” At the sente ncing hear ing, the district cour t heard from t he parties’ counsel an d allowed Mason to a ddress the court. Ma son’s counsel argue d in favor of a probationary sentence. Mason’s counsel also read a letter of support fr om Mason’s wife in whi ch she noted that “his absence is causing significant hardship for [their] fa mily” and emphasized that the “fam ily needs him home.” When Mason addres sed the court, he apolo giz ed for his conduct and express ed his remorse. The state opposed the motion, arguing that Mason had not met his burden to demonstrate facts sufficient to support a p robationary sentence rather than the presum ptive executed prison s entence. After hearing from th e parties, the district court denied Mason’s motion for a downward dispositiona l departure on count II — felony threats of vio lence. In explaining its decision to com mit Mason to pris on, the district cour t stated that i t was “sympathetic” to Mason and his famil y, but that it could not “make a findin g that [Mason was] amenable to probation.” The district court note d that the offense of threats of violence occurred when Mason was on supervised release. The court al so emphasized that “thi s offense is serious,” “[i]t had an effect on the victi m,” and “was completely avoida ble.” The district court went on to s tate that it did “ see some mitigating factors, ” n oting “ it seems like this was an impulsive decision [,] ” “ probably .. . influenced by metham phetamine use,” but the co urt

5 explained that the court “ha[d] to look at accountability.” T he district court then reiterated that it could no t place Mason on probation be cause he was on superv ised release when he committed the offense and he is “getting i nto the same trouble ove r and over.” But, following the d enial of Mason’s motion for a downward dispositi onal departure, the district c ourt sua sponte ordered a downward d urational departure on count II. The court provi ded the following brief explanation: “That being said, I will make t he finding that there are mitigating facto rs. I’ll depart durationally, but I think something has to change here, Mr. M ason, because thi s can’t go on i n the communit y.” The distric t court then imposed a downward durational departure of three months from the a greed upon “bottom-of-the- box” se ntence of 21 months, committing Mason “to the commissi oner of corrections for a perio d of eighteen month s” on count II. The court did not specify the “mitigating factors” that it was relying on to grant the downward durational departu re for count II. 1 On count III as amende d, the district court se ntenced Mason to a c oncurrent sentence of 364 day s in jail (or in prison) with credit for time served. The state appeals the district court’s imposition of a downward durational departure. DECISION An appellate court “afford[s] the [district] court great discretion in th e imposition of sentences and reverse [s] sentencing deci sions only for an abuse of that discretion. ” State v. Soto, 855 N.W. 2d 303, 307 - 08 (Minn. 2014). “A district co urt abuses its discretio n when its reasons for departure are improper or inadequate. ” State v. Rund, 1 We also note that ther e does not appear to be a sentencing departure report in the rec ord, though the sentencing order notes that the sen tence was a downward durational departure.

6 896 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2017). A district court also abuses its d iscretion when there is insufficient evidence in the record to justify t he departure or if it fail s to state the reasons for the depar ture on the record. State v. Solberg, 8 82 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2 016); State v. Geller, 665 N.W.2d 514, 5 17 (Minn. 2003). “When the district court gives improper or inadequate reasons for a downward departu re, we may scrutinize the record to determine whether a lternative ground s support the departur e. ” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Before addressing the state’s arguments, w e begin with an overview of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. The M innesota Sentencing Guidelines esta blish presumptive sentences for felony offenses and seek to “maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationa lity, and predictability i n sentencing.” Min n. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2024). “Consequently, departures fr om the guidelines are discouraged and are intended to apply to a small number of cases.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623. The sentencing guidelines provide that a district court may depart from the presumptive sentence onl y when there are “ identifiable, substantia l, and compelling circumst ances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent ’ g Guideline s 2.D.1 (20 24). And the se ntencing guidelines re quire a district court gran ting a departure to “disclose in writing or on th e record the particular substantial and compelling circumst ances that make the departure m ore appropriate than the presumptive senten ce.” Mi nn. Sent’g Gui delines 2.D.1.c. The reasons must al so be stated in either the sent encing order or in the d eparture report. Id.

7 The Minnesota Senten cing Guidelines includ e two types of sentencing departures: dispositional and durational. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623. Dispositional depar tures “place[] the offender in a different setting than t hat called for by the presumptive guidelines sentence.” Id. Dispositional departures ty pically focus on the characteristics o f the offender that show w hether a defendant is particularly amenabl e to probation. Id. Durational departures, by contrast, are sen tences that depart in duration from the presumptive guidelines sentencing range. Id. Durational departure s therefore “must be based on factors that reflect the seriou sness of the offense, no t the characteristics of the offender.” Id. at 623 - 24 (citing State v. Ch aklos, 528 N.W.2d 22 5, 228 (Minn. 1995)). “A downward durational departure is justified only if the def endant’s conduct was significantly less seri ous than that typically involved in the commis sion of the offense. ” Id. at 624 (quotation omitted). The Minnesot a Sentencing Guideli nes specif y mitigating factors that may suppo rt a downward departu re, either disposit ional or durational. See Minn. Sent ’ g Guidelines 2.D. 3.a (20 24). Of those included in the g uidelines, the parties identify three factors th at are potentially releva nt to our review: (1) The victim was an aggr essor in the inciden t.. . . . (3) The offender, because of physical or mental impairment, lacked su bstantial capacity for judgment w hen the offense was committed. The voluntary us e of intoxicants (drugs or alc ohol) does not fall within the purview of this factor.. . . .

8 (5) Other substantial grounds exist that tend to excuse or mitigate the offender’s culpability, although n ot amounting to a defense. Id. The list of factors i dentified is nonexclusi ve. Id. The State’s Argum ent The state argues that the district court abus ed its discretion when it granted a downward durational departure because it relied on “undefined” mitigating factors an d did not “ make any spe cific findings to justify a mitigat ed durational departure. ” Mason responds that the distri ct court articulated suff icient reasons to suppo rt the departure. At the sentenc ing hearing, the district court tol d the parties that it wa s “finding that there are mitigating factors” and imposed the downward durational de parture. The district court did not clearly id entify those “mitigatin g factors.” But earlier, in its discussion of Mason’s request for a downward disp ositional departur e, the district court stated that it “[saw] some mitigatin g factors and it seems like this was a n impulsive decision.” It is unclear from the transc ript whether the district court was referring to impulsivity or some of the mitigat ing factors that it referenced in r elation to Mason’s request for a downward dispositional departure when it later stated that “there are mitigating factors” to support the downward durational d eparture. W e therefore conclude that the district court made inadequat e findings to support the downward durational departure. As noted above, a “ downward durational d eparture is justified only if the def endant’s conduct was significantly less s erious than that typica lly involved in the commission of the offe nse.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 624 (quotation

9 omitted). T he district court’s reference to u nspecified “mitigating fa ctors” does not on its own support its decisio n to grant a downward durational departure. We are not persuaded otherwise by Mason ’s argument that the d istrict court’s unspecified reference to “mitigating fact ors” was intended to refer t o the district court’s earlier statement that Mason made “an impulsive de cision” and possibly to Mason’s expression of remorse at the sentencing hearing. As explained above, t he record does not indicate whether the di strict court was settin g forth these factor s as bases for a downward durational departure. While the dis trict court clearly believed the re were “mitigating factors” to support a downward durationa l departure, it did not specify any mi tigating factors or identify sufficient evidence in the record to support the downward durational departure. In other words, the district court did not find that Mason’ s threats -of-violence offense was less serious than the conduct typi cally involved in the off ense of felony threats of violence. And whe n the reasons given for the departure are inadequate, a district court abuses its discretion by imposing a departure. Rund, 896 N.W.2d at 532. We recognize that Gel ler provides that “abse nt a statement of t he reasons for the sentencing departure placed on the record at t he time of sente ncing, no departure will be allowed.” 665 N.W.2d at 517. But Geller considere d an upward departure, not a downward departure. Id. at 515. And while “we may in dependently examine the record to determine whether alternative gr ounds support the dep arture,” we note that “ may” is generally permissive. Rund, 896 N.W.2d at 53 4 (emphasis added); see The American Heritage Dictionary o f the English L anguage 1086 (5th ed. 2018) (defining “may” as “[t]o be allowed or permitted to”). Given the lack of clarity in the sentenci ng transcript regarding

10 the factors upon which the district court relied to grant the downw ard durational depart ure, we decline to exercise t he option to independently examine t he record and instead conclude that remand for resentencing is approp riate here to permit the distri ct court to provide a more fulsome explanat ion of the basis for the departure. 2 And we acknowledge that in some circumstances, i mpulsivity may dem onstrate that an offense is less serious than the typical offense, but wi thout clear findings on the record, we are unable to draw s uch a conclusion here. We further note that a challenge in rev iewing the record in this case i s the lack of a departure report as req uired by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. See Minn. Sent ’g Guidelines 2.D.1.c. The g uidelines require that the reasons for departure “be stated in the sentencing order or rec orded in the departure report and filed with the Commission.” Id. But “failure to file a de parture report is not itself sufficient grounds f or reversal.” State v. Stempfley, 900 N.W.2d 412, 417 n.8 (Minn. 2017). Therefo re, while our reversal is not based upon a failure to file a sentencin g departure report, we not e that a sentencing 2 We recognize that, in Rund, th e supreme cou rt reversed and reman ded for imposit ion of the presumptive sentence after it conclud ed that the reasons given by the district court were improper and it further concluded that the reco rd contained “insufficient evidence to justify the departure.” 896 N.W.2d at 529. In addition, Rund sta tes that “[r]eversal is require d when the reasons give n are improper or inad equate and the rec ord contains insufficie nt evidence to justify the departure.” Id. at 533 (emphasis a dded). But here, unlike in Ru nd, we are declining to exercise our discretion to independently examine the record to determine whether the record contains in sufficient evid ence to support the departure. Consequently, we d o not read Rund t o require reversal and remand f or imposition of the presumptive sentence given there has been no determination that the record contai ns insufficient evidence to support the departure.

11 departure report would have given us the op portunity to more fully review the district court’s findings on app eal. In sum, while the reco rd reflects that the dist rict court clearly believed there were mitigating factors to su pport the downward durational departure, it fa iled to specify those factors on the record. We therefore reverse and remand for res entencing. On reman d, the district court must mak e appropriate finding s on the record to support its decisio n and file a sentencing report. Reversed and remanded.