Krystal Drift v. Sean Swapinski - Harassment Restraining Order Affirmed

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-0669 Krystal Maria Drift, Respondent, vs. Sean Michael Swapins ki, Appellant. Filed February 23, 20 26 Affirmed Ross, Judge St. Louis County Distri ct Court File No. 69HI-CV-24- 1203 Krystal Maria Drift, Hi bbing, Minnesota (self- represented responde nt) Sean Michael Swapins ki, Bemidji, Minnesota (self-represented appel lant) Considered and decide d by Ede, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Jo hnson, Judge. NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION ROSS, Judge The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and gr anted Krystal Drift’s petition seeking a harassment re straining orde r (HRO) against her f ormer boyfriend, Sean Swapinski. We affirm t he resulting HRO over S wapinski’s challenges on appeal, holding that the district c ourt acted wit hin its discretion when it admitte d trial evidence, sufficiently supported its factual fi ndings with that evidence, exh ibited no impr oper bia s, and did n ot violate Swapinski’s co nstitutional rights.

2 FACTS Krystal Drift ended her long-term, sexual-friendship relations hip with Sean Swapinski in July 2 024 and petitioned the district court in October 2 024 to issue an HRO against him. Drift alleged that Swapi nski had continued contact ing her despite her urging him not to, including b y going to her apartment unannoun ced and co ntacting her on social media. The distri ct court issue d an H RO ex parte and granted Swapi nski’s request for an evidentiary hearing to contest it. Drift testified at the hearing, asser ting that she cut ties with Swapinsk i and told him to leave her alone. Sh e said that Swapinski “s eemed to have underst ood tho se terms for about six weeks” but th en appeared at her apartment uninvited in August 2024. She test ified that he also cont acted her “[m]ult iple times” on social media, culminating in an acrimonious Octob er 2024 Snapc hat exchange. The screenshots sho w a Snapchat request from a person with the username “Blue Eye s.” She questioned the user’s identity, and Swapinski resp onded, admitting that the acc ount belonged to him and expressi ng h is frustrations about the breakup. He told her, “I haven’t said a nything [to you] since you blocked me here.” The district court admitte d into evidence screenshots of the O ctober Snapchat exchange over Swapinski’s obje ctions. Swapinski also testified. He said that the breakup had “stunned” him a nd that he did not construe Drift’s directive to leave her a lone to mean th at she wanted no contact from him. But he acknowle dged that, after her demand, he did no t attempt to contact her for six weeks. He said that he went to her home unannounced beca use, when he tried to telep hone her, her phone seemed “either off or broken. ” He testified that Dri ft appeared “startle d ”

3 and “miffed ” by his appearance at her apartment. He admitted that h e understood from her reaction that Drift “ want[ed] to mak e a clean break” from him. Swapinski acknowledged being the subjec t of two unrelate d HROs as part of ch ild - custody orders invo lving other women. The district court issue d a form order. It checked two boxes indicat ing Swapinski’s specific acts of harassment: contacting Drift after “being told to stop” and contacting her through social media. The resulting two - year HRO prohibits Swapi nski from contact in g Drift or going within 2 5 feet of her home. Swapinski appeals. DECISION Swapinski raises four arguments to appeal the HRO. He co ntests the district court ’s admission of evidence. He maintains that the record does not supp ort the finding that his social- media contact constitute s harassment. He contends that th e HRO resulted from judicial bias. And he asserts that the distric t court violated his rig ht to due process and hi s right to appoint ed coun sel. The arguments fail. I We first address S wapinski’s evident iary argument. We w ill uphold the district court’s evidentiary ruli ngs unless the y reflect an abuse of discretion. Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 36 6 (Min n. 2020). Swapinski unconvincin gly argues t hat the district cour t failed to exclude the S napchat exhibits b ecause they pr ovide a misleading, frag mentary impression of his c ommunications wit h Drift. A party may seek to introduce the rem ainder of allegedly incomplete and potentially mislea ding documentary evidence. Minn. R. Evid.

4 106; Dolo, 942 N.W.2d at 363–64. Swa pinski never asserted that Drif t’s screenshots were contextually incomplet e, and he never move d to admit a more co mplete version of the exchange. Although he testified that other me ssages gave a more complete picture of their relationship, he did not offer those messages f or the district court to c onsider. Under these circumstances, he fails to establish th at admitting the screenshots co nstituted an abuse of the district court’s disc retion. Swapinski likewise fail s to demonstrate that the district court ab used its discretion by o verruling hi s speculation objection to Dr ift’s testimony t hat he attempted “[m]ulti ple times ” to contact her. T he t estimony was based on Drift’s personal knowledge of a d isputed fact, which is relevant, admissible evidence. S ee Minn. R. Evid. 401; Minn R. Evid. 602. Drift ’s testimony con cerned her person al experience as the recipient of Swapins ki’s communications, and the testimo ny tend ed to prove his atte mpts to co nt act her. Swapinski’s other argument challenges exhibit s Drift attached to her HRO petition, but the argument is immaterial because the record doe s not indicate that the district court admitted or considered those exhibits. II We next addres s S wapinski’s contenti on that the ev idence does n ot support the finding that he engaged in repeated acts of h arassment. We review for clear err or whether the district court’s fact findings are sup ported by the record. Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 –44 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. deni ed (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). The dist rict court may issue an HRO if i t finds that “there a re reasonable grou nds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, sub d. 5 (b)(3) (2024). Harassment

5 includes “ incidents of intrusive or unwa nted acts, words, or g estures. ” Id., su bd. 1(a)(1) (2024). An HRO requi res proof that the disp uted conduct was unre asonable and that the victim reasonably perceived that the conduct adversely affected her safety, security, or privacy. Du nham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 5 66 – 67 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006). Swapi nski argues only that his conduct was not unr easonable. Although w e observe that the district court’s ord er includes no express findings about the impact of Swapinski’s conduct on Drift’s sa fety, security, or privacy, we limit our review to Swap inski’s argu ment on appeal. Our consideration of th e record in the light mo st favorable to the H RO, particularly Swapinski’s hearing te stimony, satisfies us that the evidence supports the f inding that he engaged in multiple ac ts of harassment. It te nds to show that Swa pinski understood that Drift had directed hi m to leave her alone bu t that he nevertheless continued to initiate contact with her. For example, Swapinski ceased all contact with her for “about six weeks ” after her request. When Swapinski attempted to call her, he claims to have thought that “her phone was either off or broken. ” This evidence allows the district court to infer that he was aware that she wanted no contact wit h him, that she had taken steps to sever an y opportunity for hi m to reach he r by phone, but t hat he pursued f urther contact a nyway. And when Swapi nski then made a surprise appear ance at Drift’s home, h e recognized that his being there without notice or invitatio n had startled or upset her. Although he inter preted her reaction as demons trating that she “want[e d] to make a clean brea k” from him, he still contacted her using social-media plat forms, including Snapchat, at fir st hiding his identity from her. His testimon y also demonstrates th at he was aware that s he had blocked his

6 profile on Snapchat but that he nonetheless continued to try to comm unicate with her on it. Swapinski did not provide any Snapchat com munications (or claim that any existed) that suggested he was surprised by or attempted to c orrect Drift’s accusati on on Snapchat, “I ’ve told [you] to lea ve me alone an d [you] just don’t.” Deferring to the distr ict court’s weighing of evidence and cred ibility assessment s, we cannot sa y that its harassment f indings are clearly erroneous. III We reject Swapinski’s assertio n that the H RO reflec ts the distric t court’s bias against him. We review claims of judicial bi as to see if the record suggests fav oritism or antagonism that, if present, would reasonably call into doubt the district court’ s impartiality. See Olson v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986). We presume judicial impartiality, and the burden falls on S wapinski to rebut it. Se e State v. Burrell, 74 3 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. 2008). I t is true, a s S wapinski claim s, that Drift occa sion ally interrupted his testimo ny. But this is not evidence of judicia l bias, as the district court reprimanded Drift for doing so. H e cites Drift’s allege dly loud discussion with her advocate, but the record indicates that th e disc ussion occurred outside the cou rtroom, suggesting no bias. An d we see no bias in t he district court’s urging the parties to “stay apart,” as both parties were subject to the same admonition. The bias claim fails. IV We also are not persua ded to reverse by Sw apinski’s due- process arguments. The district court did not violate his right to due process by issuing the H RO. The fundamental elements of due proces s are notice and the righ t to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

7 319, 333 (1976); Sawh v. Cit y of Lino Lake s, 823 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Minn. 201 2). We review de novo whet her the district court safeguarded this const itutional protection. Plocher v. Comm’r of Pub. Saf ety, 681 N.W.2d 698, 702 –03 (Min n. App. 2004). Swapins ki received notice of the HRO petiti on and was informed of h is statutory right to req uest an evidentiary hearing. Se e Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 3(d) (2024). He in fact exercised this right and presented evidence contest ing Drift’s harassment allegatio ns. The district court also did not viola te Swapinski’s clai med ri ght to counsel. A defendant is gua ranteed counsel during critic al stages of a criminal p roceeding. Ezeka v. St ate, 16 N.W.3d 768, 782– 83 (Minn. 2025) (explaining the const itutional protection). Although a criminal proceeding might resu lt from a person’s viol ating an HRO, it does not result from the district court’s merely issuing the HRO. See Houck v. Houck, 979 N.W.2d 907, 911 n.6 (Minn. App. 2022). S wapinski was not statutorily or constituti onally entitled to appoin ted counsel to oppose the HRO petition. His due- process contentions fail. Affirmed.