State v. Thompson - Criminal Competency Appeal

This opinion is nonpre cedential except as pro vided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 1 36.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNES OTA IN COURT OF APP EALS A25-0574 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Nicholas Scott Thomps on, Appellant. Filed February 23, 20 26 Affirmed Frisch, Chief Judge Jackson County Distric t Court File No. 32-CR- 18 -159 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Thomas R. R agatz, Assistant Attorn ey General, St. Pau l, Minnesota; and Kristi Meyeraan, Jacks on County Attorney, Ja ckson, Minnesota (for r espondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Mich ael McLaughlin, Assis tant Public Defender, St. Pa ul, Minnesota (for appe llant) Considered and decide d by Frisch, Chief Judge; Ede, Judge; and Bentley, Judge. NONPRECEDENTI AL OPINION FRISCH, Chief Judge Appellant challenges the district court’ s order finding him not competent to participate in his cri minal proceedings. He argues that the district co urt erred in declining to consider his requ est to discharge his cri minal defense counsel and that he received

2 ineffective assistance from his defense coun sel who testified at the c ontested competency hearing that appellant was not com petent. Because the district court did not err in declining to consider the r equest to discharge def ense counsel and defen se counsel’s performanc e was objectively reason able, we affirm. FACTS This is the fourth pretri al appeal in this matter. In September 2018, res pondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Nicholas Scott Thompson with one co unt of second -degree intentional murder and two counts of s econd - degree unintention al felony murder for allegedly killing his mother. Since then, the cri minal proceedings and related appeals hav e involved issues related to Thompson’s competency. See State v. Thompson, No. A19 - 0787 (Minn. App. Mar. 3, 20 20) (order op.); State v. Thompso n, No. A20 - 12 32 (Minn. App. July 26, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2021); State v. Thompson, 988 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denie d (Minn. June 20, 2023). Following remand aft er Thompson’s thir d appeal, the district co urt ordered a competency evaluation and, after a co ntested competency hearing, found Th ompson competent to proceed. Criminal proceedings resumed in the normal course through mid - 2024. In late July 2024, the state extended a plea offer to Thompson. Tho mpson rejected the offer the same day. A bout a wee k later, Thompson’s crimina l defense counsel moved the district court to suspend the criminal procee dings and conduct a competency evaluation, citing Thompson’s mental illness. Four day s later, Thompson filed a handwritten note requesting the removal of his criminal defen se counsel and objecting to the motion to

3 suspend proceedings. The next day, a t a hearing on defense counsel’s moti on, defense counsel reiterated “serious concerns” about Thompson ’s competency, expla ining that Thompson’s “ delusional thinkin g ” had become intertwined with decisions about p lea negotiations, whether to go to trial, and wh ether to testify. Tho mpson noted that he opposed the motion, reiterated his pos ition that he was competent, a nd asked the district court to continue th e matter so that he could “make the a djustment to my legal team a nd ensure my right to effe ctive counsel.” The distric t court suspended proceedings and ordered a Rule 20 competency evaluation. Following the suspension of proceedings, Thompson stated, “I just wi [s] h t o expel both attorneys at this point.” The distr ict court rep lied, “I understand tha t’ s your request. I’m not goin g to rule on that or make any determination s until after we ha ve completed the Rule 20 evaluation, because I have sus pended all pr oceedings until that evaluation is complete d. I am not going to ru le on any motions abou t the attorneys. ” Defense counsel in the criminal case di d not represent Thompson in the competency proceedings. Instead, a separate attorney was appointe d to represent Thompson (competency counsel). Thompson declined t o participate in the competency eval uation. Relying on treatmen t records and pa st evaluations, tw o competency e xaminers opined tha t Thompson’ s delusional disorder was actively symptomatic and p revented him from rationally consulting w ith crimina l defen se co unsel or participat ing in his defense in the criminal matter. Thompson personally objected to the competency report and requested a contested hearing.

4 I n December, the d istrict court held a contested competenc y hearing. Thompson was represented by c ompetency counsel. Thompson did n ot request to discharge competency counsel or otherwise object to their representation. At that hearing, Thompson, criminal defense counsel, a mental - health nurse practit ioner, and the two competency examiner s who examined Thompson testified. Following the contested competency hearing, the district co urt found Thompson not com petent and suspended the criminal proceedings. Thompson appeals. DECISION Thompson raises two issues on appea l. He argues that the district co urt was required to consider and rule on his request to disc harge criminal de fense counsel. He also argue s that he received ineffe ctive assistance from his criminal defen se counsel because counsel testified at the conteste d competency hearin g that he was not compete nt. We disagree. The Sixth and Fourtee nth Amendments guara ntee a criminal defenda nt the right to counsel of their choice. See U.S. C onst. amend. VI; amend XIV, § 1; see also Minn. Con st. art. I, § 6. A criminal defendant may n ot be tried and convicted whi le legally incompete nt. State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 171 (Min n. 1997). A criminal defendant who is found not competent to stand trial is likewise not co mpetent to waive counsel. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (199 3); see also Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 171 - 72 (discussing this aspect of Godin ez). I f the district cour t “has reason to do ubt the defenda nt’s competence, the court must make a find ing that the defendant is competent to stand trial” before deciding

5 that the defendant’s “ waiver of his constitutional right s is knowing and vol untary.” Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 171 (emphasis a dded) (footnote omitte d) (quotation omitted). The district court was obligated to ens ure Thompson’s competence at the time he requested to discharge criminal defen se counsel. Thompson’s reques t to discharge defe nse counsel ca me only after defense counsel moved to susp end the proceedings on the grounds that Thompson could no longer rationally consult with couns el or make reality -based decisions about plea and trial strategy. The di strict court acted within its broad discretion to manage the pr oceedings by addressin g Thompson’s compete nce first and def erring the discharge decisio n until the district court could determine whether Thompson wa s competent to par ticipate in the crimi nal proceedings. See Rice Pa rk Props. v. Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Cire si, 532 N.W.2d 556, 556 (Minn. 19 95) (“[T]he district court has considerable discretion in scheduling matters a nd in furthering what it has identified as the interests of judicial ad ministration and econo my.”); Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 17 2 (stating “ that the standards for competency to stand trial and for compete ncy to waive cou nsel are the same ”). And the Minnesota Supreme C ourt has confirmed that, as relevant here, “if a court has reason to doubt the defenda nt’s competence, the court must make ‘a finding that the defendant is com petent to stand trial’” b efore the defendant ca n waive the right t o counsel. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 171 (f ootnote omitted) (quoting Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400). Because the distr ict court received infor mation giving it rea son to doubt Thompson’s competence, the distric t court properly declined to rule on Thompson’s request to disc harge his defense counsel until it consider ed and resolved the question of Thomps on’s competence.

6 In any event, we discern no prejudice to Thompson associated w ith the district court’s reservation of Thompson’s motion d uring the suspended proceedings. That is because Thompson was represented by separ ate competency couns el — not his criminal defense counsel —in the contested compete ncy proceedings from which this appeal is taken. See State v. Loebach, 310 N. W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981) (req uiring a party to show error and prejudice resulting fro m that error to prevail on appeal). Although criminal defense counsel testifi ed at the contested competency hea ring, the fact and substance of that testimony is unrel ated to the discharge motion. An d Thompson did not req uest to discharge his competen cy counsel. Even though crimina l defense cou nsel remains counsel of record in the criminal proceedin gs, counsel did not und ertake any substantive action in the criminal procee ding following notice to the district court quest ioning Thompson’s competence. Given these circumsta nces, the district court’s deci sion not to rule on Thompson’s request ha d no adverse effect o n Thompson. Thompson also seeks r eversal of the compete ncy order, alle ging that his criminal defense counsel was ineffective by testifying at the contested com petency hearing in a manner that “was directly adverse to [his] p osition that he was comp etent for trial.” We disagree. A criminal defendant has a constitutional rig ht to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amen d. VI; Min n. Const. art. I, § 6. In evaluating a claim of ineffective assi stance of counsel, we apply the two - pron ged test established in Stricklan d v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 4 93, 504 (Minn. 2013). To prove ineffecti ve assistance of counsel, a defendant must sh ow that (1) their “counse l’s representation fell

7 below an objective standard of reasonable ness ”; and (2) “ there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel ’ s errors, the result of the proceedi ng would have been different.” State v. Vang, 881 N.W.2d 551, 557 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). We may address the “pr ongs in either order and may dispose of a cl aim on one withou t analyzing the other.” Martin v. State, 825 N.W.2d 734, 744 (Minn. 2013). We disagree that counsel’s perform ance fell below an o bjective standard of reasonableness for two reasons. First, counsel is obligated to inquire into a criminal def endant’ s competence on suspicion that the de fendant is not competent. Rule 20 re q u i re s defense counsel to request a compe tency evaluation if they, “at any time. . ., d oubt[] the defen dant ’ s competen cy to proceed.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3(a). Once defense counsel suspected t hat Thompson was no t competent, as here, counsel was obligated pursua nt to Rule 20 to rais e the issue of Thompson’ s competence with t he district court, and counsel fulfille d that obligation. Indeed, if counsel had reason to question Thompson’ s competency and did not comply with the obligations set forth in R ule 2 0, such inaction may fall below an objective standard of reasonable ness. State v. Epps, 996 N.W.2d 226, 239 (Minn. App. 2023), r e v. denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2023). Second, defense counsel was not required to o btain Thompson’ s cons ent to raise the issue of his competenc y and is permitted to s hare non-pr ivileged information related t o competency. Minn. Stat. § 61 1.42, subd. 3(a) (2024); Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.0 1, subd. 3(a). Further, defense co unsel may provid e non - privileged testi mony, “subject to the prosecutor ’ s cross - examination,” at a cont ested competency hearing, also withou t

8 Thompson’ s consent. Minn. Stat. § 61 1.44, subd. 2(b) (2024). Given this well -settled authority, the actions of Thompson’ s criminal defense couns el did not fall belo w an objective standard of re asonableness. W e therefore conclud e that Thompson’ s cri minal defense counsel acted in a n objectively reasonable manner by reque sting a competency eva luation upon suspicion to doubt Thompson ’s competen ce and in testifying to that effect at the contested c ompetency hearing. Indeed, Rule 20 obligated Thompson’ s defense cou nsel to inquire into Thompson’ s competency to stand trial when they suspected that he was not competent. Thompson therefore fail s to meet his burden to establish tha t defense counsel’ s representation fell belo w an objective standar d of reasonableness. Affirmed.