Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles - Administrative Code Challenge

Filed 2/27/ 26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELL ATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE FIX THE CITY, IN C., Plaintiff and A ppellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANG ELES et al., Defendants and Res pondents. B33 9464 (Los Angeles Co unty Super. Ct. No. 2 3 STC P03519) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Los Angeles County, Cu rtis A. Kin, Judge. Affirmed. The Silverstein Law Firm, Robert P. Silverstein and J ames S. Link for Pla intiff and App ellant. Hydee Feldstein Sot o, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, C hief Deputy City Attorn ey, Kathleen A. Ken ealy, Chief Assi stant City Attorney, Shaun Da bby Jacobs, Assistant City Attorney, Sa ra Ugaz and Stephen D. Lee, Deputy City Attorneys for D efendants and Respondent s City of Los Angeles an d Los Angeles City Council.

2 Patterson & O’Neill, Ryan Patterson and Brian O’Neill for Yes In My Back Yard as Amicus Cu riae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents Ci ty of Los Angeles an d Los Angeles City Council. __________________ _______ INTRODUCTION Section 8.33 of the City of Los Angeles Administrative Cod e (section 8.33) confer s various mayo ral powers upon the declaration of “a loc al housing and/or ho melessness emergen cy. ” (Id., subd. (b).) On July 7, 2023, City of Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass declare d such an emerg ency. T he Los An geles C ity Council (City Counc il) thereafter ren ewed the state of emergency and Mayor Bass exercised the powers gr anted to her to take act ion regarding unhoused city resi dents. On Novemb er 4, 2025, while this appeal w as pending, the mayor lifted t he emergency declaration and it is no longer in forc e. Appellant Fix the Ci ty, Inc. (Fix the City) claims section 8.33 is invali d, such that the City of Los Angeles (C ity) and the C ity Council acted illegally during the time the emergency declaration was in p lace. Fix the City a sserts that the Calif ornia Emergency Services Act (CESA; Gov. Code, 1 § 8550 et seq.) as well as another prov ision of the C it y’s administrative code preempted section 8.33, rendering it nul l and void. We conclude CESA and section 8.33 do not conflict and that CESA does not othe rwise preempt section 8.33. We also co nclude other provisions of t he City ’s admi nistrat ive code (LA A C) do not 1 Unspecified statuto ry references are to the Gove rnment Code.

3 invalidate section 8. 33. As the trial cou rt denied Fix the Ci ty’s requests for a writ vacat ing the em ergency declaration along with any directives, rules, and regulations iss ued under it, a nd for declaratory relief that section 8.33 viola ted CESA and other provisions of the LA AC, we affirm. BACKGROUND We summarize f irst the pertinent pr ovisions of CESA a nd the LAAC, then the Mayor’s July 7, 2023 emergency de claration, and lastly the proce dural history of Fix the City’s lawsuit. A. C ESA In CESA, the Legisl ature expressed its i ntent to coordin ate the emergency resp onses of the state, it s political subdivisio ns, the federal governm ent, and “ priva te agencies ”; to provi de state assistance to i ts political subdivisi ons; and to facilitate “the rendering of mutual aid” by the st ate and political subdivisi ons “ to the end that the most effective use m ay be made of all manpower, resource s, and facilities for d ealing with any emergency that may occur.” (§ 855 0, subds. (a)-(d).) CESA establishes t hree “degrees of em ergency”: a “ ‘[s] tate of war emergency’ ” (§ 8558, subd. (a)); a “ ‘[s]tate of em ergency’ ” (id., subd. (b)); and a “ ‘[l]ocal emergenc y’ ” (id., subd. (c)). Only the last of these is relevant here. A “ ‘[l] ocal emergency, ’ ” as defined by CESA, “ may be proclaimed only by the governin g body of a city, county, or city and county, or b y an official designated by ordinance adopte d by that governing body ” (§ 8630) based on “ conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within the territorial limit s of a county, city and county, or city, caused by conditions suc h as air pollution, fi re, flood, storm, epidemic, riot, dr ought, cyberterrorism, sud den and

4 severe energy short age, deenergization event, [2 ] electromagnetic pulse attack, plant o r animal infestation or disea se, the Governor ’ s warn ing of an earthquake or volcanic prediction, or an earthquake, or othe r conditions . . . whi ch are or are lik ely to be beyond the cont rol of the services, p ersonnel, equ ipment, an d facilities of that poli tical subdivision an d require the combined forces of other political subdi visions to combat ” (§ 8558, sub d. (c)(1)). During a “ local eme rgency ” under C ESA “ the governin g body of a political s ubdivision, or officia ls designated thereby, may promulgate ord ers and regulations necessary to provide for the protection of life and property, i ncluding orders or re gulations imposing a curfew within designated b oundari e s where necessary to preserve the publ ic order and saf ety. ” (§ 8634.) Ot her political subdivisions are provided “full power to provide mutual aid ... in accordance with loc al ordinances, resol utions, emergency p lans, or agreements there for” (§ 8631) a nd state agencies are similarly authorized to “provi de mutual aid, including personnel, equipment, and oth er available resourc es, to assist po litical subdivisions during a local emergency ” (§ 8632). T he state and its po litical subdivisions are immune fro m liability for “ the exe rcise or performanc e, or the failure to e xercise or perform, a discret ionary function or d uty on the part of a state 2 A “ ‘ deenergization event ’ ” is a “planne d power outage ... to reduce the risk of wildfires caused by utility equipment.” (§ 8557, subd. (h).) Where a “ sudden an d severe energy sho rtage ” or “ deenergization e vent ” involves a “regulated energy utilit[y]” it can be the basis for the proclamation of a “ ‘ [l]ocal eme rgency ’ ” if it “ requires extraord inary measures bey ond the authority ve sted in the Public Utiliti es Commission. ” (§ 8558, subd. (c) (1).)

5 or local agency or a ny employee of the s tate or its political subdivisions in carr ying out the provisi ons of [CESA].” (§ 86 55.) In addition, a politic al subdivision’s “offi cers, agents, [a nd] employees, ” when p erforming any funct ions or duties outsid e of the ir territory p ursuant to CESA, enjoy all “priv ileges and immunities . . . [and ] exemptions from l aws, ordinances, and rules [,] . .. and. .. benefits which appl y to the[ir] acti vity ” within their territory. (§ 8 656.) Although the gover ning bo dy of a political subdivision may designate an official to initially proclaim a “ local emergency ” pursuant to CESA, an emergency p roclaimed by such an official must be “ ratified by the governing body ” within seven d ays. (§ 8630, subd. (b).) In addition, “ [t] he governing body shall review the need for continuin g the local emergency at least once every 60 days until the governing body terminates the local emergency,” which “ shall” be done “ at the earliest possible d ate that conditions warr ant. ” (Id., sub ds. (c) & (d).) B. The City’s Authority to Declare a “ Local Ho using and/or Homelessn ess Emergency” u nder its Char ter and Administrati ve Code The City is a c harter city. Ar ticle XI, section 5, subdiv ision (a) of the California Constitution provid es, “ It shall be competent in any city charter t o provide that the city governed the reunder may make and enfo rce all ordinances a nd regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to rest rictions and limitati ons provided in their se veral charters and in respect to other m atters they shall be subject to general laws. City charters ado pted pursuant to this Co nstitution shall supersede an y existing charter, and with re spect to municipal a ffairs shall supersed e all laws inconsistent th erewith. ” This constitutional provision “ was

6 originally ‘ enacted u pon the principle th at the municipality itself knew better what it wanted and needed than the state at large, and to give th at municipality the e xclusive privil ege and right to enact direct legislati on which would carr y out and satisfy its wants a nd needs. ’ [Citation.] The provision represents an ‘ affirmative constitu tional grant to chart er cities of “ all powers appropriate for a m unicipality to posses s . ..” and [incl udes] the important corollary that “ so far as ‘ municipal affairs ’ ar e concerned, ” charter cities are “ supreme and beyond the reac h of legislative enactme nt. ” ’ ” (State B ui ld in g & Construction Trades Council of Cal iforni a v. City of Vist a (2012) 54 Cal.4th 547, 556.) The City has invoke d this constitut ional “home rule” authority over it s municipal affairs. (L.A. City Charter, vol. I, art. I, § 101 (C harte r).) The Charter authorizes the ma yor to “declare a local eme rgency and coordina te the City’s emerge ncy response activities in accorda nce with procedures establishe d by ordinance.” (Charte r, vol. I, art. I I, § 231, subd. (i).) T he Charter does not define the t erm “local emergenc y” as used in it, but the coordination it discusses invo lves only City resources and no t (as CESA’s definition of the same term does) “ the combined forces of other political subdi visions. ” (§ 8558, su bd. (c)(1).) The LAAC provides for a mayoral declara tion of a “ ‘[l] ocal [h]ousing and/or [h]omeless [e]mergency, ’ ” which is define d as “a local emergency due to the existenc e of a critical shortag e of local affordable housing a nd/or an emergency on homelessness.” (§ 8.33, subd. (a).) “ T he [m] ayor is . . . e mpowered to declar e the existence of a local housing and/or hom elessness emergenc y ” if the City’s housing s upply and the numb er of homeless

7 individuals living in the City me et certain metrics. 3 (Id., subd. (b)(i), (ii).) Upon th e m ayor’s decl aration of such an emerge ncy, the m ayor “shall coo rdinate citywide pla nning and response with respect to unsheltered or unh oused individuals in conjuncti on with” various City d epartments an d agencies and “coord inate the City’s efforts to add ress” the emergency “with th e County of Los Angele s, the State o f California, and the federal government.” (Id., subd. (c).) Furt hermore, d uring such a state of em ergency, the m ayor is empow ered to “[p]romulgat e, issue and enforce rules, regulations, orders and directives which th e Mayor considers necessary to addre ss the emergency,” “[c]omm andeer property deemed ne cessary to meet inte rim and temporary housing needs and b ind the City for the fair valu e,” “[r]equire emergency service o f any City officer or employee and r equisition necessary personnel or material of any City dep artment or agency,” “[o]rder an y action relative to t he procurement of construction contracts, service provider contracts, supplies, and 3 To proclaim an eme rgency under sectio n 8.33, the m ayor must find that “ (i) T he City ’ s housi ng supply is projected to be at least 40 percent bel ow its annual housi ng production g oals as established in the H ousing Element app roved by the State Department of Hous ing and Community Development and reported in the City Planning Departme nt ’ s quarterly Housi ng Production Report; and/or ¶ Home lessness in the C ity has reached a crisis as i ndicated by either: ¶ The unhoused population in the Ci ty is greater than two times the total number of interim beds as e stablished in the an nual Homeless Inventory Count submitted to the feder al Department of Housing and Urban Development; or ¶ There is a citywide increa se by more than 20 perce nt in a single year a s reported in the an nual Point - in - Time Coun t.” (§ 8.33, su bd. (b).)

8 equipment for home lessness facilities to safeguard life, healt h or property caused by t he emergency” and, subject to some restrictions, “[s]uspend comp etitive bidding restrictions ” set forth in the Charter and LAAC. (§ 8.3 3, subd. (d) (i) - (v).) C. Other Emergency Authority in the LAAC Separate and distin ct from any em ergency related to l ocal housing/homelessne ss under section 8.3 3, t he LAAC se parately empowers the mayo r “to declare the exi stence of a local emergency or disast er when he [or sh e] finds that any of the circumstances described in [LAAC s]ection 8.22 .. . exist, or at any time a disaster or local emergency i s declared by the President of the Uni ted States or the Go vernor of California. ” (LAAC, § 8.27.) LA AC section 8.22 defi nes “ ‘local emergency’ ” as “any occurrence which by reason of its magnitude is or is li kely to become beyond the c ontrol of the normal services, personnel, equipment and facil ities of the regularly constituted branch es and d epartments of the City governmen t.” During a “local emerg ency,” the ma yor is provided with similar powers as a re conferred during a “[l]ocal [h] ousing and/or [h]omelessness [e]mergency.” (See id., §§ 8.29, 8. 30.) D. Mayor Bass Decla res an Emergency under Section 8.33 On July 7, 2023, Mayor Bass declared an emerge ncy under section 8.33. On Oc tober 31, 2023, the City Cou ncil adopte d a resolution “ [affirmin g] that the local emergency [concernin g persons experiencin g homelessness declared by the Mayor o n July 7, 2023 ] did exist . . . an d . . . there is a need to renew the declaration of local emergency.” On January 23, 2024, t he City Council adopted a r esolution further co ntinuing the emerge ncy.

9 On November 4, 20 25, the Mayor lifted the emergency declaration. E. Fix the City Challeng es Mayor Bass ’s Declaration of Emergency On September 23, 2 023, while the home lessness emerge ncy declaration was in p lace, Fix the City so ught writ and declaratory relief against the Ci ty and the City Cou ncil challenging th at emergency declarati on. 4 In the operative petition and compla int, Fix the City so ught to require the City t o vacate the Mayor’ s July 7, 2023 emerg ency declaration and any direc tives, rules, and regulations issued u nder it. Fix th e City argued the de claration was not ratified by t he City Council wit hin seven days as required by section 8630 and not reviewed by the City Council every 60 days as req uired by section 863 0. Fix the City also sought a declarat ion that section 8. 33 (1) violate d CES A because a lack of housing an d homelessness are not grounds for a “ ‘ [l]ocal emergency ’ ” under section 8558 and because section 8. 33 does not require City Co uncil ratification or rescission of an emergency declaration within s even days, nor City Council review e very 60 days, as required by section 8630; and (2) violated the LAAC by establishing a type of local emergency i nconsistent with the definition of “local e mergency” in LAAC section 8. 22. 5 4 Fix the City a lso named Mayor Ba ss as a defendant in her official capacity but later dismissed her. 5 Although the emer gency declaration is no longer in place, this appeal is not m oot because Fix the City’s lawsuit challe nged the validity of sectio n 8.33, which remai ns part of the LA AC. Fix the City asserted additional ground s for relief before the trial

10 Respondents fil ed a demurrer on Februa ry 16, 2024. As relevant to this app eal, respondents contended that Fix the City’s mandamus claim fai led because sec tion 8630 does not appl y to charter cities and, e ven if it did, b ecause section 8.33 addresses a municipal affair the ordinance woul d be enforceable des pite any con flict with section 8630. Respondents further contended t hat Fix the City’s declaratory relief clai ms, which wer e based on the premise that section 8.33 violated CES A and wa s inconsistent with LAAC section 8.22, failed. Fix the City co ntended in its opposi tion that CESA app lies to charter cities and preempt s local legislation concernin g local emergencies. Fix th e City further co ntended that the City could not legislate for a lo cal emergency based on a ho using shortage or homelessness becau se those were not grounds for a “ ‘ [l]ocal emergency ’ ” under section 8558, subdivision (c)(1), and CESA preempted the field. In their reply, re spondents contende d that, even if CESA applies to char ter cities, it does no t preempt contr ary local ordinances such as section 8.33. After holding a hear ing on the demurrer, the trial court solicited supplemen tal briefing on the pertinent LAAC sections and whether CESA’ s legislative hi story showed the Leg islature intended CESA to apply to charter citie s. In its supple mental brief ing, Fix the Cit y contended th at section 8.33 “ille gally permits a declaratio n of local emergency ” based on conditions that do not fall with the definition of “lo cal emergency” in LAAC section 8.22. court but, as it has abandoned those ar guments on ap peal, we do not summarize the m.

11 On May 30, 2024, t he court sustaine d the demurr er without leave to amend. Among other things, t he court concluded that section 8630 does no t apply to charter ci ties because th e Legislature di d not clearly evince su ch an intent in th e statute. The court also c oncluded the defini tion of “local emerge ncy” in LAAC section 8.22 did not apply to section 8.33. On June 5, 2024, th e court entered a judgment of dis missal. Fix the City ti mely appealed. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Revie w “I n reviewing the su fficiency of a compla int against a general demurrer, we are guided by lo ng -settled rules. ‘ We treat the demurrer as ad mitting all material facts properly plead ed, but not content ions, deductions or c onclusions of f act or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters wh ich may be judiciall y noticed. ’ [Citation.] Further, we give th e complaint a reaso nable interpretation, read ing it as a whole an d its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer i s sustained, we dete rmine whether t he co mplaint states facts suffi cient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation. ] And when it is sus tained without leav e to amend, we decide w hether there is a rea sonable possibility that the defect can be cu red by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discr etion and we revers e; if not, there has b een no abuse of discr et ion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reason able possibility is sq uarely on the plaint iff. ” (Blank v. Kirwan (1 985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The tria l court’s reasoning does not bind us, and we ma y affirm the judgment if it was correct under a ny theory. (One Technologies, LLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 748, 759.)

12 The interpretat ion of statutes and city codes are issues of law which we revie w de novo. (Da vid S. Karton, a L aw Corp. v. Musick, Peeler & Ga rrett LLP (202 2) 83 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1040; People v. Venice Sui tes, LLC (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 71 5, 725.) B. CESA Does No t Preempt Secti on 8.33 The parties and ami cus curiae spill cons iderable ink over whether section 8630 — which gov er ns who may proclai m a “local emergency” under C ESA and how l ong such a proclama tion may remain in place — applies to charter citie s such as the Ci ty. We need not resolve tha t question because even if CE SA applies to charter cities, the City was empowered to enact section 8.33 because the ordinan ce does not confl ict with CESA. 1. Applicable Lega l Framework “ The California Sup reme Court has dev eloped a four-p art ‘ analytical fra mework ’ to determin e whether a state l aw u nconstitutionally i nfringes the home r ule authority of charter cities granted by article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution. [Citat ions.] First, the cou rt determines whet her the local law at issu e regulates an activi ty that can be characterized as a municipal affair. [Citations.] Seco nd, the court determines whether th ere is an actual conflict betwee n state law and the lo cal law. [Citations.] I f no conflict exists, the analysis is com plete and there is no need to go t o the next step. [Citation.] Third, t he court decides wh ether the state law addresses a matter of ‘ “statewide conce rn.” ’ [Citation s.] Fourth and finally, the cour t determines wheth er the state law is ‘ “ reasonably relate d to . .. resolution” ’ of the identified sta tewide concern and is ‘ “ nar rowly tailored ” to av oid unnecessary interference in lo cal governance. ’ ” (City of Hunti ngton Beach v. Becerra (2020) 44 C al.App.5th 243, 255.)

13 If the re is not “an ac tual conflict betwee n ” the state statute and charter city legislation, “ a choi ce between the conclusio ns ‘ municipal affair ’ and ‘ statewide concern ’ is not required. ” (Cal ifornia Fed. Sav ings & Loan Ass n. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 16; accord, Ride r v. City of San Dieg o (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1035, 1 054-1055.) 2. Analysis We address only the first two parts of this test because section 8.33 is a ma tter of municipal co ncern and it does no t conflict with CESA. Because no conf lict exists, “ the an alysis is complete [at the sec ond step] and there is no need to go ” further. (City of Huntington Beach v. Becerra, su pra, 44 Cal.Ap p.5th at p. 255.) With regard to step one, secti on 8.33 con cerns a “municipal affair” because it go verns the City’s own response to conditio ns exclusively within it s territory and provides powers to i ts executive (the mayo r) to address th ose conditions. (City of Huntington Beach v. Becerra, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 255.) Section 8.33 thus fal ls squarely within the City’s home rule authority. With regard to step two, ther e is no “act ual conflict ” between sectio n 8.33 and CESA. (Cal ifornia Fed. Savi ngs & Loan Assn. v. City o f Los Angeles, sup ra, 54 Cal.3d a t p. 16.) CESA authorizes political subdivisions to proclaim the type of emergency de scribe d in the act; it does not limit political subdivisions from declaring other types of emergencies. CESA and section 8.33 def ine the types of eme rgencies to whic h they apply in very d ifferent terms. Section 8.33 gover ns a specific type of emergency arisin g from a housing sh ortage and/or homelessness, and t he triggering levels of such conditions are

14 specific and limited to those within the City — a shorta ge of housing units in the City and the presence of unhoused peop le in the City. In contras t, CESA define s emergencies which a political subdivision can proc laim as “ condi tions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and proper ty ” which are c aused either by specific ty pes of events (such as floods and fires b ut not including homeless ness or a lack o f housing) or “other co nditions” which are beyond th e control of the political subdivisio n’s resources and require assist ance from oth er polit ical subdivisions. (§ 8558, subd. (c)(1).) Section 8.33 also do es not conflict with CESA be cause it provides the mayor with different power s than CESA d oes. Although b oth secti on 8.33 and CESA c onfer the power to issue orders and regulatio ns to address the e mergency (comp are § 8631 with § 8.33, subd. (d)(i)), section 8.33 co nfers additional po we rs related to the City’s own personnel, depa rtments, resourc es, and ordinances, and also authorizes the mayor to “commandeer property ... and bin d the City for the fai r value thereof. ” (§ 8.33, subd. (d)(ii)- (v).) CESA, in co ntrast, benefits the political subdivision proclai ming the emergency by permitting it to receive mutual aid from other political subdivisi ons and the st ate (and to more effectively combat the disaster by providing aid t o other political subdivision s dealing with the s ame conditions). (§§ 8631, 8632.) In addition, CES A expressly pro vides a political subdivision declarin g a “local emergency ” with immuni ties and protects the officials, employees, a nd agents of the political subdivision when th ey assist other politi cal subdivisions. (§ § 8655, 8656.) S ection 8.33 itsel f lists no such protectio n s. Fix the City co ntends that section 8.33 conflicts with CE SA because CESA pree mpts the field of local emergencies. We

15 disagree. Preempti on is present “ w hen the Legislature has expressly manifeste d its intent to ‘ fully occupy ’ the are a [citation], or when it has impliedly done so in light of one of t he following indicia of intent: ‘ (1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become e xclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the subject matter has b een partially covere d by general law cou ched in such terms as to i ndicate clearly that a paramount s tate con cern will not tole rate further or addit ional local action; or (3) the subject matt er has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature t hat the adve rse effect of a local ordinance on t he transient cit izens of the state o utweighs the possible benefit to the ’ locality [citations].” (Sherwin- Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 8 93, 898.) The Legislatur e has not expressed an intent in CESA to occupy the field of local government al response to emer gency or harmful conditions within local bo rders, particularly w ith regard to charter cities and their constituti onal authority to re gulate their own affairs. To the contrary, t he Legislature ha s expressed the opposit e intenti on in section 8668, s ubdivision (b), which states, “ Nothing in [CESA] shall be cons trued to diminish or remove any authority of any c ity, county, or city and county granted by [s] ection 7 of [a]rticle XI of th e California Constitution. ” That constitutional provision e stablishes tha t “[a] county or city may make a nd enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regula tions not in conflict with general laws. ” (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.) Nor does CESA “ ‘ so fully and comp letely cover [] [the are a of emergency declar ations] . .. as t o clearly indicate that it h as become exclusively a matter of state co ncern. ’ ” (Sherwi n-

16 Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, s upra, 4 Cal.4th a t p. 89 8.) T he definition of “ ‘ [l ]ocal emergency ’ ” in section 8558, subdivision (c)(1) is not all -inclusiv e. T he definition is focu sed on specific conditions w hich can affect more than one political subdivision at a tim e or spread from one to another, and its catch- all provision e xpressly refers to co nditions “which are or are likely to be beyond t he control of the services, personnel, equipment, and faci lities of that politica l subdivision and requ ire the combined forces of other political su bdivisions to combat.” (Ibid.) In turn, secti on 8630 places proc edural requirement s only on the proclamation and continuation of a “ ‘ [l]ocal em ergency ’ ” as defined in section 8558, subdivision (c)(1). In sum, th ese sections serve to fac ilitate coordina tion and mutual aid am ong the state, its politic al subdivisions, and others in respon ding to emergencies — not to preempt a city from using its own resou rces to address issues un ique to it. 6 Fix the City co ntends, “ [s] ections 85 50, 8558 and 8630. . . express the Legislat ure’s intent to fully and completely occupy the field of emergen cies by declaring th at emergencies are the State’s respons ibility and by empo wering the Governor and local governments to decl are emergencies tha t trigger coordin ation of 6 For the reasons dis cussed, sections 855 8, subdivision (c) and 8630 are not “ ‘ couched in such t erms as to indicat e clearly that a paramount st ate concern will not tolerate further or additional loc al action. ’ ” (S herwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898.) Fix the City does not contend that section 8.33 im poses any “ ‘ adverse effect . . . on th e transient citizens of the state ’ ” a nd we are unaware of any such effect which could outweigh the be nefit s of the ordinan ce to the City. (Sherwin-Will iams Co., supra, at p. 898.)

17 emergency services across the political subdivisions of t his State. ” None of these sectio ns evinces any l egislative intent to restrict local entities from legislating respo nses to types of eme rgencies not addressed in CE SA, to impose condit ions or limitations on actions taken by a p olitical subdivision t o address disas ters within its territory, or to make em ergencies solely a st ate responsibility. Section 8550 refere nces the state ’s “ responsibility ” to address and prep are for emergencies, but this does n ot suggest that political subdiv isions do not also ha ve parallel responsibilities with respect to their residents, or that local efforts to address e mergencies nece ssarily conflict with state efforts. Fix the City appears to sug gest that local legis lation is inimical to coordina tion among the state and its politi cal subdivisions in thei r emergency respon ses but fails to articulate in practice how this is necessarily so or why every localized emergency is one siz e fits all. In any eve nt, merely prov iding for coordination does not evince an intent to preclude local legislation on the to pic of emergencies. Lastly, Fix the City contends that “ only CESA empower s the declaration of lo cal emergencies.” Not so. Under ou r state constitution, “ A cou nty or city may mak e and enforce within its limits all local, polic e, sanitary, and oth er ordinances and regulations not in co nflict with general l aws ” (Cal. Con st., art. XI, § 7), and this provisi on authorizes local governments to ena ct ordinances allowing for the declaration of a local emergency (Davis v. Justice Court (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 10 02, 1007). C. LAAC Section 8.22 Does Not Re nder Section 8.3 3 Invalid LAAC section 8.22 defines a “ ‘ local emergenc y’ ... [to ] mean any occurrenc e which by reas on of its magnitude is or is

18 likely to become bey ond the control of the normal service s, personnel, equipme nt and facilities of the regula rly constituted branches and depar tments of the City g overnment.” Fi x the City contends that the co nditions supporting an emergency declaration under section 8.33 do not co nstitute an “occ urrence” as defined by LAAC section 8.22 and th erefore section 8.33 is invalid. This argument is meritless. “ Established rules o f statutory construc tion are equally applicable to munici pal ordinances, ” including that “ ‘ “ the various parts of a st atutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular cla use or section in the context of the statutory framewor k as a whole. ” ’ ” (Chun v. Del Cid (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 806, 8 15.) The City Council en acted section 8. 33 after LAAC sectio n 8.22. It therefore either understood the conditions upon which an emergency could be declared under secti on 8.33 to constitute an “occurrence” as that term is used in LA AC section 8.22, or intended to establis h an additional type of emergency under its authority to do so. (Chun v. Del Cid, supra, 34 Cal.Ap p.5th at p. 815; see Lopez v. Sony Electronics, In c. (2018) 5 Ca l.5th 627, 634 [“ ‘ If conflicting statutes cannot be r econciled, later enactments superse de earlier ones [cita tion], and more spec ific provisions take prec edence over more ge neral ones ’ ” ].) Either way, the two provisi ons do not conflict. D. Denial of Leave to Amend Fix the City h as not shown how it c ould amend its allegations to state a viable claim. Therefore, the trial cour t did not err in sustainin g respondents’ demurrer with out leave to amend.

19 DISPOSITION T he judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded t heir costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR P UBLICATION WEINGART, J. We concur: ROTHSCH ILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.