Changeflow GovPing Government Operations AAIB Report: Cagatay CGT-50 UAS Wing Separation...
Priority review Notice Added Final

AAIB Report: Cagatay CGT-50 UAS Wing Separation in Flight at Radnor Range

Favicon for www.gov.uk Uk Air Accidents Investigation Branch
Published
Detected
Email

Summary

The AAIB published its investigation report into the 5 October 2023 wing separation accident involving a Cagatay CGT-50 UAS at Radnor Range, Powys. The investigation found that wing joiners shorter than design specification were inadvertently fitted from old stock, combined with a wing design that allowed joiner movement and no symmetry-checking procedures during assembly, resulting in uneven bending loads on the forward wing joiner. The manufacturer subsequently introduced dimensional tolerances, component quality checks, serial numbers for wing joiners, design modifications, and assembly procedures.

Published by AAIB on gov.uk . Detected, standardized, and enriched by GovPing. Review our methodology and editorial standards .

What changed

The AAIB published its final investigation report into the Cagatay CGT-50 UAS wing separation accident of 5 October 2023. The right wing separated in-flight due to insufficient structural strength in the wing assembly, caused by wing joiners manufactured shorter than design specification being inadvertently installed from old stock, combined with design允许 joiner movement and no assembly symmetry verification. The aircraft descended uncontrollably and struck ground near personnel.

UAS manufacturers operating under CAA operational authorisations in the specific category should review the report findings. While specific category UAS are not required to meet recognised design and build standards, the incident demonstrates risks from production quality control gaps. Manufacturers should assess whether their wing assembly procedures include dimensional verification of structural components, symmetry checks during assembly, and traceability controls for critical hardware such as wing joiners.

What to do next

  1. Review AAIB report findings on wing joiner installation procedures
  2. Implement dimensional tolerances and quality checks on supplied components
  3. Introduce serialised wing joiner tracking and symmetry verification procedures

Archived snapshot

Apr 16, 2026

GovPing captured this document from the original source. If the source has since changed or been removed, this is the text as it existed at that time.

News story

AAIB Report: Cagatay CGT-50, (UAS registration n/a)

Cagatay CGT-50, (UAS registration n/a), right wing separated from airframe in-flight, Radnor Range, Powys, 5 October 2023

From: Air Accidents Investigation Branch Published 16 April 2026

CGT-50 general arrangement

While conducting a demonstration flight at Radnor Range the right wing separated from the unmanned aircraft. The remainder of the aircraft descended rapidly, out of control and struck the ground close to personnel who were standing under the flight path.

The investigation found that the wing assembly on the accident aircraft did not have sufficient structural strength to carry the wing bending loads encountered in 1 g straight and level flight. Structural components known as wing joiners, which attached the wings to the fuselage, were shorter than the design specification. Together with a wing design that allowed movement of the joiner position and an absence of procedures to ensure the wing joiners were installed symmetrically during aircraft assembly, this created a condition where there was an uneven bending load distribution on the forward wing joiner.

The investigation determined that it was likely that old stock wing joiners from an earlier aircraft development model were inadvertently fitted to the aircraft at the production facility.

The UAS was operating in the specific category under a CAA operational authorisation (OA). The CGT-50 was not designed, built or tested to any recognised standards, nor was it required to be for operation in the specific category.

The manufacturer took several safety actions to improve quality and component control in its production facility. These included introducing dimensional tolerances on design drawings, introducing quality checks on supplied components, introducing serial numbers for wing joiners, modifying the design and production process and introducing wing joiner assembly procedures.

The range reviewed its safety plan and indicated its intention to make several improvements to operational communication and hazard management.

Read the report.

Share this page

The following links open in a new tab

Get daily alerts for Uk Air Accidents Investigation Branch

Daily digest delivered to your inbox.

Free. Unsubscribe anytime.

About this page

What is GovPing?

Every important government, regulator, and court update from around the world. One place. Real-time. Free. Our mission

What's from the agency?

Source document text, dates, docket IDs, and authority are extracted directly from AAIB.

What's AI-generated?

The summary, classification, recommended actions, deadlines, and penalty information are AI-generated from the original text and may contain errors. Always verify against the source document.

Last updated

Classification

Agency
AAIB
Published
April 16th, 2026
Instrument
Notice
Legal weight
Non-binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Substantive

Who this affects

Applies to
Manufacturers
Industry sector
3364 Aerospace & Defense
Activity scope
Unmanned aircraft operations Manufacturing quality control Structural component verification
Geographic scope
United Kingdom GB

Taxonomy

Primary area
Aviation
Operational domain
Quality Assurance
Topics
Product Safety Consumer Protection

Get alerts for this source

We'll email you when Uk Air Accidents Investigation Branch publishes new changes.

Free. Unsubscribe anytime.

You're subscribed!